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Executive	summary	
	This	report	presents	the	findings	of	a	study	of	the	experience	of	health	and	safety	in	container	terminals	operated	by	national	and	global	companies	in	several	countries.	It	explores	indications	from	a	previous,	preliminary	study	concerning	workers’	experiences	and	the	effectiveness	of	the	management	systems	to	support	 their	health,	 safety	and	welfare	at	work.	 It	builds	on	 the	earlier	 findings	with	a	more	 in-depth	analysis,	using	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	 research	methods.	 It	discusses	 the	new	 findings	 in	 the	context	 of	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 strategies	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	 of	 occupational	 health	 and	 safety	 (OHS)	 and	 the	 national	 regulatory	 and	 socio-economic	contexts	in	which	terminals	operate	and	such	strategies	are	implemented.		Altogether,	 we	 carried	 out	 case	 studies	 in	 11	 container	 terminals	 operated	 by	 six	 companies	 in	 four	countries.	The	terminals	were	situated	in	two	different	parts	of	Europe	and	in	two	different	areas	of	the	Asia-Pacific	 region.	 They	 included	 terminals	 operated	 by	 four	 of	 the	 largest	 GNT	 companies	 and	 two	national	 companies,	 one	 in	 Europe	 and	 one	 in	 Asia	 Pacific.	 Nine	 of	 the	 participating	 terminals	 were	operated	by	GNTs,	with	the	other	two	terminals	run	by	national	operators.		
Findings  The	findings	of	the	research	concerning	governance	and	management	of	occupational	health	and	safety	in	the	companies	and	terminals	we	studied	are	based	on	analysis	of	company	documentation	and	interviews	with	 company	 and	 terminal	 management.	 Our	 respondents	 included	 senior	 company	 and	 terminal	managers	with	responsibility	 for	operations,	 for	safety	and	health,	and	 for	advising	on	these	matters	at	both	 corporate	and	 terminal	 levels.	They	 focus	on	 the	 character	of	 the	arrangements	 for	 implementing	company	strategies	on	health	and	safety	and	the	systems	in	place	for	its	delivery	and	provide	an	account	of	 their	operation,	as	perceived	by	 the	company	and	 terminal	management.	We	also	consider	 trends	 in	the	available	company	data	concerning	the	health	and	safety	outcomes	of	these	arrangements	and,	as	far	as	 it	 is	possible	to	do	so,	compare	these	trends	with	the	findings	of	other	research	on	health	and	safety	outcomes	in	container	terminals.			The	 findings	 on	 workers’	 experiences	 of	 these	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	 and	 management	 of	health	and	safety	were	drawn	from	data	gathered	in	a	questionnaire-based	worker	survey.	Overall,	there	were	1849	dockworker	 respondents	 to	 this	 survey,	with	 an	 additional	 120	 completing	 a	 diary	 of	 their	experiences	 in	 relation	 to	 selected	 indicators	 of	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare.	We	 analysed	 transcripts	 of	new	 interviews	with	workers	and	 their	 representatives	 in	each	 terminal	and	re-analysed	 transcripts	of	similar	interviews	with	workers	and	their	representatives	from	our	previous	preliminary	study	(the	two	studies	included	many	of	the	same	terminals).	Altogether	178	people	took	part	in	an	interview,	including	76	as	part	of	the	current	project.			We	outline	below	some	of	 the	key	 findings,	 first	 from	 the	data	obtained	 from	managers	 and	 their	OHS	advisers,	followed	by	that	obtained	from	workers	and	their	representatives.			
a) Company	approaches	to	managing	safety	The	 findings	 confirm	 that	 approaches	 taken	 by	 most	 of	 the	 global	 and	 national	 terminal	 operators	towards	 the	 governance	 and	management	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 have	 several	 features	 in	 common.	 They	aimed	 to	 address	 risks	 fairly	 systematically	 through	 undertaking	 risk	 assessment	 and	 introducing	engineering	 or	 administrative	 controls	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 plant	 and	 processes	 consequent	 to	 this	assessment.	There	were	standard	operating	procedures	taking	account	of	safety	issues	in	relation	to	most	operational	 activities	 and	 maintenance	 of	 safety	 critical	 plant	 and	 equipment	 according	 to	 scheduled	
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specifications.	 Information,	 informal	 training,	 supervision	and	direct	 consultation	with	workers	on	 risk	management	 were	 provided	 through	 tool-box	 talks	 and	 similar	 activities	 at	 the	 start	 of	 shifts.	 More	training	 was	 provided	 to	 new	 staff,	 and	 updated	 for	 continuing	 staff,	 by	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	arrangements.	In	parallel	with	these	routine	job	safety	arrangements,	the	safety	management	systems	in	place	 in	 all	 the	 terminals	 contained	 various	 elements	 to	 ensure	 continuous	 improvement,	 including	procedures	for	information	collection	and	dissemination	on	safety	issues,	allowing	both	the	monitoring	of	performance	 and	 timely	 interventions	 when	 required.	 The	 Safety	 (and	 Environment)	 Departments	present	 in	all	of	 the	terminals	serviced	these	arrangements,	as	well	as	providing	advice,	 training	and	in	some	 cases	 participating	 in	 the	 surveillance	 of	 safety	 behaviours.	 Generally	managers	 in	 the	 terminals	believed	these	arrangements	to	be	‘fit	for	purpose’.			Many	of	these	features	are	widely	considered	to	be	good	practice	in	current	thinking	on	managing	health	and	 safety	 and	 are	 generally	 implemented	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 extent	 in	 large	 organisations	 with	arrangements	in	place	for	safety	management.	Among	the	drivers	of	corporate	approaches	to	health	and	safety	taken	by	the	companies	studied,	a	high-profile	board-room	level	commitment	to	 ‘zero	harm’	was	influential.	 It	was	 transposed	 into	 operational	 practice	 through	 a	mix	 of	 attention	 to	 an	 organisational	‘vision’	 of	 achieving	 high	 performance	 and	 continuous	 improvement	 in	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes;	improvements	 in	 organisation	 safety	 culture,	 health	 and	 safety	 competencies,	 training	 and	 skills	 of	personnel	 and	 measurable	 performance	 targets	 for	 health	 and	 safety.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 notions	 of	accountability	for	safety	and	health	were	instilled	among	workers	and	managers	alike.	While	there	were	some	 differences	 in	 the	 detail,	 most	 of	 the	 companies	 in	 the	 study	 followed	 this	 prescription	 at	 the	corporate	level	and	required	adherence	to	it	 in	the	operational	practices	within	their	terminals.	Equally	influential	were	 the	effects	of	 international	and	national	voluntary	standards	on	OHS	management	 that	helped	to	stimulate	and	support	the	adoption	of	a	fairly	similar	management	systems	approach	to	health	and	safety	by	all	the	companies	studied.			These	zero	harm	corporate	safety	and	health	strategies	are	associated	with	a	strongly	behaviour-oriented	approach	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 terminal	 level	 arrangements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 management.	 In	 this	respect	 our	 present	 study	 confirmed	 indications	 evident	 in	 the	 previous	 study.	 Terminal	 level	arrangements	emphasised	the	promotion	of	a	‘safety	culture’	at	the	workplace,	changed	safety	behaviours	among	workers	and	surveillance	of	the	adherence	to	terminal	safety	rules,	achieved	through	instruction,	training	and	supervision	on	safe	working	procedures.	 In	keeping	with	observations	on	behaviour-based	approaches	generally,	while	 there	was	a	widely	held	view	among	workers	and	managers	alike	 that	 the	health	and	safety	management	systems	had	improved	in	recent	years,	priority	was	afforded	to	safety	as	opposed	to	health	or	welfare.			Leadership	from	the	corporate	level	on	the	objective	of	achieving	‘zero	harm’	made	a	significant	impact,	evident,	for	example,	in	the	ways	in	which	managers	in	all	terminals	stressed	the	importance	of	aiming	for	zero	lost	time	injuries	and,	as	a	step	towards	this,	systematically	reporting	and	investigating	all	incidents,	regardless	 of	 severity.	 However,	 despite	 the	 emphasis	 on	 incident	 investigation,	 interviews	 confirmed	other	findings	from	the	previous	study	indicating	that	it	was	rare	for	investigations	of	routine	injuries	and	unsafe	 incidents	 to	 go	 beyond	 their	 proximal	 causes,	 focusing	 on	 individual	 human	 error	 or	 unsafe	behaviours	 rather	 than	 possible	 underlying	 organisational	 or	 situational	 causes.	 This	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 universal	 management	 conviction	 that	 following	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 safety	management	system	closely	would	mean	that	accidents	simply	could	not	occur	–	a	conviction	supported	by	their	behavioural	foundation	and	reflecting	the	widely	held	belief	that	all	accidents	were	the	result	of	workers	failing	to	follow	such	procedures	–	a	belief	which	in	turn	was	reinforced	by	the	corporate	focus	on	changing	workers’	behaviours	to	improve	safety	culture.			The	other	significant	feature	of	behaviour-based	systems	for	health	and	safety	which	is	widely	discussed	in	 the	 literature	 and	was	 also	 clearly	 in	 evidence	 in	 the	 present	 study	was	 that	 such	 systems	 tend	 to	ignore	 or	marginalise	 institutional	 arrangements	 for	 representation	 and	 consultation	with	workers	 on	their	health	and	safety.	Our	survey	data	demonstrated	 this	very	clearly	some	with	70%	of	respondents	globally	having	no	health	and	safety	representative	or	difficulty	accessing	one.			
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Finally	 in	 terms	 of	 corporate	 OHS	 strategies,	 although	 there	 were	 few	 female	 workers	 among	 the	operational	staff	of	the	terminals	we	studied,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	trends	in	the	development	of	terminal	work	open	the	way	for	employment	of	an	increased	proportion	of	women	in	the	future.	Despite	this,	there	was	little	evidence	of	strategies	or	action	on	OHS	management	in	place	to	support	likely	needs	created	by	such	change.			
b) Company	approaches	to	measuring	safety	performance	Performance	was	measured	at	corporate	and	terminal	 level	 through	the	collection	of	 fatality	and	 injury	data.	 Consideration	 of	 this	 company	 data	 showed	 a	 mixed	 picture	 of	 performance	 but	 a	 generally	improving	 trend	 was	 discernible.	 This	 finding	 has	 been	 anticipated	 by	 some	 industry	 observers	 who	argue	that	the	increased	mechanisation	in	dock	work,	represented	by	container	terminal	activities,	along	with	 greater	 attention	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 by	 operating	 companies,	 should	 result	 in	 an	improving	trend	in	injuries	and	fatalities.	However,	we	think	that	limitations	of	reporting	arrangements	in	different	terminals	in	different	parts	of	the	world,	as	well	as	the	exclusive	focus	of	these	arrangements	on	 safety	 outcomes,	mean	some	caution	 is	warranted	 in	 the	 interpretation	of	 this	data	as	a	measure	of	performance	in	relation	to	health	and	safety	more	generally.			
c) Workers’	experiences	Such	 caution	 is	 further	 supported	by	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 study’s	 survey	of	workers’	 experiences.	 These	indicate	 considerably	 higher	 levels	 of	work-related	 harm	 than	measured	 by	 company	 data,	 substantial	dissatisfaction	with	the	nature	and	operation	of	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	safety.	There	was	an	equally	strong	sense	that	health	and	safety	effects	associated	with	the	structure,	organisation	and	pace	of	 work	 in	 the	 terminals	 were	 missed	 by	 the	 systems	 in	 place	 for	 monitoring	 health	 and	 safety	performance.			In	Chapter	4	we	give	an	account	of	these	findings.	We	begin	with	a	descriptive	account	largely	drawn	from	the	analysis	of	the	survey.	We	then	analyse	these	findings	in	more	detail,	to	develop	some	composites	of	the	 variables	 examined,	 to	 enable	 us	 to	 show	 more	 clearly	 the	 variation	 between	 the	 experiences	 in	terminals	in	different	countries,	in	different	jobs	and	between	workers	in	different	modes	of	employment.	Key	 points	 that	 emerge	 from	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 experiences	 of	 workers	 globally	included:	the	finding	that	70%	of	the	respondents	to	the	survey	felt	their	safety	was	at	high	risk,	40%	felt	these	risks	were	ineffectively	managed	and	one	third	reported	they	had	experienced	some	kind	of	injury	at	work	in	the	previous	year.	Slightly	fewer	respondents	felt	they	were	at	high	risk	of	experiencing	work-related	harm	to	their	health	(60%),	slightly	more	(48%)	felt	these	risks	were	ineffectively	managed,	and	levels	 of	 respondents	 reporting	 stress,	 mental	 fatigue	 and	 work-related	 illnesses	 were	 especially	 high	(60%,	65%	and	41%	respectively).	Overall	the	survey	findings	showed	that	workers	experience	a	higher	incidence	of	harm	to	their	safety	and	health	than	recorded	by	company	reporting	procedures,	that	many	of	 the	 more	 commonly	 experienced	 effects	 of	 the	 work	 involved	 in	 terminal	 operations	 on	 workers’	health	are	not	addressed	adequately	by	the	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	management	and	further	that	the	provisions	made	for	workers’	welfare	are	also	limited	and	do	not	adequately	provide	for	workers’	needs.	Moreover,	as	noted	above,	some	70	per	cent	of	respondents	had	either	no	worker	health	and	safety	representative	at	all	or	difficulty	in	accessing	one.			Both	the	survey	and	interviews	with	workers	and	their	representatives	indicate	that	in	terminals	in	more	advanced	economies,	where	both	regulatory	requirements	and	trade	union	workplace	organisation	were	better	developed,	consultative	arrangements	required	by	law	were	generally	in	place,	but	arrangements	seldom	went	beyond	 such	 requirements.	 There	was	 also	 a	 strong	 indication	 in	many	of	 the	 interviews	with	representatives	that	they	experienced	various	degrees	of	hostility	to	their	role	from	managers	and	supervisors.			The	survey	findings	were	corroborated	by	data	from	interviews	in	which	worker	participants	expressed	concerns	about	their	safety,	health	and	welfare	and	suggested	that	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	
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safety	at	 their	workplaces	only	partially	 addressed	 their	 concerns.	Comparisons	with	 survey	data	 from	other	 sources	 suggest	 that	 respondents’	 experiences	 were	 worse	 than	 the	 average	 for	 other	 sectors.	Furthermore,	 there	was	 a	 strong	 association	 between	 these	 negative	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	 effects	and	measures	of	poor	work	organisation,	high	work	intensity	and	poor	OHS	management	arrangements.	These	results	were	not	uniform	across	all	jobs,	employment	arrangements	or	geographical	locations	and	the	 survey	 clearly	 identified	 a	 sub-group	 of	 respondents	 as	 being	 at	 particular	 risk.	 These	were	 found	among	 the	 indirectly	 employed	workers	 doing	 jobs	 combining	quayside	 and	driving	work	 in	 terminals	situated	in	one	of	the	areas	in	the	Asia	Pacific	that	was	included	in	the	study.			In	short,	the	study’s	survey	of	workers’	experiences	of	arrangements	for	managing	their	health,	safety	and	welfare	 portrayed	 a	 rather	 different	 perception	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 these	 arrangements	 to	 that	presented	by	both	corporate	and	terminal	level	managers	and	advisers	with	responsibility	for	OHS.			
Analysis  Making	sense	of	the	study	findings	involved	examining	evidence	of	dissonance	between	management	OHS	arrangements	and	the	workers’	experience	in	the	light	of	the	influence	of:		
• the	character	of	wider	organisational	management	strategies	of	the	terminal	companies	and	the	place	of	OHS	arrangements	within	them;	and			
• the	influences	of	the	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	contexts	in	which	the	terminals	were	situated		In	keeping	with	observations	on	behaviourally-based	approaches	generally,	 this	meant	 that	while	 there	was	 a	 widely	 held	 view	 among	 workers	 and	 managers	 alike	 that	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 management	systems	 had	 improved	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 priority	 of	 these	 systems	was	 towards	matters	 of	 safety	 as	opposed	 to	 those	 of	workers’	 health	 or	 welfare.	 This	 focus	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 zero	harm	corporate	safety	strategies	more	generally,	where	a	connection	can	be	seen	between	behaviourally-orientated	 arrangements	 for	 safety,	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 on	 ‘safety	 culture’	 among	 managers	 and	safety	professionals	alike	at	corporate	and	professional	levels	and	the	high	profile	espousal	of	‘zero	harm’	approaches	 in	 the	 board	 room.	 The	 attraction	 of	 these	 ways	 of	 conceptualising	 the	 governance	 of	improvement	 in	workplace	health	and	safety	 for	corporate	 leaders	and	managers	 is	arguably	related	to	the	 fact	 that	 focusing	 on	 changing	 workers’	 behaviour	 (although	 managers’	 behaviour	 may	 also	 be	included),	 largely	 avoids	 questioning	 the	 implications	 for	workers’	 health	 safety	 and	welfare,	 of	wider	corporate	 or	 managerial	 decisions	 on	 finance,	 work	 organisation	 and	 other	 business	 or	 operational	matters.	 It	 therefore	 fits	 well	 with	 modern	 management	 and	 business	 leadership	 strategies	 that	 are	intended	to	maximise	operational	cost	efficiencies	and	their	profitability,	despite	growing	evidence	from	many	 industries	 that	 these	 approaches	 may	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 workers’	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare.	We	consider	our	evidence	concerning	the	effects	of	this	approach	on	workers’	experiences	below.		
a) The	place	of	OHS	in	organisational	and	business	management	strategies	As	 we	 argue	 in	 some	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 the	 business	 efficiencies	 associated	 with	 container	 terminal	operation	mean	 that	 success	 in	 this	 highly	 competitive	 industry	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 speed	 and	 cost	efficiencies	associated	with	cargo	handling	and	throughput	at	terminals	that,	in	turn,	drive	trends	both	in	operational	efficiency	(including	automation,	manning	levels,	shift	patterns	and	so	on)	and	in	corporate	preferences	for	contracting	out	labour.	Looking	at	the	results	of	the	survey	of	workers	OHS	experiences,	it	seems	clear	that	it	was	the	consequences	of	these	practices	which	lay	at	the	heart	of	both	the	dissonance	between	 the	 workers’	 experiences	 and	 managers’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 health	 and	safety	arrangements	as	well	as	differences	observed	in	OHS	experiences	in	terminals	located	in	different	parts	of	the	world.			
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Since	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 these	 prominent	 trends	 in	 business	 and	 organisational	 practices	 are	 set	 to	continue,	it	is	important	that	companies	are	aware	of	the	consequences	and	are	able	to	take	the	necessary	steps	 to	minimise	 their	negative	effects	on	 the	health,	 safety	and	welfare	experiences	of	 their	workers.	One	 strategy	 that	 might	 enable	 more	 preventive	 measures	 to	 be	 enacted	 could	 be	 through	 greater	engagement	in	ensuring	more	robust	feedback	from	workers	concerning	the	effects	of	work	organisation.	There	 is	 a	wealth	 of	 research	 that	 points	 to	 the	 positive	 role	 of	 institutional	 arrangements	 for	worker	representation	on	health	and	safety	 in	contributing	 to	achieving	 this.	Yet,	 in	our	study,	 the	 terminals	 in	which	 such	 arrangements	were	 least	 implemented	were	 the	 very	ones	 in	which	 the	negative	 effects	 of	these	trends	in	business	and	organisational	practice	were	most	highly	developed.			A	 second	 area	 in	 which	 companies	 might	 consider	 more	 systematic	 control	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 their	requirements	 for	 the	management	of	health	and	 safety	arrangements	by	 contractors.	While	 some	good	practices	 were	 identified	 among	 the	 terminals	 we	 studied,	 overall	 there	 was	 inconsistency	 in	 the	approaches	 enacted	 by	 different	 terminals.	 Again,	 current	 research	 suggests	 that	 buyers	 in	 close	 and	collaborative	 supply	 relations	 with	 their	 supplying	 contractors	 –	 such	 as	 were	 the	 relations	 typically	found	 in	 container	 terminals	 –	 are	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 to	 influence	 not	 only	 the	 presence	 of	 OHS	arrangements	among	contractors	during	the	procurement	process,	but	also	to	influence	and	improve	the	operation	of	these	arrangements	in	the	actual	work	carried	on	by	contractors	on-site.	There	was	evidence	in	the	present	study	that	terminals	and	terminal	operating	companies	more	generally	would	benefit	from	greater	 attention	 to	 ensuring	 consistent	 best	 practice	 in	 these	 matters.	 In	 this	 respect	 there	 was	considerable	 room	 for	 better	 information	 sharing	 globally	 within	 and	 between	 terminals	 and	 the	organisations	running	them.			
b) National	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	contexts	Whether	companies	are	global	or	national,	their	corporate	strategies	on	health,	safety	and	welfare	in	the	container	terminals	for	which	they	are	responsible	are	implemented	in	very	different	national	contexts.	We	have	argued	 in	Chapter	6	 that	 these	contexts	moderate	both	 the	nature	and	operation	of	corporate	approaches.	This	is	particularly	so	in	relation	to	the	effects	of	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	contexts	 on	 the	 approaches	 taken	 by	 terminal	 operating	 companies	 to	 managing	 safety,	 health	 and	welfare	and	workers’	consequent	experiences	of	those	approaches	and	their	outcomes.			Elements	 of	 all	 three	 of	 these	 contextual	 determinants	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 not	 only	 on	 the	arrangements	 that	 terminal	operators	make	 to	organise	work	and	manage	health,	 safety	and	welfare	 –	and	 in	 some	 cases	whether	 arrangements	 are	 in	place	 at	 all	 –	 but	 also	 their	 effectiveness	 and	value	 in	terms	of	the	experience	of	workers.	In	short,	our	analysis	clearly	shows	that	where	these	contexts	provide	only	a	weak	influence	on	the	autonomy	of	company	OHS	practice,	 that	 is,	where	OHS	is	 in	the	words	of	some	 GNTs,	 ‘loosely	 regulated’,	 workers	 report	 more	 negative	 experiences	 of	 OHS	 than	 where	 these	factors	are	more	strongly	in	evidence.	For	example,	where	outsourcing	of	labour	is	the	economic	‘norm’,	where	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	 enforcement	 practices	 are	 not	 strong,	 and	 where	 labour	 relations	histories	have	resulted	 in	a	weaker	voice	 for	 labour,	workers’	experiences	of	health,	 safety	and	welfare	arrangements	are	generally	poorer	than	in	contexts	where	the	development	and	influence	of	such	factors	are	stronger.	In	addition,	where	these	combine	with	weaker	national	external	supports	for	OHS	generally	(in	terms,	for	example,	of	compensation,	insurance	and	welfare	systems),	then	workers’	experiences	are	poorest.	 Such	 findings	 are	 in	 accord	with	 those	 of	 socio-legal	 scholars	who	 argue	 that	 the	 institutional	(including	 regulatory)	 contexts	 within	 which	 modern	 global	 business	 operates	 are	 important	determinants	of	both	management	practices	and	workers’	welfare	and,	as	other	writers	make	clear,	such	contexts	are	critical	in	initiatives	to	influence	the	extent	of	compliance	with	labour	standards.		
 In	 Chapter	 6	 we	 tried	 to	 capture	 the	 essence	 of	 this	 influence	 of	 context	 on	 experience	 by	 plotting	 a	measure	 of	workers’	 OHS	 experiences	 against	 one	 of	 context	 by	 creating	 composite	 ‘performance’	 and	‘context’	scores	for	each	terminal.	This	we	point	out	was	necessarily	a	crude	approach	but	the	graphical	description	it	provides	is	a	helpful	representation	of	these	effects	(Figure	6.3).	The	important	message	it	delivers	demonstrates	the	impact	of	context	–	and	suggests	that	without	strong	and	effectively	enforced	
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regulation	and	economic	and	labour	relations	conditions	in	which	the	balance	of	power	between	capital	and	 labour	 is	 sufficiently	 evenly	 distributed	 to	 allow	 workers	 an	 effective	 voice,	 terminal	 operating	companies	will	 tend	 to	 favour	 productivity	 over	 the	 effective	management	 of	 safety	 and,	 in	 particular,	health	and	welfare.	We	have	shown	that	these	operators,	and	especially	those	working	at	a	global	 level,	have	the	capacity	to	put	effective	OHS	strategies	in	place,	but	they	generally	do	so	only	when	the	contexts	in	which	their	business	units	are	situated	oblige	them	to.			
Conclusions  The	dominant	approaches	 to	health	and	safety	management	used	by	 the	 container	 terminal	 companies	studied	were	 elaborate	behaviourally	 focused	occupational	 safety	management	 systems	 in	which	 there	were	 only	 limited	worker	 involvement/feedback	 loops.	 These	 are	 incomplete	models	 even	 in	 terms	 of	addressing	routine	injury,	but	are	particularly	so	in	that	they	allow	only	low	engagement	with	preventive	occupational	health	matters	and	are	relatively	unresponsive	to	the	consequences	of	significant	changes	in	technology	 and	 work	 organisation	 in	 this	 respect.	 These	 approaches	 also	 contribute	 to	 a	 major	disconnect/cognitive	dissonance	observed	between	management	and	worker	perceptions	concerning	the	effectiveness	of	actions	on	OHS.		This	said,	it	is	clear	that	in	at	least	some	of	the	GNTs	studied	there	is	evidence	of	awareness	in	corporate	OHS	advice	and	governance	of	the	limited	value	of	prevention	strategies	based	solely	on	the	reduction	of	routine	 injuries	 and	 more	 attention	 being	 paid	 to	 strategies	 that	 take	 account,	 for	 example,	 of	 low	frequency/high	 impact	 incidents	 and	 integrated	 prevention	 strategies	 included	 in	 design/engineering,	maintenance,	risk	assessment,	TARPs	(trigger	action	response	plans)	etc.	These	are	relatively	recent	and	as	 yet	 incomplete	 initiatives,	 and	 they	 would	 benefit	 from	 parallel	 further	 development	 and	 greater	engagement	with	systems	for	worker	representation	and	preventive	occupational	health	measures	both	of	 which,	 as	we	 have	 pointed	 out,	 are	 underdeveloped	 in	most	 terminals	 and	 for	which	 support	 from	corporate	rhetoric	concerning	the	focus	on	‘zero	harm’	does	not	appear	especially	helpful.			While	OHS	arrangements	in	place	in	the	terminals	were	significantly	influenced	by	the	national	economic	and	regulatory	contexts	in	which	they	were	situated,	the	practice	of	regulatory	inspection	was	itself	either	underdeveloped	(and	significantly	so	in	poorer	countries	in	the	study)	or,	equally	of	concern,	suggested	by	 terminal	workers	 to	be	 less	 in	 evidence	 than	previously	 in	 some	 richer	 countries	 in	 the	 study.	This	suggestion,	which	was	to	a	large	extent	substantiated	in	interviews	with	regulatory	agency	personnel	as	well	 as	 by	 national	 enforcement	 data,	 is	 of	 some	 concern.	Up	 to	 the	 present	 time,	 such	 inspection	 had	clearly	 been	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 influence	 on	 compliance	with	 national	 OHS	 requirements	 in	 the	terminals	situated	in	these	countries	and	its	reduction	in	relation	to	these	workplaces	where	substantial	and	serious	OHS	risks	still	exist	is	disturbing.		In	short,	the	conclusion	from	our	analysis	indicates	that	even	where	we	found	the	conditions	of	context	to	be	at	 their	most	conducive,	 there	remains	significant	scope	 for	 improvement,	particularly	 in	relation	 to	the	 management	 of	 workers’	 health	 and	 welfare,	 alongside	 their	 safety,	 and	 the	 more	 effective	involvement	of	workers	and	their	representatives	 in	the	arrangements	 in	place	to	achieve	this.	 In	these	scenarios,	both	company	strategies	for	OHS	governance	and	the	surveillance	of	the	ensuing	arrangements	for	their	delivery	need	to	continue	to	be	a	priority	in	the	support	of	safe	and	healthy	work	for	all	terminal	workers.			
Recommendations		The	 following	 recommendations	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 study.	 They	 address	 issues	 of	policy	 and	 practice	 on	 the	 governance	 and	 operation	 of	 arrangements	 to	 manage	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	at	work	in	container	terminals.	It	is	hoped	they	contribute	to	improving	the	relevance,	operation	and	outcomes	of	these	arrangements.	They	are	made	with	regard	to	the	tripartite	nature	of	the	interest	in	OHS	 in	 container	 terminals	 globally.	 That	 is,	 while	 they	 are	 addressed	 in	 the	 main	 to	 corporate	 and	terminal	level	operation,	others	are	aimed	at	national	regulation	and	regulatory	policy	and	at	improving	
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global	standards	on	OHS	in	container	terminals.	All	also	have	implications	for	the	strategy	and	policies	of	the	trade	unions	that	represent	the	interests	of	workers	at	both	corporate	and	terminal	levels.			When	making	recommendations	it	is	customary	for	researchers	to	indicate	a	need	for	‘further	research’,	since	 it	 is	 also	 normal	 for	 the	 findings	 of	 research	 investigations	 to	 lead	 to	 additional	 questions.	 The	present	study	is	no	exception.	However,	the	recommendations	outlined	below	are	confined	to	those	that	address	policy	and	practice	and	are	of	relevance	to	employers,	governments,	international	organisations	and	trade	unions.	They	include	the	following:			
• Since	the	research	shows	that	there	are	significant	differences	in	health,	safety	and	welfare	practice	and	outcomes	between	terminals	operated	by	the	same	companies	in	different	locations	in	the	world,	
it	is	recommended	that	GNTs	review	the	strategies	they	have	in	place	for	the	corporate	governance	and	management	of	OHS	with	a	view	to	reducing	these	differences	by	learning	from	the	experience	of	what	constitutes	good	practice	and	what	drives	it.	There	may	be	a	role	here	for	the	development	of	a	Code	of	Practice	by	a	global	body	such	as	 the	 ILO,	which	could	act	as	a	 suitable	 standard	 (see	also	later	recommendations).			
• Zero-harm	 strategies	 and	 behaviour-based	 safety	 (BBS)	 arrangements	 dominate	 the	 approaches	taken	to	OHS	at	corporate	level	and	in	the	terminals	studied.	While	there	are	some	benefits	to	such	systems,	they	have	several	acknowledged	weaknesses.	These	are	in	particular	evident	in	relation	to	attention	to	safety	over	health	and	welfare	and	in	relation	to	questions	of	communication	and	trust	between	workers,	their	representatives	and	management.	It	is	recommended	 that	efforts	are	made	to	 ensure	 that	 such	 weaknesses	 are	 addressed	 in	 corporate	 OHS	 systems.	 This	 means	 especially	ensuring	 that	OHS	systems	 in	place	address	occupational	health	and	welfare	as	well	as	safety,	 they	pay	greater	attention	to	the	organisational	causes	of	harm	experienced	by	workers	and	they	further	allow	 for	 improved	 communication	 between	 workers	 and	 managers.	 This	 includes	 improved	arrangements	 for	 consultation	 and	participation	 of	all	workers	 on	OHS	 and	 it	 is	 further	 important	that	such	systems	help	build	trust	between	workers	and	their	managers,	rather	than	distrust.			
• Corporate	 governance	 of	 OHS	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 container	 terminals	 increasingly	 emphasises	 an	approach	to	its	management	in	which	greater	attention	is	paid	to	understanding	the	causes	of	critical	incidents.	This	emphasis	is	valuable	and	it	is	recommended	that	its	further	extension	be	supported.	In	particular,	more	attention	could	be	paid	to	management	strategies	associated	with	the	prevention	of	 low	 frequency/high	 impact	 (LF/HI)	 events.	 Here	 terminals	 could	 improve	 monitoring	arrangements	 for	 these	 incidents	 and	 the	 greater	 development	 of	 trigger	 action	 response	 plans	(TARPs)	in	relation	to	them.	Terminal	operators	might	also	consider	adoption	of	most	suitable	OHS	indicators	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	databases	whose	analysis	may	contribute	to	the	advance	of	knowledge	 in	 the	 development	 of	more	 ergonomic	 solutions	 for	 workers	 in	 ports.	 OHS	 indicators	currently	 used	 by	 container	 terminals	 are	 insufficient	 and	 mainly	 support	 a	 reactive	 rather	 than	proactive	 approach	 to	 incidents.	 Consideration	 could	 be	 given	 to	 more	 proactive	 and	 preventive	orientated	 approaches.	 Although	 some	 operators	 have	 made	 considerable	 progress	 with	 global	communications	 in	 relation	 to	 OHS	 in	 terminal	 operation,	 greater	 use	 of	 IT	 in	 achieving	 data	collection	and	dissemination	in	this	respect	should	be	encouraged	and	good	practices	shared.		
• While	continued	reporting	of	LTIs	is	important,	it	is	recommended	that	KPIs	that	are	used	to	monitor	safety	management	practice	both	at	corporate	and	terminal	level	reflect	the	issues	identified	above.			
• There	 is	a	strong	body	of	research	evidence	supporting	the	contribution	of	 formal	arrangements	to	represent	workers’	 interests	 to	 improving	 prevention	 outcomes.	 These	 arrangements	 are	 found	 in	many	high	risk	sectors	such	as	mining,	the	petrochemical	industry,	construction	and	so	on,	but	they	are	significantly	underdeveloped	 in	many	of	 the	 terminals	we	studied	and	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	this	 be	 addressed	 in	 both	 corporate	 governance	 of	OHS	 and	 in	 terminal	 level	 arrangements	 in	 the	future.			
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• Many	of	 the	 experiences	 of	 harm	 reported	by	workers	 in	 this	 study,	 but	 apparently	 not	 in	 routine	company	data,	concern	health	and	welfare.	It	is	therefore	recommended	that	corporate	and	terminal	strategies	are	reviewed	with	a	view	to	increasing	their	emphasis	on	these	matters	in	the	future.			
• It	 is	 further	 recommended	 that	 investigation	 of	 OHS	 performance	 and	 outcomes	 takes	 greater	account	of	the	views	of	workers	concerning	organisational	causes	of	commonly	experienced	forms	of	work	related	ill-health.		
• The	 organisation	 of	 work	 and	 employment	 in	 the	 terminals	 reflects	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 the	outsourcing	 of	 labour	 through	 arrangements	 with	 contractors.	 There	 are	 well-established	consequences	 for	 OHS	 arrangements	 and	 outcomes	 associated	with	 these	 practices.	Many	were	 in	evidence	 in	 the	 terminals	 studied.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that	 companies	 review	 their	 strategies	 for	addressing	these	consequences	and	take	actions	reflecting	best	practice	on	OHS	in	relation	to	the	use	of	contractors.	These	might	include:			
o Review	of	the	nature	of	supply	chain	relations	between	terminal	operators	and	contractors	in	order	to	identify	better	means	of	incentivising	improved	OHS	performance		
o Further	review	and	revision	of	corporate	guidelines	on	the	extent	to	which	OHS	management	requirements	 for	 contractors	 feature	 in	 arrangements	 for	 procurement	 and	 contract	compliance	
o Greater	engagement	with	monitoring	to	ensure	compliance	from	contractors	
o Investigation	of	incentives	for	contractors	to	improve	OHS	arrangements	and	performance		
o Review	 and	 exploration	 of	 possible	 better	 arrangements	 for	 the	welfare	 of	 the	 contractor	workforce	in	some	terminals	
o Better	 arrangements	 for	 adequate	 representation	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 contractor	workforce		
• In	 terms	 of	 corporate	 and	 terminal	 level	 actions,	 we	 have	 noted	 in	 the	 report	 that	 younger	 male	workers	 dominated	 employment	 in	 the	 container	 terminals	we	 studied.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising,	 but	given	 the	 widely	 anticipated	 changes	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 terminal	 operation	 in	 the	 future,	 it	 is	likely	 that	 the	 participation	 of	 women	 in	 the	 labour	 force	 will	 increase.	 This	 will	 have	 some	implications	for	arrangements	for	health,	safety	and	welfare.	Currently	there	is	little	evidence	of	these	being	 anticipated	 either	 by	 the	 corporate	 strategies	 for	 governance	 and	 management	 of	 OHS	 and	welfare	or	 in	arrangements	 for	 these	matters	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 terminals.	 It	 is	recommended	 that	these	implications	be	explored	at	both	corporate	and	terminal	levels.			
• Both	 national	 regulatory	 contexts	 and	 regulatory	 inspection	 practices	were	 found	 to	 be	 important	determinants	of	terminal	level	OHS	practice.	In	advanced	market	economies	there	was	a	perception	that	 the	 presence	 of	 specialist	 regulatory	 inspection	 had	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 terminal	 level	 OHS	practices.	There	is	understandable	concern	that	reduction	in	such	presence	caused	by	cuts	in	public	spending	and	reorganised	compliance	strategies	(commonly	experienced	in	most	of	these	countries)	will	 result	 in	 negative	 outcomes	 and	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 national	 authorities	 review	 their	strategies	 in	 this	 area,	 and	also	 take	account	of	 likely	 training	needs	 for	 inspectors	 involved	 in	 the	inspection	of	work	in	container	terminals.			
• In	 the	 one	 lower-middle-income	 country	 included	 in	 the	 study,	 both	 the	 regulations	 on	dock	work	and	the	regulatory	inspectorate	stood	at	some	distance	from	engagement	with	the	OHS	management	arrangements	 employed	 within	 the	 terminals.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that,	 in	 this	 situation,	 national	authorities	 take	 steps	 to	 close	 this	 gap	 by	 bringing	 regulation	 in	 line	 with	 the	 process-based	regulatory	measures	 for	OHS	 now	widely	 used	 globally,	 and	 by	 providing	 inspectors	with	 training	and	 powers	 to	 engage	with	 OHS	management	 practices	 within	 the	 terminals.	 There	may	 be	 some	scope	 for	 supporting	 this	with	 the	development	of	a	Code	of	Good	Practice	at	global	 level,	perhaps	through	the	agency	of	the	ILO.		
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1.	Introduction	
	This	report	presents	the	findings	of	a	study	of	the	experience	of	health	and	safety	in	container	terminals	operated	by	a	range	of	national	and	global	companies	in	several	different	countries.	It	is	a	follow-up	to	a	previous	 study	 undertaken	 in	 2011	 and	 it	 explores	 indications	 from	 that	 study	 concerning	 the	effectiveness	 of	 the	management	 systems	 to	 support	workers’	 health,	 safety	 and	wellbeing	 in	 place	 in	these	 terminals	 (Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012).	 It	builds	on	 the	earlier	 findings	with	a	more	 in-depth	analysis	 using	 a	 quantitative,	 questionnaire	 based	 survey	 together	 with	 the	 qualitative	 methods	 used	previously.	It	also	undertakes	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	national	regulatory	and	socio-economic	contexts	in	which	terminals	operate	in	the	different	locations	studied.		In	this	Introduction,	we	explain	our	rationale	for	the	study.	To	do	so,	we	begin	by	way	of	background	with	a	brief	outline	of	the	development	of	current	features	of	the	operation	of	container	terminals	that	can	be	observed	globally	and	are	widely	held	to	contribute	to	the	significance	of	their	role	in	the	global	economy.	We	particularly	focus	on	those	features	of	their	structure,	organisation	and	operation	that	are	most	likely	to	 influence	OHS	 arrangements	 and	 outcomes	 and	 then	 outline	 the	 existing	 evidence	 concerning	 these	arrangements	 and	 outcomes,	 including	 summarising	 relevant	 findings	 from	 the	 previous	 study.	 This	provides	 a	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 present	 research	 which	 seeks	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	organisational	 arrangements	 for	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	 in	 container	 terminals	 and	 their	 wider	national,	 regulatory,	 business	 and	 labour	 relations	 contexts.	 The	 central	 question	 addressed	 in	 the	present	work	concerns	what	determines	the	health	and	safety	outcomes	and	experiences	of	workers	 in	container	terminals	and	what	are	effective	managerial	strategies	to	improve	this	experience.			
1.1 Container	terminals	–	patterns	of	growth	and	organisation	The	introduction	of	the	shipping	container	transformed	the	operations	involved	in	loading	and	unloading	ships	by	allowing	an	increase	in	the	mechanisation	and	automation	of	cargo	handling	(Levinson,	2006).	This	 in	 turn	stimulated	 the	growth	both	of	 specialised	vessels	 to	carry	containers	and	 terminals	whose	sole	 function	 was	 to	 load	 and	 unload	 them,	 thus	 massively	 increasing	 the	 speed	 and	 efficiency	 in	transferring	 containerised	 goods	 from	 ship	 to	 shore	 and	 vice	 versa.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 this	transformation	 was	 taking	 place	 globally,	 ports	 themselves	 were	 undergoing	 significant	 change	 in	ownership,	passing	from	public	entities	to	partly	or	entirely	privatised	ones	(Baird,	2002).	In	parallel	and	relatedly,	as	the	manufacture	and	production	of	goods	increasingly	relocated	to	poorer	countries,	world	trade	increased	and	the	role	of	shipping	as	the	primary	form	of	international	bulk	transportation	of	goods	increased	 with	 it.	 The	 need	 for	 fast	 and	 efficient	 cargo	 operations	 grew	 globally,	 requiring	 new	 or	enlarged	terminals	for	the	export	of	goods,	often	in	the	poorer	parts	of	the	world	to	which	production	had	increasingly	 relocated,	 others	 for	 their	 transfer	 while	 en	 route,	 and	 others	 for	 the	 importation	 of	 the	products	in	the	containers	into	the	markets	of	advanced	economies.			These	 changes	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 global	 network	 of	 specialised	 container	 terminals	operated	by	a	range	of	both	national	and	global	logistics	companies,	themselves	often	combining	terminal	ownership	and	operation	with	other	transport	and	logistics	interests,	including	interests	in	both	land	and	sea	 transportation	 services.	 This	 development	 is	 well-known	 and	 has	 generated	 a	 large	 and	 detailed	literature	(see	for	example;	Brooks	and	Cullinane,	2007a;	Rodrigue	and	Notteboom,	2011;	Bonacich	and	Wilson,	 2008,	 and	 many	 others).	 Less	 well	 known,	 although	 in	 evidence	 in	 the	 specialised	 research	literature,	 is	 the	 impact	 these	 changes	 have	 had	 on	 workers,	 with	 the	 transformation	 of	 longstanding	work	and	employment	practices	as	well	as	of	equally	well-established	labour	relations	procedures	and	in	some	cases	of	the	regulatory	infrastructures	within	which	these	practices,	institutions	and	procedures	are	embedded.	The	consequences	of	all	these	changes	for	workers’	experience	of	safety,	health	and	working	conditions	 in	 container	 terminals	 have	 rarely	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 systematic	 study	 and	 it	 is	with	 these	
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consequences	and	how	they	might	be	managed	to	support	more	positive	outcomes	for	health,	safety	and	welfare	that	the	present	research	is	concerned.			Container	terminals	act	as	‘hubs’	at	which	transportation	systems	converge.	Cost	and	delivery	efficiencies	in	 these	 ‘hubs’	 are	 regarded	 as	 fundamental	 to	 the	 success	 of	 global	 trade.	 As	 a	 consequence	 further	changes	 have	 occurred	 in	 their	 location,	 structure	 and	 organisation	 to	 allow,	 for	 example,	 larger	 and	faster	ships	with	reduced	port-turnaround	times	to	use	them.	Associated	savings	in	operating	costs	have	been	 achieved	 through	 increased	 automation	 and	 mechanisation,	 and	 through	 the	 outsourcing	 of	dockside	labour.	Containerisation	has	dictated	and	encouraged	the	use	of	larger	ships	with	smaller	crews.	It	has	helped	to	remove	the	need	for	a	 large	workforce	 living	near	docks	to	 load	and	unload	–	enabling	docks	 to	 be	 re-located	 in	 less	 crowded	 port	 areas	 or	 new	 ports	 altogether.	 The	 road/rail	 network	associated	 with	 containerships	 has	 also	 facilitated	 this,	 including	 removal	 of	 the	 need	 for	 large	warehouses	at	or	near	docks	–	and	a	large	workforce	to	service	these.	Such	facilities	are	now	often	found	in	hubs	at	considerable	distance	from	terminals.	The	use	of	‘just	in	time	(JIT)	management	techniques	has	also	further	reduced	warehousing	requirements.			The	companies	operating	these	terminals	include	a	small	number	of	organisations	operating	on	a	global	scale,	 that,	 for	 the	 last	 decade,	 have	 controlled	 about	 half	 the	 world’s	 total	 container	 port	 capacity	(Drewry,	 2007).	 These	 global	 network	 terminal	 (GNT)	 operating	 companies	 dominate	 container	transport	through	their	capacity	to	control	not	only	the	activities	of	many	individual	terminals	but	also	by	organising	 this	 activity	 into	 operational	 networks	 globally.	 The	 four	 largest	 of	 them	 currently	 control	nearly	200	ports	globally,	each	having	annual	throughput	by	equity	(as	measured	by	TEU	levels	for	2009)	of	between	31	and	45	million	(Notteboom	and	Rodrigue,	2011).	They	are	all	large	companies	with	multi-national	interests.	Each	has	a	global	head	office	from	which	business	and	management	of	the	organisation	is	led	and	co-ordinated.			Because	of	the	importance	and	widespread	influence	of	these	companies,	 in	the	present	study,	as	in	the	previous	one,	we	have	been	particularly	interested	in	their	approaches	to	managing	the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	their	workers.	To	this	end	we	examined	management	arrangements	and	strategies	for	health	and	 safety	 in	 four	 of	 the	 largest	 of	 these	 organisations	 at	 both	 global	 and	 terminal	 levels	 in	 several	different	national	contexts.	At	the	same	time	many	smaller	national	organisations	also	operate	container	terminals	in	most	exporting	and	importing	countries.	They	too	follow	broadly	similar	trends	in	relation	to	their	 business	 practice	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 structure	 and	 organisation	 of	 their	 terminals	 and	 in	 the	employment	practices	 they	 adopt	 (see	Reveley	 and	Tull	 (2008)	 for	 examples	 from	 the	Asia	Pacific	 and	Brooks	and	Cullinane	(2007b)	for	examples	in	Europe	and	North	America).	We	have	included	examples	of	these	companies	and	their	terminals	in	some	of	the	same	national	contexts	in	which	we	have	also	studied	the	activities	of	the	global	players.			As	already	noted,	with	the	development	of	specialised	terminals	for	container	transportation	in	the	name	of	 economic	 and	business	 efficiency,	 significant	 changes	have	 taken	place	both	 in	 the	way	 that	work	 is	carried	out	 and	 in	 the	way	 in	which	workers	 are	 employed	 to	do	 it.	 This	has	been	 achieved	 through	 a	mixture	 of	 technological	 change	 and	 new	 systems	 of	 work.	 In	 parallel,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 considerable	reorganisation	 of	 contractual	 relationships	 in	 the	 employment	 of	 labour,	 with	 downsizing	 and	outsourcing	 of	 work	 activities	 within	 ports,	 increased	 casualisation	 of	 labour	 and	 greater	 presence	 of	contractor	labour.	In	advanced	market	economies	these	changes	have	often	been	imposed	upon	older	and	well-established	patterns	of	employment	and	work	organisation	resulting,	among	other	things,	 in	large-scale	 redundancy	 alongside	 substantial	 revision	 and	 redefinition	 of	 long-standing	 work	 practices	(Turnbull,	2012).	Such	changes	have	not	been	without	conflict	and	have	often	been	the	subject	of	long	and	bitter	 industrial	 disputes	 (Turnbull	 and	 Wass,	 2007).	 The	 resulting	 structural	 and	 organisational	arrangements	 for	 employment	 and	 terminal	 operation	 are,	 therefore,	 frequently	 consequences	 of	compromises	reached	in	the	resolution	of	conflict	between	social	organisation	and	economic	growth	and	efficiency.	In	this	sense	they	are	influenced	not	only	by	the	organisational	and	business	priorities	of	the	terminal	 companies	 involved,	 and	 the	 national	 economic	 and	 political	 strategies	 of	 the	 states	 in	which	they	 are	 located,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 strategies	 of	 organised	 labour	 in	 its	 efforts	 to	 protect	 jobs	 and	work	practices	(Fairbrother	and	Gekara,	2013).		
22		
	
	In	 poorer	 countries	 the	 changes	 from	previous	practices	 have	been	 as	 comprehensive	 as	 those	 in	 high	income	countries,	and	the	introduction	of	new	forms	of	employment	and	work	arrangements	have	led	to	the	same	consequences	for	traditional	work	and	employment	practices	as	those	experienced	elsewhere.	Perhaps	because	labour	organisation	in	these	countries	has	been	considerably	less	well	established	and	therefore	more	limited	in	its	influence	than	in	some	higher	income	countries,	the	disputed	nature	of	these	changes	 has	 been	 less	 conspicuous	 and	 the	 changes	 in	 employment	 practices,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	contract	 labour,	 have	 been	more	 extreme.	 In	 other	 situations,	 in	 both	 high	 and	 low	 income	 countries,	state-led	privatisation	policies,	when	applied	to	port	activities,	have	assisted	terminal	operators	to	reduce	embedded	 resistance	 to	 change	 by	 granting	 them	 more	 freedom	 to	 build	 and	 operate	 entirely	 new	facilities	in	which	they	have	succeeded	in	introducing	new	forms	of	work	organisation	and	employment	practices	 with	 less	 opposition	 from	 existing	 and	 embedded	 practices	 and	 their	 control	 by	 organised	labour	(Turnbull,	2012).			Organisational	practices	in	container	terminals	are	also	influenced	by	national	regulatory	provisions	and	the	systems	in	place	to	achieve	compliance	with	them.	By	this	we	mean	not	only	the	wider	state	systems	and	 strategies	 to	 achieve	 economic	 growth,	 but	 also	 those	 aimed	 at	 social	 protection,	 including	 those	covering,	for	example,	employment	protection,	labour	administration	and	social	welfare	as	well	as	those	addressing	safety	and	health	more	narrowly.	Despite	 international	 requirements	on	dock	work	such	as	ILO	Conventions	137	and	152,	comparative	research	indicates	there	are	likely	to	be	major	differences	in	the	 role	 of	 national	 contextual	 determinants	 of	 practices	 in	 dock	 work	 (see	 for	 example,	 Barton	 and	Turnbull,	2002)	–	as	there	are	in	most	other	sectors.	It	can	be	also	anticipated	these	will	affect	the	content	and	operation	of	those	made	for	OHS	specifically	(Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2014).	Recent	de-regulatory	or	 re-regulatory	 trends	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 work	 and	 employment	 generally,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 OHS	specifically,	all	of	which	have	been	 introduced	 largely	 to	stimulate	economic	growth,	 in	many	countries	may	have	had	further	and	continuing	effects	on	the	role	of	these	national	contextual	influences.			Container	terminals	can	be	distinguished	by	their	functions,	which	is	to	either	serve:	primarily	as	gateway	ports	acting	as	 the	 interface	between	 the	hinterland	of	 the	countries	 in	which	 they	are	 located	and	 the	maritime	 routings	 of	 containerised	 cargo;	 or	 as	 transhipment	 ports	 for	 the	 transfer	 of	 cargoes	 from	maritime	routings	(Notteboom	and	Yap,	2012).	All	the	terminals	in	the	present	study	were	gateway	ports	of	 one	 sort	 or	 another.	 Those	 in	 the	 EU	 were	 in	 ports	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 the	 inward	 flow	 of	containers,	 as	were	 those	 in	 one	 of	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 regions	 studied.	 The	 EU	 ports	 and	 terminals	were	further	 subject	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 EU-wide	 economic	 policies	 and	 plans	 concerning	 port	 and	 transport	infrastructure	 development,	 while	 those	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 region	 mentioned	 were	 located	 in	 a	country	 administered	 federally	with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 devolved	 autonomy	 at	 state	 level.	 The	 terminals	were	situated	in	two	different	states	and	subject	to	the	effects	of	both	federal	and	state	policies.	Those	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	region	were	fairly	evenly	balanced	in	terms	of	inward	and	outward	movement	of	containers.	 There	 were	 different	 national	 (and	 state/provincial)	 economic	 structures	 and	 policies	concerning	port	development	in	all	of	the	countries	in	which	the	terminals	were	situated	that	influenced	their	 operation.	 This	 said,	 the	 over-riding	motif	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 operational	 activities	 in	 all	 the	terminals	and	 in	 the	companies	operating	 them	was	one	of	 intense	competition,	 to	which	they	were	all	highly	 sensitive	 and	 which	 created	 strong	 and	 continuing	 pressures	 for	 increased	 productivity	 and	operational	efficiency.		As	with	 the	 position	 in	 the	 port	 industry	 globally,	 the	 economic	 policies	 of	 the	 countries	 in	which	 the	terminals	we	studied	were	situated	and	state	requirements	concerning	revenues	and	port	development,	influenced	their	activities	and	the	nature	and	importance	of	competition	with	other	ports	nationally	and	internationally.	While	the	general	direction	of	economic	policies	in	all	the	countries	studied	was	towards	greater	 liberalisation	 and	 the	 removal	 of	 restrictive	 state	 controls	 on	 capacity	 and	 throughput,	 current	literature	 indicated	 that	 ports	 and	 terminals	 in	 some	 countries	 remained	 subject	 to	 significant	restrictions	 in	 this	 respect	 (see	 for	 example;	 Hill,	 2008).	 Increasingly	 demanding	 port	 security	requirements	contributed	further	operational	challenges	for	the	speed	of	the	flow	of	containers	in	and	out	of	all	the	terminals	and	ports.			
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There	 was	 considerable	 variation	 in	 the	 inland	 transport	 infrastructures	 to	 which	 the	 terminals	 were	linked,	which	had	 implications	 for	 the	operational	 flows	of	 containers.	Generally	efforts	 to	 improve	 the	efficiencies	in	terminal	capacity	and	throughput	lead	to	the	relocation	of	terminals	(or	the	commissioning	of	 new	 ones)	 to	 new	 sites	 at	 some	 distance	 from	 the	 older	 ports	 and	 the	 port	 cities	where	 they	were	previously	situated.	New	road	and	rail	links	can	then	be	designed	and	built	to	maximise	efficiencies	in	the	flow	of	 goods	 to	 and	 from	 these	 relocated	or	new	 terminals.	However,	 all	 the	 terminals	 in	 the	present	study	were	 located	 in	 older	 ports.	While	 some	were	 increasingly	 in	 competition	with	more	 favourably	located	rivals,	 their	activities	were	constrained	by	their	physical	 location,	sometimes	in	or	very	close	to	port	cities,	and	shared	transportation	infrastructures.	In	particular,	the	terminals	situated	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	were	situated	at	the	ends	of	extremely	congested	inland	transport	networks.	There	had	been	efforts	by	the	state,	the	port	authorities	and	the	terminal	companies	to	relieve	congestion	and	some	reorganisation	 of	 inland	 container	 storage	 and	 transfer	 had	 occurred	 in	 recent	 years	 (sometimes	 the	GNTs	 had	 themselves	 invested	 in	 these	 improvements).	 Additionally,	 rail	 transportation	 supplemented	the	 transport	 infrastructure	 for	 some	 terminals	 but	 road	 transport	was	 the	principal	means	of	moving	containers,	and	overall	its	infrastructure	remained	poor	and	was	a	source	of	considerable	concern	to	the	operations	 management	 of	 the	 terminals	 as	 well	 as	 a	 major	 issue	 for	 the	 working	 conditions	 of	 the	external	 truck	 drivers	 and	 a	 contributory	 factor	 to	 poor	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 experienced	 by	drivers	and	exposed	terminal	staff,	both	outside	and	inside	the	terminals	and	at	the	interface	between	the	two.			Patterns	 of	 employment	 and	 of	 work	 organisation	 in	 these	 establishments	 are	 therefore	 dynamic	 and	subject	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 changing	 national	 and	 global	 contexts	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 business	 and	organisational	strategies	of	the	companies	involved.	It	follows	that	the	nature	of	work	hazards	and	risks	to	 health	 and	 safety	will	 also	be	 influenced	by	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	 all	 these	 factors	 and	will	 change	apace	with	developments	within	each	of	 them.	A	major	argument	 in	 the	present	report,	 is	 that	because	these	combinations	result	in	different	effects	in	different	contexts,	it	is	important	to	take	proper	account	of	 them	 in	 an	 evaluation	 of	 arrangements	 to	 prevent	 work-related	 harm.	 As	 we	 outline	 below,	unfortunately	with	only	rare	exception,	most	of	the	limited	literature	on	safety	management	in	container	ports	has,	to	date,	failed	to	do	this.			
1.2 Health	and	safety	in	container	terminals	–	what	we	know	from	previous	
research		The	 structural	 and	 organisational	 changes	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 dock	 work	 as	 a	 result	 of	containerisation	present	 some	paradoxes	 for	 preventive	 health	 and	 safety.	 It	might	 be	 anticipated	 that	their	 introduction	would	 lead	to	an	overall	reduction	 in	 injuries	and	cases	of	 ill-health	 in	the	ports	that	handle	 containers.	 For	 those	 ports	 for	which	 reliable	 information	 is	 available,	 at	 first	 sight	 this	would	appear	to	be	the	case	at	least	as	far	as	injuries	are	concerned	(Sisson,	2012).	The	company	level	aggregate	data	 on	 injuries	 that	 were	 available	 in	 our	 previous	 study	 on	 container	 terminals	 also	 appeared	 to	support	this	notion	and	suggested	a	broadly	downward	trend	in	many	regions.	However,	as	we	pointed	out	in	that	study,	the	limitations	of	this	data	were	such	that	this,	on	its	own,	it	could	not	be	taken	as	robust	evidence	of	an	improving	pattern	overall	(Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012:14).			It	 is	 also	 not	 clear	 how	much	 of	 this	 reduction	 is	 explained	 simply	 by	 there	 being	 fewer	 dockworkers	employed	and	how	much	 can	be	 attributed	 to	making	 their	workplaces	 safer.	A	 general	 trend	 towards	reducing	the	need	for	heavy	manual	labour	through	increased	mechanisation	of	tasks	formerly	conducted	by	workers	might	be	expected	to	yield	reduction	in	injuries.	Additionally,	the	recent	trend	towards	semi-	or	complete	automation	of	container	operations,	along	with	the	deployment	of	managerial	strategies	to	improve	safety,	 such	as	 systems	separating	workers	 from	 the	vicinity	of	dangerous	processes	 like	yard	transport	and	 lifting	operations,	might	act	 to	 reduce	 them	 further.	However,	despite	 the	acknowledged	extent	of	change	in	the	design	and	operation	of	dockside	activities	and	the	introduction	of	management	systems	for	health	and	safety,	to	date	there	has	been	little	independent,	robust	study	of	the	OHS	outcomes	resulting	 from	 them.	 What	 exists,	 however,	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 widely	 held	 belief	 that	 they	 have	necessarily	 resulted	 in	 improved	 OHS	 outcomes	 and,	 in	 particular,	 suggests	 that	 the	 employment	 and	
24		
	
organisational	changes	that	accompany	them	may	have	given	rise	to	new	or	increased	risks	of	injury	and	ill-health	 for	some	of	 the	current	 forms	of	work	 in	container	 terminals	 (see	 for	example,	Fabiano	et	al.,	2010;	Darbra	and	Casal,	2004).	Unfortunately	these	studies,	which	attempt	to	measure	trends	in	reported	injuries	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 take	 account	 of	 change	 in	 work	 organisation,	 are	 exceptional.	 Most	published	research	on	container	terminal	safety	has	tended	to	focus	on	technical	and	engineering	design	issues	or	mathematical	modelling	of	techniques	of	risk	analysis	(see	for	example;	Mabrouki	et	al.,	2014;	Shang	and	Tseng,	2010),	which	generally	do	not	engage	with	the	lived	work	experiences	of	the	terminal	workers.	 Other	 published	 research	 has	 focused	 on	 soft	 issues	 of	 safety	 culture	 and	 leadership	 (see	 for	example	Shang	and	Lu,	2009).	This	work	tends	to	reflect	a	similar	interest	in	behavioural	approaches	to	safety	 that	 are	 predominant	 in	 the	 industry	 and	 pays	 scant	 attention	 to	 either	 their	 organisational	contexts	or	outcomes.			The	limited	approaches	to	understanding	the	consequences	for	workers’	health	and	safety	of	structural,	organisational	 and	 employment	 changes	 in	 terminals	 is	 unfortunate	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 large	 body	 of	evidence	 on	 the	 OHS	 consequences	 of	 these	 changes	 in	 other	 sectors.	 This	 research	 suggests	 that	operating	 with	 a	 reduced	 and	 casualised	 workforce,	 with	 agency,	 contractor	 and	 directly	 employed	workers	engaged	on	 the	same	worksite,	 is	associated	with	 increased	vulnerability	 to	accidents,	 injuries	and	 ill-health	 (see	 Quinlan	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 and	 Quinlan	 and	 Bohle	 (2008)	 for	 reviews	 of	 the	 research	evidence).	Such	changes	present	particular	challenges	to	the	delivery	of	best	practice	in	OHS	management	because	 they	 undermine	 many	 of	 the	 preconditions	 for	 its	 success	 –	 such	 as	 arrangements	 for	communications	between	management	and	all	workers;	co-ordination	and	control;	and	effective	worker	participation	 (Walters	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 There	 is	 a	 substantial	 body	 of	 research	 and	 writing	 on	 working	conditions	 and	 labour	 relations	 in	 modern	 container	 terminals	 (see	 above)	 which	 provides	 some	
circumstantial	 evidence	 that	 the	 forms	 of	 work	 organisation	 and	 employment	 practices	 used	 by	 both	global	 and	 national	 companies	 in	 terminal	 operation	 may	 not	 be	 the	 most	 supportive	 of	 scenarios	 in	which	 to	 deliver	 effective	 strategies	 to	 improve	 safety	 or	 health	 outcomes	 for	 workers.	 But,	 with	 the	exception	of	the	research	by	Fabiano	and	his	colleagues	referred	to	above,	there	is	little	robust	empirical	study	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 these	 issues	 on	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 of	 terminal	 workers.	 It	 was	 with	 this	observation	 in	 mind	 that	 we	 carried	 out	 our	 preliminary	 study	 of	 management	 arrangements	 for	 the	health	 and	 safety	 of	workers	 in	 globalised	 container	 terminals	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	world	 in	 2011	(Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012).	The	following	section	briefly	summarises	the	relevant	findings	from	the	previous	study	and	notes	their	implications	for	the	present	research			
1.3 Indicative	findings	from	the	preliminary	study	Our	 previous	 study	 examined	 arrangements	 for	 managing	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 container	 terminals	operated	by	four	large	Global	Network	Terminal	(GNT)	operators	in	two	high-income	countries	in	Europe	and	 in	 one	 middle-income	 country	 in	 Asia.	 Its	 aims	 were	 to	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	arrangements	 exemplified	 best	 practice	 and	 the	 perceptions	 of	 workers,	 their	 representatives	 and	managers	concerning	their	effectiveness.	We	sought	to	explore	how	the	policies	and	practices	adopted	by	the	 GNTs	 took	 account	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 restructuring	 of	 work	 and	 employment	 on	 OHS.	 As	 noted	above,	 the	 study	 was	 a	 preliminary	 one	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 time	 and	 resources	 available	 to	undertake	 it	 meant	 that	 the	 data	 collection	 was	 limited	 to	 interviews	 with	 a	 small	 number	 (usually	around	 20)	 of	 workers,	 their	 representatives	 and	 managers	 in	 each	 of	 the	 (6)	 terminals	 studied,	supported	with	documentary	analysis	of	OHS	arrangements	and	outcomes	among	the	companies	and	in	the	 terminals	 concerned,	 along	 with	 a	 small	 questionnaire-based	 global	 scoping	 study	 of	 trade	 union	respondents.	 Despite	 its	methodological	 limitations,	 the	 study	 produced	 indicative	 findings	 concerning	perceptions	 of	 risks	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 and	 how	 they	 were	 managed	 at	 the	 global	 level	 and	 in	 the	terminals	 in	 different	 locations,	 including	 arrangements	 for	 monitoring	 and	 feedback	 and	 those	 to	facilitate	worker	representation	and	consultation.			Respondents	 identified	 risks	 to	 health	 arising	 from	 the	 physical	 environment,	 including	 safety	 risks	associated	with	poor	workplace	infrastructure,	and	risks	arising	from	inadequate	information	concerning	the	possible	hazardous	nature	of	 the	contents	of	containers.	Perceptions	of	 risks	arising	 from	the	work	
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activities	within	terminals	were	also	frequently	articulated.	That	is,	risks	were	perceived	to	be	associated	with	the	operational	activities	involved	in	loading	and	unloading	ships	and	the	storage	and	transportation	of	containers.	Although	the	risks	of	heavy	physical	work	were	lessened	by	the	mechanisation	of	 loading	and	unloading	operations,	for	some	workers,	such	as	lashers,	they	remained	significant.	There	were	risks	seen	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 coming	 into	 contact	 with	 moving	 machinery	 and	 vehicles	 as	 well	 as	 those	associated	with	falling	objects	and	falls	from	height.	Increased	pace	and	intensity	of	work	necessitated	by	the	 faster	 turn-around	 times	 in	 container	 ports	 was	 perceived	 by	 workers	 to	 increase	 the	 risks	 of	accidents	 which,	 in	 some	 cases,	 they	 felt	 was	 exacerbated	 by	manning	 levels	 being	 adequate	 only	 for	‘normal’	 operational	 conditions.	 Risk	 of	 accidents	was	 also	 raised	 by	 pressure	 to	 increase	 or	maintain	high	 productivity	 levels.	 Along	with	 poor	 ergonomic	 design	 and	 long	 shift	 patterns,	workers	 and	 their	representatives	 believed	 this	 also	 increased	 the	 experience	 of	 musculoskeletal	 disorders	 (MSDs).	Intensification	 of	 work	 was	 also	 associated	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 fatigue	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 with	 increased	stress	as	well.			There	 were	 differences	 of	 quality	 and	 scale	 in	 the	 risks	 perceived	 to	 be	 significant	 by	 participants	 in	terminals	 in	 high	 income	 countries	 compared	 with	 those	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	 economy1	 we	studied.	 For	 example,	 risks	 associated	 with	 poor	 workplace	 equipment	 and	 infrastructure	 were	 more	commonly	 identified	by	workers	 in	 the	 latter	 country,	who	 in	addition	generally	 experienced	a	greater	level	of	risks	common	to	both	high	and	lower-middle-income	economy	terminals,	such	as	those	resulting	from	increased	work	intensity.	The	contractor	workforce,	which	is	generally	proportionally	quite	large	in	terminals	 in	poorer	countries,	was	regarded	as	being	more	vulnerable	to	these	risks	than	were	directly	employed	workers	-	which	is	consistent	with	research	on	OHS	and	contractors	more	generally.			There	appeared	 to	be	a	broad	similarity	 in	 the	overall	 strategies	 for	managing	OHS	 in	all	 the	 terminals	studied,	 that	 were	 best	 characterised	 as	 behaviour-based	 approaches	 to	 achieving	 improved	 OHS	performance.	While	they	all	displayed	some	features	to	suggest	they	had	been	adapted	to	local	conditions,	the	 companies	 determined	 the	 overall	 character	 of	 the	 safety	 management	 systems	 in	 place	 in	 each	terminal	 globally.	 Features	 in	 common	 included	 overall	 responsibility	 for	 safety	 being	 vested	 in	 the	terminal’s	senior	management	–	with	accountability	to	the	company	globally;	a	safety	department	in	the	terminal,	charged	with	supporting	the	delivery	of	a	system	rolled	out	at	global	level	and	adapted	to	suit	local	conditions;	strong	emphasis	on	achieving	 improved	 ‘safety	culture’	 through	behaviour	change,	 the	latter	 exemplified	 by	 emphasis	 on	 the	 issue	 and	wearing	 of	 PPE,	 training	 packages	 emphasising	 rules	concerning	safe	working	procedures,	especially	those	designed	to	separate	workers	from	the	hazards	of	moving	 vehicles	 and	machinery	 on	 the	 terminal	 yards,	 systems	 for	 ensuring	 compliance	 through	 peer	monitoring,	supervision	and	so	on;	incident	and	accident	investigation	and	reporting	procedures;	further	procedures	for	identifying	and	communicating	safety	failures;	and	documented	risk	assessments,	method	statements	and	standard	operating	procedures.			At	the	global	level	the	trade	union	respondents	in	the	study	welcomed	the	engagement	of	the	GNTs	with	health	 and	 safety	 management.	 However,	 they	 were	 frequently	 critical	 of	 the	 systems	 introduced	 in	terminals	 as	 a	 result,	 suggesting	 they	 represented	 superficial	 and	 limited	 ways	 of	 tackling	 the	 OHS	consequences	 of	 drives	 to	 improve	 productivity	 performance	 and	 reform	work	 organisation,	 that	 they	believed	 constituted	many	 of	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 the	 accidents	 and	 ill-health	 experienced	 at	 the	terminals.	They	argued	that	the	health	and	safety	management	arrangements	in	place	did	little	to	prevent	workers	 feeling	obliged	 to	 take	risks	 to	meet	productivity	expectations,	 that	 they	had	no	 impact	on	 the	work	 organisation	 issues	 causing	 fatigue,	 stress	 or	 musculoskeletal	 disorders,	 and	 that	 they	 were	pernicious	in	the	way	they	laid	blame	for	safety	failings	on	workers,	whose	employment	was	precarious	and	who	tried	to	carry	out	activities	in	ways	so	as	not	to	jeopardise	their	fragile	employment	security.			Workers	and	their	representatives	in	the	terminals	shared	these	concerns.	While	most	broadly	approved	of	managerial	 initiatives	 to	 improve	 the	 ‘safety	 culture’	of	 the	 terminal	organisation	 through	behaviour	change	strategies	and	efforts	to	be	more	systematic	with	safety	management,	they	conveyed	their	sense	of	 the	 limitations	 of	 these	 approaches	 –	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 reach	 the	 underlying																																																																					
1 As defined by the World Bank 2015: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups 
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causes	of	the	work-related	health	risks.	There	was	also	a	clear	distinction,	particularly	in	the	terminals	in	the	 lower-middle-income	 country,	 between	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 approaches	 to	 health	 and	 safety	management	as	experienced	by	the	directly	employed	workforce	and	the	effects	of	the	same	approaches	for	the	contractor	workforce.	Reporting	arrangements	for	accidents	and	incidents	were	often	regarded	as	limited	in	their	effectiveness	by	workers	and	their	representatives	and	particularly	with	regard	to	those	for	 contractors	 and	 their	 workers.	 Again,	 there	 were	 differences	 in	 the	 experiences	 of	 respondents	 in	terminals	 located	 in	high-income	countries	and	 those	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	country,	with	better-developed	arrangements	present	in	the	terminals	in	the	former	countries.			The	 experience	 of	 arrangements	 for	worker	 representation	 and	 consultation	 on	 health	 and	 safety	was	mixed.	Again,	there	were	marked	differences	between	practices	in	terminals	in	high-income	countries	and	those	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	 country	 in	 the	 study,	 as	 well	 as	 differences	 between	 arrangements	covering	the	directly	employed	workforce	and	those	of	contractors’	workers.	Those	for	directly	employed	workers	in	terminals	in	high	income	countries	were	the	best	developed,	but	even	here	they	were	at	times	somewhere	 short	 of	 the	 relevant	 requirements	 of	 national	 regulatory	 provisions.	 A	 critical	 difference	between	 arrangements	 in	 these	 terminals	 and	 those	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	 country	 studied	 was	found	in	their	depth	and	formality,	which	strongly	affected	both	their	functions	and	sustainability.	In	the	terminals	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	 economy	 we	 studied,	 for	 example,	 while	 there	 was	 a	 general	allowance	made	by	the	management	for	workers’	representation,	in	reality	such	representation	was	not	consistent	 and	 the	 limited	 facilities	 to	 support	 it	 did	 not	 allow	 the	 representatives	 themselves	opportunity	for	sustained	engagement	with	investigation,	inspection,	involvement	in	risk	assessments	or	with	consultation	on	changes	at	work	and	other	activities	conventionally	associated	with	good	practice	in	worker	representation	and	consultation	on	health	and	safety.			In	each	of	the	above	areas	of	OHS	management,	participants	pointed	to	issues	implicit	in	the	structure	and	organisation	of	work,	which	 fell	 outside	 the	arrangements	 to	manage	or	be	 consulted	on	OHS,	or	were	impervious	to	them.	They	also	argued	that	in	relation	to	outsourcing	and	contracting	out	especially,	the	same	structural	and	organisational	elements	not	only	made	OHS	management	more	challenging,	they	also	made	regulatory	enforcement	more	difficult.	In	each	of	these	cases,	the	experience	was	different	and	felt	to	be	more	extreme	in	the	terminals	in	the	middle-income	economy.		These	findings	throw	some	light	on	how	workers	and	their	representatives	felt	about	the	consequences	for	their	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	changes	in	the	structure	and	organisation	of	work	and	employment	experienced	in	container	terminals.	They	are	suggestive	of	what	might	be	expected	given	what	is	known	about	the	consequences	of	similar	changes	in	other	sectors	and	add	weight	to	findings,	such	as	those	of	Fabiano	 et	 al.	 (2010),	which	 indicate	 that	 containerisation	 has	 not	 necessarily	made	 these	workplaces	safer	and	healthier	for	everyone	who	works	in	them.	They	are,	however,	only	indicative	findings	since,	as	we	have	made	clear,	the	constraints	of	time	and	resources	prevented	a	more	robust	study.	For	this	reason	in	 the	present	 study	we	have	chosen	 to	 revisit	 the	 terminals	we	studied	previously,	 along	with	 several	additional	 terminals	we	 did	 not	 study,	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 these	 indications	 in	 greater	 depth.	We	 also	broadened	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 study	 in	 some	 countries	 to	 include	 some	 terminals	 operated	 by	 national	terminal	operators,	as	well	as	those	operated	by	the	main	GNTs.			
1.4 The	aims	of	the	present	study	Put	simply,	existing	knowledge	of	the	occupational	health	and	safety	consequences	of	work	in	container	terminals	is	suggestive	of	trends	in	two	opposite	directions.		On	the	one	hand,	 it	seems	clear	 that	 the	changes	wrought	by	containerisation	mean	that	 the	heavy	and	dangerous	physical	work	undertaken	by	dockworkers	has	been	substantially	reduced.	The	much	reduced	workforce	within	 the	 terminals	 not	 only	work	 in	 environments	 in	which	many	 of	 their	work	 risks	 are	reduced	 compared	 with	 previously,	 but	 the	 physical	 nature	 of	 these	 environments	 and	 the	 resources	available	to	the	large	companies	that	operate	them	also	contribute	to	the	possibility	of	a	greater	degree	of	systematic	management	of	the	remaining	risks	to	occupational	health	and	safety	in	container	terminals.	
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There	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 some	 evidence	 of	 this	 in	 the	 improving	 injury	 and	 fatality	 rates	 claimed	 by	terminal	operating	companies,	although	the	data	here	are	acknowledged	to	be	insufficiently	robust.		On	the	other	hand,	at	the	same	time,	the	over-riding	concern	for	speed	and	cost-efficiency	in	the	highly	competitive	business	environment	that	characterises	container	transport	has	led	to	the	adoption	of	work	and	employment	practices	that	a	host	of	research	studies	in	other	sectors	have	identified	as	contributing	to	 poor	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 –	 with	 disproportionately	 high	 levels	 of	 fatigue,	 stress	 and	musculoskeletal	disorders	contributing	both	to	poorer	health	outcomes	and	to	increased	risks	of	unsafe	incidents	 and	 consequent	 injuries,	 as	well	 as	 to	 reduction	 in	welfare	 among	workers	 in	 these	 sectors.	Moreover,	 the	 business	 and	 employment	 practices	 adopted	 by	 many	 terminal	 operators	 for	 the	 same	reasons	of	cost	efficiency,	 seek	 to	outsource	work	and	 lead	 to	situations	 in	which	a	 large	proportion	of	workers	 in	 some	 container	 terminals	 are	 contractor	 labour.	While	 these	 practices	 are	 known	 to	 affect	both	 the	 reporting	 and	 regulation	 of	 OHS	 outcomes,	 research	 in	 other	 sectors	 indicates	 these	workers	often	experience	poorer	working	conditions	than	those	who	are	directly	employed	in	the	same	worksite.	At	 the	 same	 time	 it	 is	 further	 acknowledged	 that	 it	 is	 often	 more	 difficult	 to	 deliver	 effective	arrangements	 for	managing	and	monitoring	workers’	health	and	safety	 in	 the	complex	workplaces	 that	are	the	result	of	these	business	and	employment	practices.			As	the	previous	sections	have	made	clear,	indications	of	this	paradoxical	situation	have	been	found	in	the	limited	research	conducted	on	health	and	safety	outcomes	in	container	terminals	(such	as	that	of	Fabiano	et	al.,	2010).	They	were	 further	evident	 in	 the	 results	of	our	preliminary	study.	The	aim	of	 the	present	study,	 therefore,	 was	 to	 investigate	 these	 indications	 with	more	 in-depth	 and	 systematic	 research.	 To	achieve	this	we	sought	to	address	five	main	research	questions:			
• How	and	to	what	extent	do	the	business	strategies	and	management	policies	of	major	global	and	national	container	terminal	operators	take	account	of	the	OHS	of	workers	involved	in	the	transfer	of	containers?		
• What	 are	 their	 specific	 strategies	 for	 addressing	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 in	 container	terminals	and	how	effective	are	they?		
• What	are	dockworkers’	OHS	experiences	of	these	strategies?		
• How	 do	 these	 experiences	 compare	 in	 GNT	 terminals	 situated	 in	 different	 countries	 and	 in	terminals	that	are	operated	by	large	national	operators?			
• What	determines	 the	 features	of	 the	health	and	safety	arrangements	 in	place	 in	 these	different	situations	 and	what	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 for	 good	 practice	 in	 improving	 the	 health	 and	safety	experience	for	workers	in	container	terminals	globally?			To	 address	 these	 questions,	 the	 present	 study	 took	 as	 its	 central	 interest	 the	 operation	 in	 selected	terminals	 of	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 policies,	 strategies	 and	 arrangements	 adopted	 by	 the	 four	largest	GNT	operating	companies.	In	addition	to	revisiting	the	same	terminals	as	in	the	previous	study,	to	broaden	the	reach	of	the	study	the	number	of	these	GNT	terminals	studied	in	the	middle	income	country	was	 increased,	 another	 terminal	 from	 a	 third	 high-income	 country	 was	 added,	 and	 two	 terminals	operated	by	national	companies	in	two	of	the	high	income	countries	were	also	included	for	comparative	purposes.	In	all	these	terminals	the	present	study	explored	the	indications	of	the	previous	study	further,	with	a	broader	and	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	experience	of	health	and	safety	arrangements	using	a	mixed-method	approach	 in	which	qualitative	methods	 similar	 to	 those	employed	 in	 the	previous	 study	were	 integrated	with	 a	 quantitative	questionnaire-based	 survey	 and	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	national	regulatory	and	socio-economic	contexts	 in	which	 the	 terminals	are	situated	and	 in	which	 they	operate.	These	 instruments	were	used	 to	gather	data	enabling	 further	exploration	of	workers’	health	and	safety	experiences,	the	relationship	of	these	experiences	with	the	systems	in	place	to	manage	their	health	and	safety,	as	well	as	with	the	structure	and	organisation	of	work	in	the	terminals	in	which	these	systems	and	
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outcomes	 occur.	 The	 research	 additionally	 examined	 the	 moderating	 effects	 of	 different	 national	 and	labour	relations’	contexts	upon	these	systems,	practices	and	outcomes	in	the	terminals	concerned.		In	 the	 present	 research,	 we	 have	 first	 sought	 to	 understand	 the	 strategies	 and	 systems	 in	 place	 for	managing	 workers’	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	 through	 scrutiny	 of	 company	 documentation	 and	qualitative	 interviews	with	 senior	 personnel	with	 responsibility	 for	 safety	 and	 health	 at	 company	 and	terminal	 levels.	 We	 have	 further	 examined	 available	 company	 data	 concerning	 the	 health	 and	 safety	outcomes	at	these	levels.			We	 probed	 workers’	 experiences	 of	 these	 strategies	 and	 systems	 with	 a	 more	 systematic	 and	 robust	investigation	facilitated	by	the	use	of	a	questionnaire-based	survey	of	a	sample	of	workers	involved	with	key	 operations	 in	 each	 terminal,	 in	 combination	with	 further	 qualitative	 interviews	with	workers	 and	their	representatives.	This	approach	helped	elicit	a	more	robust	understanding	of	the	work-related	health	and	 safety	 experiences	 of	 dockworkers	 in	 container	 terminals	 globally.	 For	 example,	 the	 questionnaire	contained	 a	 section	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 work	 safety	 in	 which	 we	 sought	 information	 concerning	respondents’	experiences	in	relation	to	perceived	work	risks,	personal	injuries	and	incidents	that	might	have	 led	 to	 injury,	as	well	as	 the	consequences	of	such	 injuries	or	 incidents	 in	 terms	of	reporting	 them	and	taking	time	off.	Another	section	dealt	with	experiences	of	work-related	ill-health.	As	well	as	seeking	information	concerning	 its	nature	and	occurrence	 in	 the	container	 terminals	 it	 also	asked	about	 taking	time	off	as	a	consequence	of	work-related	 ill-health.	 In	a	 further	section	we	asked	a	series	of	questions	designed	to	elicit	 information	concerning	particular	 forms	of	 ill-health	experienced	by	workers,	such	as	fatigue	and	stress,	as	well	as	about	 the	work	patterns	and	work	 intensity	 that	might	contribute	to	such	outcomes.	 In	 this	way	 our	 questionnaire	was	 aimed	 at	 generating	 information	 to	 enable	 us	 to	 inquire	further	 into	 indicative	 findings	 on	 these	 matters	 in	 the	 previous	 study	 and	 gain	 a	 more	 robust	understanding	 of	 the	 occurrence	 and	 causes	 of	 the	 health	 effects	 highlighted	 in	 the	 interviews	 in	 the	previous	study.			It	 will	 be	 recalled	 that,	 in	 the	 previous	 study,	 participants	 among	 the	 workers	 and	 workers’	representatives	we	interviewed	told	us	of	their	concerns	with	management	strategies	on	manning	levels,	work	intensity,	shift	patterns	and	so	on,	that	they	felt	contributed	to	poor	safety	and	health	outcomes	in	a	variety	 of	 operational	 situations.	 In	 addition,	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives,	 especially	 from	 the	terminals	 in	 the	 lower-middle-income	 country	 we	 studied,	 identified	 the	 precariousness	 of	 their	employment	 and	 that	 of	 others	 as	 among	 the	 reasons	 for	 poor	 safety	 and	 health	 outcomes.	 They	especially	 pointed	 to	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 work	 conditions	 experienced	 by	 directly	 employed	workers	 and	 those	 employed	 by	 contractors.	 In	 the	 present,	 study	 we	 designed	 our	 sampling,	 survey	instruments	and	interview	schedules	to	explore	these	matters	more	fully.	For	example,	the	questionnaire	solicited	details	of	the	organisation	of	respondents’	employment	and	work,	including,	employer,	job	type,	shift	patterns,	breaks,	work	intensity,	payment	systems	and	staffing	levels.	We	were	thus	able	to	compare	a	 range	 of	 experiences	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 management;	 experiences	 of	 arrangements	 for	 work	organisation	and	their	health	and	safety	consequences;	and	we	were	able	to	do	these	things	for	workers	doing	different	jobs,	in	different	terminals	and	among	those	who	were	directly	and	indirectly	employed.			Turning	 to	management	arrangements	 for	health	and	safety	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	a	 little	more	detail,	 the	findings	 from	 the	previous	 study	 suggested	 that	 these	arrangements	were	essentially	behaviour-based.	Although	overall	they	were	regarded	favourably	by	managers	and	workers	alike,	there	were	suggestions	that	they	were	limited	in	several	respects.	These	included,	the	extent	to	which	they	addressed	health	and	safety	 concerns	 associated	 with	 work	 organisation	 issues	 and	 those	 where	 corrective	 action	 might	require	significant	financial	investment.	They	also	exhibited	considerable	variation	in	the	extent	to	which	they	 supported	 participative	 approaches	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 management.	 Here	 again	 a	 more	comprehensive	and	robust	picture	of	the	perceived	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	these	arrangements	has	been	 undertaken	 in	 the	 present	 study	 through	 the	 use	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	worker	 survey	 in	 all	 of	 the	terminals	studied.	The	questionnaire	addressed	the	workers’	experiences	of	 these	arrangements	with	a	series	of	questions	concerning	the	provision	of	health	and	safety	information	and	training,	access	to,	and	knowledge	of,	the	systems	and	arrangements	in	place	for	managing	health	and	safety,	assessing	risk	and	monitoring	outcomes	as	well	as	questions	concerning	the	experience	of	consultation	and	representation	
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on	all	these	matters.	Data	gathered	from	the	survey	have	been	analysed	taking	account	of	that	obtained	on	 the	 same	 matters	 from	 qualitative	 interviews	 with	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 in	 all	 the	terminals.	This	allowed	us	to	compare	the	outcome	of	this	process	with	that	derived	from	company	and	terminal	management	sources	concerning	the	arrangements	in	place.	Thus	a	robust	assessment	has	been	made	of	the	nature	and	operation	of	these	health	and	safety	management	arrangements	as	well	as	their	strengths	and	limitations	in	practice.			While	 it	 was	 not	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 study	 to	 compare	 performances	 between	 terminals	 or	 between	companies	 directly,	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 the	 reasons	 for	 variation	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 OHS	arrangements,	we	have	found	it	instructive	to	be	able	to	compare	these	experiences	in	different	locations,	between	different	work	groups	and	between	workers	with	different	contractual	arrangements	 for	 their	employment.	 For	 example,	 as	 the	 previous	 section	 made	 clear,	 our	 preliminary	 study	 indicated	 there	were	considerable	differences	between	the	perception	of	workplace	health	and	safety	arrangements	and	outcomes	 among	 directly	 employed	workers	 and	 among	 contract	workers	 –	 especially	 in	 terminals	 in	poorer	countries.	Our	extended	data	collection	in	the	present	study	–	particularly	the	use	of	the	worker	survey	on	samples	of	operational	workers	in	all	the	terminals	we	studied	–	allowed	more	comprehensive	and	 reliable	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 these	matters.	This	 in	 turn	 enabled	 some	 reflection	on	 the	 role	of	outsourcing	and	the	use	of	contractors	in	the	structure	and	organisation	of	work	in	container	terminals	and	their	consequences	for	health	and	safety	arrangements,	practices	and	their	outcomes.	It	also	allowed	us	to	compare	more	effectively	the	experiences	of	different	categories	of	workers	(such	as	lashers,	crane	operators,	truck	drivers	and	so	on)	in	the	same	and	different	terminals.	It	further	allowed	us	to	discuss,	in	later	Chapters	of	the	report,	the	extent	to	which	the	companies	involved	in	this	study	have	been	able	to	use	management	strategies	adopted	in	other	sectors	to	increase	leverage	on	contractors	and	minimise	the	harmful	effects	of	these	practices	on	the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	their	workers.			Our	methods	 also	mean	we	 have	 been	 able	 to	 explore	 reasons	 for	 possible	 gaps	 between	 the	 aims	 of	safety	management	systems	in	place	both	globally	and	within	terminals	and	the	reported	experiences	and	expectations	of	workers	in	a	comparative	way,	because	in	addition	to	data	collection	inside	the	terminals,	in	the	present	study	we	have	also	used	data	from	outside	the	terminals.	There	are	two	main	sources.	On	the	one	hand,	we	have	obtained	documentary	material	on	company	OHS	strategies	from	three	of	the	four	GNT	companies	in	the	study	and	undertaken	secondary	analysis	of	OHS	performance	data	they	provided.	We	 have	 enhanced	 this	 analysis	 with	 that	 of	 detailed	 qualitative	 interviews	 with	 senior	 company	personnel	with	responsibility	for	health,	safety	and	the	environment	carried	out	at	the	global	Head	Offices	of	three	GNT	companies	and	two	of	the	national	companies	in	the	study.	On	the	other	hand,	in	each	of	the	countries	 in	which	 the	 terminals	we	studied	are	 located,	we	have	carried	out	 interviews	with	 the	main	regulatory	 agencies	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 that	 terminal	 operations	 are	 in	 compliance	with	 national	regulatory	requirements	on	health	and	safety	in	dock-work	and	other	relevant	national	labour	standards	on	dock-work.			Through	this	approach	we	were	able	to	examine	the	relationship	between	company	strategies	and	those	of	national	regulatory	contexts.	We	have	further	developed	this	comparative	approach	with	a	review	of	the	 relevant	 literature	 on	 regulation	 and	 labour	 relations	 in	 dock-work	 in	 each	 country	 and	 where	necessary	we	have	undertaken	further	interviews	with	key	informants	including	trade	union	officials	and	others	 with	 relevant	 contextual	 information.	 In	 this	 way	 we	 have	 explored	 some	 of	 the	 contextual	determinants	of	 the	variations	we	observed	in	both	the	previous	and	the	present	study	in	management	and	work	 practices	 in	 terminals	 situated	 in	 different	 countries.	 This	 approach	 allowed	 us	 to	 return	 to	addressing	 the	 first	 of	 our	 research	 questions	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 management	policies	of	major	global	and	national	container	terminal	operators	and	the	occupational	safety,	health	and	welfare	 of	 their	 workers	 and	 it	 provided	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 situational	 and	contextual	influences	on	OHS	management	and	its	outcomes.		
30		
	
1.5 Outline	of	the	report	Chapter	 2	 of	 this	 report	 provides	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 methods	 we	 used	 to	 undertake	 our	research.	 It	 includes	 a	 further	 elaboration	 of	 the	 rationale	 for	 the	 mixed-method	 approach	 used,	 an	outline	of	our	quantitative,	qualitative	and	contextual	methods,	including	our	approach	to	reviewing	the	literature	and	using	documentary	data	from	companies	and	other	sources,	our	field	research	instruments,	the	terminals	and	countries	selected,	our	approach	to	sampling	and	administration	of	the	worker	survey,	and	 the	 qualitative	 interviews	 used	 in	 the	 study.	 We	 further	 describe	 the	 methods	 we	 used	 for	 both	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	analysis	and	outline	the	procedures	we	adopted	to	ensure	the	study	met	the	code	of	research	ethics	required	by	Cardiff	University.			Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 our	 findings.	 In	 Chapter	 3	 we	 start	 with	 the	 governance	 and	management	of	occupational	health	and	safety	in	the	companies	and	terminals	we	studied	based	on	our	analysis	 of	 company	 documentation	 and	 interviews	 with	 company	 and	 terminal	 management	 and	supervisors.	Our	respondents	included	senior	company	and	terminal	management	with	responsibility	for	operations	and	for	safety	and	health,	as	well	as	supervisors.	We	outline	the	character	of	the	arrangements	for	 implementing	company	strategies	on	health	and	safety	and	the	systems	in	place	 for	 its	delivery	and	provide	an	account	of	their	operation,	as	perceived	by	the	company	and	terminal	management.	We	also	consider	 trends	 in	 the	 available	 company	 data	 concerning	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 of	 these	arrangements	 and,	 as	 far	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 do	 so,	 compare	 these	 trends	 with	 the	 findings	 of	 other	research	on	health	and	safety	outcomes	in	container	terminals.			In	Chapter	4	we	give	an	account	of	the	findings	from	our	questionnaire	survey	in	the	terminals	we	have	studied.	 We	 begin	 with	 a	 descriptive	 account	 of	 our	 findings	 largely	 drawn	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	survey.	We	go	on	to	analyse	these	findings	in	further	detail,	to	develop	some	composites	of	our	variables	to	 enable	 us	 to	 show	 more	 clearly	 the	 variation	 between	 the	 experiences	 in	 terminals	 in	 different	countries,	 in	 different	 jobs	 and	 between	 workers	 in	 different	 modes	 of	 employment.	 We	 use	 our	qualitative	interviews	to	explore	the	detail	of	these	differences	in	more	depth.			Chapters	3	and	4	therefore	provide	empirical	material	for	further	discussion	in	Chapter	5.	In	this	chapter	we	seek	to	explore,	in	the	ways	we	have	described	above,	the	experience	of	work	and	its	management	in	the	terminals	and	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	the	evidence	of	the	present	study	corroborates	or	qualifies	the	disconnects	between	safety	management	and	workers’	health	and	safety	experiences	suggested	in	in	our	previous	study.	We	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	the	present	study	is	able	to	throw	further	light	on	the	supports	and	constraints	of	effective	preventive	health	and	safety	in	container	terminals	generally.	This	leads	to	the	final	substantive	chapter	in	the	report	in	which,	in	the	light	of	our	findings,	we	discuss	what	determines	the	health	and	safety	outcomes	and	experiences	of	workers	in	container	terminals.	To	do	this,	we	place	our	national	findings	within	their	wider	economic,	labour	relations	and	regulatory	contexts.	We	evaluate	the	impact	of	these	contexts	on	the	health	and	safety	experiences	we	have	observed.			We	 end	 with	 conclusions	 concerning	 our	 findings	 overall	 and	 suggest	 some	 areas	 in	 which	 further	improvements	in	arrangements	for	the	health,	safety	and	wellbeing	of	workers	employed	in	the	operation	of	container	terminals	worldwide	might	be	considered.	
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2.	Research	Methods	
	This	section	describes	 the	methods	and	 instruments	used	 in	collecting	 the	data	 for	 this	project	and	 the	approaches	 taken	 to	 its	 analysis.	 As	 the	 research	 builds	 on	 and	 extends	 the	methodological	 approach	taken	in	our	preliminary	project,	(Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012),	we	summarise	the	methods	with	which	we	conducted	the	earlier	work.		
2.1 Summary	of	the	preliminary	project’s	methodological	approach	The	 aim	 of	 the	 preliminary	 study	 was	 to	 explore	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 indicators	 of	 good	practice	 in	participative	approaches	 to	managing	OHS	 in	GNT-operated	container	 terminals.	We	used	a	mixed-methods	approach	to	carry	out	a	two-level	 investigation.	First,	at	the	global	 level,	we	carried	out	both	a	questionnaire	survey	of	trade	union	representatives	and	a	set	of	semi-structured	interviews	with	a	sub-group	of	those	representatives.	We	sought	 information	on	health	and	safety	policies,	strategies	and	performance	from	the	headquarters	of	three	of	the	four	largest	GNTs2.	Second,	at	the	workplace	level,	we	carried	 out	 six	 case	 studies	 in	 terminals	 operated	 by	 the	 four	 largest	 GNTs.	 In	 each	 case	 study	 we	interviewed	 key	 members	 of	 the	 management	 team,	 as	 well	 as	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives.	 In	addition,	we	requested	terminal	level	information	on	OHS	strategies	and	performance.			The	preliminary	project,	therefore,	collected	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	globally	and	at	the	terminal	level.	The	questionnaire	data	were	used	indicatively	and	in	conjunction	with	the	global	level	interviews	to	describe	trade	union	representatives’	perceptions	of	the	presence	and	effectiveness	of	participative	OHS	management	 practices	 and	 prevailing	working	 and	 employment	 conditions	 in	 GNT-operated	 terminals	generally.	This,	coupled	with	the	global	level	OHS	performance	data3,	provided	a	backdrop	to	the	detailed	profiles	of	the	six	case	study	terminals.	Their	 inclusion	of	both	management	and	workers’	perspectives,	and	coverage	of	high	and	middle	income	economies,	allowed	the	preliminary	study	to	consider	how	and	at	what	level	OHS	management	in	the	case	study	terminals	was	determined,	how	it	was	put	into	practice	and	how	it	was	experienced	by	those	it	was	intended	to	safeguard,	as	well	as	to	make	some	comparisons	between	 GNT-run	 terminals	 operating	 in	 different	 economic	 and	 labour	 relations	 contexts	 and	circumstances.		
2.2 Data	collection	and	literature	review	We	undertook	a	comprehensive	review	of	 the	research	 literature	on	health	and	safety	arrangements	 in	container	terminals,	regulatory	provisions	in	the	countries	studied	and	the	economic	and	labour	relations	contexts	 in	 which	 the	 terminals	 we	 studied	 were	 situated.	 In	 so	 doing,	 we	 considered	 trends	 in	 the	development	of	container	terminals	as	one	element	in	the	reorganisation	and	restructuring	of	dock	work	globally	in	recent	decades.		In	 terms	 of	 data	 collection,	 the	 current	 study	 used	 a	 similar	mixed-methods	 approach	 to	 build	 on	 the	findings	of	our	preliminary	project.	Our	intention	was	to	extend	the	scope	of	the	research	by	carrying	out	case	studies	in	more	terminals	and	including	two	terminals	run	by	national	operators	rather	than	GNTs	as	well	as	a	 further	two	middle	 income	economy	GNT-run	terminals.	We	increased	the	reach	and	depth	of	the	 research	by	carrying	out	 surveys	of	workers	 in	all	 the	participating	 terminals	 –	 including	 those	we	studied	in	the	preliminary	project	and	those	that	were	new	to	the	current	study.		
																																																																				
2 GNTs were initially approached through the ITF, which had established working relationships with the leaders of these 
companies. No such relationship existed with the fourth GNT at the time of either the preliminary or the current project. 
3 These data, in practice, were limited and difficult to compare so were used purely descriptively.	
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Data	 were	 collected	 at	 three	 levels.	 At	 the	 global	 or	 corporate	 level,	 we	 approached	 the	 safety	departments	 in	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 three	 GNTs	 that	 provided	 data	 to	 the	 preliminary	 study4	 and	requested	 further	and	updated	 information	about	OSH	performance	(globally	or	corporately,	 regionally	and	 for	 the	 participating	 terminals)	 and	 about	 their	 strategic	 approaches	 to	 OHS	 management	 and	governance,	and	the	business	 level	headquarters	of	one	of	 the	national	operators5.	To	support	and	gain	increased	 understanding	 of	 these	 documentary	 and	 quantitative	 data	 and	 their	 provenance,	 we	conducted	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	 those	 responsible	 for	 occupational	 health	 and	 safety	 at	 the	corporate	level	wherever	possible.	For	all	six	companies	operating	the	case	study	terminals,	we	obtained	publicly	available	material	on	 these	areas.	At	 the	national	 level,	we	carried	out	 further	semi-structured	interviews	with	key	 informants,	 such	 as	 representatives	of	 relevant	 inspectorates	 and	port	 authorities.	These	 interviews	 were	 designed	 to	 provide	 data	 on	 the	 national	 legislative,	 labour	 relations,	 socio-economic	and	other	relevant	contexts	in	which	the	terminals	were	operating.	Lastly	at	the	terminal	level,	data	collection	was	approached	in	two	ways.	Within	the	six	terminals	that	participated	in	the	preliminary	project,	 we	 carried	 out	 surveys	 of	 the	 workforce	 but	 only	 carried	 out	 interviews	 if	 there	 were	 key	personnel	who,	because	of	time	restrictions,	had	been	unable	to	take	part	in	the	preliminary	study.	In	the	terminals	that	were	new	to	the	project,	in	addition	to	the	workforce	surveys,	semi-structured	interviews	were	 carried	 out	with	managers,	workers	 and	 their	 representatives,	 to	 provide	 full	 datasets	 on	 all	 the	case	study	terminals.		
2.2.1 Research	instruments	The	survey	schedules,	interview	guides,	participant	information	sheets,	consent	forms	and	project	flyers	used	in	the	study	were	drafted	and	designed	in	accordance	with	the	rigorous	ethical	standards	required	by	Cardiff	University	and	using	the	research	team’s	substantial	previous	experience	and	particularly	that	gained	 in	 the	 preliminary	 project.	 The	 ITF	 and	 union	 officials	 from	 a	 number	 of	 the	 participating	terminals	 commented	on	and	 tested	 the	 survey	 schedules	with	volunteers,	 and	 their	 comments,	 advice	and	recommendations	were	taken	into	account	in	the	final	instruments.		The	surveys	and	interview	guides	covered:	OHS	performance,	outcomes	and	experiences	in	terms	of	both	safety	and	health;	OHS	management,	 including	safety	practices	and	working	arrangements;	and	worker	representation,	 consultation	 and	 involvement	 (see	 Appendix).	 For	 the	 interview	 guides,	 the	 detail	 and	coverage	 of	 these	 areas	were	 altered	 to	 fit	 the	 respondent’s	 background	 and	position	 (e.g.	 focusing	 on	management	 practices	 among	 representatives	 of	 terminals’	 management	 teams,	 on	 individual	experiences	of	OHS	and	its	management	among	workers,	and	on	national	requirements,	monitoring	and	enforcement	 arrangements	 in	 relation	 to,	 for	 example,	 participation	 among	 national	 level	 key	informants).		
2.2.2 Global	and	national	level	data	collection	Approaches	to	terminal	operating	companies	were	made	at	the	headquarters	level.	All	such	approaches,	as	well	 as	 those	 to	 key	 informants	 at	 the	 national	 level,	were	made	 directly	 by	 the	 research	 team	 and	wherever	 possible	 through	 contacts	 established	 by	 the	 research	 team	 during	 the	 preliminary	 project.	Interviews	were	carried	out	face-to-face.		
2.2.3 Terminal	level	data	collection	–	the	case	studies	For	 each	 of	 the	 participating	 terminals,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 the	preliminary	 project,	 consent	 for	 the	 case	 study	 was	 sought	 from	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 company	operating	the	terminal	(the	GNT	or	the	national	operator),	from	the	most	senior	manager	at	the	terminal	and	 from	 the	 union	 officials	within	 the	 terminals	where	 unions	were	 active.	Members	 of	 the	 research	
																																																																				4	The fourth GNT was also approached at the corporate level but did not respond. 
5 The other national operator was approached but declined. 
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team	 spent	 several	 days	 in	 each	 participating	 terminal	 carrying	 out	 the	 fieldwork.	 This	 involved	 both	interviewing	and	running	and/or	facilitating	the	surveys.		In	 each	 terminal,	 a	 questionnaire	 survey	 of	 the	 operational	workforce	was	 carried	 out.	 The	number	 of	workers	 targeted	 in	 each	 terminal	 varied	 for	 pragmatic	 reasons,	 but	we	 aimed	 to	 achieve	 a	 completed	questionnaire	 from	 between	 15%	 and	 50%	 of	 the	 workforce	 in	 each	 terminal.	 Our	 ideal	 approach	 to	questionnaire	 distribution	 was	 for	 the	 terminal’s	 management	 and	 union	 officials	 to	 agree	 to	 allow	research	 team	members	 to	administer	 the	questionnaire	 to	groups	of	workers	during	a	break	or	at	 the	start	or	end	of	a	shift.	This	was	not	always	possible	or	permitted,	so	various	other	approaches	were	also	used	 including:	 administration	 to	 individuals	 by	 research	 team	 members	 and/or	 workers’	representatives	in	rest	areas	on	the	terminals	on	an	ad	hoc	basis;	and	administration	to	groups	of	workers	by	 research	 team	members	 and/or	union	officials	 outside	 the	 terminals	 and	outside	working	hours	by	arrangement	with	the	union	officials.			In	 some	 terminals,	we	were	 also	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 diary	 survey	 of	 limited	 groups	 of	workers.	 These	surveys	were	intended	to	collect	workers’	experiences	over	a	normal	set	of	shifts	to	give	an	indication	of	day-to-day	workplace	health	and	safety.	This	involved	workers	completing	a	brief	set	of	measures	before	the	start	of	each	one	of	their	normal	set	of	shifts.	We	aimed	to	collect	10	diaries	from	each	of	two	groups	of	workers	(by	job	type)	from	each	terminal	in	which	the	diary	surveys	were	carried	out.	Where	possible,	members	of	 the	research	team	introduced	the	diary	survey	to	participants	at	 the	start	of	 their	working	week	and	collected	the	schedules	back	from	them	at	the	end	of	their	working	week.	Where	this	was	not	possible,	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons,	 research	 team	 members	 briefed	 workers’	 representatives	 or	 union	officials	in	the	diary	survey	administration.		All	 the	 case	 study	 interviews	and	 surveys	used	 the	appropriate	 language	 for	 the	area	and	account	was	taken	of	local	terminology	and	arrangements	in	the	guides	and	schedules.		
2.2.4 Ethical	approval	Ethical	approval	for	the	design	and	methods	used	in	the	project	was	obtained	from	the	Cardiff	University	School	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 Research	 Ethics	 committee.	 After	 participants’	 informed	 consent	 had	 been	obtained,	interviews	were	carried	out	face-to-face	and	were	recorded	wherever	possible.	The	recordings	were	 transcribed	 and	 the	 transcriptions	 anonymised.	 Questionnaire	 and	 diary	 data	 were	 collected	anonymously	(no	identifying	data	were	requested)	and	serial	numbers	were	given	to	questionnaires	and	diaries	after	they	were	returned	to	the	research	team.	All	data	(qualitative	and	quantitative)	were	stored	in	accordance	with	the	rigorous	standards	required	by	Cardiff	University.		
2.3 Data	analysis	Qualitative	data	were	coded	using	a	 thematic	 framework	and	analysed	 in	NVIVO	software.	Quantitative	survey	data	were	analysed	using	bivariate	and	multivariate	techniques	in	SPSS	software.	In	each	case,	the	analyses	were	designed	to	consider	and	explore	OHS	management	and	performance	experiences,	to	make	comparisons	between	regions	and	economies	and	between	workers	grouped	according	to	their	 job	and	employment	 types.	 Quantitative	 OHS	 performance	 data	 have	 again	 been	 used	 purely	 descriptively	because	of	their	relatively	limited	nature	and	problems	of	comparability.		
2.4 Participants	In	 total,	 case	 studies	 were	 carried	 out	 in	 11	 terminals.	 Tables	 2.1	 and	 2.2	 give	 details	 of	 the	 survey	participants	 and	 the	 interview	 participants	 respectively.	 Overall,	 1849	 dockworkers	 completed	 a	questionnaire	and	120	completed	a	diary	(Table	2.1).	 In	addition,	178	people	took	part	 in	an	interview,	
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including	76	as	part	of	the	current	project6.	This	includes	the	case	study	and	key	informant	interviewees	detailed	in	Table	2.2,	and	the	8	global	level	interviewees	representing	the	safety	teams	of	GNTs	1	(N=1),	2	(N=1)	and	3	(N=6).		Our	 survey	 sampling	 strategy	 was	 intended	 to	 achieve	 representative	 numbers	 of	 respondents	 in	 key	operational	positions	in	each	terminal.	Ideally	it	aimed	for	50%	of	the	operational	workforce.	In	practice,	however,	this	was	only	practical	and	possible	in	the	terminals	with	fewer	workers,	so	targets	varied	from	15-50%.	 As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2.1,	 returns	 came	 close	 to	 these	 targets	 in	 most	 cases	 and	 significantly	exceeded	them	in	 two	cases.	 In	one	 terminal	 in	which	returns	 fell	 substantially	short	of	our	 target,	 this	was	the	result	of	limited	co-operation	from	the	terminal	management.		
Table	2.1:	Questionnaire	and	diary	survey	respondents	
AREA	 TERMINAL	 QUESTIONNAIRES	 %	OF	TARGET	 %	OF	WORKFORCE	 DIARIES	
ASIA	PACIFC	
AP2T2	 420	 140	 39	 34	AP2T1	 57	 29	 8	 30	AP2T3	 102	 68	 18	 NA	AP2T4	 196	 196	 37	 4	AP1T1	 221	 67	 34	 25	AP1T2	 169	 91	 46	 9	
EUROPE	
EU1T1	 363	 97	 48	 NA	EU1T2	 13	 65	 65	 NA	EU2T1	 60	 46	 12	 NA	EU2T2	 185	 62	 9	 18	EU2T3	 75	 81	 41	 NA	
TOTAL	 1849*	 85	 25	 120		*Includes	2	questionnaires	 from	 the	Europe	area	1	 for	which	 the	 terminal	 the	 respondent	worked	at	 could	not	be	identified.					 	
																																																																				6	There was less than two years between the interviews for the current study and those carried out during the preliminary 
project, with current study interviewees asked about any changes that had taken place between the two projects. As our 
findings show, there was generally little change during this period and the more recent interviews corroborated all the main 
findings of those carried out as part of the preliminary project. 	
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Table	2.2:	Interview	participants	(General	information)	
INTERVIEWS	 PRELIMINARY	 CURRENT	
MANAGEMENT	 44	 17	
WORKERS	 50	 34	
KEY	INFORMANTS	 8	 25	
TOTAL	 102	 76	
OVERALL		 178	
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Table	2.3:	Interview	participants	(Detailed	Information)		 AREA	 ASIA	PACIFIC	
TERMINALS	 AP2T1	 AP2T2	 AP2T3	 AP2T4	 AP1T1	 AP1T2	
IN
TE
RV
IE
W
EE
S	
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T	
CURRENT	PROJECT	 	 	 3	representing	safety	and	human	resources	departments	
4	representing	the	operations,	engineering	and	safety	departments	
2	representing	the	operations	and	safety	departments	 1	representing	the	safety	department	
PRELIMINARY	STUDY	
5	representing	the	operations,	engineering	and	safety	departments	
11	representing	the	operations,	engineering	and	safety	departments	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
W
O
RK
ER
S	
CURRENT	PROJECT	 	 	 	 5	including	2	crane	drivers,	2	lashers	and	1	truck	trailer	driver	
19	including	9	stevedores,	4	technicians,	2	gantry	crane	operators,	2	safety	facilitators,	1	fork	lift	driver	and	1	trainer	(6	were	also	safety	committee	members)	
9	including	4	straddle	carrier	drivers,	3	stevedores,	1	safety	facilitator	and	1	tower	clerk	(3	were	also	safety	committee	members,	3	were	also	union	H&S	representatives,	2	were	also	union	delegates	and	2	were	also	safety	facilitators)	
PRELIMINARY	STUDY	
9	including	5	contract	truck	trailer	drivers,	3	crane	drivers	and	a	gantry	crane	operator	
8	including	5	contract	truck	trailer	drivers	and	3	crane	drivers		 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
K
EY
	
IN
FO
RM
AN
TS
	 CURRENT	PROJECT	 5	including	3	representing	the	dock	inspectorate,	1	representing	the	port	safety	department	and	1	representing	the	harbour	master	 2	including	1	union	official	and	1	dock	inspectorate	representative	
7	including	5	union	officials	and	2	inspectorate	representatives	 8	including	1	union	official	and	7	inspectorate	representatives	PRELIMINARY	STUDY	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A		 TOTAL	 14	 24	 5	 9	 28	 18		
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	 AREA	 EUROPE	
TERMINALS	 EU1T1	 EU1T2	 EU2T1	 EU2T2	 EU2T3	
IN
TE
RV
IE
W
EE
S	
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T	 CURRENT	PROJECT	 	 	 	 1	representing	the	safety	and	operations	departments	
6	representing	the	safety	and	the	contract	operations	and	safety	departments	
PRELIMINARY	STUDY	 7	representing	the	safety,	operations,	engineering	and	human	resources	departments	
12	representing	the	safety,	operations,	engineering,	planning	and	IT	departments	
9	representing	the	safety,	operations,	engineering	and	human	resources	departments	 	 N/A	
W
O
RK
ER
S	
CURRENT	PROJECT	 	 	 1	contract	stevedore	and	union	delegate	 	 	
PRELIMINARY	STUDY	 12	stevedores	(2	were	also	union	delegates	and	10	were	also	union	activists)	 6	including	2	foremen,	2	lashers	and	2	straddle	carrier	drivers	
8	including	7	stevedores	and	1	technician	(4	were	also	union	delegates	and	2	were	also	safety	representatives)	
7	including	3	tug	drivers	and	4	stevedores	(2	were	also	union	delegates	and	4	were	also	safety	representatives)	
N/A	
K
EY
	IN
FO
RM
AN
TS
	 CURRENT	PROJECT	
2	including	1	inspectorate	representative	and	1	management	representative,	who	is	also	a	safety	expert	on	the	joint	OHS	committee	for	the	port	
1	inspectorate	representative	 	 	 	
PRELIMINARY	STUDY	
5	including	3	union	official,	a	union	appointed	employment	agency	safety	training	and	a	representative	of	the	employment	agency	safety	department	 2	union	officials	 	 1	union	official	 N/A		 TOTAL	 26	 21	 18	 9	 6				 	
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3.	Managing	health	and	safety	in	container	terminals	–	company	and	terminal	arrangements	
	This	 Chapter	 presents	 our	 findings	 on	 the	 strategies	 and	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	 of	 occupational	 health	 and	 safety	 as	 they	 were	 explained	 to	 us	 in	 interviews	 with	representatives	 of	 management	 and	 OHS	 support	 services	 in	 the	 companies	 operating	 the	 container	terminals	we	studied.	We	carried	out	case	studies	in	11	container	terminals	operated	by	6	companies	in	4	countries	(Table	3.1).	The	terminals	were	situated	in	two	different	parts	of	Europe	and	in	two	different	areas	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	They	included	terminals	operated	by	four	of	the	largest	GNT	companies	and	 two	national	 companies,	 one	 in	Europe	and	one	 in	Asia	Pacific.	Nine	of	 the	participating	 terminals	were	operated	by	GNTs	(5	by	GNT	1,	2	by	GNT	2,	2	by	GNT	3	and	1	by	GNT	4),	with	the	other	2	terminals	run	by	national	operators	(Table	3.1).		
Table	3.1:	The	case	study	terminals,	their	regions	and	operators	
REGION	 NATIONAL	AREA	 TERMINAL	OPERATOR	 TERMINAL	
EUROPE	
EU1	 GNT	2	 EU1T1	GNT	3	 EU1T2	
EU2	 GNT	1	 EU2T1	GNT	4	 EU2T2	National	2	 EU2T3	
ASIA	PACIFIC	
AP1	 GNT	1	 AP1T1	National	1	 AP1T2	
AP2	 GNT	1	 AP2T1	GNT	3	 AP2T2	GNT	1	 AP2T3	GNT	2	 AP2T4		The	 aim	 in	 this	 Chapter	 is	 to	 present	 a	 descriptive	 analysis	 of	 the	 strategic	 positions	 taken	 by	 the	companies	 operating	 container	 terminals	 and	 to	 show	 how	 this	 strategy	 is	 turned	 into	 operational	arrangements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 within	 the	 terminals	 themselves	 –	 that	 is,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	workplace.	Additionally	we	analyse	company	information	concerning	health	and	safety	outcomes,	based	on	data	they	have	gathered	on	reported	injuries	and	fatalities	among	workers	in	their	terminals	in	recent	years.			Using	 documentary	 sources	 and	 the	 transcripts	 of	 interviews	 conducted	 at	 company	 Head	 Offices,	 we	begin	with	a	profile	of	each	of	the	companies	we	have	studied	and	the	policies	and	arrangements	made	at	the	company	level	for	the	governance	and	management	of	the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	workers	in	the	terminals	under	their	control.	We	follow	this	with	a	description	of	the	available	data	on	health	and	safety	performance	–	which,	broadly	speaking,	we	find	to	be	indicative,	not	so	much	of	the	performance	itself,	but	 of	 the	 limitations	 in	 what	 this	 data	 can	 reliably	 tell	 us	 concerning	 performance.	 Focusing	 on	 the	terminals,	 we	 provide	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 the	 main	 features	 of	 each	 before	 exploring	 their	arrangements	for	the	implementation	and	operation	of	company	policies	and	procedures	for	health	and	safety	management.	 Based	 on	 interviews	with	 the	 operational	 and	 health	 and	 safety	management	 and	supervisors	in	each	of	the	terminals,	we	consider	the	general	character	of	the	management	systems	and	arrangements	 for	health	 and	 safety	 that	 are	 in	place	 in	 the	 terminals	 and	 their	main	objectives,	 before	
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examining	them	in	more	detail.	Here	we	have	taken	the	opportunity	to	explore,	in	more	detail,	aspects	of	OHS	management	where	there	appeared	to	be	some	level	of	disconnect	between	arrangements	described	by	managers	and	the	experiences	of	them	as	described	by	workers	and	their	representatives.	In	the	final	section	 of	 the	 chapter	 we	 summarise	 our	 findings	 and	 draw	 some	 broad	 conclusions	 concerning	 the	character	of	the	arrangements	we	found.		
3.1 Features	of	governance	and	management	of	OHS	in	global	and	national	
container	terminal	companies	Three	 of	 the	 four	 GNT	 companies	 had	 clear	 centralised	 arrangements	 in	 place	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	of	safety,	health	and	environment	matters	at	the	global	corporate	level,	while	the	fourth	was	rather	more	decentralised	in	its	approach.	Policies	and	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	in	place	at	the	corporate	 level	 shared	 a	 number	 of	 common	 features.	 For	 example,	 generally,	 at	 Board	 level,	 a	commitment	was	claimed	to	ensuring	the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	the	workforce,	including	striving	to	improve	health	and	safety	outcomes	to	help	to	achieve	this.	In	some	cases,	overall	responsibility	for	OHS	was	stated	to	rest	with	named	individuals	at	this	level	and	systems	were	in	place	to	ensure	that	regular	corporate	reporting	of	health	and	safety	matters	 to	 these	 individuals	occurred.	Each	of	 the	 three	global	companies	with	these	more	centralised	arrangements	included	a	special	corporate	unit	devoted	to	safety,	health	 and	 environment	 matters,	 with	 expertise	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	 monitor	 and	 advise	 on	 the	development	 and	operation	of	 global	 company	 strategies	within	 the	 terminals.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	were	 further	 systems	 to	 ensure	 communication	 of	 OHS	messages	 from	 this	 level	 to	 that	 of	 individual	business	 units	 and,	 in	most	 cases,	 vice	 versa.	 Generally	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 some	movement	 in	developing	and	refining	approaches	at	this	level	in	the	relatively	recent	past	in	several	of	the	companies	in	 the	 study	 –	 and	 while	 there	 was	 a	 willingness	 among	 interviewees	 at	 the	 corporate	 level	 in	 these	companies	to	explain	the	need	for	such	change,	at	the	same	time	they	also	felt	it	was	perhaps	too	soon	to	comment	extensively	on	the	effectiveness	of	these	changes.			A	 key	 issue	 for	 all	 the	GNT	 companies	 concerned	how	 they	managed	 relations	between	 the	 company’s	global	 corporate	 strategies	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 terminals	 they	 operated	 to	 be	 responsive	 to	 local	conditions	 that	 affected	 their	 business.	 Policy	 and	 management	 arrangements	 for	 safety	 and	 health	reflected	 this	 tension	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 and	 each	 of	 the	 four	 GNT	 companies	 determined	 for	themselves	the	ways	in	which	they	found	a	suitable	balance.	Three	were	similar	in	the	general	character	of	their	approach	in	this	respect,	while	the	fourth	appeared	considerably	more	decentralised.		Broadly	speaking,	the	two	national	companies	had	defined	responsibilities,	procedures	and	arrangements	for	 corporate	 governance	 and	 management	 of	 OHS	 at	 the	 company	 level	 as	 well	 as	 arrangements	 to	implement	OHS	management	systems	in	the	terminals	we	studied.		In	 the	 following	 sections	we	 explore	 in	 further	 detail	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 responsibilities	 for	 the	governance	and	management	of	OHS	were	delivered	at	the	corporate	and	terminal	levels.		
	The	four	GNT	companies	in	the	study	were	among	the	largest	involved	in	the	container	terminal	business.	Each	had	a	portfolio	of	 interests	in	container	terminals	and	related	logistics	activities	–	as	well	as	other	business	activities.	Collectively	 they	are	estimated	 to	be	 responsible	 for	 almost	half	 of	 global	 container	terminal	business.	The	growth	of	these	companies	and	the	main	features	of	their	governance,	structure,	operation	and	business	have	been	analysed	in	the	recent	literature	summarised	in	the	previous	Chapter.	Our	 investigations	 and	 discussions	with	managers	 at	 the	 global	 level	 in	 these	 companies	 suggested	 no	significant	departures	from	the	features	already	presented	in	this	literature	(see	for	example:	Bichou	and	Bell,	 2007;	 Parola	 and	 Musso,	 2007;	 Notteboom	 and	 Rodrique,	 2012)	 concerning	 their	 character,	business,	growth	and	governance.	 In	general,	 the	rise	 to	prominence	of	 these	GNT	companies	has	been	both	comparatively	recent	and	rapid.	Consequently	all	the	companies	concerned	are	relatively	new	to	the	business	 of	 global	 networks	 of	 container	 terminals.	 Each	 developed	 from	 more	 localised	 business	interests	 either	 in	 stevedoring,	 or	 as	 offshoots	 of	 shipping	 companies	 with	 interests	 in	 ports,	 or	 from	financial	 holdings	 companies	 initially	 investing	 in	 ports	 for	 revenue	 generation,	 which	 subsequently	
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developed	business	interests	in	the	operation	and	direct	management	of	their	container	terminal	assets	globally.			The	 companies	 have	 all	 grown	 in	 size	 and	 business	 largely	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 opportunities	presented	 by	 port	 privatisation	 schemes	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 container	 carrier	 companies	 seeking	 to	improve	 the	 support	 for	 their	 core	 business.	Mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 have	 taken	 place	 alongside	 the	expansion	of	container	terminals	into	new	locations,	and	they	have	also	been	driven	by	the	efforts	of	the	larger	maritime	 shipping	 companies	 to	 gain	 even	 bigger	 shares	 of	 the	market	 for	 carrying	 containers,	with	 a	 resultant	 increasingly	 powerful	 role	 for	 these	 companies.	 This	 in	 turn	 has	 helped	 shape	 the	business	of	the	terminals	and	contributed	to	stevedoring	companies	seeking	alliances	or	acquisitions	 in	the	business	of	shipping,	 leading	to	a	development	of	global	networks	of	 increasingly	aligned	terminals	and	shipping	lines	in	a	highly	competitive	market	that	has	served	to	facilitate	the	emergent	dominance	of	a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 large	 and	 powerful	 players	 such	 as	 are	 exemplified	 by	 the	 GNTs	 in	 the	present	study.			As	noted	above,	three	of	the	four	GNTs	studied	had	arrangements	for	leadership	on	OHS	at	Board	level.	They	 aimed	 to	 ensure	 the	 delivery	 of	 this	 leadership	 through	 measures	 with	 which	 the	 corporate	governance	of	OHS	could	be	implemented	in	relation	to	the	business	units	(terminals)	of	the	companies.	They	 all	 acknowledged	 that	 exercising	 governance	 over	 the	 delivery	 of	 their	 commitments	 was	 more	straightforward	in	the	terminals	over	which	they	held	operational	control	and	far	less	so	in	those	(smaller	numbers	 of)	 terminals	 in	 which	 they	 held	 a	 business	 interest	 but	 did	 not	 have	 overall	 operational	control7.	There	were	several	similar	approaches	that	were	shared	by	these	three	of	the	four	GNTs	studied.	In	summary	they	include:		
• Clear	 statements	 of	 corporate	 leadership,	 responsibility	 and	 commitment	 from	Board	 and	CEO	level	–	 for	example	there	was	usually	a	strong	public	declaration	of	commitment	to	prioritising	safety	for	terminal	workers	from	the	Board	Chairperson	or	CEO	that,	in	at	least	one	case,	claimed	prioritisation	of	safety	and	health	of	all	workers	on	the	terminal	regardless	of	whether	they	were	there	 as	 employees	 of	 the	 company	 or	 part	 of	 the	 contractor	 workforce	 that	 is	 a	 significant	presence	in	many	terminals	operated	by	these	companies.		
• Leadership	commitment	was	usually	supported	with	a	set	of	global	standards	through	which	the	corporate	goals	were	to	be	achieved.	Typically	they	consisted	of	a	set	of	simple	statements	widely	promulgated	to	all	terminals	and	company	employees	–	often	displayed	in	the	terminals’	offices,	corridors,	canteens	and	rest	facilities.			
• Arrangements	were	in	place	at	corporate	level	to	ensure	appropriate	expertise	was	available	to	monitor	and	advise	on	the	company	performance	of	health	and	safety	across	the	activities	of	all	the	business	units.	Typically	 this	consisted	of	a	small	group	of	specialist	staff	 (on	average	3-4),	based	in	the	corporate	offices,	with	responsibility	for	co-ordination,	monitoring	and	advising	on	the	corporate	system	for	OHS	at	the	terminals.			
• The	structures	through	which	OHS	was	governed	and	managed	between	the	corporate	office	and	the	 business	 units	 varied.	 In	 one	 GNT	 there	 was	 a	 regional	 structure	 into	 which	 terminals	 in	different	regions	were	grouped	and	within	which	 further	expertise	was	available	 to	support	as	well	as	monitor	OHS	activities	at	the	level	of	the	terminals	and	provide	feedback	to	the	corporate	level.	Others	performed	similar	activities	but	through	direct	links	between	the	business	units	and	the	specialist	personnel	at	Head	Office.			All	the	companies	had	sets	of	procedures	in	place	to	ensure	the	collection	of	data	on	safety	performance	and	its	reporting	to	corporate	level.	Usually	specialists	employed	at	corporate	level	processed	this	data,	before	 its	 key	 elements	 were	 circulated	 more	 widely	 among	 the	 business	 units.	 Other	 procedures	required	 the	reporting	of	 serious	 incidents	or	 those	with	a	high	potential	of	 severity	and	 in	most	cases																																																																					7	In	all	of	the	terminals	we	studied,	the	organisation	operating	the	terminal	had	overall	operational	control.		
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some	means	of	communicating	useful	information	concerning	the	future	prevention	of	such	incidents	was	used	to	convey	 ‘lessons	 learned’	 to	all	 the	 terminal	operators.	These	data	had	been	used	globally	 to	set	terminal	level	performance	targets	on	accidents	and	injuries.			As	far	as	company	strategies	concerning	OHS	governance	overall	were	concerned	there	were	a	number	of	distinctive	features	shared	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	by	three	of	the	four	GNTs	studied.	As	has	been	the	case	in	a	number	of	sectors	in	which	there	is	a	relatively	high	incidence	of	serious	and	fatal	injuries,	such	as	mining	and	construction,	acknowledgement	of	the	need	to	address	the	risks	that	lead	to	such	incidents	has	 been	 coupled	 with	 an	 awareness	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 simply	 predicted	 from	 the	 analysis	 and	interpretation	of	 trends	 in	 lost	 time	 injury	data.	The	 result	has	been	 that	 recent	 revisions	of	 corporate	strategies	have	placed	greater	emphasis	on	achieving	‘zero	harm’	in	the	terminals	which,	as	is	usually	the	case	 with	 such	 strategies,	 is	 coupled	 with	 movement	 away	 from	 a	 traditional	 concentration	 on	interpreting	and	monitoring	trends	in	lost	time	injuries	to	paying	more	attention	to	the	investigation	and	analysis	of	low	frequency	high	potential	incidents.	We	return	to	a	further	discussion	of	the	implications	of	such	 ‘zero	harm’	 strategies	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 terminal	 companies	 operate	 them	 later.	 First	we	consider	 arrangements	 for	 governance	 and	management	 in	 each	of	 the	 companies	 in	more	detail,	with	some	of	the	measures	of	performance	outcomes	made	available	by	the	companies.		
3.1.1 GNT	1	GNT	 1	 employs	 over	 30,000	 people	 and	 operates	 over	 60	 terminals	 globally.	 It	 handles	more	 than	 60	million	TEUs	annually,	and	at	the	time	of	the	study	was	planning	to	develop	and	extend	its	network	and	capacity	substantially	in	the	next	few	years.	Its	safety	strategy	is	globally	driven.	As	part	of	this	corporate	approach,	 the	 company’s	 headquarters	 rolls	 out	 management	 systems	 with	 specific	 processes	 and	procedures	 and	 runs	 regular	 campaigns	 and	 benchmarking	 exercises	 to	 measure	 its	 standing	 against	global	standards	and	industry	best	practice.	The	global	safety	and	environment	department	leads	in	these	activities	 and	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 series	 of	 regional	 safety	 departments,	 through	which	 safety	 strategies,	approaches	and	systems	are	cascaded	to	the	terminals	and	OHS	performance	information	is	returned	for	central	 analysis	and	monitoring.	The	company	currently	has	global	 targets	of	 zero	 fatalities	and	a	20%	reduction	 in	 lost	 time	 injury	 frequency	 rate	 (LTIFR)	which	 it	 describes	 as	 having	 fallen	 by	 37%	 since	2009).	One	of	 its	ways	of	aiming	to	meet	these	targets	across	all	 its	terminals	has	been	to	issue	a	set	of	global	standards	in	relation	to	seven	areas	identified	as	high	accident	potential	work	activities:	pedestrian	safety,	handling	loads,	working	at	height,	mobile	equipment,	vessel	safety,	engineering	and	isolation.	Each	standard	contains	minimum	control	measures	to	mitigate	the	potential	for	accidents.	Over	the	eight	years	prior	to	the	study,	GNT	1	had	67	fatalities	globally,	all	of	which	were	in	one	of	these	areas.	GNT	1	also	sets	global	 standards	 for	 ‘human	 capital’	 global	 engagement	 programmes	 for	 risk	 management	 and	 it	periodically	 conducts	 global	 surveys	 of	 employees	 on	matters	 such	 as	 ‘engagement’	 which	 are	 further	supported	 by	 subsequent	 discussion	 seminars.	 The	 organisation	 describes	 its	 policies	 as	 meeting	 or	exceeding	national	health	and	safety	 legislation	wherever	 it	operates,	 complying	with	all	aspects	of	 the	OHSAS	18001	international	certification	system,	and	includes	a	requirement	for	all	staff	and	contractors	to	meet	health	and	safety	requirements	and	participate	in	comprehensive	training.	Its	approach	includes:	health,	safety	and	environment	programmes	to	improve	understanding	and	strengthen	the	safety	culture	at	all	terminals;	safety	and	environment	assessments;	and	the	delivery	of	accident	investigation	training	to	 all	 terminals	 to	 enhance	 the	quality	of	 investigations	 and	 improve	 risk	management.	There	 is	 also	 a	global	 commitment	 to	 creating	 a	 safe	 culture	 across	 all	 operations	 and	 regularly	 monitoring	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 safety	 strategy	 including	 employee	 training,	 regular	 audits	 and	 management	objectives	in	relation	to	safety.	GNT	1	draws	attention	to	its	zero	tolerance	of	conditions	and	behaviours	contributing	to	workplace	incidents.	Its	view	is	that	operational,	safety	and	security	risks	are	decreasing	through	rigorous	and	continuous	monitoring	by	management	and	by	having	review	processes,	policies,	guidance	documents	and	operational	procedures	in	place.		Overall,	a	recent	annual	report	 indicated	that	52%	of	GNT	1’s	employees	have	worked	for	the	company	for	more	than	five	years.	The	GNT	describes	itself	as	adhering	to	local	labour	regulations	and	statutes	but	emphasises	 that	 it	 is	 a	 single	organisation	with	 common	goals,	 reinforced	with	 common	approaches	 to	
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reward,	performance	management	and	succession	planning.	An	example	of	this	is	its	requirement	that	at	the	terminal	level	that	at	least	one	of	the	objectives	that	earns	a	bonus	must	be	linked	to	a	safety	measure.		In	total,	about	two	thirds	of	the	company’s	person	hours	are	worked	by	direct	employees	and	one	third	by	contractors.	However,	as	Figure	3.1	shows,	rates	for	their	Asia	Pacific	and	European	terminals,	as	well	as	for	 the	case	study	 terminals	 in	each	of	 those	regions,	varied	substantially.	Partial	year	 figures	 for	2013	suggest	an	increase	in	the	proportion	of	hours	worked	by	indirectly	employed	workers	in	Europe	and	the	case	study	terminal	EU2T1.		
Figure	3.1:	Employee	and	contractor	hours	(%)	for	the	Asia	Pacific	and	Europe	regions	and	the	
case	study	terminals	for	GNT	1	
		Company	data	on	lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	for	GNT	1	show	a	decline	between	2007	and	2012	from	16.5	to	7.3	per	million	hours	worked.	A	recent	annual	report	suggests	that	this	has	continued,	with	LTIFR	falling	by	12%	to	6.4	in	2013.	Behind	these	rates	are	an	increase	in	hours	worked	(from	over	85	million	in	2007	 to	 approaching	 100	million	 in	 2012)	 and	 a	 drop	 in	 absolute	 numbers	 of	 lost	 time	 injuries	 (from	nearly	1500	to	under	500).	These	trends	were	broadly	mirrored	in	the	regional	and	terminal	level	data.	However,	there	were	also	large	differences	in	rates	between	the	regions	and	terminals	–	ranging	from	a	rate	of	84.8	lost	time	injuries	per	million	hours	worked	in	terminal	AP1T1	to	one	of	0	in	AP2T1	in	2009	and	2012	and	in	AP2T3	in	2009	and	2010.	In	addition,	the	AP1T1	rates	were	closer	to	those	of	terminal	EU2T1	and	Europe	as	a	whole,	 suggesting	a	difference	by	economic	 income	area	 rather	 than	by	 region	(Figure	3.2).	A	difference	of	this	scale	calls	into	question	the	accuracy	of	the	data,	raising	the	possibility	of	incomplete	reporting	and/or	different	reporting	‘thresholds’	in	terminals	by	economic	income	area.	It	is	also	 significant	 because	 of	 the	 numbers	 of	 workers	 involved.	 GNT	 1,	 for	 example,	 employs	 over	 3000	people	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	alone	(i.e.	not	the	Asia	Pacific	region	as	a	whole),			
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Figure	3.2:	Lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	per	million	hours	worked	for	2007	to	2012	for	the	Asia	
Pacific	and	Europe	regions	and	the	case	study	terminals	for	GNT	1	
		Limited	 data	 were	 available	 on	 lost	 time	 injury	 frequency	 rates	 to	 enable	 comparisons	 to	 be	 made	between	directly	and	indirectly	employed	workers.	These	comparisons	should	therefore	be	approached	with	great	caution,	but	they	suggest	a	higher	LTIFR	among	those	who	were	indirectly	employed	(Figure	3.3).		
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Figure	3.3:	Lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	for	directly	and	indirectly	employed	GNT	1	workers	for	
2013	to	October	
		
3.1.2 GNT	2	GNT	2	handles	over	60	million	TEUs	annually,	increasing	its	throughput	by	nearly	3%	in	2013.	Like	GNT	1,	it	has	a	strategic	approach	to	health	and	safety	globally.	This	included	rolling	out	its	safety,	security	and	environment	management	system	framework	to	all	of	its	terminals	and	recently	holding	an	organisation-wide	safety	week.		Considering	lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	per	100	workers	for	GNT	2	showed	similar	patterns	to	those	seen	 in	 the	 GNT	 1	 data	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 the	 downward	 trend	 in	 rates	 generally	 and	 the	 difference	between	rates	by	region,	as	well	as	indicating	that	both	the	GNT’s	case	study	terminals’	trends	were	very	similar	to	those	for	the	regions	in	which	they	were	situated	(Figure	3.4).		
Figure	3.4:	Lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	per	100	workers	worked	for	2009	to	2013	for	the	Asia	
Pacific	and	Europe	regions	and	the	case	study	terminals	for	GNT	2	
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indirectly	employed	workers	compared	to	those	who	were	directly	employed	within	Europe	as	a	whole	and	 in	 terminal	 EU1T1	 (Figure	3.5).	 This	 lends	 some	weight	 to	 the	 suggestion	 from	 the	GNT	1	data	 of	poorer	OHS	outcomes	for	indirectly	employed	workers.	Here	again,	however,	the	numbers	involved	were	very	 small	 in	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 region,	 adding	 to	 the	 concerns	 raised	 above	 about	 data	 accuracy	 and	comparability	between	regions	and	income	economy	types.		
Figure	3.5:	Lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	per	million	hours	worked	for	2012	and	2013	for	
Europe	and	the	case	study	terminals	for	GNT	2	
		For	the	years	2009	to	2013,	there	were	six	fatalities	in	the	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	regions,	including	one	in	 the	Asia	Pacific	 case	study	 terminal.	There	were	 three	 in	each	region.	Two	occurred	 in	 the	years	 for	which	data	showing	directly	and	 indirectly	employed	workers	separately	were	available.	Of	 these,	both	were	in	Europe	in	2013,	with	one	directly	employed	and	one	indirectly	employed	worker	killed.		
3.1.3 GNT	3	GNT	3	employs	over	20,000	people	globally,	 operating	over	70	 terminals	 in	more	 than	60	 countries.	 It	handles	 over	 30	 million	 TEUs	 annually.	 It	 has	 a	 global	 approach	 to	 safety,	 with	 a	 recently	 appointed	headquarters	level	safety	team	and	new	additional	resources	for	training,	measurements	and	behaviour	change.	 It	 identifies	 risk	 management,	 leadership,	 technological	 innovation	 and	 learning	 as	 the	 core	elements	of	 its	strategic	approach	 to	safety,	describing	 its	approach	as	one	of	zero	 tolerance	 for	unsafe	acts	 in	 which	 everyone	 is	 expected	 to	 intervene.	 With	 perhaps	 the	 most	 well-developed	 strategic	approach	to	governance	and	management	among	the	GNTs,	GNT	3	characterises	its	approach	as	focusing	on	improving	safety,	productivity	and	efficiency	by	ensuring	that	employees	build	skills,	capabilities	and	performance	 while	 ensuring	 that	 their	 rights	 are	 upheld	 through	 the	 organisation’s	 global	 labour	standards.	 One	 of	 these	 covers	 employee	 working	 hours,	 which	 are	 now	 described	 as	 successfully	managed,	and	another	is	aimed	at	ensuring	that	wages	meet	basic	needs.	A	further	such	standard	covers	worker	representation,	and	here	GNT	3	states	that	70%	of	terminals	have	a	workplace	committee,	with	participating	 employee-elected	 representatives,	 intended	 to	 improve	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 and	promote	 company-employee	 co-operation.	 The	 latest	 annual	 report	 says	 that	 the	 organisation	 will	continue	to	work	to	achieve	greater	global	consistency	and	alignment	to	labour	standards	in	all	locations,	
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focusing	on	improving	communications	between	the	company	and	its	global	workforce	as	well	as	building	local	capacity	and	working	to	integrate	the	standards	more	effectively	into	local	processes.		The	GNT’s	goal	is	zero	fatalities,	and	deaths	have	come	down	from	10	in	2011	and	five	in	2012	to	three	in	2013.	 Its	 ‘materiality	matrix’	puts	safety	at	 the	highest	 level	of	 importance	 to	both	 the	business	and	 its	stakeholders,	close	to	 issues	such	as	emergency	/	spills	response.	The	main	safety	risks	are	categorised	into	four	areas	–	traffic,	working	at	height,	falling	objects	and	stored	energy.	These	are	addressed	by	the	organisation’s	global	minimum	requirements	for	safety	with	which	all	terminals	must	comply.	Numbers	of	 safety	 inspections	 and	 reviews	have	been	 increased,	 and	new	standards	 in	 relation	 to	work	permits	and	machinery	have	recently	been	implemented.	The	GNT’s	own	employee	engagement	survey	suggests	its	 efforts	 are	 regarded	 favourably	within	 the	workforce,	 with	 81%	 of	 operations	 staff	 responses	 to	 a	question	on	company	commitment	to	employee	safety	described	as	favourable.		In	 relation	 to	 contractor	 organisations,	 GNT	 3	 describes	 them	 as	 actively	 involved	 in	 safety	 and	 lists	supply	chain	partners	as	contributing	to	safety	improvement.	Its	recent	global	safety	culture	survey	was	made	available	to	all	employees,	contractors	and	third	parties.		Data	 for	2011	to	2013	(to	August)	suggest,	 like	 those	 for	GNTs	1	and	2,	a	downward	trend	 in	 lost	 time	injury	 frequency	 rates	 per	 million	 hours	 worked.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 here	 that	 the	substantial	regional	(income	economy	type)	differences	in	the	GNT	1	and	2	data	are	not	apparent	in	the	GNT	 3	 data	 (Figure	 3.6),	 suggesting	 that,	 in	 this	 case,	 more	 comparable	 reporting	 practices	 and/or	performance	in	the	two	regions.		
Figure	3.6:	Lost	time	injury	frequency	rates	per	million	hours	worked	for	2012	and	2013	for	
Europe,	Asia	Pacific	and	overall	for	GNT	3	
		
3.1.4 GNT	4	GNT	4	operates	globally,	employing	over	30,000	people	and	running	over	50	terminals	in	more	than	20	countries.	It	currently	has	an	overall	capacity	of	nearly	80	million	TEUs	annually	and	in	this	respect	often	features	as	the	market	leader	in	terms	of	throughput	volumes	and	number	of	terminals	in	comparisons	of	economic	and	business	profiles	among	GNTs	(see	for	example	Notteboom	and	Rodrigue,	2012).	However,	it	functions	rather	differently	to	the	other	GNTs	and	does	not	appear	to	have	a	well-developed	corporate	level	OHS	strategy,	preferring	to	leave	the	management	of	health	and	safety	to	individual	terminals.	At	the	global	 level	 it	 states	 that	 it	 observes	 international	 labour	 standards	 and	 laws	 in	 the	 areas	 in	which	 its	terminals	are	situated,	and	that	there	are	dedicated	workplace	safety	teams	within	the	terminal	business	units.		
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This	 said,	 there	 were	 perhaps	 some	 indications	 of	 change	 in	 this	 approach.	 For	 example,	 a	 relatively	recent	 innovation	was	a	 regional	 (European)	safety	committee	 that	met	at	 least	every	six	months.	This	was	seen	by	the	chair	of	the	committee	as	a	move	towards	more	‘global	thinking’,	with	parallels	in	other	aspects	of	the	business	such	as	the	engineering	and	commercial	sides.	The	committee	recently	developed	a	 set	 of	 minimum	 safety	 standards,	 most	 of	 which	 were	 based	 on	 regional	 and	 international	 (OHSAS	18001)	standards	and	what	the	chair	described	as	‘general	best	practice’.	These	were	to	be	circulated	to	terminals	 in	 the	 region	 that	would	self-assess	by	using	 them,	before	 individual	business	units	began	 to	audit	 each	 other.	 An	 audit	 tool	 for	 this	 purpose	 was	 in	 development,	 again	 based	 on	 international	standards	(OHSAS	18001).	The	committee	also	feeds	information	on	areas	such	as	OHS	performance	and	best	practice	back	to	a	global	level	committee.	This	move	towards	a	more	corporate	approach,	at	least	at	the	regional	level,	was	seen	as	a	positive	change,	though	GNT4	continues	to	differ	from	its	competitors	by	not	having	a	global	head	of	safety	or	a	corporate	strategic	approach.	Rather,	regional	co-ordinators	were	‘left	to	support,	administer	and	advise	at	the	regional	level’	–	which	meant	that	the	regional	committees	had	to	act	as	the	driving	force	for	change	or	improvement	on	OHS.		In	 contrast	 to	 the	 other	 GNT	 operators	 in	 this	 study,	 discussion	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 governance	 and	management	in	its	published	company	literature	is	almost	non-existent	and	performance	data	were	not	made	available	to	the	research	team	by	the	organisation.	
	
3.1.5 Features	of	governance	and	management	of	OHS	in	national	companies		Broadly	speaking	 the	 two	national	companies	had	 in	place	systems	of	governance	and	management	 for	safety	and	health	that	mirrored	those	of	the	GNTs,	albeit	on	a	smaller	and	less	formalised	scale.			
3.1.5.1 National	operator	1	National	 operator	 1	 has	 an	 annual	 capacity	 approaching	 4	 million	 TEUs.	 Like	 GNTs	 1	 to	 3,	 it	 has	 an	organisational	 level	strategic	approach	to	safety	 in	which	 it	describes	the	 involvement	of	employees,	as	well	as	 training,	 competence	and	effective	safety	standards,	as	essential.	This	 includes	a	company-wide	set	of	health	and	safety	management	standards.	Key	safety	policies	and	lead	initiatives	are	developed	at	headquarters	level	on	a	regular	basis.	For	example	its	recent	critical	safety	essentials	programme	aimed	at	improving	management	of	the	most	critical	safety	risks	and	a	new	OHS	system	for	improved	tracking,	notification	and	management	of	safety	 incidents.	A	programme	aimed	at	reshaping	safety	culture	and	a	safety	 leadership	 training	 programme	 is	 also	 planned.	 A	 recent	 focus	 has	 also	 been	 on	 improving	employees’	 engagement	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 OHS	 strategic	 plans	 around	 a	 common	 framework	with	 associated	 action	 plans	 that	 are	 tracked	 and	 reviewed	 at	 the	 divisional	 and	 headquarters’	 levels.	National	 1	 has	 six	 strategic	 safety	 objectives	 relating	 to:	 leadership	 and	management	 capability;	 safety	management	 systems;	 risk	 management	 capability;	 employee	 engagement;	 safety	 culture;	 and	verification.		The	organisation	has	an	executive	safety	committee	which	meets	monthly	to	discuss	safety	performance	and	incidents,	drive	improvement	initiatives	and	make	policy	decisions.	About	15%	of	executives’	pay	is	linked	to	improvements	in	safety	(recordable	injury	frequency	rate).		National	1’s	LTIFR	for	2013	fell	by	70%	from	2011,	an	improvement	of	over	30%	on	the	previous	year.	
	
3.1.5.2 National	operator	2	National	2	operates	a	network	of	seven	ports.	It	currently	has	a	less	well	developed	corporate	approach	to	health	and	safety	than	National	1,	but	is	undergoing	a	period	of	change.	At	the	time	of	writing	elements	of	OHS	management	were	standardised.	These	included,	for	example,	hazard	observations,	risk	assessments	and	permits	to	work.	Day-to-day	operational	safe	work	systems,	though,	were	developed	at	the	terminal	level.	However,	an	objective	for	the	coming	year	was	to	begin	to	standardise	more	elements	of	operations,	training,	safety	awareness	and	so	on,	first	regionally	and	then	across	the	whole	organisation,	with	a	view	to	standardising	as	much	as	possible	and	working	towards	a	set	of	minimum	standards,	which	managers	expected	to	save	time	and	money.	
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	The	human	resource	strategy	of	National	2	was	to	contract	out	its	operational	workforce.	To	do	so	it	had	in	 place	 various	 requirements	 covering	 competitive	 tendering	 in	 which	 specification	 of	 OHS	arrangements	 by	 contractors	 were	 included.	 Managers	 claimed	 that	 tenders	 had	 been	 refused	 on	 the	grounds	that	tenderers	had	not	met	these	requirements.	As	pointed	out	elsewhere	in	this	report,	the	low	levels	 of	 unionisation	 in	 the	 ports	 operated	 by	 the	 company	 had	 meant	 there	 had	 been	 only	 limited	resistance	to	the	company’s	human	resource	strategies.			In	operational	practice,	therefore,	as	detailed	in	section	3.3.5,	the	overall	governance	of	health	and	safety	matters	 remained	 the	 responsibility	 and	 role	 of	 National	 2,	 and	 contractors	 worked	 to	 its	 safety	management	 system	 requirements	 for	 OHS	 policies	 and	 procedures,	 safe	 working	 practices	 and	 safe	systems	 of	 work	 as	 well	 as	 risk	 assessments,	 but	 the	 day-to-day	 supervision	 of	 these	 systems	 was	undertaken	by	the	contractor,	under	the	general	oversight	of	National	2.		
	
3.2 The	character	of	arrangements	for	OHS	in	the	terminals		Arrangements	 to	 deliver	 the	 corporate	 strategies	 of	 the	 companies	 included	 in	 the	 study	 towards	governance	 and	 management	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 terminals	 are	 explored	 in	 the	following	section.	Since	container	terminals	are	situated	in	different	parts	of	the	world,	some	variation	in	local	conditions	and	national	contexts	can	be	anticipated.	How	GNTs	manage	operational	practices	within	these	 differently	 situated	 terminals	 and	 also	 how	 national	 companies	 in	 different	 countries	 do	 so	 is	therefore	important	in	determining	how	successful	they	are	in	achieving	their	objectives.	We	begin	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	common	features	of	these	arrangements	across	the	differently	situated	terminals,	as	managers	and	OHS	advisers	described	them	to	us	during	our	visits	to	these	sites.			From	these	accounts	it	was	clear	that	arrangements	for	OHS	were	founded	on	strongly	behaviour-based	approaches	to	health	and	safety.	In	general,	the	most	senior	Terminal	Manager	held	overall	responsibility	for	the	health	and	safety	of	workers	and	there	was	a	Safety	Department	in	each	of	the	GNT	terminals	as	well	 as	 in	 the	 nationally	 operated	 terminals	 and	 it	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 development,	implementation,	 monitoring	 and	 review	 of	 their	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 systems	 and	arrangements.	 Written	 policy	 statements	 on	 health	 and	 safety	 were	 in	 evidence	 and	 were	 generally	prominently	displayed	or	made	available	to	workers.	 In	some	of	the	terminals	they	were	supplemented	with	 simple	 messages	 concerning	 key	 safety	 objectives,	 standards	 and	 so	 forth	 that	 were	 widely	displayed.	 There	was	 evidence	 of	 locally	 produced	 posters	 and	 slogans	 in	 the	 terminals,	 together	with	heavy	 emphasis	 within	 the	 safety	 management	 systems	 themselves	 on	 achieving	 behaviour	 change	towards	safer	working	practices	among	the	workforce	and	inculcating	a	‘safety	culture’	at	all	levels	within	the	organisation	of	the	terminals.	These	were	especially	in	evidence	in	the	terminals	in	the	middle-income	country	studied,	where	there	were	also	indications	that	the	idea	of	influencing	safety	behaviours	included	attempts	to	extend	such	influence	beyond	the	terminal	and	into	the	communities	in	which	workers	live.	A	similar	 strategy	 was	 adopted	 by	 some	 of	 these	 terminals	 in	 relation	 to	 influencing	 the	 behaviour	 of	external	 truck	 drivers	 outside	 the	 terminal	 by	 focusing	 safety	 awareness	 activities	 on	 the	 depots	 and	truck	stops	where	these	drivers	were	likely	to	congregate.			As	well	as	advising	on	OHS	and	administering	the	procedures	of	 the	safety	management	systems	 in	the	terminals,	Safety	Departments	were	also	the	formal	link	between	the	terminals	and	their	parent	GNTs	in	relation	to	safety	both	regionally	and	globally,	which	in	the	case	of	three	of	the	four	GNTs	(GNTs	1	to	3),	as	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 constituted	 a	 fairly	 close	 and	 occasionally	 quite	 directive	relationship,	while	 in	 the	 fourth	 (GNT	4)	 the	connection	was	considerably	 looser.	The	relationship	was	intended	as	a	two-way	process.	Safety	Departments	implemented	policies	and	procedures	from	the	GNT	and	 in	 addition	 they	 acted	 as	 a	 hub	 for	 information	 by	 inputting,	 downloading	 and	distributing,	 safety	performance	 information	 to	 and	 from	 the	 global	 intranet.	 Senior	 management	 in	 each	 of	 the	 GNT	terminals	were	in	close	contact	with	the	global	company	in	the	three	GNTs	in	which	the	company	took	a	strong	co-ordinating	and	leadership	role.	In	one	of	these,	contact	was	via	the	regional	arrangements	the	global	company	had	made,	while	in	the	other	two	it	was	a	more	direct	connection	to	the	head	office.	In	all	
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cases,	there	was	little	doubt	among	senior	management	that	they	were	likely	to	be	held	accountable	for	serious	incidents	at	the	terminals	they	managed	and	that	there	were	systems	in	place	to	effect	two-way	communication	on	such	matters	between	the	terminal	and	the	company	HQ.			Within	the	health	and	safety	management	systems,	in	general	all	operational	activity	was	intended	to	be	covered	 by	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	 assessment	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 areas,	operations	and	processes	 that	 required	attention	 in	 the	 terminals’	 safety	procedures	and	systems.	Risk	assessments	were	normally	reviewed	following	an	incident	or	any	change	in	operational	procedure,	while	in	 some	 terminals	 procedures	 were	 in	 place	 to	 keep	 all	 risk	 assessments	 updated	 through	 a	 more	systematic	and	planned	review	process.			Management	 and	 supervisory	 interviewees	 from	 all	 terminals	 also	 referred	 to	 many	 specific	 safety	practices	 and	measures	 within	 various	 broad	 groupings	 aimed	 at	 managing	 risks.	 These	 included,	 for	example:	 technical	measures,	 such	as	 the	provision	of	cages	and	harnesses	 for	 those	working	on	 top	of	containers;	 procedural	 measures,	 such	 as	 always	 carrying	 out	 lashing	 in	 pairs;	 measures	 relating	 to	environmental	conditions,	for	example,	stopping	work	at	specified	high	wind	speeds;	and	infrastructural	measures,	including	maintenance	of	terminal	surfaces	and	the	provision	of	ergonomic	equipment.	Several	of	 the	management	 interviewees	stressed	 that	a	number	of	 these	measures	 involved	significant	cost,	 in	terms	 of	 financial	 outlay	 but	 also,	 in	 some	 cases,	 in	 relation	 to	 reduced	 work	 speed	 and	 consequent	productivity	–	something	 that	was	considered	worthwhile	 for	 the	sake	of	 safety	–	and	emphasised	 that	their	company	globally	had	no	limits	on	their	safety	budget.		In	 keeping	 with	 perceptions	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 risks,	 in	 all	 of	 the	 terminals	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 safe	working	strategies	had	been	identified	in	which	the	risks	associated	with	the	operation	of	machinery	and	with	 man-machine	 interfaces	 were	 recognised	 as	 among	 the	 most	 important	 and	 for	 which	 standard	approaches	 to	 risk	minimisation	were	 applied	 (i.e.	 avoidance,	 for	 example,	 introducing	 pedestrian	 free	zones,	carrying	out	repairs	in	the	workshop	rather	than	in-situ	and/or	stopping	work	completely	around	the	repair	site;	and,	where	avoidance	was	not	possible,	risk	reduction,	 for	example	 job	rotation,	regular	maintenance	inspection	and	adherence	to	PPE	requirements).			Again	behaviour-based	 strategies	 tended	 to	dominate	 these	 approaches	 and	management	 interviewees	were	 generally	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 all	 the	 possible	 structural	 and	 engineering	 controls	 had	 been	implemented,	 leaving	 a	 strong	 focus	 on	 behaviour	 safety,	 and	 the	 view	 that	 the	 behaviour-orientated	procedures	and	systems	in	place	in	the	terminals	were	such	that	if	everybody	followed	them	there	would	not	be	any	harmful	incidents.	
	Systems	 for	 recording	 and	 investigating	 incidents,	 injuries	 and	 near	 misses	 were	 also	 described	 and	played	a	major	role	in	the	activities	of	the	safety	and	health	departments	in	each	of	the	terminals.	These	data	were	added	to	both	local	and	global	databases.		In	 each	 terminal,	 training	 of	 two	 kinds	 supported	 these	 health	 and	 safety	management	 arrangements:	induction	 training	 and	 on-going	 or	 refresher	 training.	 In	 general,	 induction	 training	 was	 relatively	structured	 and	 systematically	 administered.	 Where	 workers	 were	 directly	 employed,	 training	 was	generally	provided	by	the	terminals’	Safety	Departments	and	by	the	joint	employment	bodies	in	Europe	area	 1.	 For	 indirectly	 employed	 workers	 training	 was	 mainly	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 contractor	organisation	 employing	 them.	 Again	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 this	 regard	 between	 the	terminals	 in	 high	 and	 middle	 income	 economies.	 In	 the	 terminals	 situated	 in	 the	 former,	 contractors	delivered	training	programmes	developed	by	the	terminal	operating	organisations	and	for	the	most	part	were	also	used	for	their	own	employees.	Oversight,	prescription	and,	in	some	cases,	awareness	of	content	of	 training	 for	 indirectly	 employed	workers	were	 significantly	 lower	 in	 the	 terminals	 operating	 in	 the	middle	income	country.	This	pattern	of	differences	by	region	of	operation	and	employment	type	was	also	apparent	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 areas,	 such	 as	 PPE	 provision	 and	 replacement.	 On-going	 training	 varied	significantly	 from	 terminal	 to	 terminal	 -	 for	 some	 it	was	 formally	 applied	 to	 the	whole	workforce	with	refresher	training	every	two	or	three	years,	whereas	elsewhere	on-going	training	was	said	to	be	provided	
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through	the	dissemination	of	safety	practice	information	(for	example	during	toolbox	talks	and	pre-shift	briefings)	on	specific	risks	and	solutions	as	necessary.			At	 each	 of	 the	 case	 study	 terminals,	 there	was	 a	widespread	 confidence	 in	 the	 arrangements’	 effective	coverage	of	key	risks	faced	by	workers	and	managers	were	vocal	about,	and	committed	to,	delivering	the	zero	 tolerance	approach	 to	 injuries	 that	was	 the	 stated	aim	of	 the	 safety	policies	of	 their	global	parent	companies.	 This	 helped	 reinforce	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 strong	 emphasis	 of	 OHS	 arrangements	 on	 safety	 as	opposed	to	health.		
	There	 were	 also	 systems	 in	 place	 for	 undertaking	 documented	 risk	 assessments,	 writing	 methods	statements	 and	 producing	 standard	 operating	 procedures,	 all	 of	which	were	 held	 at	managerial	 (or	 in	some	 cases	 supervisory)	 levels	 and	 thought	 to	 be	 accessible	 or	 available	 as	 required	by	 those	needing	them.	 There	were	 accident	 and	 incident	 reporting	 systems	 in	 all	 these	 terminals	 as	well	 as	 targets	 for	reported	injuries	and	it	was	reported	that	regular	meetings	in	relation	to	health	and	safety	took	place	at	various	 levels,	 from	 work	 groups	 to	 terminal	 levels.	 While	 the	 preference	 for	 the	 structuring	 and	operation	of	the	terminal	level	provision	for	OHS	management	in	the	GNT-run	terminals	was	clearly	the	company	 model	 developed	 at	 global	 level,	 these	 arrangements	 were	 also	 influenced	 by	 wider	requirements	made	in	the	ports	where	the	terminals	were	situated.	In	most	cases	such	requirements	had	only	a	limited	effect	on	the	company’s	structuring	and	operation	of	OHS,	but	in	one	of	the	European	areas	studied,	its	national	port	employment	and	labour	relations’	arrangements	did	have	more	of	an	impact.	In	the	case	of	Terminal	EU1T1	in	particular,	this	meant	that	the	port	employment	body	played	a	significant	role	in	OHS	management	arrangements	by	producing	mandatory	health	and	safety	management	policies	and	detailed	risk	management	plans,	as	well	as	safety	rules	for	specific	areas	and	jobs	across	the	whole	port,	which	the	GNT-run	terminal	was	obliged	to	follow.			Beyond	the	arrangements	for	engaging	workers	individually	through	a	range	of	work	group	and	terminal	level	 meetings	 concerning	 safety	 and	 health,	 there	 were	 other	 arrangements	 for	 consultation	 with	workers	representatives	on	health	and	safety.	Generally,	in	all	the	GNT	and	national	company	terminals	in	high	income	countries,	the	formal	set	up	of	these	followed,	at	least	to	a	minimal	level,	that	mandated	by	national	 (or	 state)	 regulation.	Most	 commonly	 they	 involved	 the	 election	or	 selection	of	worker	health	and	 safety	 representatives	 and	 the	 constitution	 of	 a	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committee	 at	 the	establishment	 level.	 Representatives	 performed	 functions	 such	 as	 undertaking	 inspections,	 requesting	information,	 making	 representations	 to	 managers	 on	 behalf	 of	 workers,	 but	 generally	 at	 a	 level	somewhere	 below	 the	 entitlements	 in	 the	 relevant	 legislation.	 There	 were	 few	 cases	 where	 these	arrangements	 built	 on,	 and	 went	 beyond,	 what	 was	 provided	 for	 by	 regulation.	 There	 were	 some	variations	 in	 this	 pattern	 of	 appointment	 and	 functions	 observed	 in	 different	 terminals,	 such	 as	 the	differences	in	arrangements	for	safety	representatives/champions	between	the	two	GNT-run	terminals	in	Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2,	 that	 were	 essentially	 made	 possible	 by	 historical	 differences	 in	 the	 legislative	requirements	involved.		There	 was	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 these	 formal	 arrangements	 in	 high	 income	 countries	 and	those	in	the	terminal	in	the	middle	income	country	we	studied.	In	the	latter	case,	generally	there	were	no	specifically	elected	or	selected	health	and	safety	representatives	from	among	the	workforce,	nor	did	the	health	 and	 safety	 committee	 function	 in	 a	 consultative	 way.	Where	 such	 representatives	 were	 said	 to	exist,	they	were	far	less	well-established	or	continuous	and	with	far	fewer	functions	or	facilities	than	their	counterparts	 in	 the	high	 income	country	 terminals.	 In	particular,	 they	were	 far	 less	 likely	 to	have	been	elected	 by	workers,	 provided	with	 any	 training	 for	 their	 health	 and	 safety	 role,	 or	 given	 the	 time	 and	facilities	to	carry	it	out	–	including	being	freed	from	duties	to	attend	meetings	and	afforded	the	provision	needed	for	consulting	with	those	they	were	said	to	represent.		In	 the	 report	 of	 the	 previous	 study	 we	 noted	 that	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 workers	 and	 their	representatives,	 the	concerns	of	management	 for	speed	and	cost-efficiency	 in	 terminal	operation	which	dominated	 the	 highly	 competitive	 business	 environment	 of	 container	 transport	 coloured	 workers’	experiences	of	the	arrangements	made	for	their	occupational	health,	safety	and	welfare	at	work.	In	their	view,	this	influence	contributed	to	poor	health	and	safety	outcomes,	especially	in	relation	to	issues	such	
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as	 fatigue,	 stress	and	musculoskeletal	disorders,	 and	 it	 served	 to	 increase	 risks	of	unsafe	 incidents	and	consequent	injuries,	as	well	as	reducing	welfare,	among	workers	–	and	this	happened	despite	there	being	arrangements	 in	place	 for	managing	safety.	Moreover,	 there	was	a	 further	view	that	 the	outsourcing	of	work	 in	some	terminals,	which	had	occurred	 for	 the	same	reasons	of	cost	efficiency,	contributed	to	 the	experience	of	poorer	working	conditions	and	the	ineffective	delivery	of	arrangements	for	managing	and	monitoring	 workers’	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 such	 situations.	 Therefore,	 as	 we	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	principal	 aims	 of	 the	 present	 study	 were	 to	 further	 explore	 this	 apparent	 gap	 between	 the	 company	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	and	workers’	experiences.			Having	outlined	the	common	features	of	the	systems	in	place	to	deliver	arrangements	for	the	governance	and	management	of	OHS	as	 they	were	explained	 to	us	 from	 the	perspectives	of	 the	managers	and	OHS	advisers	charged	with	this	task,	in	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	we	deliver	the	aims	of	the	study	by	giving	more	 detailed	 consideration	 to	 the	 understandings	 of	 managers	 and	 their	 advisers	 concerning	 their	approaches	in	relation	to	a	few	key	areas	that	were	indicative	of	the	possible	gap	between	arrangements	and	experiences	 identified	 in	 the	previous	 study.	To	do	 so	 our	examination	 takes	particular	 account	of	what	 managers	 and	 their	 advisers	 shared	 with	 us	 concerning	 the	 character	 and	 quality	 of	 their	arrangements	to	ensure	the	protection	of	safety	and	health,	including	their	experience	of	safety	incidents	and	work-related	health	and	welfare	outcomes	in	relation	to	the	arrangements	they	had	made	to	manage	prevention	of	harm	and	the	protection	of	workers	in	their	terminals.	We	examine	these	two	areas	with	a	consideration	 of	 managers’	 views	 concerning	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 systems	 in	 place	 to	 manage	 OHS	especially	 in	 relation	 to	 job	 type,	 employment	 organisation	 and	 terminal	 location.	 We	 take	 a	 similar	approach	in	examining	managers’	perspectives	concerning	the	relationship	between	the	organisation	of	work	and	working	conditions	and	explore	managers’	understandings	concerning	the	relationship	of	these	matters	 with	 OHS	 outcomes	 and	 OHS	 management,	 again	 in	 relation	 to	 different	 jobs,	 employment	organisation	 and	 terminal	 locations.	 This	 approach	 allows	 us	 also	 to	 set	 the	 scene	 for	 a	 further	examination	of	 the	same	 issues	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	respondents	 to	 the	 terminal	worker	survey	analysed	in	Chapter	4.			
3.3 Translating	company	policies	into	terminal	level	arrangements			All	of	 the	case	study	terminals	are	significant	players	 in	the	business	of	the	sector.	Though	they	vary	 in	size	and	capacity,	all	are	among	the	leading	terminals	for	the	regions	where	they	are	situated.	They	also	all	 operate	 within	 contexts	 influenced	 by	 national	 legislative,	 regulatory	 and	 labour	 relations’	arrangements.	Those	in	the	first	and	second	European	areas	are	subject	to	regional	 legislation;	those	in	the	 first	 European	 and	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 areas	 operate	 under	 port	 level	 legislative	 and	 regulatory	arrangements	that,	 in	the	case	of	the	first	European	area,	also	extend	to	labour	relations	arrangements;	while	 those	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 operate	 under	 different	 federal	 legislative	 and	 regulatory	jurisdictions.	Before	turning	to	managers’	perspectives	on	their	arrangements	for	health	and	safety,	it	is	important	 to	 note	 some	 of	 the	 more	 significant	 elements	 of	 these	 varying	 contexts	 in	 which	 such	arrangements	operate	within	the	different	terminals.	This	we	do	below	in	Section	3.3.1.		
3.3.1	The	broader	contexts	of	operational	management	arrangements	in	the	case	study	
terminals		In	Europe	area	1	all	ports	are	required	to	set	up	the	joint	bodies	that	employ	dockworkers	on	a	day-hire	basis.	Employers	hire	most	of	their	dockworkers	by	the	shift	from	a	port-level	pool,	though	some	terminal	operators,	 including	 GNTs	 2	 and	 3	 which	 operate	 terminals	 EU1T1	 and	 EU1T2	 respectively,	 are	increasingly	employing	dockworkers	more	permanently,	by	booking	them	for	at	least	80	per	cent	of	their	monthly	 shifts	 (although	 formally,	 they	 are	 still	 employed	 by	 the	 joint	 port	 authority).	 This	 applies	particularly	for	dockworkers	with	the	greatest	levels	of	training	and	experience.	Such	arrangements	are	allowed	for	under	the	complex	laws	governing	port	labour.	National	laws	also	mean	that	dock	work	can	only	be	carried	out	by	registered	dockworkers	trained	to	appropriate	 levels	by	these	 joint	employment	
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bodies8.	As	a	result	of	these	arrangements,	it	is	generally	only	foremen	and	supervisors	(and	maintenance	workers,	 who	 are	 directly	 employed)	 who	 have	 direct	 contact	 with	 terminal	 operating	 company	managers.	The	joint	employment	bodies	also	operate	training	agencies	and	may	be	active	in	OHS	policy	development	and	monitoring	–	although	especially	 the	 latter	varies	 in	extent.	The	employment	body	 in	the	port	in	which	EU1T2	operates	has	a	much	lesser	role	than	that	in	the	port	in	which	EU1T1	operates.			By	contrast,	in	Europe	area	2	the	lack	of	port	authority	influences	on	the	case	study	terminals	is	the	result	of	 privatisation	 of	 ports	 in	 the	 area	 that	 began	 in	 the	 1980s.	 The	 country	 in	 which	 the	 terminals	 are	situated	 was	 in	 the	 vanguard	 of	 port	 privatisation.	 Following	 a	 period	 of	 bitterly	 contested	 industrial	disputes	several	decades	ago,	there	was	a	substantial	decline	in	the	dock	labour	force	along	with	a	general	decline	in	trade	union	presence	and	power	in	many	ports.	In	the	docks	where	trade	unions	managed	to	retain	 their	organising	 role,	membership	 remains	high	and	union	 representation	 is	 the	normal	 form	of	worker	representation	 for	wider	collective	bargaining	as	well	as	health	and	safety	 issues.	The	two	GNT	operated	 terminals	 here	 (EU2T1	 and	 EU2T2)	 are	 among	 those	 with	 these	 types	 of	 labour	 relations	arrangements,	while	the	port	operated	by	the	national	operator	in	which	EU2T3	is	situated	represents	an	example	of	the	former	kind,	in	which	trade	unions	are	no	longer	a	major	presence	at	the	workplace	level.			All	 five	 European	 terminals	 are	 also	 subject	 to	 European	 legislation.	 Of	 particular	 relevance	 to	 the	research	 are	 the	 requirements	 relation	 to	 the	minimum	 protection	 level	 and	 systematic,	 participatory	health	and	safety	management	based	on	risk	assessment.		Although	subject	to	the	same	federal	level	legislation,	the	terminals	in	Asia	Pacific	area	1	are	covered	by	different	state	legislatures	and	labour	inspectorates.	Health	and	safety	regulation	is	mainly	made	at	state	level	and	historically	there	have	been	differences	of	detail	in	provisions	between	different	states.	This	was	true	 for	 the	 different	 jurisdictions	 in	 which	 the	 two	 terminals	 studied	 are	 located.	 However,	 recent	reforms	at	federal	level	have	resulted	in	a	significant	level	of	harmonisation	of	the	statutory	measures	in	the	 two	 states	 and	 currently	 the	 legislative	 requirements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 arrangements	 in	 the	terminals	 are	 similar.	 Nevertheless,	 variations	 in	 practice	 still	 result	 from	 the	 small	 but	 significant	historical	differences	in	regulatory	requirements,	some	of	which	are	particularly	relevant	to	our	research.	For	 example,	 although	OHS	 legislation	 has	 been	moving	 towards	 a	 national	 uniform	model,	 provisions	relating	to	safety	committees	and	the	election	of	health	and	safety	representatives	and	their	powers	are	newer	to	the	area	in	which	terminal	AP1T1	operates	than	to	the	area	in	which	terminal	AP1T2	operates.	This	has	an	impact	on	the	arrangements	for	worker	representation	in	the	terminals9.		Lastly,	 the	 four	 terminals	 in	 the	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 operate	 in	 a	 country	 with	 a	 middle-income	economy	 under	 the	 same	 national	 legislation	 and	 labour	 inspectorate	 monitoring.	 The	 terminals	 are	located	in	two	of	the	country’s	11	major	ports.	Overall	container	terminal	growth	has	been	rapid	during	the	last	fifteen	years	and	data	suggests	that,	from	2000,	container	handling	in	the	major	ports	of	this	area	grew	from	around	2.22	million	to	7.5	million	TEUs	annually	in	2014.		Case	 study	 terminals	AP2T1	and	AP2T2	 (operated	by	GNT	1	and	GNT	3	 respectively)	 are	 situated	 in	 a	major	port	 that	has	been	prominent	 in	privatised	port	development	 since	 the	mid-1990s	 following	 the	opening	 up	 of	 the	 national	 economy	 to	 inward	 foreign	 investment.	 Terminals	 AP2T3	 and	 AP2T4	(operated	by	GNT	1	and	GNT	2)	are	in	another	port	some	1300	kilometres	away	in	which	GNTs	have	also	invested	for	some	considerable	time.	There	is	some	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	productivity	of	these	and	container	terminals	in	other	major	ports	in	the	country	has	been	achieved	largely	though	downsizing	of	the	labour	force	(De,	2006).		Each	port	 is	operated	by	a	Trust,	which	has	some	influence	over	health	and	safety	arrangements	 in	our	case	study	terminals.	However,	 the	extent	of	 influence	of	 these	Trusts	varies,	with	that	covering	AP2T1	
																																																																				8	Though	employers	can	hire	other	workers	for	unskilled	jobs	if	there	are	not	enough	registered	dockworkers	available.	
9 At the time of the case study, health and safety representatives had yet to be elected in AP1T1, where the legislation was 
newer, but were in place in AP1T2. 
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and	AP2T2	being	the	greater	–	for	example,	extending	to	regular	workplace	inspections	in	the	terminals	by	the	on-site	port	trust	inspectors.		The	poor	development	of	transport	infrastructure	around	the	ports	in	the	country	generally,	especially	in	those	connecting	to	the	main	rail	and	road	arteries,	is	a	feature	that	has	been	noted	to	contribute	to	their	limited	economic	performance	(Van	Marle,	2012).	For	example,	most	of	the	case	study	terminals	in	other	countries	 had	 efficient	 automated	 systems	 through	which	 truck	 drivers	were	 able	 to	 co-ordinate	 their	terminal	 visits	 and	 consequently	most	were	 relatively	 short.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 this	 area	large	numbers	of	 loaded	 trucks	and	 trailers	very	 frequently	waited	 for	extended	periods	of	 time	at	 the	roadside	with	minimal	 rest	 and	welfare	 facilities	 available	 to	 their	 drivers.	 This	 situation	 significantly	exacerbated	 the	 likelihood	 of	 the	 occurrence	 of	 serious	 health	 and	 safety	 incidents,	 both	 outside	 and	inside	the	terminal	gates,	 involving	trucks	and	pedestrian	workers	and,	 in	at	 least	one	of	 the	terminals,	had	 resulted	 in	 fatalities.	 These	 are	 areas	 that	 we	 return	 to	 in	 later	 Chapters,	 but	 their	 influence	 on	shaping	 the	 systems	 and	 procedures	managers	 in	 the	 case	 study	 terminals	 described	 are	 important	 to	bear	in	mind.		
3.3.2	Health	and	safety	outcomes	and	performance	In	general,	managers	in	all	of	the	case	study	terminals	felt	that	OHS	performance	was	good	and	that	the	management	 arrangements	 they	had	put	 in	place	 to	 achieve	 this	were	 at	 the	 very	 least	 adequate,	with	many	 seeing	 their	 terminal	 as	 exemplary	 in	 the	 sector.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 widespread	 view	 among	managers	 that	 incidents	 and	 injuries	 were	 almost	 exclusively	 the	 result	 of	 workers	 not	 following	procedures,	and	a	corresponding	view	that	compliance	monitoring,	coupled	with	moves	to	minimise	man-machine	interfaces,	have	been	particularly	significant	in	bringing	about	improving	OHS	performance.	For	example,	 the	head	of	health	and	safety	at	EU2T2	saw	people	–	their	 losses	of	concentration,	negligence,	failure	to	follow	procedures	and	lack	of	supervision	–	as	the	biggest	safety	risk	at	the	terminal.	Like	their	counterparts	 in	most	of	 the	other	case	study	 terminals,	managers	here	stressed	their	no	blame	culture,	making	 it	 clear	 that	 as	 long	as	workers	had	not	been	negligent	 then	 they	would	be	helped	 to	 improve,	usually	 through	 retraining.	 Similarly,	 managers	 at	 AP2T2	 felt	 that	 under-reporting	 had	 significantly	reduced	following	the	introduction	of	a	reporting	scheme	and	their	emphasis	on	not	blaming	individuals.			Managers	at	AP2T4	explained	that	there	had	been	two	recent	fatal	and	one	serious	disability	incident,	all	of	which	they	had	concluded	were	the	result	of	non-compliance	with	safety	procedures.	At	this	terminal,	managers	felt	that	monitoring	compliance	and	safety	behaviour	was	pivotal	to	safety	and	explained	that	they	hoped	to	install	CCTV	in	the	near	future,	suggesting	that	 ‘constant	surveillance	or	patrolling’	might	further	 improve	 safety.	 Similarly,	 the	 operations	 managers	 at	 AP1T2	 regarded	 the	 interface	 between	people	and	machines	as	the	most	significant	risk	the	terminal’s	OHS	management	system	was	intended	to	address.	Managers	 here	 felt	 that	 the	 use	 of	 CCTV	 and	 a	 new	 system	 for	 recording	 all	 radio	 traffic	 had	significantly	improved	incident	and	near	miss	investigations.	Their	view	was	that	the	industry	generally	was	a	tough	one,	with	some	injuries	inevitable	and	a	limited	time	that	people	could	work	in	certain	areas	because	 they	 ‘wear	 out’.	 The	 feeling	 was	 that	 the	 terminal	 had	 gone	 as	 far	 as	 was	 possible,	 without	becoming	automated,	in	terms	of	minimising	safety	problems.		
“…one	 of	 the	 big	 things	 that’s	 helped,	 that’s	 really	 helped	 in	 the	 incident	 investigations	 is	 the	
cameras.	 Cameras	 don’t	 lie.	 You	 know,	 you	 talk	 to	 three	 people,	 you’ll	 get	 three	 different	
interpretations	of	an	 event,	 but	 the	 cameras	have	been	 fantastic.	And	also	we’ve	got	a	new	radio	
system	where	it	records	all	the	conversations	which	is	fantastic	too,	people	forget	you	know,	heat	of	
the	moment,	things	like	that…”	[Safety	Manager,	AP1T2]		Managers	in	all	of	the	case	study	terminals	also	talked	about	the	investigation	of	incidents,	including	high	potential	 near	miss	 incidents,	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 their	 causes,	 at	 the	 terminal	 level.	 In	 addition,	 safety	department	managers	in	each	terminal	took	part	in	their	terminal	operating	organisations’	arrangements	for	sharing	this	information.	There	were,	however,	variations	in	how	all	of	this	took	place,	reflecting	both	
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the	contexts	in	which	terminals	were	operating	and	their	operating	organisations’	strategic	approaches.	For	example,	the	employment	bodies	in	the	ports	 in	which	each	Europe	area	1	terminal	operated	had	a	significant	role	in	the	collection	of	performance	data	and	in	incident	investigations.			In	EU2T1,	reports	were	made	to	the	GNT	globally	and,	depending	on	incident	severity,	also	to	the	national	labour	 inspectorate.	 Here	 managers	 suggested	 that	 the	 inspectorate	 took	 matters	 seriously,	 including	concerns	reported	by	workers,	visiting	fairly	regularly	–	something	they	felt	was	not	necessarily	the	case	elsewhere	in	the	world.	This	reflected	a	view	held	by	managers	in	both	European	areas	and	in	Asia	Pacific	area	1.	For	instance,	managers	at	AP1T2	explained	that	the	terminal	complied	with	national	requirements	for	reporting	incidents	of	a	certain	severity,	following	which	the	inspectorate	would	investigate,	with	the	investigation	involving	a	health	and	safety	representative.	In	addition,	health	and	safety	representatives	were	 able	 to	 issue	 a	 notice	 to	 stop	 work	 they	 saw	 as	 dangerous	 (again	 resulting	 in	 an	 inspectorate	investigation),	with	workers	also	able	to	contact	the	inspectorate	directly	about	their	concerns.			In	some	cases,	for	example	AP1T1	and	AP2T1,	both	of	which	were	operated	by	GNT	1,	corporately	shared	information	on	incidents	and	was	also	made	available	to	workers.	Data	sharing	extended	to	areas	such	as	managers’	 safety	 interactions	with	workers,	 PPE	 compliance,	 handrail	 compliance,	 near	miss	 reporting	and	close-out	of	incidents,	that	were	further	linked	into	KPIs.		Managers	in	EU2T1	explained	that	they	encouraged	all	those	on	the	terminal	to	report	all	 incidents	and	near	misses	and	were	confident	that	most	did	so,	suggesting	further	that	workers	were	comfortable	about	letting	them	know	about	any	issues	or	concerns	generally.	This	was	a	view	that	managers	in	all	of	the	case	study	terminals	in	both	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	shared.			In	 many	 terminals,	 managers	 had	 been	 given	 corporate	 level	 guidance	 on	 incident	 investigation.	 For	example,	 at	 AP2T2	managers	 explained	 that	 investigations	 followed	 a	 standard	 format	 put	 in	 place	 by	GNT	3,	that	had	starting	creating	‘simulated	incidents’	displayed	on	screens	in	the	terminal	for	all	workers	to	see.	However,	there	were	some	approaches	to	trying	to	reduce	incidents	and	injuries	that	were	specific	to	 individual	terminals.	For	example,	 the	operations	manager	at	EU2T2	described	a	radical	approach	to	trying	to	reduce	vehicle	incidents	in	the	terminal	that	he	felt	had	been	persistently	high	for	some	time.	In	addition	to	fitting	some	vehicles	with	speed	limiters,	this	involved	putting	vehicles	that	had	been	involved	in	an	incident	on	a	trailer	‘blood	and	all’	at	the	entrance	to	the	terminal,	for	all	external	truck	drivers,	as	well	 as	 workers,	 to	 see.	 Following	 this,	 incidents	 stopped,	 and	 vehicle	 maintenance	 costs	 were	substantially	 reduced.	On	 the	whole,	 this	 individuality	 reflected	 the	degree	 of	 autonomy	 terminals	 and	their	management	teams	had	in	designing	approaches	to	the	operation	of	OHS	management	(as	was	the	case	 for	EU2T2,	which	was	operated	by	GNT	4	which	 took	a	much	more	 ‘hands-off’	 approach	 than	 the	other	GNTs),	or	the	extent	of	the	freedom	they	had	to	adapt	corporate	approaches	at	the	terminal	level.		Where	 terminals’	 had	 a	 (partially)	 outsourced	 workforce,	 responsibility	 for	 incident	 investigation	 and	management	varied.	For	example,	in	terminal	EU2T3,	where	all	dock	workers	were	indirectly	employed,	all	incidents	and	accidents	were	reported	to	the	contractor	and	then	on	to	National	2.	Although	National	2	tracked	 and	 monitored	 this	 information,	 incident	 investigations	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 contractor.	Nevertheless,	the	safety	manager	stressed	that	in	the	event	of	any	serious	incident	his	department	carried	out	an	investigation:			
“…the	 investigation	 for	 general	 incidents	will	 be	 done	by	 the	 third-party	 labour	 providers.	 But	 at	
any	 point	 where	 the	 business	 –	 being	 (names	 company)	 –	 feels	 there’s	 a	 risk	 to	 the	 business,	 or	
substantial	 enough	 to	 cause	 concern	 –	 that	 somebody’s	 been	 seriously	 injured,	 or	 there	might	 be	
some	sort	of	liability	on	the	business	–	my	team	will	then	carry	out	a	fully	detailed	investigation.	And	
obviously	the	contract	gives	us	full	authority	to	do	so.”	[National	2	Safety	Manager,	EU2T3]		However,	 at	 the	 organisational	 level,	 information	 about	 incidents	 at	 National	 2	 terminals	were	 shared	regionally	and	nationally	and	in	some	cases	where	an	industry	interest	was	perceived	also	passed	on	to	the	 national	 trade	 association.	 The	 area	 of	 outsourcing,	 and	 its	 implications	 for	 the	 arrangements	
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terminals’	management	 teams	made	 for	managing	OHS,	 is	one	we	 return	 to	 in	greater	detail	 in	 section	3.3.5.		
3.3.2.1 Health	outcomes		All	 the	 arrangements	 described	 above	 focus	 primarily	 on	 safety	 and	 in	most	 cases	managers	 felt	 that	policies	 in	 this	area	rarely	changed.	However,	 the	degree	 to	which	welfare	and	health	were	 included	 in	those	 arrangements,	 or	 acknowledged	 as	 being	 an	 area	 for	 future	 development,	 varied	 substantially	between	the	case	study	terminals,	as	did	their	respective	occupational	health	arrangements.	In	the	main	this	 reflected	 local	 contexts	 and	 traditions.	 So	 in	 Europe,	 for	 example,	 the	 terminals	 in	 Area	 1	 used	external	occupational	health	services	in	accordance	with	the	legal	requirement	in	place	there,	while	those	in	Area	2,	where	there	was	no	such	requirement,	used	a	mix	of	 in-house	and	external	provisions	which	varied	in	their	arrangements,	coverage	and	reach	from	terminal	to	terminal.	A	similarly	mixed	approach	applied	in	Asia	Pacific	Area	1,	while	in	Asia	Pacific	Area	2,	terminals	predominantly	used	external	medical	support	for	examinations	and	emergencies.		The	greatest	degree	of	awareness	and	progress	 in	relation	to	extending	systems	to	 incorporate	welfare	and	 health	 were	 apparent	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 Europe	 and	 those	 in	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 1.	 This	 generally	reflected	leadership	and	personal	‘ownership’	of	the	area	at	the	terminal	level	rather	than	corporately	led	strategy	or	governance.			For	example,	at	the	time	of	our	first	visit	to	terminal	EU2T1,	which	was	led	by	a	terminal	manager	who	was	 strongly	 committed	 to	 leading	 on	 OHS	 himself	 (by	 chairing	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committee	meetings),	 managers	 explained	 that	 a	 section	 on	 health	 had	 been	 added	 to	 the	 OHS	 policy	 relatively	recently	 as	 part	 of	 the	 terminal’s	 wider	 strategy	 of	 broadening	 its	 coverage	 of	 workers’	 health	 and	welfare.	 They	 stressed	 that	 their	 medical	 standards	 (for	 example,	 for	 pre-	 and	 post-employment	screening)	were	developed	at	the	terminal	rather	than	following	a	corporate	approach.	At	that	time,	the	terminal	was	in	the	process	of	producing	a	number	of	health-related	policies,	for	example	on	MSDs	(it	had	carried	out	a	vibration	study	and	was	now	 including	a	musculo-skeletal	 function	assessment	 in	 its	pre-employment	medical)	and	mental	health	(including	stress	and	depression).	The	terminal	had	contracted	an	organisation	which	follows	up	employees	on	sickness	absence.	The	aim	was	described	as	assisting	the	occupational	health	department	to	refer	workers	to	a	physiotherapist	or	psychologist	as	early	as	possible	in	 any	 MSD	 or	 mental-health	 related	 absence.	 The	 department	 was	 preparing	 a	 booklet	 on	 health	promotion	 and	 injury	 management	 and	 prevention	 to	 cover	 areas	 including	 fatigue	 and	 MSDs	 (again	independent	of	 the	GNT	globally).	The	HR	manager	described	recently	having	written	policies	 for	areas	including	wellbeing	 and	 stress	management,	 as	well	 as	 a	 stress	 risk	 assessment	 (which	was	 based	 on	standards	 produced	 by	 the	 national	 labour	 inspectorate),	 explaining	 that	 these	 were	 produced	 in	consultation	with	workers’	representatives.		Elsewhere	 in	 these	 high-income	 area	 terminals,	while	most	 provided	 some	on-site	 occupational	 health	services,	there	was	growing	awareness	among	management	of	the	need	to	do	more	in	relation	to	health.	For	example,	managers	in	EU2T2	felt	that	health-related	issues,	such	as	fatigue	and	stress,	were	covered	in	refresher	and	induction	training	to	a	much	lesser	degree	than	safety-related	issues.	Similarly,	the	safety	manager	 at	 AP1T1	 felt	 that	 there	 was	 insufficient	 emphasis	 on	 occupational	 health	 in	 the	 OHS	management	system,	explaining	that	there	was	no	fitness	to	work	process.	The	focus	of	the	health	policy	at	 the	 terminal	 was	 primarily	 on	 noise,	 eye	 safety	 and	 UV	 exposure.	 Managers	 referred	 to	 the	 recent	involvement	 on	 the	 terminal	 of	 a	 national	 organisation	 focused	on	depression	particularly	 among	men	that	 provided	 on-site	 mental	 health	 awareness	 programmes,	 while	 the	 terminal	 itself	 provided	programmes	for	assisting	workers	with	work	and	personal	emotional	and	psychological	problems.			The	operations	manager	at	AP1T2	regarded	manual	handling	(among	lashers)	and	MSDs	(among	drivers)	as	 the	 second	 and	 third	 greatest	 risks	 risk	 the	 terminal’s	 OHS	 management	 system	 was	 intended	 to	address,	explaining	that	the	safe	work	instructions	were	designed	to	specify	ways	to	minimise	these	risks.	For	 instance,	 risks	 associated	 with	 lashing,	 which	 was	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 risky	 jobs,	 were	
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tackled	 through	manual	 handling	 training,	 advice	 on	 pre-work	 stretches,	 toolbox	 talks	 and	working	 in	pairs,	 job	 rotation	 (between	 lashing	 and	 straddle	 driving),	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 on-site	 physiotherapy.	They	 explained	 that	 drivers	 had	 set	 periods	 of	 driving	 and	 break	 time	 (90	 minutes	 and	 30	 minutes	respectively).	These	were	areas	that	were	included	in	the	terminal’s	enterprise	agreement	with	the	union.			The	port	level	agreement	covering	EU1T1	specified	which	categories	of	dock	worker	could	do	which	jobs	–	something	that	managers	were	keen	to	change,	preferring	to	have	multi-skilled	dock	workers	who	can	move	from	one	job	type	to	another.	They	argued	that	this	would	reduce	MSD	risks	by	being	ergonomically	better	for	dock	workers.			Managers	in	the	middle	income	terminals,	often	referred	to	awareness-raising	campaigns,	many	of	which	extended	beyond	the	terminal.	For	example,	the	safety	department	at	AP2T1	was	responsible	for	health	campaigns	 (such	 as	 arranging	 for	 doctors	 to	 visit	 the	 terminal	 and	 give	 advice),	 as	 well	 as	 for	 safety,	health	and	environmental	awareness-raising	campaigns	aimed	at	truck	drivers,	workers’	families	and	so	on.	They	also	referred	to	the	ergonomic	improvements	made,	for	example,	to	crane	chairs.	In	this	regard,	they	 stressed	 that	 crane	 drivers	 were	 trained	 on	 a	 simulator	 to	 use	 appropriate	 postures	 and	 that	referrals	were	made	for	any	drivers	suffering	from,	for	example,	back	problems.			Similarly,	AP2T2	managers	referred	to	offering	eye,	dental	and	health	check-ups	as	well	as	to	providing	regular	yoga	sessions	and	a	canteen,	and	there	is,	 in	preparation,	a	policy	on	violence	in	the	workplace.	However,	while	some	managers	at	the	terminal	felt	that	fatigue	was	an	issue	as	it	‘just	adds	on	to	safety	problems’,	others	felt	that	it	was	not	a	problem	as	workers	were	given	sufficient	rest	time	and	facilities,	explaining	that	the	terminal	met	national	working	time	regulations.	In	addition,	most	managers	felt	that,	with	the	introduction	of	ergonomic	equipment	and	motivational	and	promotional	sessions	(such	as	yoga),	the	terminal	had	no	MSD	problems,	explaining	that	there	had	been	no	serious	cases	of	back	pain	 in	the	five	to	six	years	prior	to	our	preliminary	study.		Likewise,	AP2T4	managers	felt	that	stress	was	lower	in	their	terminal	than	in	other	terminals	because	of	the	provisions	of	relief,	breaks	and	meals.	MSDs	were	described	as	not	being	a	problem	at	the	terminal	because	the	workforce	was	young	–	with	very	few	workers	over	30.	The	terminal	also	provided	welfare	(canteen)	 and	 recreational	 facilities	 (including	 chess	 and	 setting	 up	 cricket	 and	 volleyball	 teams	 to	encourage	 team	 spirit).	 When	 asked	 about	 fatigue	 among	 crane	 drivers,	 the	 operations	 manager	explained	that	workers	were	provided	with	ergonomically	sound	chairs	and	were	encouraged	to	report	tiredness	to	the	supervisor.	He	said	that	staffing	levels	were	arranged	so	that	there	were	five	or	six	‘spare’	workers	who	could	be	rotated	to	reduce	fatigue	and	stress	levels,	something	that	was	possible	because	of	the	comparative	cost	of	labour	in	the	area:			
“Here	the	manpower	cost	is	low	so	I	can	afford	to	have	two	additional	men	on	the	shift	who	will	go	
around	relieving	people.	…	the	workforce	here	is	very	young.	Most	of	my	operators	are	in	their	early	
20s…”	[General	Manager,	AP2T4]		Owing	to	the	current	under-utilisation	of	AP2T3,	 the	managers’	view	was	that	operations	such	as	those	involving	cranes	and	truck-trailers	in	loading	and	unloading	were	not	excessively	demanding.	Generally	in	 this	 terminal,	 (as	with	AP2T4),	 the	directly	employed	workforce	was	comparatively	young	and	well-educated,	with	tertiary	 level	educational	qualifications.	According	to	management,	 this	was	a	deliberate	strategy	aimed	at	recruitment	of	a	better	qualified	workforce.	A	medical	insurance	scheme	was	available	to	 the	 directly	 employed	 workers	 at	 the	 terminal	 that,	 in	 the	 view	 of	 the	 managers	 was	 a	 generous	scheme.		In	 essence,	 the	 high-income	 terminals	 led	 the	 way	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 OHS	 arrangements	 to	 cover	workers’	 health	 and	welfare.	 In	 these	 terminals,	 this	 varied	 from	 relatively	 recent	 and	 fairly	 extensive	attempts	to	include	health	and	welfare	in	policies,	to	an	awareness	that	this	is	as	area	in	which	there	was	still	 much	 work	 to	 be	 done.	 In	 the	 middle-income	 terminals,	 the	 reluctance	 to	 acknowledge	 possible	health	effects	was	relatively	common,	and	even	where	they	were	acknowledged	the	emphasis	tended	to	
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be	on	awareness-raising	as	opposed	to	preventive	policy	or	procedures.	Importantly	however,	corporate	leadership	was	not	obvious	in	any	of	the	initiatives,	with	the	exception	of	AP1T2	where	procedures	and	policies	on	areas	including	bullying	and	harassment	were	described	as	being	led	from	the	corporate	level	by	National	 1’s	HR	 department	 –	 though	 a	 number	were	 linked	 to	 legislation	 or	 to	 other	 stakeholders	such	as	the	unions	and	most	were	aimed	at	tackling	or	preventing	problems	on	an	individual	behaviour	basis	rather	than	on	considering	the	often	organisational	sources	of	the	problems.			
3.3.3	Worker	participation	and	consultation	Managers	 in	all	of	 the	 terminals	described	 the	various	ways	 in	which	 they	disseminated	 information	 to	workers.	 These	 usually	 included	 some	 combination	 of,	 for	 example,	 toolbox	 talks,	 posters,	 videos,	newsletters,	emails	and	access	to	electronic	information,	with	variations	tending	to	reflect	terminal	level	differences	in	resources.	The	arrangements	for	representative	worker	participation	and	consultation	that	managers	described,	varied	substantially.	 In	 the	main,	 this	 reflected	 the	different	 legislative	and	 labour	relations	contexts	within	which	the	terminals	were	operating.		In	Europe	area	1,	where	the	ports	in	which	both	EU1T1	and	EU1T2	are	situated	were	strongly	unionised,	with	 practically	 all	 dockworkers	 members	 of	 one	 of	 two	 or	 three	 main	 unions.	 Elected	 union	representatives	sat	on	the	port-wide	joint	health	and	safety	committees	(although	the	one	for	EU1T2	had	a	narrow	mandate,	as	most	OHS	issues	were	handled	within	each	terminal,	in	which	there	are	also	local	joint	 OHS	 committees)	 and	 the	 unions	 acted	 jointly	 in	 collective	 contract	 negotiations	 over	 working	conditions.	These	arrangements	reflect	strong	national	and	sectoral	labour	relations’	traditions	which	are	supported	by	European	 and	national	 legislation.	Nevertheless,	 some	differences	between	 the	 terminals	remained	because	of	the	different	levels	of	influence	held	by	the	two	port	employment	bodies.	In	terminal	EU1T1,	where	the	employment	body	has	a	much	broader	mandate	than	that	for	EU1T2,	while	there	was	a	joint	health	and	 safety	 committee	at	 the	port	 level	 chaired	by	 the	 joint	 employment	body	which	meets	monthly,	 there	 was	 no	 terminal	 level	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committee.	 Managers	 at	 the	 terminal	described	 consulting	 workers	 on	 safe	 work	 procedures	 but	 referred	 to	 some	 resistance	 to	 their	introduction.	 They	 described	 regular	 six-monthly	meetings	with	 each	 category	 of	 dock	worker	 but	 felt	there	was	 little	 interest	 in	 these	meetings,	with	 few	workers	attending,	and	expressed	a	preference	 for	direct	communication	with	workers,	emphasising	their	policy	of	encouraging	all	workers	to	bring	safety	issues	to	management	themselves.		Arrangements	 at	 EU1T2	 are	 similar,	 though	 there	 was	 also	 a	 terminal	 level	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	committee	on	which	elected	union	representatives	sit.	Here	the	terminal’s	safety	manager	described	his	department’s	 approach	 as	more	 one	 of	 trying	 to	 reach	 agreements	 on	 safe	 working	 than	 formulating,	issuing	and	enforcing	procedures.			In	Europe	area	2,	virtually	all	those	involved	in	dock	work	in	terminals	EU2T1	and	EU2T2	were	members	of	a	single	union.	In	these	terminals	representation	was	again	through	elected	union	representatives	who	were	members	of	 the	 terminals’	 joint	health	and	safety	 committees.	At	 terminal	EU2T1	 this	 committee	was	chaired	by	the	terminal’s	managing	director	and	included	representatives	of	other	stakeholders	such	as	 the	human	 resources	 and	occupational	 health	departments,	 the	 civil	 engineering	 contractor	 and	 the	operations	department	of	the	contractor	workforce.	At	EU2T2,	which	had	a	much	larger	workforce,	each	of	the	four	shifts	at	the	terminal	had	its	own	joint	safety	committee	chaired	by	the	shift	manager.	These	committees	 fed	 information	 into	 a	 container	 division	 committee,	 which	 in	 turn	 fed	 into	 the	 executive	committee,	 chaired	 by	 the	 head	 of	 operations.	 In	 turn,	 information	was	 fed	 back	 down	 through	 these	hierarchies,	 and	 here	 again	 all	 the	 committees	 included	 representatives	 of	 any	 other	 relevant	 bodies	(such	as	the	police	force).			Managers	 at	 EU2T1	 stressed	 that	workers	were	 encouraged	 to	 provide	 feedback	 and	become	 involved	wherever	 possible	 –	 for	 example	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 ongoing	 training.	 Senior	 managers	 talked	 about	consulting	 workers	 during	 the	 development	 phase	 of	 new	 procedures	 and	 practices,	 as	 well	 as	 the	purchase	of	new	equipment	(including,	for	example,	sending	small	teams	to	other	terminals	elsewhere	in	
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the	organisation	to	see	procedures	or	plant	 in	use	and	discuss	 it	with	their	counterparts).	Their	view	is	that	this	process,	and	in	particular	the	provision	of	information	on	why	certain	decisions	had	been	taken,	had	 enhanced	 workers’	 ‘ownership’	 and	 so	 acceptance	 of	 and	 compliance	 with	 new	ways	 of	 working.	They	also	referred	to	the	introduction	of	systems	for	providing	feedback	to	individual	workers	who,	for	example,	reported	a	fault	with	equipment	or	a	defect	in	the	quayside	surface.			The	management	 view	 at	 both	EU2T1	 and	EU2T2,	where	workers	 and	 their	 representatives	were	 also	described	as	being	involved	in	areas	such	as	risk	assessment	and	incident	investigation,	was	that	workers	felt	very	involved	in	all	of	the	terminal’s	safety	management	arrangements.		In	all	of	these	European	terminals	in	areas	1	and	2,	workers’	health	and	safety	interests	were	represented	by	elected	union	representatives.	These	representatives	were	provided	with	time	off	from	their	duties	not	only	to	attend	the	joint	health	and	safety	committee	meetings	but	also	to	prepare	for	those	meetings.		At	 terminal	EU2T3,	where	union	membership	was	much	 lower	and	the	whole	workforce	was	 indirectly	employed,	 the	 arrangements	described	were	 similar,	 but	 the	way	 they	were	 explained	 as	working	was	different.	 Here	 union	 representatives	 sat	 on	 the	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committee,	 as	 did	 any	 other	workers	who	wished	 to	 attend,	 as	well	 as	 representatives	 from	National	 2	 and	 the	 port’s	 police	 force.	However,	 managers	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 reps’	 and	 workers’	 attendance	 depended	 on	 operations	 and,	further,	 that	 the	 union	 representatives	 were	 tolerated	 rather	 than	 seen	 as	 contributing	 to	 OHS	arrangements	and	management:			
“…we	recognise	a	number	of	union	safety	reps	–	mainly	 ‘cause	we	have	to	…	the	problem	is...	 they	
don’t	 talk	 to	each	other.	…	 I	 think	 they	could	 talk	better.	They’ll	 say,	when	 they	come	 in,	 that	no-
one’s	listening	to	them,	but	unfortunately	they	don’t	understand	how	big	business	works,	and	I	think	
they	just	think	“there’s	a	problem;	let’s	throw	a	pile	of	money	at	it,	it’ll	be	done	tomorrow”	and	life’s	
just	not	like	that;	so	you	have	to	prioritise.	And	it’s	like...	we	encourage	the	shop	floor	to	put	hazard	
observations	in,	and	then...	but	sometimes	you	need	continuous	hazard	obs	for	the	same	hazard,	for	
it	to	upscale	and	then	become	a	greater	priority;	it	depends	on	what	it	is…”	[Contractor	Operations	Manager,	EU2T3]		Nevertheless,	managers	felt	that	the	committee	did	provide	two-way	communication.	They	also	described	an	 ‘improvement	 group’	 which	 consisted	 of	 volunteer	 workers	 representing	 various	 groups	 (crane	drivers,	stevedores	etc.)	that	was	intended	to	pass	on	workers’	concerns	to	managers.	However,	they	felt,	although	 they	 had	 tried	 to	 encourage	 it,	 that	 this	 group	 did	 not	work	 very	well.	 It	was	 also	 clear	 that	workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 had	 significantly	 less,	 if	 any,	 involvement	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 risk	assessment	and	incident	investigation	than	their	counterparts	in	the	other	case	study	terminals	in	Europe	area	2.			Turning	 to	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 1,	 in	 both	 case	 study	 terminals	 (where	 virtually	 all	 dockworkers	 were	members	of	 the	 same	union),	 as	 in	 those	 in	Europe	area	1	 and	 terminals	EU2T1	and	EU2T2	 in	 area	2,	regulatory	 requirements	 for	 terminal-level	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committees	 were	 met	 and	representation	on	health	and	safety	was	increasingly	by	elected	union	officials.		At	 AP1T1,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 proposed	 change	 to	 any	 part	 of	 the	 OHS	 management	 system,	 managers	described	 a	 consultative	 process	 involving	 workers.	 For	 example,	 before	 a	 proposed	 change	 to	 a	procedure,	 managers	 put	 together	 a	 team	 involving	 workers	 and	 a	 safety	 facilitator	 to	 consider	 the	change	 and	 the	 work	 instruction	modification.	 Tiered	 documentation	 from	 policy	 procedures	 to	 work	instructions	was	 provided,	with	work	 instructions	 providing	 basic	 task	 descriptions.	When	 these	were	produced	or	changed,	workers	who	use	them	were	usually	involved	in	their	development	and/or	review.	Workers	were	also	involved	in	risk	assessments	and	the	terminal	had	a	worker	engagement	programme	designed	 to	 get	 workers	 involved	 –	 for	 example	 by	 putting	 together	 a	 team	 to	 work	 on	 the	 recent	development	 of	 standards	 (in	 relation	 to	mirrors,	 seat	 belts	 etc.)	 for	 the	 terminal’s	 internal	 transport	vehicles.			
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There	was,	however,	clear	tension	between	the	terminal’s	management	and	the	union	at	the	time	of	our	study.	For	example,	the	safety	manager	described	compliance	with	PPE	use	as	at	about	99%	and	felt	that	the	 shortfall,	which	 he	 regarded	 as	 larger	 than	 that	 for	 other	 safety	 critical	 industries	 such	 as	mining,	reflected	dock	work	culture	and	union	insistence	that	workers	should	not	accept	direct	instructions	from	management.	 Similarly,	 the	 terminal	manager	 felt	 that	 the	 union	was	 trying	 to	 use	 its	 involvement	 in	industrial	 relations	 meetings	 to	 buy	 in	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 discussions.	 Similar	 tensions	 were	 also	apparent	at	AP1T2	at	the	time	of	our	case	study.		The	 operations	 manager	 at	 AP1T2	 described	 a	 recent	 dramatic	 reduction	 in	 incidents	 across	 the	organisation	(National	1)	following	a	significant	change	of	focus	at	the	highest	level	of	the	company.	The	number	of	health	professionals	in	the	organisation	was	substantially	increased,	which	he	felt	had	led	to	a	cascading	down	of	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	proactivity	and	worker	engagement.	This	in	turn	had	prompted	an	increase	in	safety	walks	and	talks	with	workers,	as	well	as	in	consultation.	His	view	was	that	this	corporate	change	had	been	instigated	for	three	reasons:	first	the	change	of	the	most	senior	managers;	second	a	 fatality	at	a	sister	 terminal	(which	he	 felt	had	occurred	because	the	worker	was	not	 following	the	safe	work	instructions);	and	third	the	legislative	change	making	business	owners	liable	for	workplace	incidents.			In	Asia	Pacific	area	2,	union	density	varied	substantially,	as	did	union	independence	(Table	3.2),	since	not	only	were	 independent	dockworkers’	unions	not	present	 in	all	of	 the	terminals	and	party	to	negotiated	Collective	Bargaining	Agreements	only	 in	 some,	but	 in	most	 cases	 the	 companies	had	 set	up	 their	own	‘company	 unions,’	 making	 workers’	 representation	 more	 complex	 and	 led	 to	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	majority	of	workers	were	either	unrepresented,	or	represented	by	‘company	unions’.	This	had	an	impact	on	 arrangements	 for	 representation	 and	 consultation,	 though	 the	 management	 view	 was	 that	 these	arrangements	were	effective	and	functioned	well.		
Table	3.2:	Employment	and	unionisation	levels	in	the	case	study	terminals	in	the	second	Asia	
Pacific	area	
TERMINAL		
AND	GNT	
TOTAL	
WORKFORCE	
SIZE	
PROPORTION	OF	WORKFORCE	
INDIRECTLY	EMPLOYED	
UNION	DENSITY	
Management	
‘union’	
Independent	
union	AP2T2,	GNT	3	 1083	 71%	 23%	 57%	AP2T1,	GNT	1	 751	 54%	 56%	 7%	AP2T3,	GNT	1	 560	 54%	 20%	 11%	AP2T4,	GNT	2	 527	 72%	 NA	 14%		At	AP2T1,	 for	example,	where	under	10%	of	 the	workforce	was	 represented	by	an	 independent	union,	managers	 explained	 that	 the	 joint	 health	 and	 safety	 committee	 meetings	 were	 attended	 by	 safety	department	 managers,	 the	 CEO,	 the	 heads	 of	 all	 the	 other	 departments	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	contractors	and	each	group	of	directly	employed	workers	by	job	type.	Managers	felt	that	representatives	were	 willing	 to	 participate	 and	 provided	 useful	 feedback	 about	 the	 work.	 They	 explained	 that	representatives	were	kept	free	from	their	duties	to	be	able	to	attend	the	meetings	and	went	on	to	say	that	workers	were	involved	in	any	changes	to	procedures	and	equipment	purchases.			Terminal	AP2T2	had	the	highest	proportion	of	independent	union	membership	at	over	50%.	Here	again	there	was	a	 joint	health	and	safety	committee	meeting	attended	by	workers	or	 their	representatives	as	well	as	managers.	Managers	described	these	meetings	as	well	attended	and	involving	‘healthy	discussion’	and	 ‘not	 fault	 finding’	but	 ‘fact	 finding’	with	a	view	 to	 improving	existing	 systems.	They	explained	 that	workers	were	encouraged	 to	come	up	with	 their	own	 ideas,	 for	which	 they	were	rewarded.	They	were	hoping	 to	 re-instigate	 the	 port	 level	 safety	 meetings	 that	 used	 to	 take	 place,	 but	 at	 the	 time	 of	 our	preliminary	study	this	had	not	happened.	Workers	or	their	representatives	were	involved	in	inspections	(for	 example	 of	 electrical	 substations)	 and	 in	 PPE	 procurement	 by	 being	 given	 equipment	 to	 try	 and	
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provide	 feedback.	The	 terminal	had	a	 system	of	 life	 expectancy	 for	PPE	 (which	managers	 explained,	 in	some	 instances,	workers	had	challenged	and	reduced).	The	terminal’s	 ‘internal’	union	was	described	as	being	involved	in	the	development	of	policies	and	practices	on	which	it	was	asked	to	sign	off	–	at	which	point	they	could	make	suggestions	or	raise	safety	issues,	though	managers	said	that	this	was	rare.			AP2T4,	however,	had	no	joint	health	and	safety	committee.	Managers	explained	that	there	had	been	one	in	the	past	that	had	involved	workers’	representatives,	but	it	was	no	longer	in	place	as	workers	had	not	supported	 it	 by	 attending	 meetings.	 Managers	 did	 refer	 to	 ‘regular	 dialogue’	 which	 they	 felt	 covered	safety	 issues.	 There	was	 also	 a	 regular	managers’	 safety	 committee	meeting	 chaired	 by	 the	 terminal’s	general	manager.	The	terminal	had	a	suggestion	box	but	no-one	had	made	any	suggestions.	The	system	of	duty	safety	inspectors,	in	which	workers	carried	out	inspection	in	rotation,	was	seen	as	more	successful	for	two	reasons.	First,	those	involved	in	the	inspections	were	more	safety	conscious	during	their	normal	work	and	second,	they	provided	a	further	opportunity	for	feedback.	Managers	encouraged	feedback	and	held	monthly	welfare	meetings	at	which	directly	employed	workers	could	air	their	views,	particularly	if	the	regular	channels	(reporting	to	a	supervisor	who	reported	to	a	manager)	had	not	resolved	the	issue.		Overall,	 arrangements	 for	 representation	 and	 consultation	 appeared	 to	 be	 broadly	 similar	 in	 most	terminals,	 but	 in	 practice	 their	 operation	 varied	 within	 the	 prevailing	 labour	 relations	 contexts.	Nevertheless,	managers	generally	thought	that	the	systems	in	place	in	their	terminal	worked	well.	There	was	a	tendency,	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	in	particular,	to	equate	lack	of	engagement	on	the	part	of	workers	with	lack	of	interest	in,	or	perhaps	even	need	for,	communication	–	despite	the	fact	that	safety	committee	meetings	 (where	 they	 existed)	 tended	 to	 be	 arranged	 without	 reference	 to	 representatives’	 ability	 to	attend.		
3.3.4	Work	organisation	and	arrangements	for	its	management	In	comparison	with	arrangements	 for	managing	safety,	 there	were	considerably	 fewer	arrangements	 in	place	for	managing	the	impact	of	work	organisation.	When	asked	about	this	area,	 there	was	a	tendency	among	some	managers	 to	suggest	 that	 it	was	something	over	which	they	had	relatively	 little	control	or	ability	to	influence.		For	 example,	 the	port	 level	 agreement	 covering	EU1T1	 specifies	 numbers	 of	 dock	workers	 required	 in	teams	both	on	the	quayside	and	on-board	vessels,	with	employers	 liable	 for	contractual	 fines	 if	 they	do	not	 follow	 the	 requirements.	 Here	managers	 felt	 that	while	 following	 these	 stipulations,	 they	 kept	 the	numbers	of	dock	workers	to	a	minimum,	at	the	same	time	ensuring	that	there	were	enough	present	for	the	 work	 to	 be	 done	 safely.	 They	 suggested	 that	 work	 was	 often	 carried	 out	 at	 high	 speed	 at	 the	instigation	of	workers	who	wanted	to	be	able	to	finish	early.	Some	did	acknowledge	that	on	occasion	dock	workers	 may	 take	 on	 ‘economic	 responsibility’	 themselves	 (by	 working	 at	 high	 speed	 because	 of	 a	perception	 that	 this	was	what	management	wanted,	 for	 example,	 to	 get	 a	 ship	 ready	 to	 leave	with	 the	incoming	 tide),	but	stressed	 that	 this	was	against	 their	clear	 instructions	on	always	putting	safety	 first.	They	suggested	that	this	conflict	between	safety	and	productivity	was	difficult	for	them	to	handle	because	of	the	long	distance	between	management	and	the	workforce.			Similarly,	the	EU2T2	head	of	health	and	safety	acknowledged	that	the	terminal’s	12	hour	shifts	on	a	four	on	four	off	pattern	might	be	a	contributory	factor	in	terms	of	 incidents	by	creating	fatigue,	but	stressed	that	 the	workforce	 liked	 this	 arrangement	 and	would	 resist	 any	 change	 to	 it,	 and	went	 on	 to	 describe	training	through	which	he	felt	 that	 ‘people	are	given	the	tools’.	He	explained	that	the	terminal	 followed	local	working	 time	 regulations,	 and	 that	 the	 occupational	 health	 department	 carried	 out	 night	worker	assessments	part	of	regular	(five	yearly)	medical	check-ups,	while	the	safety	department	also	carried	out	periodic	assessments	of	working	hours	to	prevent	excessive	overtime.			As	was	also	common	in	many	of	the	terminals,	workers	at	AP1T1	could	earn	productivity	bonuses,	while	managers	had	bonuses	linked	to	their	regional	OHS	KPI	targets.	The	safety	manager	acknowledged	some	incentive	 for	 shortcut-taking	 associated	 with	 the	 productivity	 bonus,	 but	 felt	 that	 this	 had	 been	
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successfully	addressed	by	management’s	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	not	taking	short-cuts	(illustrated	by	its	recent	‘don’t	die	for	a	deadline’	awareness-raising	programme).	He	explained	that	he	was	currently	trying	 to	 correlate	 safety	 performance	 and	productivity	 for	 each	 team	 to	 check	 on	 this,	with	 a	 view	 to	possibly	developing	a	reward	scheme	(probably	in	the	form	of	vouchers)	in	relation	to	safety.			In	AP2T1,	where	managers	 stressed	 that	 safety	always	came	 first	 in	 the	balance	between	business	and	operations	 and	 that	 employees	were	made	aware	 that	 safety	 should	never	be	 compromised,	 the	 safety	department	manager	referred	to	a	time	management	system	for	monitoring	any	instances	of	work	over	12	 hours.	 Similarly,	 AP2T4	managers	 explained	 that	 the	 terminal	 followed	 ILO	 guidelines	 on	 working	time.	 This	meant	 ensuring	 that	workers	 did	 not	 do	more	 than	48	hours	 per	week,	 though	on	 occasion	workers	might	be	asked	to	do	more	but	that	this	never	exceeded	62	hours.			Overall	 there	was	relatively	 little	 in	what	managers	 told	us	 that	 focused	on	strategies	 for	managing	the	impact	 of	work	 organisation	 on	workers’	 safety,	 health	 or	welfare.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 summed	 up	 by	 the	operations	manager	for	the	contractor	at	EU2T3:		
“It’s	just	that	things	have	changed;	you	used	to	be	able	to	just	climb	on	the	container	and	you	can’t	
do	that	now;	it’s	just	stepping	on	that	chair’s	“working	at	height”	now	…	a	lot	of	that’s	down	to	the	
media	…	“where	there’s	a	blame,	there’s	a	claim”	and	stuff	like	that.	So	safety	has	moved	on	–	it’s	had	
to	move	on,	rightly	or	wrongly.	…	I	think	it	can	hold	you	up,	but	it	is	obviously	there	for	the	greater	
good.	There’s	nothing	wrong	with	Health	and	Safety,	it’s	just	having	the	right	pragmatic	approach,	
isn’t	it?”	[Contractor	Operations	Managers,	EU2T3]		
3.3.5	Outsourcing	In	seven	of	our	case	study	terminals,	those	in	Europe	area	2	and	Asia	Pacific	area	2,	at	least	a	proportion	of	the	workforce	was	outsourced	and	this	had	implications	for	OHS	and	its	management.		Turning	first	to	Europe	area	2,	as	described	above	both	EU2T1	and	EU2T2	have	strong	traditions	of	full	direct	employment	among	dock	workers	but	each	has	experienced	changes	in	this	area	in	recent	years.	In	EU2T1	 approximately	 half	 the	 400	 strong	 workforce	 is	 directly	 employed	 by	 GNT	 1.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	workforce	is	supplied	by	a	contractor	which	has	been	in	place	for	many	years.	With	the	exception	of	crane	driving,	 indirectly	 employed	 workers	 can	 carry	 out	 all	 the	 same	 duties	 as	 their	 directly	 employed	counterparts,	but	they	are	more	often	used	in	work	on-board	vessels	than	directly	employed	workers.	As	a	 result,	 although	 most	 of	 the	 indirect	 workforce	 is	 multi-skilled,	 around	 15-20%	 are	 only	 trained	 in	padding	and	lashing.			In	terminal	EU2T2	at	the	time	of	the	case	study	a	trial	had	just	begun	of	an	indirectly	employed	workforce	in	 addition	 to	 the	 over	 2000	 workers	 directly	 employed	 by	 GNT	 4.	 The	 senior	 union	 official	 at	 the	terminal	explained	that	any	indirect	employment	had	been	strongly	resisted	by	the	union	for	many	years	but	that,	in	response	to	the	opening	of	a	new	terminal	run	by	a	rival	operator	in	the	same	area,	a	trial	use	of	contract	workers	alongside	the	directly	employed	workforce	was	underway.	Here	managers	explained	that,	 in	 addition	 to	 more	 flexible	 contracts,	 some	 of	 these	 workers’	 conditions	 were	 different	 –	 for	example	they	could	drive	for	three	hours	continuously,	rather	than	the	two	and	a	quarter	hours	allowable	under	the	collective	agreement	that	covered	the	main	workforce.	Managers	also	described	these	changes	as	a	response	to	current	competition	in	the	region.		In	 both	 these	 terminals,	 health	 and	 safety	management	processes	 and	 arrangements	were	 extended	 to	cover	 indirectly	 employed	 workers	 and	 the	 terminals’	 management	 sought	 to	 influence	 contract	organisations	 in	 terms	 of	 OHS.	 Despite	 these	 efforts,	 however,	 there	 were	 some	 differences	 in	 their	working	conditions	and	arrangements	(for	example	in	relation	to	shift	patterns,	time	off	and	breaks),	that	in	terminal	EU2T1	had	led	to	a	view	among	these	workers	that	they	are	given	poorer	quality	jobs.		
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As	 described	 in	 section	 3.3.1,	 the	 entire	 operational	workforce	 at	 EU2T3	 is	 outsourced.	 As	 in	 terminal	EU2T1,	the	single	contractor	had	been	in	place	for	some	years,	but	in	this	case,	as	part	of	a	competitive	process,	 it	 periodically	 has	 to	 re-tender	 for	 the	 work.	 National	 2	 managers	 at	 the	 terminal	 felt	 that	outsourcing	labour	provided	job	security	because	it	reduced	running	and	overhead	costs.	The	National	2	safety	 manager	 explained	 that	 the	 contractor	 worked	 to	 National	 2’s	 safety	 management	 system	requirements.	This	meant	that	policies	and	procedures,	safe	working	practices	and	safe	systems	of	work	were	 driven	 by	 National	 2,	 with	 day-to-day	 supervision	 of	 those	 systems	 by	 the	 contractor	 and	 an	overseeing	 perspective	 from	 National	 2	 shift	 managers,	 supervisors	 and	 safety	 department	 staff.	Information	 was	 disseminated	 via	 a	 two-tier	 system,	 with	 National	 2	 holding	 daily	 briefings	 with	 the	contractor	and	the	contractor	then	briefing	their	operational	teams.	This	was	described	as	a	continuous	loop	of	communication.	National	2	also	set	the	contractor	a	series	of	operations,	finance,	and	health	and	safety	KPIs,	as	well	as	including	requirements	in	relation	to	capacity	for	safety	management	in	its	tender	specifications.	National	2	managers	were	able	to	stop	work	and	dismiss	workers	 immediately,	although	managers	explained	that	they	generally	took	a	‘coaching’	approach	or	simply	notified	supervisors	of	any	minor	issues.			The	terminal	operated	a	hazard	observation	system	through	which	workers	could	report	issues	and	near	misses.	 This	 information	 was	 checked	 and	 actions	 assigned	 by	 National	 2,	 and	 all	 information	 was	available	 to	 both	 National	 2	 and	 the	 contractor	 managers.	 Contractor	 managers	 were	 confident	 that	workers	did	make	reports,	particularly	if	they	saw	National	2	spending	money	on	improvements.	There	was	a	view	among	the	contractor	managers	that	workers	trusted	that	contractor	managers	did	as	much	as	they	could	 to	address	concerns	but	 that	 they	were	 limited	by	what	National	2	would	do.	This	 reflected	tension	between	the	contractor	manager	and	National	2.	For	example,	the	contractor	operations	manager	explained	that	National	2	notified	him	of	its	requirements	for	the	following	day	between	13.00	and	15.00,	with	 consequent	 difficulties	 for	 planning	 its	 guaranteed	40	hours	per	week	of	work	 for	 all	 operational	staff.	Managers	explained	that,	as	a	result,	though	they	tried	to	give	workers	sufficient	time	off	between	blocks	of	day	and	night	shifts,	and	tried	to	ensure	they	had	one	day	off	in	eight	or	two	in	12,	this	was	not	always	 possible	 (though	 they	 stressed	 that	 national	 requirements	 on	working	 times	were	met).	 These	arrangements	meant	 that	workers	 called	 the	 contractor	management	 team	 each	 afternoon	 to	 find	 out	whether	they	were	working	the	following	day	–	meaning	that	managers	dealt	with	around	200	calls	each	day	on	this	issue	alone	and	workers	had	very	limited	notice	of	their	working	arrangements.	Management	described	communication	with	National	2	as	‘a	big	problem’	as	the	organisation	assumed	the	contractor	had	 lots	 of	 staff	 available	 to	 do	 anything	 at	 any	 time	 (for	 example,	 requesting	 extra	 staff	 above	 the	standard	hire	maximum	when	 they	wanted	 to	keep	one	of	 their	 clients	happy).	They	 stressed	 that	 this	reflected	 the	 relationship	with	 those	middle	managers	 setting	 requirements	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 whereas	those	at	the	more	senior	level	were	seen	as	being	more	understanding.			In	Asia	Pacific	area	2,	all	 the	case	study	terminals	 in	this	region	were	operated	by	a	mix	of	 indirect	and	directly	 employed	workers	 and	 in	 each	 case	 indirectly	 employed	workers	made	up	 the	majority	 of	 the	total	workforce	(see	Table	3.2).	Generally,	most	of	the	contract	labour	was	accounted	for	by	a	relatively	small	 number	 of	 contractors	 (fewer	 than	10)	 that	 had	 a	 long-standing	 relationship	with	 the	 terminals’	management.	So	although	some	turnover	is	experienced	among	contractors,	managers	in	these	terminals	felt	 that	 hiring	 contractors	 was	 stable.	 The	 general	 approach	 to	 contracted	 out	 work	 suggested	 by	managers	was	that	the	terminal	operational	activities	(i.e.	management	and	administration,	 loading	and	unloading	operations	including	crane	operation,	safety	services,	maintenance	and	engineering)	remained	under	the	control	of	directly	employed	workers.	In	fact,	outsourcing	was	more	extensive	than	this	in	all	the	 terminals.	 In	 addition	 to	 catering,	 cleaning,	 building	 and	 repair,	 it	 also	 included	 truck-trailer	 and	lashing	 operations	 and	 there	was	 further	 outsourcing	 of	 rubber-tyre	 gantry	 crane	 operation	 and	other	specialised	work.			In	 most	 of	 these	 terminals,	 managers	 referred	 to	 systems	 for	 specifying	 safety	 requirements	contractually,	 against	 which	 organisations	 were	 monitored	 and	 if	 necessary,	 sanctioned.	 For	 example,	AP2T1	 safety	 managers	 explained	 that	 contracts	 included	 clauses	 covering	 aspects	 such	 as	 the	requirement	for	annual	medicals	and	a	maximum	shift	length	of	12	hours.	Contract	workers	were	issued	with	 a	 card	 after	 induction	 training,	 which	 expired	 after	 a	 year	 –	 to	 ensure	 they	 received	 refresher	
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training.	 Managers	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 contractors	 were	 aware	 that	 they	 had	 to	work	 to	 AP2T1’s	 standards.	 They	 described	 terminating	 the	 contract	 with	 one	 organisation	 which	repeatedly	 allowed	 workers	 to	 work	 extra	 hours.	 Similarly,	 at	 AP2T2	 contractor	 organisations	 were	monitored	 to	 ensure	 that	 workers	 did	 not	 work	 excessive	 hours.	 Contracts	 included	 requirements	 in	relation	to	health	and	safety	(for	example,	pre-work	medicals	and	subsequent	regular	medical	reviews),	and	 managers	 explained	 that	 they	 planned	 to	 include	 further	 mandatory	 requirements	 (for	 example	covering	training	and	the	need	to	have	their	own	safety	programme)	in	the	future.	Contractors	were	also	audited	by	AP2T2	managers,	and	required	to	have	their	own	safety	manager	who	acted	as	a	contact	point	for	the	terminal	management	team,	and	were	encouraged	to	use	the	same	PPE	procurement	agencies	as	the	terminal,	to	ensure	consistency.	At	AP2T3	the	procurement	procedures	also	required	specification	of	health	 and	 safety	 standards	 by	 tenderers.	 Managers	 indicated	 that	 they	 believed	 health	 and	 safety	requirements	 on	 contractors	 had	 increased	 in	 number	 and	 rigour.	 There	 were	 special	 provisions	 to	manage	 contractors	 and	 their	workers	 and	 a	manager	with	 responsibility	 for	 the	 oversight	 of	 this	 and	relations	with	contractors.			Performance	 was	 monitored	 and	 occasionally	 contracts	 terminated	 if	 performance	 is	 deemed	unsatisfactory.	 Qualifications	 of	 contractor	 employees	were	 checked	 and	 training	 provided	 to	 all,	 with	satisfactory	completion	of	training	required.	Management	at	AP2T4	sought	to	influence	health	and	safety	among	 contractor	 organisations	 by	 including	 non-negotiable	 terms	 in	 their	 contractors	 (for	 example,	requiring	 contractor	 staff	 to	 undergo	 the	 terminal	 induction	 training	 to	 obtain	 a	 port	 pass	 as	 well	 as	regular	refresher	training,	and	requiring	each	contractor	organisation	to	have	a	safety	officer.	If	this	was	not	possible,	having	safety	checks	supervised	by	the	terminal’s	management;	and	requiring	the	use	of	PPE	and	following	of	safety	rules	and	procedures).	In	addition,	contract	workers	at	AP2T4	were	subject	to	the	same	safety	systems	and	procedures	as	directly	employed	workers,	including	being	obliged	to	follow	the	same	GNT	2	provided	training	and	having	their	working	hours	monitored	to	prevent	excess	working,	as	well	 as	 being	 subject	 to	 safety	 rewards	 and	 penalties,	 with	 violations	 further	 linked	 to	 contractors’	payments.	Managers	were	 clear	 that	 any	 health	 and	 safety	 problems	 experienced	 by	 contract	workers	were	the	contract	organisation’s	responsibility.		Most	terminal	managers	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	case	studies	said	that	they	could	discipline	individual	contract	 workers	 for	 non-compliance.	 However,	 at	 AP2T2	 managers	 explained	 that	 if	 they	 found	individual	 contractor	 workers	 involved	 in	 unsafe	 work	 they	 went	 through	 the	 contractor	 rather	 than	approaching	the	worker	directly	–	except	in	the	case	of	non-use	of	PPE.	At	AP2T4,	in	terms	of	monitoring	safe	behaviour,	information	was	provided	to	all	contract	organisations	concerning	safe	behaviour	and	the	procedures	 for	 monitoring	 it.	 Incidences	 of	 unsafe	 behaviour	 were	 reported	 to	 the	 contract	 labour	manager	 and	 an	 inquiry	would	 be	 conducted	with	 the	 supervisory	 staff	 of	 the	 contractor.	 There	were	follow-up	procedures	in	place	to	address	breaches	of	the	safety	system	and	a	range	of	penalties	could	be	applied	from	warnings	through	to	suspensions	and	dismissal.	Managers	at	AP2T4	had	instigated	a	 joint	inspection	system	in	which	all	contractors	had	to	participate.	This	was	described	by	managers	as	being	a	response	 to	 poor	 safety	 monitoring	 and	 supervision	 by	 contractor	 managers.	 It	 involved	 fining	 the	contractor	organisations	for	workers’	breaches	of	regulations,	such	as	non-use	of	PPE.	If	contractors	were	deemed	to	be	at	fault	in	an	incident	they	could	be	required	to	pay	for	any	costs	incurred,	and	individual	workers	 (direct	 or	 indirect)	were	 issued	with	warning	 letters.	Managers	were	 clear	 that	 their	 current	approach	in	relation	to	contractors	was	not	participative:		
“…the	 other	 safety	 aspect	 is	 the	 behavioural	 aspects.	 That’s	 where,	 for	 example,	 it’s	 more	
characteristic	here	and	some	of	it	is	more,	I	would	say,	punitive	which	I	think	eventually	will	become	
more	 participative.	….basically	we	 do	 have	 dialogues	with	 the	 contractors	 and	 then	we	 discuss	 it	
and	 procedures	 that	 we	 are	 implementing	 but	 encouraging	 them	 to	 implement	 without	 forcing	
them	 is	 not	workable	 at	 this	 point	 of	 time	 –	 here	 in[names	area].	 So	we	have	 to	 say	 you	have	 to	
implement	 this	 …	 At	 this	 point	 of	 time	…	 the	 people	 here	 are	 not	 ready	 to	 just	 adopt	 the	 safety	
practices	voluntarily.”	[General	Manager,	AP2T4]		
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There	 was	 also	 considerable	 variation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 facilities	 and	 conditions	 afforded	 to	 contract	workers	in	these	terminals.	For	instance,	in	AP2T1	the	terminal’s	canteen	was	available	to	all	-	indirectly	as	well	 as	 directly	 employed	workers.	 At	 terminal	 AP2T2,	managers	 stressed	 that	 indirectly	 employed	workers	 had	 access	 to	 terminal	 facilities	 (such	 as	 the	 canteen,	 free	 24	 hour	 paramedic	 service,	 on-site	health	centre,	and	eye,	dental	and	health	check-ups),	as	well	as	going	through	a	similar	induction	process	and	 the	 same	 terminal-provided	 refresher	 training.	 Similarly,	 at	AP2T3	 employees	 of	 contractors	were	eligible	to	be	part	of	an	employee	providence	fund	and	there	were	checks	in	place	to	ensure	benefits	were	paid.	Welfare	facilities	for	contractors,	however,	were	provided	in	containers	dedicated	for	this	purpose,	and	 there	were	 toilet	 facilities	 and	 drinking	water	 located	 near	 them.	Managers	 said	 that	 the	 terminal	company	was	willing	 and	 able	 to	 provide	 canteen	 facilities	 but	 explained	 that	 this	 had	 not	 been	 done	because	 contract	 workers	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 pay	 for	 it	 (though	 there	 was	 a	 suggestion	 that	 it	 would	 be	included	 in	 future	 contracts).	 AP2T4	 managers	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 direct	 workers	 had	 better	conditions	 than	 indirect	 workers	 in	 terms,	 for	 example,	 of	 medical	 insurance	 but	 felt	 this	 was	 not	something	 they	 could	 influence.	 They	 explained	 that	 while	 they	 would,	 for	 example,	 ask	 if	 a	 direct	employee	was	OK	if	they	looked	tired	during	a	toolbox	talk,	this	kind	of	monitoring	was	not	in	place	for	contract	workers.			Arrangements	 for	participation	and	consultation	also	varied.	For	example,	at	AP2T1	managers	stressed	that	representatives	of	 the	contractor	organisations	were	 included	 in	 joint	health	and	safety	committee	meetings.	However,	 contract	workers	had	 their	 own	 representatives	 and	 contractor	 organisations	held	their	 own	 health	 and	 safety	 committee	 meetings.	 At	 AP2T2,	 managers	 explained	 that	 the	 monthly	contractor	 meetings	 were	 run	 by	 terminal	 managers	 and	 attended	 by	 senior	 contractor	 staff	 and	representatives	of	their	workforce.	Managers	discussed	any	unsafe	acts	and	incidents	involving	contract	workers,	 as	 well	 as	 passing	 on	 any	 other	 information,	 including	 from,	 for	 example,	 their	 monthly	inspection	of	contractors’	vehicles.	At	AP2T3	there	were	monthly	meetings	between	contractors	and	their	workers	 and	 the	 terminal	 management	 responsible	 for	 them	 during	 which	 they	 would	 be	 given	information	 concerning	 new	 projects,	 actions	 concerns	 and	 expectations.	 There	 were	 opportunities	 to	raise	 issues	 at	 these	meetings,	which	were	 generally	 attended	by	 some	50	 to	 60	 contractors	 and	 their	workers.	Terminal	managers	stressed	the	importance	of	hearing	the	views	of	contractors.		In	 essence,	while	outsourcing	of	 labour	was	present	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	Europe	area	2	and	Asia	Pacific	area	 2,	 there	 were	 differences	 between	 the	 regions	 in	 the	 way	 this	 was	 managed,	 reflecting	 national	contexts	 and,	 in	 particular,	 prevailing	 conditions	 in	 relation	 to	 outsourcing	more	 generally	 and	 labour	relations	 arrangements.	 On	 the	 whole	 managers	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 they	 operated	 safety	management	systems	that	cared	for	all	workers,	including	those	who	were	employed	by	contractors	and	they	were	doing	as	much	as	they	could	to	minimise	risk	to	their	safety,	health	and	welfare.		The	subsections	above	that	make	up	section	3.3	have	used	the	views,	perspectives	and	descriptions	of	the	
managers	that	took	part	in	our	research	to	outline	how	the	policies	of	the	organisations	running	the	case	study	 terminals	were	 translated	 into	 terminal	 level	 arrangements,	 systems	and	procedures.	From	 their	point	of	view,	as	in	the	previous	study,	these	terminal	level	arrangements	were	generally	seen	positively	and	described	as	being	effective	and	sufficient.			
3.4 But	from	the	workers’	perspective?	The	 foregoing	account	provides	a	 rich	description	of	health	and	safety	governance	and	management	at	both	corporate	level	and	within	the	business	units	represented	by	the	container	terminals,	as	seen	from	the	perspective	of	managers,	supervisors	and	occupational	safety	and	health	advisers.	 In	the	main,	they	described	a	set	of	systems	that	appeared	broadly	similar	(though	there	were	often,	in	fact,	differences	in	operation	and	practice,	particularly	in	relation	to	worker	participation)	and	which	focused	primarily	on	safety	–	with	relatively	little	inclusion	or	coverage	of	health,	welfare	and	work	organisation.	There	was	a	general	 sense	among	 these	 interviewees	 that	 the	arrangements	and	systems	 in	place	 in	 their	 terminals	were	effective	–	with,	for	example,	safety	performance	seen	as	being	good	and	arrangements	for	worker	participations	as	working	well.	They	were	inclusive	–	such	that,	for	instance,	systems	were	described	as	
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covering	 indirectly	 employed	 workers	 as	 far	 as	 was	 possible	 and	 they	 were	 sufficient	 –	 in	 that	 they	covered	all	the	areas	over	which	management	control	was	perceived.			Workers	 participating	 in	 the	 previous	 study	who	 experienced	 the	 operation	 of	 these	 arrangements,	 as	well	 as	 their	 trade	 union	 representatives,	 did	 not	 always	 share	 these	 perspectives.	 Indeed	 they	 were	critical	about	the	effectiveness	of	the	provisions	made.	A	similar	view	was	shared	in	the	interviews	with	workers	and	their	representatives	in	the	present	study.	In	short,	in	our	qualitative	data,	a	gap	was	clearly	evident	between	what	the	systems	in	place	were	intended	to	achieve	in	terms	of	the	experience	of	a	safe	and	healthy	work	environment	as	they	were	described	by	the	managers	and	the	safety	advisers	who	were	responsible	 for	 their	 operation	 and	 the	 ‘lived	 experience’	 of	 this	 environment	 as	 presented	 to	 us	 by	workers	 and	 their	 representatives.	 The	 latter	 experience	 led	 our	 respondents	 to	 comment	 on	 their	terminals’	provision	for	OHS	in	two	rather	different	ways.			On	the	one	hand,	while	they	acknowledged	the	existence	of	arrangements	and	systems	in	place	to	manage	safety	 at	 the	 terminals,	 they	 questioned	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 these	 systems	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 extent	 of	protection	 they	 offered	 to	 their	 safety,	 health	 and	welfare.	 Essentially,	 they	 presented	 a	 less	 optimistic	view	of	their	effectiveness	than	that	offered	by	managers	and	they	were	critical	of	other	effects	of	these	systems	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 behaviour	monitoring	 and	disciplinary	 elements.	 A	 further	 consequence	 of	these	 elements	 was	 that	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 clearly	 felt	 that	 the	 opportunities	 these	systems	offered	them	to	share	more	effectively	 their	concerns	and	perspectives	on	health	and	safety	at	work	with	management	were	quite	limited.			On	the	other	hand,	 the	concerns	for	their	health,	safety	and	welfare	that	emerged	from	interviews	with	workers	and	representatives	were	less	a	denial	of	the	existence	of	the	arrangements	for	governance	and	management	 of	 safety	 and	 health	 that	 managers	 had	 described	 to	 us,	 and	 more	 a	 comment	 on	 their	applicability	to	the	experience	of	work	in	the	terminals.	That	is,	they	generally	did	not	deny	the	existence	of	 the	 arrangements	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 nor	 doubt	 the	 visibility	 of	 the	 corporate	commitment	 to	 its	 goals	 for	 safe	 behaviours	 within	 the	 terminals.	 They	 did,	 however,	 question	 their	relevance	to	the	effects	of	the	primary	aims	of	the	businesses	operating	the	terminals,	which	were	to	do	so	in	increasingly	productive	and	cost	efficient	ways.	Many	respondents	in	both	the	present	and	previous	study	expressed	the	view	that	these	issues	were	the	over-riding	concerns	that	drove	the	culture	of	work	within	the	terminals	–	and	not	that	of	the	‘safety	culture’	promulgated	as	the	aim	of	governance	of	safety.	This,	they	told	us	repeatedly,	had	resulted	in	much	of	their	daily	experience	of	harm	being	entirely	missed	by	the	systems	in	place	to	prevent	it.			It	 was	 to	 explore	 the	 extent	 of	 these	 perceptions	 further	 that	 we	 undertook	 the	 questionnaire-based	survey	of	the	experiences	of	workers	and	we	turn	to	our	analysis	of	its	findings	in	the	following	Chapter.		
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4.	Workers’	OHS	Experiences	
	This	Chapter	presents	findings	on	dockworkers’	experiences	in	relation	to	safety,	health	and	wellbeing,	as	well	 as	 their	 experiences	 of	 the	 systems,	 procedures	 and	 arrangements	 in	 place	 in	 the	 terminals	 to	manage	their	health	and	safety	described,	using	the	perspective	of	managers,	in	the	previous	Chapter.	The	evidence	is	drawn	from	our	analysis	of	the	findings	of	the	questionnaire-based	survey	we	used	in	each	of	the	participating	terminals.	The	aim	of	the	Chapter	is	to	present	a	sufficiently	detailed	account,	based	on	quantitative	 evidence,	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	 workers	 in	 the	 terminals	 we	 have	 studied	 to	 inform	 the	evaluation	 of	 company	 arrangements	 globally,	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 Chapter	 to	 address	 these	matters.	Our	evaluation	of	these	arrangements	will	be	presented	in	subsequent	Chapters	–	the	objectives	of	the	present	Chapter	being	simply	to	present	our	analysis	of	this	experience	in	relation	to	a	set	of	issues	of	health	safety	and	welfare	–	that	arguably,	such	arrangements	should	address	and	on	which	there	were	indications	in	the	previous	report	that	there	may	be	a	gap	(see	Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012:	81-92).			After	 giving	 some	 brief	 details	 about	 the	 survey	 respondents,	 we	 present	 descriptive	 accounts	 of	 the	survey	findings	concerning	their	experiences	of	work-related	safety,	health	and	welfare,	and	of	the	way	in	which	their	health	and	safety	was	managed	and	their	work	arranged.	This	is	followed	by	an	analysis	of	the	associations	 between	 workers’	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	 and	 their	 working	 conditions	 and	 OHS	management	experiences.	The	material	obtained	from	the	organisations	running	the	case	study	terminals	presented	 in	 the	 previous	 Chapter	 suggested	 that	 the	 approaches	 taken	 by	 the	 terminal	 operating	companies	 to	 OHS	 governance	 and	 management	 are	 broadly	 similar,	 derived	 largely	 from	 strategies	developed	 at	 a	 global	 level	 (at	 least	 as	 far	 as	 the	 GNTs	 were	 concerned);	 and	 further	 that	 OHS	performance	is	generally	improving,	with	terminals	in	developing	economies	showing	the	lowest	incident	rates.	This	 implies	 that	workers’	 experiences	 should	be	 similar	 across	 the	participating	 terminals,	with	relatively	few	experiencing	incidents	and	potential	incidents.	This	Chapter,	therefore,	assesses	differences	and	similarities,	in	particular	between	respondents	from	the	four	different	regions	included	in	the	study.		
4.1 Survey	respondents	Most	of	the	respondents	to	the	questionnaire	survey	worked	in	terminals	operated	by	GNTs	(1619,	88%)	as	opposed	to	companies	operating	at	a	national	level	(230,	12%).	Findings	presented	in	this	Chapter	are	drawn	from	survey	respondents	working	in	GNT-operated	terminals.	However,	section	4.7	considers	how	responses	 from	 those	working	 in	 terminals	 run	by	national	operators	 compare	with	 those	of	 the	other	respondents.	Virtually	all	the	respondents	were	male	(1505,	98%),	and	most	were	aged	between	20	and	50	(20<30:	458,	29%;	30<40:	420,	26%;	40<50:	420,	26%).	It	should	be	noted	here	that	every	effort	was	made	 to	ensure	 that	women	were	 included	 in	 the	surveys	wherever	possible,	 and	 further	 that,	broadly	speaking,	this	gender	balance	reflected	that	which	our	research	teams	observed	during	their	case	study	visits	to	terminals.	About	two	thirds	(931,	60%)	were	directly	employed,	and	most	had	been	in	their	job	for	between	one	and	15	years	(1<5	years:	411,	26%;	5<10	years:	453,	28%;	10<15	years:	313,	20%).	Most	worked	in	jobs	involving	crane	and/or	horizontal	transport,	followed	by	quayside	and/or	on	vessel	work	and	jobs	combining	both	these	sets	of	tasks	(Table	4.1).			
Table	4.1:	Questionnaire	survey	respondents	jobs		 N	 %	
A:	Quayside	or	on	the	vessel	(lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery)	 415	 26	
B:	Driving	(crane	operations	and/or	horizontal	transport)	 598	 37	
C:	Maintenance	or	other	roles	 181	 11	
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D:	Jobs	combining	A	and	B		 419	 26	
TOTAL	 1613	 100		There	were,	however,	significant	differences	in	all	these	areas	by	region	of	employment.	Of	the	35	female	respondents,	 two-thirds	 (23,	 66%)	 worked	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 the	 first	 European	 area	 (chi-square	 =	39.78,	 3df,	 p<0.0001).This	 was	 consistent	 with	 our	 interviewees’	 reports	 of	 the	 numbers	 of	 women	working	 in	 the	 case	 study	 terminals.	 Almost	 all	 those	 who	 were	 employed	 by	 a	 contractor	 or	subcontractor	 (rather	 than	by	 the	GNT	operating	 the	 terminal)	worked	 in	 the	 second	Asia	Pacific	 area	terminals	(514,	99%).	Ninety-six	respondents,	27%	of	those	working	in	the	first	European	area	terminals,	were	day	hire	workers.	They	have	been	included	with	 indirectly	employed	workers	 for	the	purposes	of	the	 following	 analyses.	 Second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 terminal	 workers	 were	 also	 much	 more	 likely	 to	 be	younger	and	to	have	less	experience	than	their	high	income	economy	counterparts	(chi-square	=	530.15,	3df,	p<0.0001	and	476.45,	3df,	p<0.0001	respectively;	see	Figures	4.1	and	4.2).	And	as	is	clear	from	Figure	4.3,	roles	combining	quayside	and/or	vessel	work	with	driving	were	very	uncommon	in	the	Europe	area	1	terminals	 and	 were	 most	 common	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 terminals	 (chi-square	 =	 284.71,	 9df,	p<0.0001).			The	 sample	 therefore	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 having	 features	 typical	 of	 what	 might	 be	 anticipated	 for	dockworkers	 in	 container	 terminals	 situated	 in	 the	 three	 continents	 studied.	 Its	 profile	 reflects	 the	economic	and	regulatory	contexts	and	labour	relations	traditions	of	the	areas	in	which	the	terminals	were	operating	 (see	 for	 example	Turnbull,	 2012:517-548).	 The	historical	 role	 played	by	 organised	 labour	 in	helping	to	determine	patterns	of	employment	in	dock-work,	alongside	its	resilience	in	at	least	some	docks	in	 the	 high	 income	 countries	 included	 in	 the	 study,	 combined	with	 the	 regulatory	 frameworks	 within	which	 it	 is	 embedded	 in	 these	 countries,	 have	 been	 influential	 in	 explaining	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	gender	mix,	use	of	contract	workers,	age	profiles	and	job	demarcation	patterns	observed	in	the	sample.	The	point	to	stress	here	is	that	this	is	the	nature	of	the	labour	force	employed	by	the	container	terminals	companies	to	work	in	the	terminals	they	operate.	It	is	these	features	that	the	companies	need	to	take	into	account	 when	 designing	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 strategies	 and	 arrangements	 to	 protect	 and	promote	health,	safety	and	welfare	among	workers	 in	 the	container	 terminals.	We	turn	to	 the	workers’	experience	of	these	matters	next.		
Figure	4.1:	Proportion	(%)	of	respondents	aged	under	40	and	aged	40	or	older	by	area	of	
employment	
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Figure	4.2:	Proportion	(%)	of	respondents	with	less	than	10	years’	experience	and	10	years’	
experience	or	more	by	area	of	employment	
		
Figure	4.3:	Proportion	(%)	of	respondents	in	each	job	type	by	area	of	employment	
	
4.2 Safety	experiences	The	questionnaire	survey	measured	respondents’	safety	experiences	in	two	ways.	First,	it	collected	their	perceptions	in	relation	to	risks	to	their	safety	and	second	it	focused	on	safety	incidents.		
4.2.1 Perceptions	of	safety	risk	Perceptions	of	risk	to	safety	were	measured	using	two	5-point	scales	assessing:		
• The	extent	to	which	respondents	thought	their	safety	was	at	risk	because	of	their	work	
o 1	=	Not	at	all;	5	=	Extremely	
o High	risk	to	safety	was	defined	as	selecting	4	or	5	on	this	scale		
• The	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 respondents	 felt	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 policies,	 procedures	 and	practices	covered	the	safety	risks	in	their	jobs	
o 1	=	Not	at	all	effectively;	5	=	Very	effectively	
o Ineffective	safety	management	was	defined	as	selecting	1	or	2	on	this	scale	
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	Overall,	70%	of	respondents	felt	there	was	a	high	risk	to	their	safety	and	40%	that	the	risks	they	faced	to	their	safety	were	ineffectively	covered	by	the	OHS	management	arrangements.	These	proportions	for	the	respondents	 as	 a	whole	 group	 show	 high	 levels	 of	 concern	 among	workers	 about	 their	 safety	 and	 the	arrangements	in	place	to	protect	it.	Within	each	of	these	two	areas,	however,	there	were	also	significant	differences	by	 region	of	 employment	 (chi-square	=	51.46,	 3df,	 p<0.0001;	 and	 chi-square	=	213.77,	 3df,	p<0.0001	respectively;	Figure	4.4).	Perceptions	of	high	risk	to	safety	were	most	common	in	the	first	and	second	Asia	Pacific	 areas	 (over	70%	 in	 each	 case	–	 though	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	over	half	 of	 the	respondents	 in	 the	 two	European	areas	also	 felt	 their	 safety	was	at	high	 risk,	 indicating	generally	high	levels	of	perceived	risk	to	safety	among	all	groups).	Concerns	about	ineffective	safety	management	were	most	common	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals	–	the	rate	for	respondents	from	the	terminals	in	this	 area	was	 approximately	double	 that	 of	 the	 respondents	 from	 the	 region	with	 the	next	 closest	 rate	(Europe	area	1).		
Figure	4.4:	Proportions	(%)	of	respondents	reporting	poor	safety	perceptions	by	area	of	
employment	
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The	questionnaire	survey	data	showed	differences	by	region.	Proportionately	more	respondents	from	the	first	 European	 area	 terminals	 and	 fewer	 respondents	 from	 the	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 terminals	reported	having	been	injured	in	the	previous	12	months	(43%	and	24%	respectively	compared	to	38%	in	the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 and	 37%	 in	 Europe	 area	 2;	 chi-square	 =	 47.55,	 3df,	 p<0.0001).	 Those	 in	 the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals	were	least	likely	to	report	these	incidents	(71%	compared	to	93%	in	Europe	 area	 1,	 89%	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 and	 86%	 in	 Europe	 area	 2;	 chi-square	 =	 33.99,	 3df,	p<0.0001).	 Nevertheless,	 as	 we	 discuss	 below,	 the	 proportion	 of	 respondents	 from	 terminals	 in	 this	region	 reporting	 injury	 was	 still	 substantially	 higher	 than	 the	 GNT	 supplied	 data	 described	 in	 the	previous	Chapter	would	lead	us	to	expect.			Near	misses	were	more	common	in	respondents	from	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals	(67%	and	65%	respectively	compared	with	57%	and	43%	respectively	in	Europe	areas	1	and	2;	chi-square	=	41.73,	3df,	p<0.0001).	In	this	case,	those	from	the	first	European	area	terminals	were	least	 likely	 to	 report	 their	near	miss	 (46%	compared	 to	54%	 in	Europe	 are	2,	 60%	 in	 the	 second	Asia	Pacific	area	and	62%	in	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area;	chi-square	=	10.44,	3df,	p=0.02).		Reporting	 levels	 are	 important	 because	 they	 determine	 the	 accuracy,	 and	 therefore	 reliability	 and	usefulness	 of	 official	 company	 incident	 data.	 Our	 survey	 suggests	 that	 such	 data	 may	 underestimate	injury	rates	by	a	little	over	15%,	but	that	this	underestimate	varies	by	region	from	under	10%	to	nearly	30%.	As	would	be	expected,	near	miss	or	high	potential	incident	data	are	likely	to	underestimate	workers’	experiences	substantially.	Our	interview	data	suggest	that	these	differences	tend	to	reflect	problems	with	reporting	procedures	and	systems	and/or	concerns	about	the	consequences	of	reporting	incidents,	which	we	will	discuss	further	in	the	following	Chapters.	It	is	worth	bearing	in	mind	two	important	points.	The	first	 is	 that	whatever	model	of	health	 and	 safety	management	 is	 adopted	by	a	 company	–	 for	 example,	whether	 it	 takes	 a	 traditional	 view	 of	 trying	 to	 reduce	 lost	 time	 accidents	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 OHS	improvement	 or	 whether	 it	 distinguishes	 from	 this	 a	 more	 concentrated	 attention	 on	 safety	 critical	incidents.	Successful	outcomes	from	either	approach	depend	upon	the	comprehensiveness	and	quality	of	the	reporting.	As	shown	in	many	other	studies,	workers	and	their	representatives	play	a	key	role	as	the	eyes	 and	 ears	 of	 the	 system	 in	 terms	 of	 gathering	 intelligence	 on	 the	 occurrence	 of	 accidents	 and	incidents.	 While	 some	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 our	 results	 and	 those	 obtained	 by	 the	 terminal	managements	may	 reflect	 differences	 in	what	 is	 required	 to	 be	 reported	 and	what	workers	 themselves	regard	as	an	injury	or	safety	critical	 incident,	 the	substantial	difference	between	our	findings	and	those	presented	by	 the	 companies	 in	 terms	of	 the	number	of	 these	 events	 suggests	 a	 considerable	degree	of	
under-reporting	of	these	incidents	is	the	case	for	all	the	terminals	and	this	should	be	a	cause	for	concern	at	company	level.	This	finding	further	suggests	that	in	some	of	the	terminals	the	issue	of	under-reporting	may	be	more	significant	than	in	others.	Data	from	the	interviews	with	workers,	their	representatives	and	managers	that	we	discuss	in	the	next	Chapter	helped	to	identify	some	of	the	reasons	why	this	might	be	so.		It	is	not	possible	to	make	direct	comparisons	between	these	survey	figures	and	the	OHS	performance	data	supplied	by	the	GNTs	(see	Chapter	3).	However,	using	a	crude	estimate	of	48	hours	worked	per	week	for	44	 weeks	 per	 year,	 the	 survey	 LTIFR	 would	 be	 154.1	 per	 million	 hours	 worked.	 This	 is	 significantly	higher	 than	 the	 top	 rate	 reported	 by	 the	 GNTs	 of	 84.8	 per	million	 hours	 worked,	 suggesting	 that	 the	official	 data	 may	 significantly	 underestimate	 workers’	 experiences	 of	 injuries.	 Of	 course	 these	 figures	must	be	 treated	with	extreme	caution.	For	example,	we	can	only	estimate	hours	worked	and,	while	 the	figures	may	be	close	to	reality	in	Europe	areas	1	and	2	and	Asia	Pacific	area	1,	they	may	underestimate	hours	worked	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2.	Not	all	injuries	may	have	resulted	in	officially	lost	time	–	though	we	would	argue	that	they	should	still	be	counted	as	they	represent	workers’	experience	of	injury	–	and	some	respondents	may	 have	 been	 injured	more	 than	 once	 in	 the	 previous	 year.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 serve	 to	highlight	 the	 potential	 gap	 between	 company	 data	 and	 workers’	 experience.	 Furthermore,	 while	 the	differences	 in	proportions	of	 our	 survey	 respondents	 reporting	 injury	do	 indicate	 experience	of	higher	proportions	of	work	 injuries	 among	 those	 in	 the	European	 terminals	 as	 compared	 to	 those	 in	 the	Asia	Pacific	ones,	the	differences	are	nowhere	near	what	would	be	expected	based	on	the	lost	time	injury	data	provided	by	GNTs	1	and	2	in	particular,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	that	provided	by	GNT	3	(see	Chapter	3).	Our	findings	 suggest	 it	 is	 those	 from	 the	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 in	 particular	with	 the	 lowest	 proportion	(24%),	with	 those	 from	 the	 first	Asia	Pacific	 area	 (38%)	 closer	 to	 the	European	proportions.	This	may	
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reflect	the	difference	in	awareness	of	the	experience	of	work-related	injuries	between	those	in	high	and	lower-middle-income	economies.	 It	also	 implies	 that	 the	differences	may	be	more	complex	 than	simply	regional,	with	economy	type	also	being	significant.			
4.2.3 Safety	outcomes	A	 composite	 safety	 measure	 was	 created	 to	 allow	 comparisons	 along	 a	 continuum	 of	 safety	 outcome	experiences.	This	 technique	which	 is	designed	to	reflect	real	word	experience	by	taking	a	holistic	view,	has	 been	 used	 extensively	 in	 occupational	 research	 to	 give	 a	 truer,	 more	 realistic	 representation	 of	workplace	situations	(see,	for	example,	van	Stolk	et	al.,	2012a	and	b,	Wadsworth	et	al.,	2003,	Smith	et	al.,	2001,	 and	 Johnson	 et	 al.,	 1989).	 Here	 it	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 allow	 us	 to	 combine	 scores	 for	 several	different	measures	derived	 from	responses	 to	different	questions	 to	create	a	composite	measure	of	 the	issue	of	interest.	In	this	case	we	were	seeking	to	derive	an	overall	measure	of	respondents’	perception	of	the	 level	 of	 the	 safety	 they	 experienced	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 which	 they	 worked.	 We	 therefore	 gave	reporting:	‘high	risk	to	safety’,	‘ineffective	coverage	of	safety	risks’,	‘injury	in	the	previous	12	months’	and	‘one	or	more	near	miss	in	the	previous	12	months’;	each	a	score	of	1	before	summing	them	to	produce	a	single	measure	ranging	from	0	to	4.	Overall,	 the	mean	score	was	2.06	(SD=1.14),	with	138	respondents	scoring	0	and	157	scoring	4.	Again,	there	were	significant	differences	by	area	of	employment,	and	also	by	both	job	type	and	employment	type	(F=23.33	(3df)	p<0.0001,	F=20.61	(3df)	p<0.0001	and	F=92.24	(1df)	p<0.0001	respectively),	with	those	 in	 indirect	employment,	 jobs	 involving	 lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 work	 and	 in	 the	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 terminals	 having	 the	 highest	 scores	 (Table	 4.2	 and	Figure	4.5).								
Table	4.2:	Mean	(SD)	safety	outcome	score	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	employment	type		 	 SAFETY	OUTCOMES		 MEAN	 SD	
AREA	OF	WORK	 Asia	Pacific	area	2	 2.25	 1.07	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 2.04	 1.05	Europe	area	1	 1.98	 1.21	Europe	area	2	 1.54	 1.14	
JOB	TYPE	
Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 2.25	 1.03	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 2.29	 1.18	Crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 1.89	 1.16	Maintenance	and/or	other	 1.64	 1.01	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	 Indirect	 2.41	 1.05	Direct	 1.83	 1.12		
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Figure	4.5:	Mean	safety	outcomes	scores	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	employment	type	
		Binary	backward	stepwise	 logistic	regression	was	then	used	to	consider	these	associations	further.	The	safety	outcome	measure	was	split	at	the	median	to	indicate	high	or	low	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes.	This	 showed	 independent	 associations	 between	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 safety	 outcomes	 and	 area	 of	employment,	 job	 type	 and	 employment	 type,	 after	 controlling	 for	 age	 and	 experience	 (these	 variables	were	 controlled	 for	 in	 the	 analyses	 because	 of	 the	 differences	 in	 age	 and	 experience	 between	 the	terminals’	workforces	–	with	those	in	the	Asia	Pacific	Area	2	terminals	younger	and	less	experienced	than	their	counterparts	elsewhere	(see	section	4.1)).	Specifically,	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	were	more	common	among:	those	in	terminals	outside	Europe	Area	2;	those	in	 jobs	other	than	maintenance;	and	those	who	were	indirectly	employed	(Table	4.3).			Repeating	 these	 analyses	 for	 each	 area	 of	 employment	 separately10	 showed	 no	 significant	 association	between	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	and	job	type	anywhere	except	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals.	 In	 order	 to	 explore	 this	 further,	 and	 given	 the	 close	 connection	 between	 job	 type	 and	employment	 type	 in	 this	region,	 these	variables	were	combined	 to	give	a	six	 level	measure	(Table	4.4).	This	was	 strongly	 independently	 associated	with	high	 levels	of	 adverse	 safety	outcomes.	 In	 addition,	 it	showed	that	those	in	driving	jobs	were	about	three	times	more	likely	than	those	in	maintenance	or	other	roles	 (virtually	 all	 of	 whom	 were	 directly	 employed)	 to	 have	 high	 levels	 of	 adverse	 safety	 outcomes	regardless	of	 their	employment	 type,	as	were	 those	 in	 lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	roles	who	were	 also	 directly	 employed.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 direct	 employment	was	much	more	 common	among	those	in	driving	roles	(63%)	and	much	less	common	among	those	in	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 roles	 (18%).	 However,	 those	 in	 lashing	 and/or	 receiving	 and	 delivery	 roles	 who	 were	 also																																																																					
10 The safety outcomes variable was split at the median separately for each region; employment type was only included in the 
models for Europe area 1 and the second Asia Pacific area; and jobs combining lashing and driving were included with lashing 
jobs in the model for Europe area 1. 
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indirectly	employed	were	about	six	 times	more	 likely	 than	those	 in	maintenance	or	other	roles	 to	have	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	–	a	 level	very	similar	to	those	in	roles	combining	lashing	and/or	receiving	 and	 delivery	with	 driving,	 virtually	 all	 of	whom	were	 indirectly	 employed.	While	 these	 odds	ratios	are	not	significantly	different	from	each	other,	probably	because	of	the	relatively	small	numbers	in	some	categories,	they	suggest	there	is	a	group	that	is	particularly	vulnerable	to	adverse	safety	outcomes:	those	 involved	 in	 lashing	 and/or	 receiving	 and	delivery	 –	 roles	 acknowledged	within	 the	 industry	 and	identified	 by	 our	 interviewees	 as	 being	 the	most	 dangerous	 –	 who	 are	 also	 indirectly	 employed.	 This	particularly	 risky	 combination	 is	 one	 that	 only	 arises	 for	 respondents	 in	 the	 second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	terminals	in	our	study.	As	managers	and	workers	frequently	told	us:		
	
“…the	most	likely	…	accident	is	collision	between	two	vehicles	leading	to	injuries	…	second	is	on	the	
lashers	while	working	on	the	vessel…”	[HSSE	Manager,	Terminal	AP2T2]			 	
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Table	4.3:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	and	area	of	employment,	
job	type	and	employment	type	
	 ODDS	RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
AREA	OF	
EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 3,	0.001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 1.08	 0.69-1.69	Europe	area	2	 0.46	 0.30-0.72	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 1.06	 0.74-1.50	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Driving	 1.78	 1.13-2.80	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 2.92	 1.80-4.71	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 2.59	 1.58-4.24	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Direct	 1.00	 	 1,	0.008	Indirect	 1.55	 1.12-2.14	
	
Table	4.4:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	and	job	type	and	
employment	type	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals		 ODDS	
RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
JOB	AND	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Maintenance	or	other	(virtually	all	directly	employed)	 1.00	 	
5,	<0.0001	
Driving	and	direct	employment	 3.13	 1.48-6.61	Driving	and	indirect	employment	 3.01	 1.30-6.98	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	direct	employment	 3.09	 1.21-7.92	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	indirect	employment	 6.05	 3.01-12.16	Both	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	(virtually	all	indirectly	employed)	 6.08	 3.06-12.08		The	analysis	of	the	data	from	the	questionnaire	survey	indicates	that	respondents	felt	they	experienced	a	substantial	 level	of	poor	safety	outcomes	that	was	considerably	greater	 than	might	be	anticipated	 from	both	the	company	evidence	on	OHS	outcomes	and	the	arrangements	made	for	OHS	management	at	these	terminals	described	in	the	previous	Chapter.	It	further	shows	that	there	is	variation	in	the	experience	of	safety	outcomes	that	appears	to	be	the	result	of	both	 job	type	and	the	 form	of	contractual	employment	arrangements.	These	findings	corroborate	those	indicated	in	the	preliminary	study	and	we	will	return	to	a	discussion	of	their	implications	in	following	Chapters.				
4.3 Work-related	health	and	welfare	Turning	to	respondents’	work-related	health	and	welfare,	our	survey	again	collected	data	on	perceptions	of	risks	to	health	and	on	personal	health	and	welfare.		
4.3.1 Perceptions	of	health	risk	Perceptions	of	 risk	 to	health	were	measured	using	 two	5-point	scales	similar	 to	 those	assessing	risk	 to	safety:		
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• The	extent	to	which	respondents	thought	their	health	was	at	risk	because	of	their	work	
o 1	=	Not	at	all;	5	=	Extremely	
o High	risk	to	health	was	defined	as	selecting	4	or	5	on	this	scale		
• The	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 respondents	 felt	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 policies,	 procedures	 and	practices	covered	the	health	risks	in	their	jobs	
o 1	=	Not	at	all	effectively;	5	=	Very	effectively	
o Ineffective	health	management	was	defined	as	selecting	1	or	2	on	this	scale		Overall	 60%	 fell	 into	 the	high	 risk	 to	health	 category	 and	48%	 into	 the	 ineffective	health	management	category,	and	again	there	were	significant	differences	by	area	of	employment	(chi-square	=	103.41,	3df,	p<0.0001	 and	 chi-square	 =	 232.62,	 3df,	 p<0.0001	 respectively).	 As	 Figure	 4.6	 shows,	 proportions	reporting	high	risk	to	health	and	ineffective	health	management	were	highest	among	respondents	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals.		
Figure	4.6:	Proportions	(%)	of	respondents	with	high	risk	to	health	and	ineffective	health	
management	by	area	of	employment	
		
4.3.2 Health	and	welfare	Respondents’	work-related	health	and	wellbeing	were	measured	on	5	scales:		
• The	extent	to	which	respondents	found	their	job	stressful	
o 1	=	Not	at	all	stressful;	5	=	Very	stressful	
o High	stress	defined	as	selecting	4	or	5	on	this	scale		
• Level	of	physical	tiredness	after	a	normal	set	of	work	days	
o 1	=	Not	at	all	tired;	5	=	Very	tired	
o High	physical	fatigue	defined	as	selecting	4	or	5	on	this	scale		
• Level	of	mental	tiredness	after	a	normal	set	of	work	days	
o 1	=	Not	at	all	tired;	5	=	Very	tired	
o High	mental	fatigue	defined	as	selecting	4	or	5	on	this	scale		
• Having	experienced	ache,	pain	or	discomfort	other	than	as	a	result	of	an	accident	that	was	caused	or	made	worse	by	work	in	the	previous	12	months	
o 1	or	more	instance	defined	as	musculo-skeletal	disorder	(MSD)		
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• Suffering	from	an	illness	or	physical	or	mental	problem	that	was	caused	or	made	worse	by	work	in	the	previous	12	months	
o 1	or	more	instance	defined	as	work-related	illness		Again	there	were	clear	differences	by	area	of	employment,	with	respondents	from	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	 terminals	having	 the	highest	 rates	of	high	stress	and	physical	and	mental	 fatigue,	 those	 from	Asia	Pacific	area	2	and	Europe	area	2	the	highest	rates	of	MSD	and	respondents	from	Europe	area	2	the	highest	rates	 of	 work-related	 illness	 (high	 stress:	 chi	 square	 =	 258.40,	 3df,	 p<0.0001;	 high	 physical	 fatigue:	173.12,	3df,	p<0.0001;	high	mental	 fatigue:	chi	 square	=	78.57,	3df,	p<0.0001;	MSD:	11.23,	3df,	p=0.01;	work-related	illness:	70.25,	3df,	p<0.0001;	Table	4.5).		
Table	4.5:	Health	and	welfare	by	area	of	employment		 EUROPE	
AREA	1	
EUROPE	
AREA	2	
ASIA	
PACIFIC	
AREA	1	
ASIA	PACIFIC	
AREA	2		 ALL	
High	stress	 48%	 35%	 39%	 81%	 60%	
High	physical	fatigue	 48%	 75%	 73%	 85%	 73%	
High	mental	fatigue	 48%	 65%	 60%	 74%	 65%	
MSD	 28%	 31%	 21%	 32%	 30%	
Work-related	illness	 46%	 61%	 46%	 32%	 41%		Among	 those	 reporting	MSDs,	most	 (88%)	had	 had	more	 than	 one	 instance	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	with	23%	 having	 20	 or	 more.	 A	 little	 under	 half	 (45%)	 had	 reported	 the	 most	 recent	 instance	 to	 their	employer.	Similarly,	among	those	reporting	work-related	 illnesses,	most	 (85%)	had	had	more	 than	one	illness	in	the	previous	year,	with	37%	reporting	5	or	more;	and	again	45%	had	reported	the	most	recent	illness	to	their	employer.	Most	commonly	reported	work-related	illnesses	were	muscle	pain/ache	(46%)	and	 fatigue/tiredness	 (38%),	 followed	 by	 stress/anxiety/depression,	 stomach/gastric	 and	cold/flu/respiratory	(28%,	25%	and	24%	respectively).		Stomach/gastric	 work-related	 illnesses	 were	most	 common	 among	 respondents	 from	 the	 second	 Asia	Pacific	area	terminals	(33%	of	those	reporting	a	work-related	illness,	compared	to	12%	in	Europe	area	1,	11%	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 and	 19%	 in	 Europe	 area	 2),	 which	 bears	 out	 the	 findings	 from	 the	interviews	 in	 our	 preliminary	 project	 in	which	 respondents	 suggested	 that	 these	 illnesses	were	 linked	both	to	inadequate	breaks	and	welfare	facilities	and	to	poor	surface	conditions	and	vehicle	repair	and	use.	Rates	of	fatigue	were	lowest	among	those	in	Europe	area	2	(20%	compared	to	25%	in	Europe	area	1	and	43%	and	46%	 respectively	 in	 the	 first	 and	 second	Asia	Pacific	 areas),	while	 stress/anxiety/depression	was	most	 common	 in	 the	 first	Asia	Pacific	 area	 (47%	compared	 to	22%	 in	Europe	area	2,	29%	 in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	and	16%	in	Europe	area	1).	Reporting	MSDs	and	work-related	 illnesses	varied	from	35%	and	24%	respectively	in	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	to	51%	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	and	55%	in	Europe	area	2	respectively,	 again	 suggesting	 the	 likelihood	 that	 any	 official	 company	 figures	 would	 significantly	understate	workers’	actual	experiences.		
4.3.3 Health	outcomes	Using	 a	 similar	 approach	 to	 that	 applied	 to	 safety	 outcomes	 (see	 section	 4.2.3),	 a	 composite	 health	outcome	score	was	created	from	the	measures	of	high	stress,	high	physical	and	mental	fatigue,	high	risk	to	 health,	 1	 or	 more	 MSD	 and	 1	 or	 more	 work-related	 illness	 in	 the	 previous	 12	 months	 and	 poor	coverage	of	health	risks.	Total	possible	score	was	7	and	overall	the	mean	score	was	4.47	(SD=2.05),	with	49	respondents	scoring	0	and	265	scoring	7.	Again	there	were	significant	differences	by	area	of	work,	job	type	 and	 employment	 type	 (F=75.87	 (3df)	 p<0.0001,	 F=39.23	 (3df)	 p<0.0001	 and	 F=152.42	 (1df)	p<0.0001	 respectively;	 Table	 4.6	 and	 Figure	 4.7).	 Highest	 health	 outcome	 scores,	 indicating	 greater	numbers	of	adverse	health	outcomes,	were	found	among	respondents	working	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	
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area	terminals,	those	in	jobs	combining	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	driving,	and	those	in	indirect	employment.		
	
	
Table	4.6:	Mean	(SD)	health	outcome	score	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	employment	type		 HEALTH	OUTCOMES	
MEAN	 SD	
AREA	OF	
EMPLOYMENT	
Asia	Pacific	area	2	 5.23	 1.87	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.02	 1.87	Europe	area	1	 3.62	 1.99	Europe	area	2	 3.54	 1.87	
JOB	TYPE	
Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 5.30	 1.80	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 4.49	 2.03	Crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 4.21	 2.04	Maintenance	and/or	other	 3.36	 1.91	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	 Indirect	 5.29	 1.84	Direct	 3.94	 2.00		
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Figure	4.7:	Mean	health	outcome	scores	by	area	of	employment,	job	type	and	employment	type	
	Exploring	these	associations	further	using	multivariate	analyses	showed	that	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	were	independently	associated	with	area	of	employment,	job	type	and	employment	type	after	controlling	for	age,	experience	and	general	health	(Table	4.7).	Specifically,	those	working	in	terminals	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	were	more	likely	than	those	working	elsewhere	to	have	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes,	 as	were	 those	 in	 jobs	 other	 than	maintenance	 and	 those	who	were	 indirectly	 employed.	 As	with	the	safety	outcomes	measure,	models	considering	each	region	separately	showed	that	there	was	no	association	between	job	type	and	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	in	any	of	the	areas	except	Asia	Pacific	2.	However,	within	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	respondent	group,	 it	was	again	those	 in	 indirect	employment	who	were	working	 in	 roles	 combining	 lashing	 and/or	 receiving	 and	delivery	with	driving	that	were	most	likely	to	report	having	experienced	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	(Table	4.8).			 	
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Table	4.7:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	and	area	of	employment,	
job	type	and	employment	type		 ODDS	
RATIO	
CONFIDENCE	
LIMITS	 DF,	P	
AREA	OF	
EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 1.25	 0.79-1.97	Europe	area	2	 0.81	 0.54-1.22	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 3.49	 2.44-5.01	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	 3,	0.0001	Driving	 2.94	 1.91-4.54	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 2.62	 1.63-4.21	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 4.66	 2.82-7.68	
EMPLOYMENT	TYPE	
Direct	 1.00	 	 1,	0.003	Indirect	 1.67	 1.19-2.33	
GENERAL	HEALTH	
Better	 1.00	 	 1,	0.02	Poor	 1.59	 1.07-2.35	
EXPERIENCE	
Less	than	10	years	 1.00	 	 1,	0.03	10	years	or	more	 1.42	 1.04-1.92	 		
Table	4.8:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	and	job	type	and	
employment	type	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals		 ODDS	
RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
JOB	AND	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Maintenance	or	other	(virtually	all	directly	employed)	 1.00	 	
5,	<0.0001	
Driving	and	direct	employment	 4.46	 2.02-9.06	Driving	and	indirect	employment	 5.45	 2.46-12.10	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	direct	employment	 2.98	 1.17-7.56	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	indirect	employment	 5.01	 2.53-9.89	Both	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	(virtually	all	indirectly	employed)	 19.95	 9.96-39.97	
HEALTH	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	0.01	Poor	 1.97	 1.15-3.38	
AGE	
Under	40	 1.00	 	 1,	0.06	40	or	older	 0.61	 0.36-1.03		The	diary	survey	also	collected	data	on	fatigue,	stress	and	MSD.	Comparing	respondents’	ratings	of	their	levels	of	fatigue,	stress	and	MSD	before	their	first	and	last	shifts	in	a	block	of	shifts	suggested	increases	in	all	 three	areas	over	 the	working	week.	 Indirectly	employed	workers	had	higher	 levels	of	both	pre-first	and	 last	 shift	 fatigue	and	 stress	–	 and	 in	 the	 case	of	 stress,	 indirectly	 employed	workers’	pre-first	 shift	stress	levels	were	higher	than	the	pre-last	shift	stress	levels	of	the	directly	employed	workers,	suggesting	that,	in	terms	of	stress,	these	workers	are	starting	their	working	week	from	a	poorer	position	than	that	at	which	their	directly	employed	counterparts	are	finishing	 their	week	(Figure	4.8).	While	these	data	must	be	 considered	 with	 caution	 because	 of	 the	 relatively	 small	 numbers	 involved,	 they	 are	 nonetheless	
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supportive	 of	 our	 questionnaire	 survey	 findings	 suggesting	 poorer	 health	 outcomes	 for	 indirectly	employed	workers,	and	significant	work-related	fatigue	and	stress	building	up	over	a	set	of	shifts	for	all	workers.		
Figure	4.8:	Fatigue	and	stress	by	employment	type	–	comparing	first	and	last	shifts	
	Taken	together	with	the	findings	on	safety	outcomes	reported	in	the	previous	section,	this	suggests	high	levels	of	adverse	health	and	safety	outcomes	among	all	respondents.	It	is	worth	bearing	in	mind	here	that,	while	 the	 companies	 all	 had	 in	 place	 systems	 for	 reporting	 measures	 of	 safety	 such	 as	 injuries	 and	incidents,	 they	did	not	have	 such	well-developed	 systems	 for	 collecting	data	on	 the	 incidence	of	work-related	 ill-health.	 These	 high	 levels	 are	 therefore	 of	 particular	 concern,	 not	 least	 as	 the	 composite	measures	 of	 adverse	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 were	 correlated	 (Spearman’s	 rho	 =	 0.48,	 p<0.0001),	indicating	that	higher	levels	of	poor	safety	outcomes	are	likely	to	be	accompanied	by	higher	levels	of	poor	health	outcomes.	In	addition,	the	findings	make	it	clear	that	some	groups	are	at	significantly	greater	risk	than	 others,	 depending	 on	where	 they	work,	 their	 job	 types	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 they	 are	 employed.	These	 are	 issues	 to	which	we	will	 return	 in	 following	Chapters	when	we	 consider	 the	 character	 of	 the	arrangements	 for	managing	health	and	safety	 in	 the	 terminals	and	give	some	attention	 to	 the	areas	 for	improvement	indicated	by	this	study	and	its	predecessor.			We	 turn	 next	 to	 respondents’	 experiences	 of	 arrangements	 for	 managing	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 the	terminals.			
4.4 Experiences	of	OHS	management	Respondents’	experiences	of	the	arrangements	for	managing	risks	to	health	and	safety	in	the	participating	terminals	 were	 measured	 using	 a	 series	 of	 questions	 focusing	 on:	 health	 and	 safety	 training	 and	 the	provision	 of	 personal	 protective	 equipment	 (PPE);	 written	 policies	 and	 procedures;	 risk	 assessment	arrangements;	and	systems	and	practices	related	to	worker	consultation	and	representation.	As	already	explained,	 these	 were	 designed	 to	 measure	 how	 closely	 respondents’	 experiences	 of	 the	 OHS	management	arrangements	they	worked	under	matched	up	to	what	is	widely	accepted	as	being	a	set	of	cross-sector	 best	 practices.	 Table	 4.9	 gives	 details	 of	 the	 responses	 on	 each	 measure	 by	 area	 of	employment.	 There	 were	 significant	 differences	 on	 all	 11	 measures11.	 In	 most	 cases,	 the	 highest																																																																					
11 Staffing for safety: chi square = 116.69, 3df, p<0.0001; induction training: chi square = 24.53, 3df, p<0.0001; PPE: chi square 
= 203.73, 3df, p<0.0001; on-going training: chi square = 89.06, 3df, p<0.0001; access to written H&S policy: chi square = 
382.22, 3df, p<0.0001; access to written H&S standard procedures: chi square = 468.74, 3df, p<0.0001; written long/irregular 
hours policy: chi square = 93.27, 3df, p<0.0001; written stress policy: chi square = 87.37, 3df, p<0.0001; risk assessment: chi 
square = 56.08, 3df, p<0.0001; consultation: chi square = 84.22, 3df, p<0.0001; health and safety committee: chi square = 
573.78, 3df, p<0.0001; and health and safety representative: chi square = 292.49, 3df, p<0.0001. 
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proportions	reporting	the	lack	of	a	good	practice	OHS	management	arrangement	were	those	respondents	working	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	1	terminals12.			
Table	4.9:	OHS	management	experiences	by	area	of	employment		 	 EUROPE	
AREA	1	
EUROPE	
AREA	2	
ASIA	
PACIFIC	
AREA	1	
ASIA	
PACIFIC	
AREA	2	
ALL	
STAFFING	FOR	SAFETY	 Frequently	insufficient	 11%	 28%	 25%	 42%	 31%	
INDUCTION	TRAINING	 None	provided	 7%	 0%	 3%	 8%	 6%	
PPE	 Some	or	all	replacement	costs	taken	from	wages	 11%	 1%	 1%	 33%	 19%	
ONGOING	TRAINING	 None	provided	 8%	 <1%	 5%	 20%	 12%	
ACCESS	TO	WRITTEN	
H&S	POLICY	 None	or	don’t	know	 76%	 10%	 30%	 72%	 58%	
ACCESS	TO	WRITTEN	
H&S	STANDARD	
PROCEDURES	
None	or	don’t	know	 75%	 14%	 36%	 83%	 64%	
WRITTEN	
LONG/IRREGULAR	
HOURS	POLICY	
None	or	don’t	know	 90%	 59%	 78%	 82%	 80%	
WRITTEN	STRESS	
POLICY	 None	or	don’t	know	 94%	 70%	 83%	 90%	 87%	
RISK	ASSESSMENT	
No	risk	assessment	or	no	worker	involvement	in	risk	assessment	 90%	 66%	 73%	 82%	 80%	
CONSULTATION	
None	(new	procedures	introduced	without	warning	or	worker	involvement)	 74%	 53%	 51%	 77%	 69%	
HEALTH	AND	SAFETY	
COMMITTEE	 None	or	don’t	know	 62%	 24%	 8%	 86%	 60%	
HEALTH	AND	SAFETY	
REPRESENTATIVE	 None	or	difficult	to	access	 77%	 37%	 43%	 85%	 70%		Following	the	approach	used	for	safety	and	health	outcomes	(see	sections	4.2.3	and	4.3.3),	a	composite	variable	 indicting	 the	 number	 of	 poor	 OHS	management	 arrangements	 was	 produced,	 comprising	 the	measures	 in	Table	4.9.	Total	possible	combined	OHS	management	score,	 indicating	the	poorest	practice	OHS	 management	 arrangements,	 was	 12.	 Overall,	 the	 mean	 score	 was	 6.31	 (SD=2.85),	 with	 27	respondents	scoring	0	and	6	scoring	12.	There	were	significant	differences	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	employment	 type	 (F=178.61	 (3df)	 p<0.0001,	 F=44.09	 (3df)	 p<0.0001	 and	 F=414.60	 (1df)	 p<0.0001	respectively;	 Table	 4.10	 and	 Figure	 4.9).	 Again,	 those	with	 the	 poorest	OHS	management	 arrangement	experiences	were	 those	working	 in	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	 terminals,	 those	working	 in	 lashing	 and/or	receiving	and	delivery	jobs	and	those	in	indirect	employment.		These	mean	scores	suggest	that	there	is	significant	room	for	improvement	in	all	the	regions	included	in	the	 project.	 Furthermore,	 some	 of	 the	 individual	 measures	 suggest	 particular	 areas	 of	 concern.	 For	example,	perceptions	of	staffing	levels	in	relation	to	working	safely	are	particularly	high	among	the	Asia																																																																					
12 This may be a reflection of the particular employment arrangements and practices in the terminals in this region (see Chapter 
3), where arrangements made at terminal level elsewhere in our case studies are instead made at the port level. This may have 
resulted in respondents in this area interpreting questions differently to those elsewhere.  	
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Pacific	area	2	terminal	respondents,	for	whom	arrangements	for	consultation	and	representation	are	also	particularly	 poor.	 Similarly,	 access	 to	 written	 health	 and	 safety	 policies	 and	 procedures	 is	 poor	 in	particular	in	Europe	area	1	and	Asia.	The	relatively	high	proportions	of	respondents	from	all	four	regions	reporting	no	access	to	policies	on	working	hours	and,	in	particular,	stress	management,	also	underline	the	under-representation	 of	 the	 management	 of	 health	 risks	 within	 terminal	 operators’	 health	 and	 safety	management	arrangements	identified	by	our	workforce	interview	participants.	In	fact,	stress,	followed	by	fatigue,	were	 the	 second	and	 third	 risks	 respondents	most	 commonly	 cited	as	ones	 they	 faced	at	work	(identified	by	82%	and	81%	respectively),	behind	back,	neck	or	shoulder	problems	(86%)	and	ahead	of	vehicle	incidents,	crush,	fall	and	over-familiarity	(79%,	78%,	77%	and	61%	respectively),	adding	further	weight	 to	 the	 suggestion	 of	 a	 gap	 between	workers’	 experiences	 and	 concerns	 in	 relation	 to	 risk	 and	terminals’	arrangements	for	managing	it.		
Table	4.10:	Mean	(SD)	combined	score	for	OHS	management	arrangements	by	area	of	work,	job	
type	and	employment	type		
OHS	MANAGEMENT	
ARRANGEMENTS	
MEAN	 SD	
AREA	OF	WORK	
Asia	Pacific	area	2	 7.52	 2.63	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.35	 2.25	Europe	area	2	 3.63	 2.13	Europe	area	1	 6.67	 1.91	
JOB	TYPE	
Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 7.00	 2.74	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 7.17	 2.73	Crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 5.78	 2.70	Maintenance	and/or	other	 4.52	 2.65	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Direct	 5.18	 2.74	Indirect	 8.15	 1.96	
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Figure	4.9:	Mean	(SD)	combined	score	for	OHS	management	arrangements	by	area	of	work,	job	
type	and	employment	type	
		Using	 binary	 logistic	 regression	 to	 consider	 these	 associations	 in	more	 detail	 (see	 section	 4.2.3	 for	 an	explanation	 of	 the	 approach	 used)	 showed	 independent	 associations	 between	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	management	arrangements	and	area	of	 employment	 (with	 those	 in	 the	Europe	area	1	and	second	Asia	Pacific	 area	 terminals	 more	 likely	 to	 report	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	 management	 arrangements	 than	those	 in	 the	 first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	 in	Europe	area	2	terminals),	 jobs	other	than	maintenance	and	 in	particular	 those	 combining	 lashing	 and/or	 receiving	 and	 delivery,	 with	 driving,	 and	with	 employment	type	 (with	 those	 in	 indirect	 employment	 nearly	 three	 times	 as	 likely	 as	 their	 directly	 employed	counterparts	 to	 experiences	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	 management	 arrangements)	 (Table	 4.11).	Considering	each	of	 the	areas	of	employment	separately	again	showed	no	association	between	 job	type	and	OHS	management	 arrangements	 outside	Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2.	Within	 the	 second	Asia	 Pacific	 area	2	terminals,	however,	those	in	the	group	identified	as	most	vulnerable	to	poor	health	and	safety	outcomes	were	again	most	likely	to	report	high	levels	of	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	(Table	4.12).							
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Table	4.11:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	and	area	of	
employment,	job	type	and	employment	type		
ODDS	
RATIO	
CONFIDENCE	
LIMITS	 DF,	P	
AREA	OF	
EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 0.10	 0.05-0.18	Europe	area	2		 0.07	 0.04-0.13	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 1.18	 0.82-1.70	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	
3,	0.001	Driving	 3.16	 1.96-5.10	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 3.59	 2.12-6.09	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 10.30	 5.54-19.15	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Direct	 1.00	 	 1,	<0.0001	Indirect	 2.96	 2.01-4.34		
Table	4.12:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	and	job	type	
and	employment	type	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals		 ODDS	
RATIO	
CONFIDENCE	
LIMITS	 DF,	P	
JOB	AND	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Maintenance	or	other	(virtually	all	directly	employed)	 1.00	 	
5,	<0.0001	
Driving	and	direct	employment	 3.86	 1.67-8.89	Driving	and	indirect	employment	 3.75	 1.48-9.49	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	direct	employment	 10.84	 4.12-28.55	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	indirect	employment	 9.00	 4.07-19.88	Both	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	(virtually	all	indirectly	employed)	 18.84	 8.49-41.85		In	 sum,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 survey	 data	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 significant	 room	 for	 improvement	 in	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	safety	in	all	of	the	regions	included	in	the	project.	In	the	eyes	of	respondents	their	experience	of	these	arrangements	fall	far	short	of	that	which	might	be	anticipated	from	the	company	and	terminal	managers’	descriptions	presented	in	the	previous	Chapter.	Moreover,	there	are	particular	areas	of	 concern	 in	 relation	 to	 the	extent	of	 communication	between	 terminal	managements	and	 workers	 concerning	 these	 health	 and	 safety	 arrangements,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 extent	 of	 participative	approaches	adopted	in	instituting	them.	Poor	consultation/feedback	is	of	particular	concern	because	as	is	well	established	in	the	critical	safety	literature	attests,	such	one-way	systems	are	especially	vulnerable	to	failure	because	problems	are	likely	to	not	be	reported	let	alone	rectified	(see	for	example,	Le	Coze	2008;	Hopkins	2011).		The	 analysis	 further	 indicates	 that	 experiences	 are	 not	 even	 across	 the	 different	 terminals,	with	 those	situated	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	reporting	poorer	experiences	than	elsewhere,	both	overall	and	in	relation	to	particular	forms	of	employment	and	job	type.	Again,	this	analysis	raises	a	number	of	issues	that	we	will	return	to	in	the	discussion	in	subsequent	Chapters	concerning	our	overall	assessment	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	terminal	arrangements	and	ways	in	which	they	might	be	improved		
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4.5 Working	conditions,	work	organisation	and	arrangements	The	final	substantive	area	of	analysis	of	the	survey	data	concerned	working	conditions	experienced	in	the	terminals.	The	questionnaire	survey	also	collected	data	about	respondents’	working	conditions	and	 the	way	in	which	their	work	was	organised	and	arranged.	In	all	we	included	13	relevant	measures.	As	Table	4.13	shows,	their	scores	on	all	of	these	measures	varied	according	to	area	of	employment13.			
Table	4.13:	Working	conditions’	experiences	by	area	of	employment		 	 EUROPE	
AREA	1	
ASIA	
PACIFIC	
AREA	1	
EUROPE	
AREA	2	
ASIA	
PACIFIC	
AREA	2	
ALL	
SHIFT	PATTERN	 Irregular	 12%	 34%	 17%	 6%	 13%	
SPLIT	SHIFTS	 Occasional	or	regular	 6%	 27%	 8%	 13%	 12%	
NIGHT-WORK	 Occasional	or	regular	 15%	 93%	 94%	 90%	 76%	
SHIFT	LENGTH	 10	hours	or	longer	 2%	 9%	 99%	 68%	 49%	
BREAKS	 None	scheduled	 12%	 4%	 27%	 71%	 42%	
PAID	HOLIDAY	
ENTITLEMENT	 None	 1%	 1%	 0%	 20%	 10%	
WORKING	HOURS	FIT	
WITH	COMMITMENTS	 Poor	 11%	 48%	 21%	 74%	 48%	
JOB	SECURITY	 Poor	 16%	 57%	 14%	 66%	 45%	
CONTENTMENT	WITH	
BASIC	PAY	 Low	 23%	 18%	 18%	 86%	 52%	
STAFFING	FOR	TARGET	 Poor	 12%	 28%	 43%	 46%	 35%	
WORK	INTENSITY	 High	 64%	 50%	 56%	 68%	 63%	
SATISFACTION	WITH	
WORKING	CONDITIONS	 Low	 14%	 50%	 27%	 70%	 48%	
SATISFACTION	WITH	
WELFARE	CONDITIONS	 Low	 15%	 32%	 41%	 74%	 50%		Combining	 these	measures	allowed	us	 to	create	a	 single	 item	working	conditions	score	with	a	possible	total	of	13	to	indicate	the	poorest	conditions	and	0	to	indicate	the	best.	Overall,	the	mean	score	was	5.58	(SD=3.08),	 with	 39	 respondents	 scoring	 0	 and	 4	 scoring	 12	 (none	 scored	 13).	 Again,	 there	 were	significant	 differences	 by	 area	 of	work,	 job	 type	 and	 employment	 type	 (working	 conditions:	 F=427.89	(3df)	p<0.0001,	F=138.39	(3df)	p<0.0001	and	F=468.20	(1df)	p<0.0001	respectively;	with	lashers	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals	 indicating	they	were	experiencing	the	worst	conditions;	Table	4.14,	Figure	4.10).	
																																																																				
13 Irregular shifts: chi-square = 115.66, 3df, p<0.0001; split shift: chi-square = 61.91, 3df, p<0.0001; night-work: chi-square = 
786.92, 3df, p<0.0001; shift length: chi-square = 814.71, 3df, p<0.0001; breaks: chi-square = 558.38, 3df, p<0.0001; paid 
holiday entitlement: chi-square = 164.83, 3df, p<0.0001; working hours fit with commitments: chi-square = 480.31, 3df, 
p<0.0001; job security: chi-square = 371.16, 3df, p<0.0001; contentment with basic pay: chi-square = 697.24, 3df, p<0.0001; 
staffing for targets: chi-square = 130.27, 3df, p<0.0001work intensity: chi-square = 31.10, 3df, p<0.0001; satisfaction with 
working conditions: chi-square = 358.35, 3df, p<0.0001; and satisfaction with working conditions: chi-square = 394.93, 3df, 
p<0.0001. 	
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Table	4.14:	Mean	(SD)	combined	score	for	working	conditions	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	
employment	type		 WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
MEAN	 SD	
AREA	OF	WORK	
Asia	Pacific	area	2	 7.52	 2.56	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.52	 2.06	Europe	area	2	 4.62	 1.72	Europe	area	1	 2.02	 1.60	
JOB	TYPE	
Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 7.61	 2.81	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 6.08	 2.93	Crane	and/or	horizontal	transport	driving	 4.30	 2.57	Maintenance	and/or	other	 3.68	 2.30	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Direct	 7.56	 2.88	Indirect14	 4.32	 2.49		
Figure	4.10:	Mean	combined	score	for	working	conditions	by	area	of	work,	job	type	and	
employment	type	
		
																																																																				
14 Includes Europe area 1 day hire 
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Considering	the	working	conditions	measures	individually,	it	is	clear	that	some	of	the	ways	in	which	work	is	organised	are	strongly	linked	to	region.	For	example,	long	shifts	are	almost	universal	among	the	Europe	area	1	respondents	and	very	common	among	 the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	 terminal	 respondents.	These	kinds	of	patterns	likely	reflect	longstanding	traditions	in	the	areas	concerned.	However,	the	consistently	high	 levels	 of	 respondents	 reporting	 high	 levels	 of	 work	 intensity	 in	 all	 four	 regions	 is	 of	 particular	concern,	 and	 reflects	 a	 more	 general	 concern	 about	 rapidly	 increasing	 work	 intensity	 –	 with	 its	recognised	health	and	safety	consequences	(see,	for	example,	Quinlan	and	Bohle,	2008)	–	apparent	both	in	our	qualitative	findings	and	in	the	literature	on	the	changes	that	have	taken	place	in	dock-work	more	generally	(see,	for	example,	Gekara	and	Fairbrother,	2013).		Multivariate	 analyses	 again	 showed	 significant	 independent	 associations	 between	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	working	conditions	and	area	of	employment,	job	type	and	employment	type	after	controlling	for	age	and	experience	 levels	 (Table	 4.15).	 As	 with	 the	 models	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 and	 for	 OHS	management	 arrangements,	 when	 the	 regions	 were	 considered	 separately	 there	 were	 no	 associations	between	 job	type	and	working	conditions	except	 in	 the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals,	where	again	those	in	 indirect	employment	and	in	 jobs	combining	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	driving	were	by	far	the	most	likely	to	report	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions.		
Table	4.15:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions	and	area	of	employment,	
job	type	and	employment	type		 ODDS	RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
AREA	OF	
EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 12.16	 5.34-27.71	Europe	2	 11.70	 5.33-25.69	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 93.69	 44.49-197.29	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	
3,	<0.0001	Driving	 3.69	 2.17-6.27	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 8.43	 4.61-15.41	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 12.78	 6.87-23.77	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Direct	 1.00	 	 1,	<0.0001	Indirect	 2.74	 1.77-4.23	
EXPERIENCE	
Under	10	years	 1.00	 	 0.03	10	years	or	longer	 1.55	 1.05-2.30														
88		 	
	
Table	4.16:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions	and	job	type	and	
employment	type	in	the	second	Asia	Pacific	area	terminals		 ODDS	
RATIO	
CONFIDENCE	
LIMITS	 DF,	P	
JOB	AND	
EMPLOYMENT	
TYPE	
Maintenance	or	other	(virtually	all	directly	employed)	 1.00	 	
5,	<0.0001	
Driving	and	direct	employment	 2.74	 1.31-5.75	Driving	and	indirect	employment	 4.71	 2.11-10.53	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	direct	employment	 9.92	 3.96-24.90	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	and	indirect	employment	 6.21	 3.09-12.51	Both	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	(virtually	all	indirectly	employed)	 65.85	 30.03-144.42	
EXPERIENCE	
Under	10	years	 1.00	 	 0.03	10	years	or	longer	 1.92	 1.07-3.45		
4.6 Associations	between	OHS	outcomes,	working	conditions	and	OHS	
management	The	analyses	 in	sections	4.2	to	4.5	above	show	that	a	substantial	proportion	of	our	survey	respondents	have	 experienced	 high	 levels	 of	 adverse	 safety	 and	 health	 outcomes,	 poor	 OHS	 management	arrangements	and	poor	working	conditions.	They	have	identified	a	sub-group	of	respondents	that	seem	to	 be	 at	 particular	 risk	 in	 all	 four	 of	 these	 areas	 –	 indirectly	 employed	 dockworkers	 involved	 in	 jobs	combining	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	driving,	the	combination	of	which	is	unique	to	the	second	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 terminals	 in	 our	 dataset.	 This	 section	 brings	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 four	 areas	together	 by	 considering	whether	 poor	working	 conditions	 are	 associated	with	 poor	 OHS	management	arrangements	and	adverse	outcomes	are	associated	with	both	working	conditions	and	OHS	management	arrangements.	The	same	multivariate	approach	was	used.		
4.6.1 Associations	between	working	conditions	and	OHS	management	High	 levels	 of	 poor	 working	 conditions	 were	 strongly	 associated	 with	 poor	 OHS	 management	arrangements	 independent	 of	 area	 of	 employment,	 job	 type,	 employment	 type,	 age,	 experience	 and	general	 health	 (Table	 4.17).	 Specifically,	 those	 who	 reported	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	 management	arrangements	 were	 over	 10	 times	 as	 likely	 as	 those	 with	 low	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	 management	arrangements	to	report	experiencing	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions.	Repeating	these	analyses	for	each	area	separately	showed	that	this	association	was	significant	in	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area,	Europe	area	2	 and	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	 (OR=2.74	 (1.40-5.37),	 1df,	 p=0.003;	 OR=1.89	 (1.04-3.42),	 1df,	 p=0.04;	 and	OR=7.02	 (4.45-11.06),	 1df,	 p<0.0001)	 and	 approached	 significance	 in	 Europe	 area	 1	 (OR=1.73	 (0.94-3.19),	1df,	p=0.08).							
Table	4.17:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions	and	OHS	management	
arrangements		 ODDS	
RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
OHS	MANAGEMENT	 Good	 1.00	 	 1,	
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ARRANGEMENTS	 Poor	 10.14	 6.66-15.44	 p<0.0001	
AREA	OF	EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 38.56	 13.66-108.88	Europe	area	2		 54.27	 20.30-145.06	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 136.74	 55.58-336.41	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	 3,	<0.0001	Driving	 2.63	 1.42-4.86	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 8.83	 4.56-17.10	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 7.53	 3.80-14.90	
HEALTH	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	0.01	Poor	 2.29	 1.22-4.30		
4.6.2 Associations	between	health	and	safety	outcomes	and	both	working	conditions	
and	OHS	management	arrangements	High	 levels	 of	 perceived	poor	 safety	 outcomes	were	 independently	 associated	with	 both	poor	working	conditions	and	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	after	controlling	for	area	of	employment,	 job	type,	employment	 type,	 age,	 experience	 and	 general	 health	 (Table	 4.18).	When	 the	 regions	were	 considered	separately	there	were	independent	associations	between	adverse	safety	outcomes	and:		
• Poor	 working	 conditions	 in	 the	 terminals	 in:	 Europe	 area	 1	 (OR=2.58	 (1.32-5.07),	 1df,	p=0.006);	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 (OR=4.04	 (1.88-8.68),	 1df,	 p<0.0001);	 and	Asia	 Pacific	area	2	(OR=1.97	(1.24-3.14),	1df,	p=0.004)		
• Poor	OHS	management	arrangements	in	the	terminals	in:	Asia	Pacific	area	2	(OR=1.56	(1.03-2.37),	1df,	p=0.04)		Similarly,	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 health	 outcomes	were	 independently	 associated	with	 both	 poor	working	conditions	 and	 poor	 OHS	management	 arrangements	 (Table	 4.18).	When	 the	 regions	were	 considered	separately	there	were	independent	associations	between	adverse	health	outcomes	and:		
• Poor	 working	 conditions	 in	 the	 terminals	 in:	 Europe	 area	 1	 (OR=3.15	 (1.52-6.53),	 1df,	p=0.002);	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 (OR=2.44	 (1.16-5.13),	 1df,	 p=0.02);	 Europe	 area	 2	(OR=3.75	 (1.90-7.40),	 1df,	 p<0.0001);	 and	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	 (OR=3.91	 (2.49-6.16),	 1df,	p<0.0001)		
• Poor	 OHS	management	 arrangements	 in	 the	 terminals	 in:	 Europe	 area	 2	 (OR=2.04	 (1.03-4.04),	1df,	p=0.04);	with	a	similar	association	suggested	 for	Asia	Pacific	area	1,	 though	this	did	not	reach	significance	(OR=1.96	(0.93-4.13),	1df,	p=0.08).		These	 analyses	 show	 that	 our	 composite	 measures	 of	 working	 conditions	 and	 OHS	 management	arrangements,	intended	to	reflect	more	closely	workers’	overall	workplace	experiences,	are	significantly	associated	with	their	OHS	outcomes.	This	is	worth	drawing	attention	to	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	implies	that	changes	to	one	or	two	arrangements	or	practices	might	have	considerable	knock-on	effects.	This	is	important,	 particularly	 in	 an	 environment	 in	 which,	 for	 example,	 some	 working	 conditions	 are	 less	possible	to	improve	than	others	(such	as	the	necessity	for	night-work	on	the	one	hand	and	staffing	levels	on	 the	 other).	 Second,	 the	 findings	 also	 suggest	 that	 GNTs’	 relative	 emphasis	 on	 altering	 behaviour	 in	order	 to	 raise	 OHS	 performance	 levels	 in	 comparison	 with	 that	 on	 altering	 work,	 management	 and	employment	practices	is	missing	an	opportunity	to	improve	workers’	OHS	experiences.		
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Table	4.18:	Associations	between	high	levels	of	adverse	safety	and	health	outcomes	and	both	
working	conditions	and	OHS	management	arrangements		 	 ODDS	
RATIO	 CONFIDENCE	LIMITS	 DF,	P	
HIGH	ADVERSE	
SAFETY	
OUTCOMES	
OHS	MANAGEMENT	
ARRANGEMENTS	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	p<0.0001	Poor	 2.11	 1.43-3.12	
WORKING	CONDITIONS	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	p<0.0001	Poor	 3.51	 2.28-5.40	
AREA	OF	EMPLOYMENT	
Europe	area	1	 1.00	 	 1,	p<0.0001	Asia	Pacific	area	1	 0.98	 0.54-1.78	Europe	area	2	 0.38	 0.20-0.70	Asia	Pacific	area	2	 0.45	 0.26-0.78	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	
0.08	
Driving	 1.71	 0.96-3.04	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 2.18	 1.20-3.96	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 1.73	 0.94-3.19	
EXPERIENCE	
Under	10	years	 1.00	 	 0.09	10	years	or	longer	 1.37	 0.95-1.99	
HIGH	ADVERSE	
HEALTH	
OUTCOMES	
OHS	MANAGEMENT	
ARRANGEMENTS	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	p<0.0001	Poor	 2.80	 2.01-3.90	
WORKING	CONDITIONS	
Good	 1.00	 	 1,	p<0.0001	Poor	 5.30	 3.71-7.56	
JOB	TYPE	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	 	
3,	p=0.04	
Driving	 1.96	 1.18-3.24	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 1.32	 0.76-2.30	Both	driving	and	lashing/receiving	and	delivery	 1.65	 0.93-2.93		
4.7 National	terminal	operators	All	the	analyses	in	the	sections	above	are	based	on	the	data	from	the	respondents	working	in	terminals	operated	by	GNTs	only.	Two	further	terminals	run	by	national	operators,	one	in	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	one	in	Europe	area	2,	participated	in	the	project.	It	is	important	to	remember	here	that,	as	described	in	 Chapter	 3,	 all	 dock-work	 in	 the	 Europe	 area	 2	 national	 operator	 run-terminal	 is	 carried	 out	 by	indirectly	employed	workers.			Comparing	the	GNT-	and	national	operator-run	terminals	univariately	(i.e.	without	controlling	for	factors	such	as	age	and	work	experience),	in	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	respondents	in	the	GNT-run	terminals	had	significantly	 lower	 mean	 health	 outcomes,	 OHS	 management	 arrangements	 and	 working	 conditions	scores	(F=14.52,	1df,	p<0.0001;	F=3.75,	df,	p=0.05;	and	F=27.63,	1df,	p<0.0001	respectively;	Figure	4.10)	and	were	significantly	less	likely	to	have	health	outcomes,	OHS	management	arrangements	and	working	conditions	 scores	 above	 the	median	 for	 the	 region	 as	 a	 whole	 (47%	 and	 61%,	 chi-square	 =	 6.09,	 1df,	p=0.01;	 49%	 and	 71%,	 chi-square	 =	 13.83,	 1df,	 p<0.0001;	 and	 51%	 and	 62%,	 chi-square	 =	 4.35,	 1df,	
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p=0.04	respectively).	Among	 the	Europe	area	2	 respondents,	however,	although	 the	pattern	of	 findings	was	 the	 same	 for	OHS	management	 arrangements	 and	working	 conditions	 (F=10.77,	1df,	 p=0.001;	 and	F=15.58,	p<0.0001	respectively;	Figure	4.11;	and	50%	and	71%,	chi-square	=	6.26,	1df,	p=0.01;	and	48%	and	65%,	chi-square	=	4.42,	1df,	p=0.04	respectively),	the	mean	health	outcomes	score	was	significantly	higher	 for	 the	 GNT-run	 terminals’	 respondents	 (F=3.79,	 1df,	 p=0.05;	 Figure	 4.10)	 and	 the	 proportion	above	 the	 median	 was	 also	 higher	 for	 GNT-run	 terminal	 respondents,	 though	 this	 did	 not	 reach	significance	(51%	and	37%,	chi-square	=	2.14,	1df,	p=0.14).			Repeating	the	multivariate	models	for	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	2	described	in	sections	4.2	to	4.6	above	with	the	inclusion	of	a	dummy	variable	for	terminal	operator	type	showed	that	most	of	these	associations	remained	after	controlling	for	other	factors.	In	comparison	with	those	from	the	GNT-run	terminals,	respondents	from	the	terminals	run	by	national	operators	were	more	likely	to	report	high	levels	of	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	in	both	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	2,	more	likely	 to	 report	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	working	 conditions	 in	 the	 first	 Asia	 Pacific	 area,	 and	 less	 likely	 to	report	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 health	 outcomes	 in	 Europe	 area	 2	 (see	 Appendix,	 Table	 A.1).	 The	 latter	 is	probably	a	reflection	of	the	profile	of	the	workforce	in	terminal	EU2T3.	These	workers	were	all	indirectly	employed	and	were	significantly	younger	and	had	less	work	experience15	than	their	counterparts	in	the	GNT-run	terminals	(EU2T1	and	EU2T2),	most	of	whom	were	directly	employed.			Taken	 together,	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 relationships	 between	 working	 conditions,	 OHS	management	and	OHS	outcomes	are	similar	for	GNT-	and	national	operator-run	terminals.	However,	they	suggest	that	those	working	in	national	operator-run	terminals	generally	experience	higher	levels	of	poor	working	conditions	and	OHS	management	arrangements.		
Figure	4.11:	Mean	safety	and	health	outcomes,	OHS	management	arrangement	and	working	
conditions	scores	by	terminal	operator	for	the	first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	2	
		
4.8 Summary	and	conclusions	The	 findings	 in	 this	 Chapter	 suggest	 that	 substantial	 proportions	 of	 survey	 respondents	 have	 poor	workplace	health	and	safety	experiences	 in	container	 terminals	–	be	 those	 in	 relation	 to	 their	personal	safety	 and	 health,	 the	 management	 of	 the	 risks	 they	 face	 at	 work	 or	 the	 way	 in	 which	 their	 work	 is	organised	and	arranged.			In	terms	of	safety,	70%	felt	they	were	at	high	risk,	40%	felt	these	risks	were	ineffectively	managed	and	one	third	had	been	injured	in	the	previous	year.	While	for	health,	although	slightly	fewer	respondents	felt	they	were	at	high	risk	(60%),	slightly	more	(48%)	felt	these	risks	were	ineffectively	managed,	and	levels																																																																					15	In the national operator run terminal, 80% of respondents had less than 10 years’ experience compared to 32% for the GNT 
run terminals (X2 = 47.88, 1df, p<0.0001) – and in fact 64% had less than 5 years’ experience (compared to 12%). Similarly, 
72% were under 40 compared to 28% of those in the GNT run terminals (X2 = 38.67, 1df, p<0.0001) – with 50% were under 30.		
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of	respondents	reporting	stress,	mental	fatigue	and	work-related	illnesses	were	high	(60%,	65%	and	41%	respectively).	These	findings	are	corroborated	by	the	qualitative	data	from	our	studies	in	which	many	of	the	worker	participants	expressed	concerns	about	their	safety	and,	in	particular,	their	health,	and	the	way	in	which	these	were	managed.	They	also	identified	work-related	impact	on	their	health	and	welfare	(for	example	 in	 the	 form	 of	 stress	 and	 fatigue),	 that	 research	 from	 other	 sectors	 of	 industry	 has	 shown	 is	associated	with	changes	in	the	way	in	which	work	is	organised	and	managed	(such	as	increases	in	flexible	or	contingent	work	patterns	and	employment	arrangements,	 increases	 in	 job	 insecurity	and	work	pace	and	 a	 decrease	 in	 control	 over	work	 (see,	 for	 example;	 Quinlan	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Quinlan	 and	Bohle,	 2008;	Walters	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 as	 being	 increasingly	 common	 and	 inadequately	 addressed	 by	 arrangements	 for	managing	workplace	 risk.	 Comparisons	with	 data	 from	 other	 sources	 suggest	 that	 respondents	 to	 our	survey	are	worse	off	 than	others.	For	example,	data	 from	 the	5th	European	Working	Conditions	Survey	(EWCS)	 (EUROFOUND,	 2010)	 show	 that,	 among	male	 respondents	 in	 European	 workplaces	 generally,	only	29%	felt	their	health	or	safety	and	18%	their	welfare	were	at	risk	because	of	work	and	just	26%	said	they	experienced	stress	at	work	always	or	most	of	the	time.			The	survey	also	suggested	that	many	respondents	experience	high	levels	of	what	they	perceive	to	be	poor	OHS	management	arrangements	and	working	conditions.	 In	particular	 they	 felt	 that	such	arrangements	failed	to	provide	adequately	for	their	voice	to	be	heard.	For	example,	over	two-thirds	of	respondents	said	they	were	 not	 consulted	 about	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	procedures	 and	70%	had	no	 health	 and	 safety	representative	or	had	difficulty	accessing	one.	In	addition,	they	believed	that	the	arrangements	for	their	health,	safety	and	welfare	failed	to	address	the	issues	of	work	organisation	and	welfare	that	were	critical	to	health	and	welfare.	For	example,	63%	had	high	levels	of	 job	intensity	and	half	were	dissatisfied	with	their	workplace	welfare	conditions	and	arrangements.	There	seems	to	be	therefore,	substantial	room	for	improvement	in	relation	to	health	and	safety	management	arrangements,	including	those	relating	to	the	representation	 and	 consultation	 of	 workers	 on	 these	 arrangements,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 work	 organisational	issues	 that	 affect	welfare	 (and	may	 indirectly	 also	 affect	 safety).	 Relatedly,	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	respondents	(31%)	felt	staffing	levels	were	frequently	 inadequate	for	work	to	be	carried	out	safely	and	35%	 of	 respondents	 felt	 that	 they	were	 frequently	 inadequate	 for	work	 to	 be	 completed	 according	 to	targets,	indicating	considerable	room	for	improvement	here	too.		Strong	 associations	 between	 all	 of	 these	 areas	 (that	 is,	 between	 working	 conditions	 and	 workplace	arrangements	 for	 managing	 health	 and	 safety,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 OHS	 outcomes	 and	 both	 working	conditions	 and	 OHS	 management	 arrangements)	 were,	 expected	 and	 were	 borne	 out	 by	 the	 survey	findings.	However,	the	same	findings	also	suggested	that	increased	emphasis	on	changing	aspects	of	OHS	management	 and	 workplace	 arrangements,	 as	 opposed	 to	 focusing	 mainly	 on	 changing	 workers’	behaviour,	has	the	potential	to	improve	workers’	OHS	experiences	overall	as	well	as	terminal	 level	OHS	performance	–	something	we	return	to	in	the	following	Chapter.			Lastly,	 the	 findings	 clearly	 identified	 a	 sub-group	 of	 the	 respondents	 as	 being	 at	 particular	 risk.	 These	were	 indirectly	 employed	 workers	 doing	 jobs	 which	 combined	 quayside	 and	 driving	 work	 –	 a	combination	that	was	only	present	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals	in	our	survey.	This	finding	suggests	that	 global	 approaches	 by	 GNTs	 to	 OHS	 governance	 and	 management	 do	 not	 produce	 similar	 OHS	conditions,	arrangements	and	outcomes	in	different	contexts.	It	also	calls	into	question	the	company	data	identifying	 those	 in	 developing	 economy	 terminals	 as	 having	 better	 OHS	 performance	 –	 a	 reflection,	perhaps	at	 the	widest	end,	of	 the	more	general	gap	our	research	has	 identified	between	these	data	and	workers’	day-to-day	OHS	experiences.		In	 the	 following	 Chapter	 we	 explore	 these	 issues	 further,	 discussing	 what	 helps	 to	 determine	 them,	especially	in	relation	to	the	national	contexts	in	which	they	are	experienced,	and	we	further	consider	how	the	 arrangements	 in	 place	 to	 support	 positive	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 in	 the	 terminals	 might	 be	improved	in	the	light	of	the	findings	presented	in	this	Chapter.		
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5.	Addressing	‘the	gap’	
	The	 major	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 indicate	 that	 while	 detailed	 strategies	 and	 arrangements	 to	 manage	safety	 and	 health	 are	 adopted	 by	most	 global	 and	 national	 container	 terminal	 operators,	 there	 remain	major	gaps	between	these	approaches	and	the	outcomes	and	everyday	experiences	of	health,	safety	and	welfare	 shared	 by	workers	 in	 container	 terminals	 operated	 by	 these	 companies	worldwide.	 They	 also	confirm	 indications	 that	 the	 patterns	 of	 such	 experiences	 and	 outcomes	 are	 not	 consistent	 across	terminals	situated	in	different	parts	of	the	world.			Our	previous	 study	 focused	on	many	of	 the	 same	 terminals	as	 those	 included	 in	 the	present	 study	and	came	to	similar	conclusions.	The	key	difference	between	the	 two	studies	 is	 found,	not	so	much	 in	 their	conclusions	on	these	matters,	but	 in	the	evidence	we	have	obtained	and	analysed	during	the	process	of	reaching	 them.	 The	 earlier	 study	 was	 based	 on	 interviews	 with	 managers,	 workers	 and	 their	representatives	 in	 the	 terminals	 as	 well	 as	 on	 interviews	 with	 union	 officials	 globally.	 It	 therefore	concerned	 the	 perceptions	 of	 a	 small	 number	 of	 key	 informants	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 container	terminals	 and	 of	 the	 arrangements	made	 by	 companies	 to	manage	 this	 experience.	While	 the	 present	study	also	includes	such	interviews	with	key	informants,	and	seeks	evidence	of	occupational	health	and	safety	and	the	arrangements	to	manage	it,	it	does	so	by	drawing	in	addition	on	the	analysis	of	a	survey	of	nearly	 two	 thousand	 respondents	 among	 the	 container	 terminals	 studied	 globally.	 It	 therefore	 adds	substantial	quantitative	power	to	its	analysis	of	the	evidence	on	the	experience	of	occupational	health	and	safety	issues	in	container	terminals	globally	and	the	arrangements	made	to	manage	them.			There	 are	 three	main	 areas	 in	which	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	 outcomes	we	 have	 observed	 are	 to	 be	found.	They	are:		
• the	 nature	 of	 the	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 the	 terminal	 companies	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	 of	 arrangements	 made	 for	 the	 safety,	 health	 and	 welfare	 of	 the	 workers	 in	 the	terminals		
• the	position	of	these	approaches	within	the	wider	strategies	adopted	by	the	same	companies	for	managing	the	operation	of	their	terminals		
• the	 national	 contextual	 determinants	 of	 practices	 to	 support	 the	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	 of	workers	in	container	terminals	located	in	different	parts	of	the	world	–	in	particular	in	this	latter	respect,	the	regulatory	and	labour	relations	contexts	of	such	practices.			In	this	Chapter	we	focus	on	discussing	reasons	for	the	first	two	of	these	groups	of	influencing	factors,	and	will	address	the	third	in	the	following	Chapter.			
5.1 The	character	of	arrangements	made	for	the	governance	and	management	
of	OHS	in	container	terminals	As	we	noted	in	Chapter	3,	the	approaches	taken	by	most	of	the	global	and	national	terminal	operators	in	our	 study	 towards	 the	 governance	 and	 management	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 have	 several	 features	 in	common.	 They	 aimed	 to	 address	 risks	 fairly	 systematically	 through	 undertaking	 risk	 assessment	 and	introducing	engineering	or	administrative	controls	in	relation	to	both	plant	and	processes	consequent	to	this	assessment.	There	were	standard	operating	procedures	taking	account	of	safety	issues	in	relation	to	most	operational	activities	and	maintenance	of	safety	critical	plant	and	equipment	according	to	scheduled	specifications.	Information,	informal	 ‘training,’	supervision	and	direct	consultation	with	workers	on	risk	management	 was	 provided	 through	 tool-box	 talks	 and	 similar	 activities	 at	 the	 start	 of	 shifts.	 Other	
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training	 was	 provided	 to	 new	 staff	 and	 updated	 for	 continuing	 staff	 by	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	arrangements.	In	parallel	with	these	routine	job	safety	arrangements,	the	safety	management	systems	in	place	 in	 all	 the	 terminals	 contained	 various	 elements	 to	 ensure	 continuous	 improvement,	 including	procedures	for	information	collection	and	dissemination	on	safety	issues,	allowing	both	the	monitoring	of	performance	and	 timely	 interventions	when	 required.	The	Safety	 (and	Environment)	Departments	 that	were	present	in	all	of	the	terminals	serviced	these	arrangements,	as	well	as	providing	advice,	training	and	in	some	cases	participating	in	the	surveillance	of	safety	behaviours.	Generally	managers	in	the	terminals	believed	these	arrangements	to	be	‘fit	for	purpose’.			Many	of	these	features	are	widely	considered	to	be	good	practice	in	current	thinking	on	managing	health	and	 safety	 and	 are	 generally	 implemented	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 extent	 in	 large	 organisations	 with	arrangements	in	place	for	safety	management.	However,	as	we	detail	in	Chapter	4,	the	perception	of	the	operation	 of	 these	 arrangements	 and	 the	 engagement	 of	 workers	 with	 them	 that	 was	 evident	 in	 the	results	of	the	survey	of	terminal	workers	was	at	variance	with	the	views	of	managers.	Overall	there	was	a	view	 that	arrangements	 for	OHS	management	were	 less	 than	satisfactory	and	 fell	 far	 short	of	 the	 ideal	described	 by	 terminal	 managers.	 For	 example,	 nearly	 one	 third	 of	 respondents	 described	 the	 level	 of	staffing	 to	 support	 the	effective	operation	of	 the	arrangements	 in	place	 to	manage	health	and	safety	at	their	 place	 of	work	 as	 insufficient.	 The	 greatest	 proportion	 of	 respondents	with	 this	 view	was	 in	 Asia	Pacific	 area	2	 (42%).	The	 survey	data	 showed	 that	 experience	was	not	uniform,	with	 certain	 job	 types	(like	 receiving	 and	 delivery	 work	 and	 lashing),	 types	 of	 employment	 (such	 as	 contract	 workers	 as	opposed	to	directly	employed	workers)	and	regions	(especially	terminals	in	Asia	Pacific	Area	2)	reporting	poorer	experiences	than	others.	There	was	also	a	far	higher	incidence	of	work-related	harm	reported	by	respondents	in	the	survey	than	was	suggested	by	the	company	data.	This	was	true	for	injuries	(and	near	misses),	but	especially	for	work-related	ill-health	such	as	fatigue,	stress	and	MSDs.			In	 characterising	 the	 drivers	 of	 corporate	 approaches	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 taken	 by	 the	 companies	studied,	 it	 is	 notable	 from	 earlier	 chapters	 that	 most	 recently,	 a	 high-profile	 board-room	 level	commitment	to	‘zero	harm’	has	been	particularly	influential.	As	detailed	in	Chapter	3,	this	is	transposed	into	 operational	 practice	 through	 a	mix	 of	 attention	 to	mission	 statements	 in	which	 the	 organisation’s	leadership	makes	clear	its:	‘vision’	of	achieving	high	performance	and	continuous	improvement	in	health	and	safety	outcomes;	efforts	to	achieve	on-going	improvements	in	organisation	safety	culture;	efforts	to	improve	health	and	safety	competencies,	 training	and	skills	of	personnel;	and	measurable	performance	targets	 for	 health	 and	 safety.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 notions	 of	 accountability	 for	 safety	 and	 health	 among	workers	and	managers	alike	are	instilled.	While	there	were	some	differences	in	the	details	of	exactly	how	they	did	so,	three	of	the	four	global	operators	in	the	study	followed	this	prescription	at	the	corporate	level	and	 required	 adherence	 to	 it	 in	 the	 operational	 practices	 within	 their	 terminals.	 The	 two	 national	companies	did	likewise,	although	less	conspicuously.			Equally	 widespread	 and	 influential	 have	 been	 the	 effects	 of	 international	 and	 national	 voluntary	standards	on	OHS	management.	These	have	helped	to	stimulate	and	support	the	widespread	adoption	of	a	management	systems	approach	to	health	and	safety	that	shares	similar	 features	as	those	summarised	above	and	has	been	 implemented	widely,	especially	 in	 larger	organisations.	The	terminal	companies	all	seem	to	have	followed	this	trend.			Among	 the	 most	 emblematic	 of	 the	 procedures	 underpinning	 such	 systems	 were	 those	 for	 risk	assessment,	and	managers	and	health	and	safety	advisors	interviewed	in	the	terminals	commented	on	the	significance	 of	 these	 procedures	 in	 the	 workplaces	 for	 which	 they	 had	 responsibility.	 However,	 the	respondents	to	the	survey	were	far	less	convinced	concerning	its	place	or	their	engagement	with	it	in	the	terminals	 in	 which	 they	 worked.	 Eighty	 per	 cent	 of	 them	 indicated	 that	 there	 was	 either	 no	 risk	assessment	present	in	relation	to	their	work,	or	if	 it	had	been	present,	the	assessment	had	not	involved	them.	Analysis	of	 the	 interviews	 in	both	 the	present	and	previous	study	suggests	 that	a	 reason	 for	 this	disturbing	 lack	 of	 awareness	 of	 risk	 assessment	may	 have	 been	 related	 to	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 the	terminal	management	 towards	 risk	assessment	 rather	 than	 its	 complete	absence	 from	 their	health	and	safety	management	strategies.	While	managers	believed	they	operated	a	participatory	approach,	this	was	not	the	experience	of	either	the	workers	or	their	representatives	who	were	quite	clear	that	rarely	were	
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they	 consulted	 or	 involved	 in	 the	 process	 of	 risk	 assessment	 at	 the	 terminals.	 As	we	will	 discuss,	 the	behaviour-based	character	of	arrangements	in	place	for	safety	in	all	the	terminals	would	tend	to	promote	such	perspectives.			Alongside	the	promotion	of	a	‘zero	harm’	approach	and	concomitant	interest	in	safety	culture	mentioned	above,	another	feature	of	current	strategy	was	a	shift	in	emphasis	in	the	monitoring	of	safety,	away	from	the	 collection	 and	 collation	 of	 LTIs	 and	 the	 measurement	 of	 performance	 standards	 against	 them	(although	this	still	took	place)	and	towards	greater	attention	to	taking	account	of	incidents	that	had	not	necessarily	resulted	in	harm	but	which	had	a	high	potential	to	cause	serious	harm:		
“…we	need	to	be	more	proactive	about	…	and	that	 is	what	we	are	now	trying	to	drive	towards	so	
how	do	we	get	our	terminals	to	see	a	potential	 incident	before	it	happens,	right	so	we	are	looking	
more	at	the	near	misses	we	are	looking	at	the	observations	…	when	people	see	something	unsafe	do	
they	actually	do	something	about	it	‘cause	we	have	a	history	of	people	probably	seeing	a	lot	but	not	
doing	anything	about	 it	 and	we	want	 to	 change	 that	mind	 set	 so,	 so	we	have	been	doing	a	 lot	of	
communication	campaigns	and	stuff…”	[Global	level	safety	adviser	(1),	GNT	3]		This	 reflects	 current	 practice	 elsewhere	 and	 especially	 in	 high-risk	 industries	 such	 as	 petro-chemicals,	energy	 extraction	 and	 supply	 and	 construction,	where	 safety	management	 theory	 holds	 that	 there	 are	significant	differences	between	the	causes	of	major	incidents	and	those	of	more	routine	LTIs.	Following	from	 this,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 concentration	 on	measures	 of	 the	 reduction	 of	 LTIs	will	 not	 lead	 to	 better	prevention	in	relation	to	more	serious	incidents.	Therefore	it	is	thought	to	be	important	to	concentrate	on	the	 recording	 and	 investigation	 of	 such	 events	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 organisational	 learning	 concerning	their	 causes,	 and	 through	 this,	 their	 future	 prevention.	 This	 thinking	 was	 evident	 in	 several	 of	 the	approaches	to	the	governance	of	health	and	safety	among	the	GNTs	at	corporate	level	that	are	discussed	in	Chapter	3	as	well	as	in	terminal	level	OHS	information	collection	and	dissemination.			
“…we	have	…	LTI	calculated	on	the	basis	of	that	and	then	we	have	those	special	categories	which	are	
near	misses	with	high	potential	so	nothing	happening	could	potentially	have	been	a	fatality,	green	
incidents	 are	 less	 than	LTIs	 so	 there	was	 actual	 incidents,	 actual	 injury	which	 could	 have	 been	 a	
high	potential,	 LTIs	with	a	high	potential	and	 fatalities	and	 then	we	have	 some	 sort	of	 frequency	
calculations	for	that	specific…	category	which	is	the	LTIs	with	high	potential	because	this	is	one	of	
the	things	we	want	to	focus	on	a	lot	right	now.	Also	seeing	if,	if	an	LTI	could	have	led	into	a	fatality	
so	whether	we	could	almost	predict	LTIs	going	down	and	the	potentials	going	down	…	and	this	 is	
one	of	the	important	numbers	for	us	so	whether	these	numbers	going	down	so	the	frequency	….	of	
LTIs	with	high	potential	and	globally	…	and	this	is	something	we’re	looking	for	if	that	number	from	
previous	years	and	well	 the	most	reliable	data	we	have	started	 in	2012	so	we	are	also	comparing	
whether	 these	numbers	were	reducing	 in	a	on	a	 rolling	 frequency	 so	a	year	 to	date	but	also	on	a	
monthly	basis…”	[Global	level	safety	adviser	(2),	GNT	3]		A	further	feature	of	these	strategies,	also	of	recent	origin	(and	a	change	that	seems	to	have	occurred	since	the	previous	study),	was	the	greater	emphasis	attached	to	 ‘accountability’	reported	 in	 interviews	at	 the	corporate	level	in	the	GNTs.	In	some	cases	the	examples	that	were	used	to	illustrate	this	change	involved	relations	 between	 terminal	 managers	 and	 the	 company	 head	 office	 concerning	 accountability	 of	 the	former	for	poor	OHS	performance	or	serious	incidents	within	their	terminals.			In	other	interviews	with	managers	and	OHS	advisers	within	terminals,	as	well	as	with	workers	and	their	representatives,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 same	 emphasis	 on	 accountability	 was	 applied	 to	 surveillance	 of	unsafe	acts	or	failure	to	follow	safety	procedures	among	terminal	workers.	It	was	clear	from	many	of	the	interviews	 with	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 in	 both	 the	 present	 and	 previous	 study	 that	 such	approaches	substantially	reduce	workers’	feelings	of	trust	in	the	terminal	management’s	commitment	to	their	health,	safety	and	welfare,	despite	the	assurances	concerning	a	‘no	blame	culture’	being	at	the	same	time	espoused	in	the	terminal.	In	this	respect,	our	findings	confirm	Hopkins’	(2005)	critique	of	behaviour-
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based	 safety	 systems	 in	which,	 as	we	detailed	 in	 the	previous	 report	 (pages	85-87),	 he	points	out	 that	‘where	such	distrust	exists	 it	 is	pointless	 for	employers	to	 introduce	such	programmes.	The	evidence	 is	that	they	will	fail’.	Despite	this	conclusion,	such	systems	were	in	widespread	use	and,	as	is	evidenced	by	both	survey	and	interview	analyses,	they	were	perceived	by	workers	to	be	both	hostile	to	their	interest	in	job	security	and	of	only	limited	value	in	addressing	their	health	and	safety	concerns.			
“They	do	safety	observations	which	all	managers	have	got	to	do,	but	that’s	to	get	their	bonus	to	be	
honest,	they’re	on	a	key	performance	indicator,	as	part	of	their	KPI	will	be	they	have	to	do	so	many	
inspections	a	year	or	observations	a	year,	but	 that’s	 just	going	down	and	visiting	 the	 ship	 if	 it’s	a	
nice	day,	they	won’t	come	on	the	ship	at	4	o’clock	in	the	morning,	in	February.	
	
They	 don’t	 know	 how	 you	 work	 or	 what	 your	 safety	 is,	 they	 ask	 you	 as	 they’re	 looking	 around.	
	
They	tend	to	check	the	photocopier	on	them	days,	and	say	yes	that’s	running.	…	some	of	the	people	
that	 are	 doing	 it,	 they’re	 not	worth	 the	 paper	 they’re	written	 on,	 to	 be	 quite	 frank,	 because	 they	
don’t	know	what	they’re	looking	for…”	[Stewards/Dock	workers,	EU2T1]	
	The	emphasis	on	changing	‘safety	culture’	in	the	organisation	that	is	the	leitmotif	of	‘zero	harm’	strategies	usually	 implies	 bringing	 about	 changes	 in	 attitudes	 and	 behaviours	 of	 the	 personnel	 working	 in	 the	establishments	 in	which	 these	 strategies	are	brought	 to	bear	once	 they	are	adopted	at	 corporate	 level.	Notions	of	‘performance	standards’	and	‘accountability’	for	safety	further	imply	monitoring	safety-related	behaviours	–	whether	 in	the	form	of	the	appraisal	of	managers’	achievement	of	performance	targets	on	safety	or	through	surveillance	of	workers’	adherence	to	work	safety	rules.	In	other	sectors	where	similar	strategies	 are	 found,	 observers	 have	 noted	 that	 in	 combination,	 the	 ‘zero	 harm’	 orientation	 of	 OHS	governance	and	the	management	systems	approach	to	its	delivery	produce	a	set	of	arrangements	that	are	strongly	behaviour-based	 in	character	 (see	 for	example	Quinlan	(2014)	on	mining;	and	Frick	(2011)	 in	other	sectors).	These	effects	were	evident	in	many	of	the	companies	and	terminals	we	studied.	What	was	also	apparent	in	these	companies	and	terminals	was	that	the	focus	of	their	attention	to	governance	and	management	 was	 weighted	 towards	 safety	 rather	 than	 occupational	 safety,	 health	 and	 welfare	management.	 Other	 researchers	 have	 pointed	 to	 similar	 orientations	 elsewhere	 and	 have	 argued	 that	they	are	a	 function	of	the	corporate	focus	on	behaviour-based	approaches.	To	support	this	point,	 in	the	previous	study	we	quoted	Frick	and	Kempa	(2011)	who	state	that	in	such	systems:			
“Safety	is	given	much	more	attention	than	health,	despite	the	fact	that	diseases	cause	far	more	ill-
health	 than	 accidents	 do.	 The	 prevention	 described	 more	 often	 revolves	 around	 control	 of	 ‘safe’	
procedures	than	the	prescribed	upstream	prevention	of	eliminating	risks	at	the	design	stage…”		Quinlan	 (2014)	makes	 the	 same	 point	 and	 suggests	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 focus	 on	 behaviourally-orientated	 arrangements	 for	 safety	 at	 work	 within	 establishments,	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 on	 ‘safety	culture’	 among	 managers	 and	 safety	 professionals	 alike	 and	 the	 high	 profile	 espousal	 of	 ‘zero	 harm’	approaches	 at	 board	 room	 level.	 He	 points	 to	 the	 attraction	 of	 these	 ways	 of	 conceptualising	 the	governance	 of	 improvement	 in	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 for	 corporate	 leaders	 and	 managers.	 He	argues	 that	 its	 focus	 on	 changing	 workers’	 behaviour	 (although	 managers’	 behaviour	 may	 also	 be	included)	does	 little	to	question	the	tenets	of	managerialist	thinking,	or	 involve	examining	corporate	or	managerial	 decisions	 on	 finance,	 work	 organisation	 and	 operation.	 It	 therefore	 fits	 very	 well	 within	modern	management	leadership	models,	and	he	further	points	out	that	there	is	now	evidence	from	many	industries	that	these	approaches	may	have	a	negative	impact	upon	workers’	health	and	safety.			This	was	essentially	the	situation	in	the	terminals	we	studied.	As	already	noted	in	both	the	present	and	previous	 study,	 a	 behaviour-based	 approach	was	 seen	 to	 characterise	 the	 arrangements	 for	 safety	 and	health	in	all	of	the	terminals.	In	keeping	with	observations	on	behaviour-based	approaches	generally,	this	meant	 that	while	 there	was	a	widely	held	view	among	workers	and	managers	alike	 that	 the	health	and	safety	 management	 systems	 had	 improved	 in	 recent	 years,	 priority	 in	 the	 systems	 we	 examined	 was	afforded	to	safety	as	opposed	to	health	or	welfare.	Leadership	from	the	corporate	level	on	the	objective	of	
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achieving	 ‘zero	harm’	had	clearly	made	a	significant	 impact,	evident,	 for	example,	 in	 the	ways	 in	which	management	 interviewees	 from	 all	 the	 terminals	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 aiming	 for	 zero	 lost	 time	injuries	and,	as	a	step	towards	this,	systematically	reporting	and	investigating	all	incidents,	regardless	of	severity.	However,	 despite	 the	 emphasis	 on	 incident	 investigation,	 interviews	 confirmed	other	 findings	from	 the	 previous	 study	 indicating	 that	 it	 was	 rare	 for	 investigations	 of	 routine	 injuries	 and	 unsafe	incidents	to	go	beyond	proximal	causes.	That	is,	whilst	investigations	established	who	had	done	what	and	when,	and	whether	any	equipment	failure	had	been	involved,	they	did	not	generally	look	at	systemic	or	deeper	organisational	causes	or	contributions	to	human	error	or	unsafe	behaviours	on	which	they	tended	to	 focus.	 This	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 universal	management	 conviction	 that	 following	 the	requirements	of	the	safety	management	system	closely	would	mean	that	accidents	simply	could	not	occur	–	 a	 conviction	 supported	 by	 their	 behavioural	 foundation	 and	 reflecting	 the	widely	 held	 belief	 that	 all	accidents	 were	 the	 result	 of	 workers	 failing	 to	 follow	 such	 procedures	 –	 a	 belief	 which	 in	 turn	 was	reinforced	 by	 the	 corporate	 focus	 on	 changing	 workers’	 behaviour	 to	 improve	 safety	 culture.	 But	 of	course,	as	both	our	own	survey	and	the	company	injury	and	incident	data	show,	work-related	injuries	and	fatalities,	as	well	as	ill-health,	did	occur	in	all	the	terminals	we	studied.	One	third	of	the	respondents	to	the	survey	indicated	that	they	had	received	a	work-related	injury	during	the	previous	year.	And	nearly	two	thirds	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 a	 near	 miss.	 There	 were	 considerable	 variations	 between	 terminals	 in	different	 regions,	 but	 generally	 the	 figures	 analysed	 in	 Chapter	 4	 suggest	 both	 that	 the	 experience	 of	injuries	 by	workers	may	 be	 considerably	 higher	 than	 that	 reported	 in	 the	 company	 data,	 and	 that	 the	
routine	causes	of	work-related	harm	were	to	be	found	in	issues	that	were	not	generally	investigated	and	which	were	embedded	in	the	way	work	was	organised	and	the	terminals	operated.16			Despite	 this,	managers	believed	 that	 the	health	 and	 safety	management	 arrangements	 in	place	 in	 their	terminals	 covered	 the	most	 significant	 risks	 faced	 by	workers.	 They	were	 proud	 of	 these	 systems	 and	arrangements	 and	 committed	 to	 their	 continued	 improvement	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	 safety	performance	 through	 systems	 such	 as	 inducting	 new	 workers	 into	 the	 safety	 culture	 of	 the	 terminal	through	training,	then	monitoring	and	supervising	their	adherence	to	its	requirements.	Workers	and	their	representatives,	who	broadly	agreed	that	the	systems	and	arrangements	were	effective	in	addressing	safe	
behaviour	 within	 the	 terminal,	 generally	 shared	 this	 pride	 and	 commitment	 but	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	arrangements	addressed	only	part	of	their	concerns.	In	particular,	as	we	discuss	later	in	this	Chapter,	they	did	not	address	their	experience	of	work-related	ill-health.			In	 the	 report	 of	 the	 previous	 study	 we	 presented	 a	 critique	 of	 behaviour-based	 safety	 management	strategies	drawn	from	the	literature.	In	summary,	we	suggested	that	the	findings	of	research	and	critical	literature	 indicate	 that	 there	 are	 several	 factors	 in	 common	 that	 help	 to	 explain	 failures	 of	 safety	management	 systems	 adopting	 a	 behaviour-orientated	 approach.	 For	 example	 there	 is	 a	 consensus	 in	published	research	(see	for	example	Frick	and	Kempa’s	(2011)	review)	that	the	application	of	these	types	of	safety	management	systems	within	organisations	often	results	in:			
• Preoccupation	with	safety	rather	than	with	safety,	health	and	welfare		
• Focus	on	the	behaviour	of	individuals	rather	than	with	organisational,	operational	or	situational	issues		
• Approaches	that	over-emphasise	strategies	and	practices	of	paper	compliance			
• Focus	 on	 top	 down	 instructive	 communication,	 with	 resulting	 inadequate	 feedback	 loops	 to	managers	from	their	subordinates,	workers	and	their	representatives																																																																							
16 Comparison between company data on LTIs and our survey data is somewhat unreliable because, given the many well-
known social and economic determinants of injury reporting, we know we are not comparing like with like. Nevertheless our 
data suggest substantial under-reporting in company data. The company data are all lost time injuries. In our data, 35.4% of 
those injured did not stop work, 13.5% continued later the same day, 9.1% took 1 to 3 days off, 13.1% 4 to 7 days, 6.8% 8 to 14 
days, 7.4% 15 to 28 days, and 14.7% 29 days or more. So overall, 21% of respondents were injured and took at least some 
time off, as opposed to the 33% who were injured per se. 	
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• Inadequate	 attention	 to	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 consequences	 of	 work	 organisation	 and	 work	processes	and	to	that	of	changes	within	them		It	is	evident	from	the	findings	in	Chapter	3	that	all	these	features	were	present	in	the	systems	in	place	to	manage	heath	safety	in	the	terminals	and,	moreover,	they	were	the	result	of	the	requirements	of	company	level	health	and	safety	governance.	As	we	have	seen,	they	were	evident	in	the	experiences	of	workers	in	the	present	study	–	both	those	reported	by	respondents	who	took	part	in	the	questionnaire	survey	and	in	the	records	of	the	more	detailed	discussion	of	these	experiences	with	the	researchers	during	interviews	with	workers	 and	 their	 representatives.	 The	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 4	 corroborated	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	previous	 study	 in	 this	 respect	 and	 demonstrated	 the	 same	 significant	 gap	 between	 the	 perceptions	 of	corporate	 leadership	 and	 management	 and	 those	 of	 terminal	 workers.	 Both	 the	 qualitative	 and	quantitative	 evidence	 supports	 conclusions	 that	 features	of	 the	 safety	management	 systems	 in	place	 in	the	 terminals	 such	 as	 those	 above	 served	 to	 undermine	 the	 delivery	 of	 an	 experience	 of	 effective	management	of	health,	safety	and	welfare	for	workers.	As	already	noted,	there	was	a	considerable	level	of	worker	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 OHS	 management	 arrangements	 they	 experienced,	 which	 was	 even	greater	for	those	in	certain	high	risk	activities	(such	as	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	work	in	Asia	Pacific	Area	2).	The	overall	score	on	the	composite	variable	we	constructed	to	 indicate	poor	health	and	safety	management	in	Chapter	4	confirmed	this.	This	composite	variable	was	made	up	of	12	measures	of	OHS	 management	 arrangements,	 with	 a	 higher	 score	 indicating	 poorer	 OHS	 management.	 The	 mean	scores	for	the	four	study	areas	ranged	from	3.63	in	Europe	Area	1	to	7.52	in	Asia	Pacific	Area	2,	with	an	overall	mean	of	6.31,	indicating	that,	while	there	was	substantial	regional	variation,	respondents	from	all	areas	 felt	 arrangements	 were	 lacking	 in	 a	 number	 of	 the	 areas	 included	 in	 our	 composite	 measure.	Additionally,	 while	 good	 communication	 within	 organisations	 is	 often	 argued	 to	 be	 a	 key	 requisite	 of	health	and	safety	management	systems	(Seibold	and	Shea	2001,	Conger	and	Kanungo	1998),	it	is	notable	that	 the	evidence	presented	 in	Chapter	4	makes	plain	that	many	respondents	had	not	experienced	this.	For	example,	on	access	to	information	concerning	the	preventive	policies	or	procedures	that	underpinned	the	safety	management	systems	in	place	in	the	terminals,	between	half	and	two	thirds	of	respondents	to	the	survey	 indicated	they	either	had	no	access	to	 these	written	safety	policies	or	procedures,	or	simply	did	not	know	about	them	despite	the	repeated	claim	by	managers	that	they	were	available	to	all.			The	evidence	indicates	that	the	aim	of	corporate	governance	to	effect	improved	health	and	safety	in	the	terminals	 through	focusing	on	zero	harm	strategies	and	changing	safety	culture	 is	at	best	only	partially	effective.	Arguably,	two	main	features	serve	to	undermine	its	aim.	First,	the	approach	is	to	a	large	extent	self-limited	 by	 its	 focus	 on	 safety	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	 -	 and	 it	 therefore	 fails	 to	address	many	of	the	workers’	concerns	that	are	articulated	in	both	Chapter	4	of	the	present	report	as	well	as	in	the	previous	study.	For	example,	nearly	90	per	cent	of	respondents	to	the	survey	indicated	that	there	was	no	terminal	policy	on	work-related	stress	at	their	place	of	work,	or	if	there	was	they	were	unaware	of	it.	 Yet	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 operational	 workers	 in	 the	 same	 survey	 indicated	 stress	 to	 be	 a	 health	outcome	that	they	experienced	as	a	consequence	of	their	work.			Second,	while	there	may	be	‘low	hanging	fruit’	to	be	harvested	in	terms	of	safety	improvements	through	using	this	approach,	ultimately	the	lack	of	trust	and	the	marginalisation	of	institutional	arrangements	for	representative	worker	participation	within	such	systems	serve	to	undermine	their	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	workers	and	their	representatives,	as	both	studies	demonstrate.	For	example,	in	the	present	study,	in	contrast	 to	what	managers	 claimed	 concerning	 the	widespread	practice	 of	 consultation,	 60	per	 cent	 of	respondents	to	the	survey	had	no	health	and	safety	committee	(or	did	not	know	if	there	was	a	health	and	safety	committee).	With	regard	to	institutional	arrangements	for	the	selection	of	and	access	to	health	and	safety	representatives,	42	per	cent	of	respondents	said	they	had	no	health	and	safety	representative.	Of	those	that	did	have	a	health	and	safety	rep,	nearly	half	(48	per	cent)	felt	they	were	not	easy	to	access	and	18	per	cent	reported	that	they	were	not	elected	by	workers.	However,	the	patterns	of	these	arrangements	varied	considerably	between	terminals	and	between	regions,	with	those	in	advanced	market	economies	in	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	 considerably	better	provided	 for	 in	 this	 respect	 than	 the	 respondents	 in	 the	Asia	Pacific	 area	2	 terminals.	We	will	 return	 to	 this	 comparative	aspect	 later	 in	 this	Chapter,	but	 these	differences	appear	to	be	related	to	a	mixture	of	regulatory	support	for	worker	representation	on	health	and	safety	and	the	resilience	of	the	institutions	of	organised	labour	in	different	national	contexts.	These	
99		 	
	
observations	were	further	borne	out	by	comments	made	by	workers	and	their	representatives	confirming	the	findings	on	the	role	of	these	institutional	arrangements	from	the	previous	study.		
“What	 you’re	 describing	 suggests	 there’s	 …	 a	 union	 strategy	 to	 increase	 how	much	 workers	 are	
involved	in	the	way	that	health	and	safety	is	managed.	
	
Yes,	absolutely,	we’ve	empowered,	you	know,	the	delegates	and	with	the	union	backing	to	take	on	
these	 issues.	…	We’ve	 also	 got	 legislative,	 you	 know,	 support	 as	well	with	 the	 OH	 and	 S	 act	…	 so	
you’ve	got	that	sort	of	additional	backup.”	[Delegate	and	Team	leader,	AP1T2]	
	
“What	union?	We	just	rely	on	the	goodwill	of	the	local	agent	of	our	contractor,	even	if	he	stops	our	
salaries	we	have	no	one	to	turn	to.”	[Lasher,	AP2T3]		Although	the	rhetoric	of	zero-harm	approaches	to	OHS	arrangements	identifies	OHS	as	a	‘core	corporate	value’	and	indicates	the	necessity	of	 its	 integration	into	the	core	aims	and	management	functions	of	the	business,	in	practice	the	same	zero-harm	approach	served	to	moderate	this	in	several	important	respects.	A	 combination	 of	 focus	 solely	 on	 safety	 with	 a	 behaviour-based	 orientation	 towards	 achieving	improvement,	meant	that	much	of	the	underlying	business	and	organisational	contribution	to	creating	a	poor	working	environment	 for	some	terminal	workers	 fell	outside	 the	remit	of	 the	strategies	 for	safety	and	health	and	was	therefore	ignored	by	them.	We	explore	the	extent	of	these	effects	next.				
5.2 The	position	of	arrangements	for	occupational	health,	safety	and	welfare	
within	wider	strategies	for	managing	the	business	and	operation	of	
container	terminals	There	 is	a	 large	body	of	research	evidence	drawn	from	a	variety	of	sectors	and	countries	that	 indicates	that	several	now	well-established	trends	in	modern	organisational	management	have	features	in	common	which	lead	to	harmful	effects	for	workers’	health,	safety	and	welfare	(see	for	example;	Benach	et	al.,	2007;	Quinlan	et	al.,	2001;	Quinlan	and	Bohle,	2008;	Underhill	 and	Quinlan,	2011;	Walters	et	al.,	2013).	They	include	the	outsourcing	of	organisational	activities	to	contractors	on	the	grounds	of	cost	and	short-term	business	efficiency;	the	de-structuring	of	organisations	with	increasing	devolution	of	authority	away	from	centralised	hierarchical	structures	to	looser	associations	of	business	units	arranged	in	flatter	matrix	style	organisational	 structures;	 the	 increased	 emphasis	 on	 short-term	 business	 performance	 targets,	 their	measurement	and	 their	 influence	on	 the	career	progression	of	managers;	an	 increased	prioritisation	of	value	 chain	 relationships	 and	 a	 resulting	 increased	 porosity	 in	 the	 boundaries	 between	 organisations.	These	have	occurred	alongside	 a	parallel	 decline	 in	 the	 significance	of	 the	 legal	nexus	 surrounding	 the	employment	 relationship	 and	 by	 extension,	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 influence	 of	 collective	 approaches	 to	employment	relations;	and	all	have	contributed	to	increased	influence	of	considerations	within	business	
relationships	upon	workplace	practices.			It	is	well	known	that	these	features	lead	to,	inter	alia,	the	reduction	of	employment	security,	greater	focus	on	price	and	delivery	outcomes	and	stronger	pressure	to	increase	work	intensity,	while	at	the	same	time	presenting	 a	 host	 of	 challenges	 for	 conventional	 approaches	 to	 communicating	 and	 managing	arrangements	 for	occupational	health	and	safety	within	organisations.	Researchers	have	noted	 that	 the	multi-employer	 worksites	 that	 result	 from	 contracting	 work	 out	 to	 contractors	 and	 subcontractors	produces	scenarios	in	which	it	is	difficult	to	manage	OHS	and	make	arrangements	to	protect	all	workers	at	the	worksite.	This	is	especially	true	for	those	workers	at	the	ends	of	the	multi-layered	contracting	and	subcontracting	chains	that	may	be	present	within	such	worksites.	Such	arrangements	also	often	result	in	the	 presence	 of	 companies	 on	 site	 with	 fewer	 resources	 to	 address	 OHS	 management	 than	 the	 large	companies	 to	 which	 they	 are	 contracted,	 and	 further	 to	 place	 these	 contractors	 under	 considerable	pressure	to	deliver	according	to	unrealistic	price	and	time	schedules	which	compromise	health	and	safety	
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(see,	for	example,	James	and	Lloyd,	2008).	The	devolving	of	organisational	authority	within	large	formally	centralised	 and	hierarchical	 organisations	 to	 flatter	matrices	 of	more	 loosely	 associated	business	 units	has	been	noted	to	contribute	to	serious	problems	of	managerial	authority	on	issues	of	OHS	as	well	as	to	a	reduction	in	resources	for	specialist	OHS	services	which	were	formerly	held	centrally	within	these	large	organisations.	 Indeed	there	have	been	a	number	of	accounts	of	 the	cause	of	major	 incidents	 identifying	failures	 of	 communication	 and	 management	 and	 disorganisation	 resulting	 from	 such	 organisational	structures	as	significant	among	the	causes	of	these	events	(see:	Le	Coze,	2008;	Hopkins,	2011;	Hopkins,	2012;	Woolfson,	2013).			Although	we	did	not	have	sufficient	access	to	the	companies	to	study	these	features	in	detail,	they	were	present	 in	 varying	 degrees	 in	 the	 companies	 included	 in	 the	 present	 study.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 they	contributed	 to	 the	 organisational	 position	 occupied	 by	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	of	OHS	within	 these	companies	and	that	 they	helped	explain	 the	strategic	approach	taken	towards	the	governance	and	management	of	OHS	within	the	business	units	for	which	the	companies	held	overall	responsibility.	For	example,	outsourcing	of	dock	 labour	 is	a	well-established	pattern	 in	terminal	operation	globally,	driven	by	corporate	strategies	concerning	cost	efficiencies.	It	was	adopted	in	all	of	the	terminals	 in	 the	 study	 in	which	 resistance	 from	 existing	 regulation	 and/or	 organised	 labour	 had	 been	overcome.	Devolved	business	autonomy	for	individual	terminals	–	the	business	units	of	the	companies,	to	use	their	corporate	appellation	-	was	also	a	clear	strategy	adopted	to	varying	degrees	by	the	GNTs	in	the	study.	In	one	of	them,	 its	progression	was	such	that,	as	we	noted	in	Chapter	3,	 there	appeared	to	be	no	obvious	corporate	 level	 infrastructure	 in	place	 for	 the	governance	of	 terminal	 level	OHS	arrangements,	while	in	the	other	three	there	were	indications	that	the	zero	harm	approach	towards	the	governance	of	arrangements	 for	 safety	 management	 at	 the	 terminals	 was	 the	 way	 in	 which	 corporate	 governance	attempted	to	exert	 its	 influence	over	otherwise	semi-autonomous	business	units,	but	 in	so	doing,	as	we	have	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘occupational	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare’	 was	considerably	narrowed	to	that	of	‘safety’.			In	Chapter	4	we	observed	that	60	per	cent	of	terminal	workers	who	took	part	in	our	survey	believed	there	to	 be	 a	 high	 risk	 to	 their	 health	 from	 their	 work	 in	 the	 terminals,	 with	 stress	 and	 fatigue	 also	 being	reported	by	over	60	per	cent	of	respondents	in	the	survey.	High	levels	of	adverse	health	outcomes	were	especially	associated	with	work	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals,	with	most	operational	jobs	and	with	indirect	 employment.	Experience	of	poor	health	outcomes	was	also	associated	with	high	 levels	of	poor	safety	outcomes.	This	suggests	several	things.	First,	wider	trends	in	organisational	management	that	were	evident	in	the	terminals	help	to	contextualise	arrangements	for	the	governance	and	management	of	OHS	reported	 previously	 and	 help	 explain	 their	 results.	 Our	 survey	 findings	 show	 that	 respondents	 clearly	regard	their	health	to	be	at	some	risk,	and	especially	so	in	relation	to	exposures	that	the	arrangements	for	safety	contribute	very	little	to	preventing.	It	is	well	established	in	the	literature	to	which	we	have	referred	that	work-related	health	outcomes	reported	in	the	survey,	like	high	levels	of	stress	and	fatigue	(as	well	as	high	levels	of	others	such	as	musculoskeletal	damage	and	gastrointestinal	problems),	are	associated	with	features	of	work	organisation,	such	as	the	pace	of	work,	the	extent	of	repetitive	tasks	and	the	degree	of	decision	latitude	allowed,	as	well	as	with	issues	of	employment	security	and	the	like.	These	are	matters	that	are	dictated	by	the	wider	organisational	and	operational	management	of	the	terminal	companies	and	are	 outside	 the	 influence	 of	 behaviour	 safety	 strategies	 –	 or	 indeed	 efforts	 to	 influence	 ‘safety	 culture’	within	the	terminals.	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	that	in	the	region	in	which	these	outcomes	were	most	pronounced,	trends	in	employment	practices	have	been	noted	by	others	to	mean	that:		
“….	workers	are	casual	employees	that	come	to	the	port	for	short	periods…These	workers	are	hired	
by	private	contractors	who	offer	poor	pay,	poor	safety	conditions	and	no	long	term	benefits….…there	
are	 considerable	 social	 costs	 associated	with	 the	 process	 of	 port	 redevelopment,	which	 are	 being	
borne	by	the	workforce.	The	rationalisation	of	workforce	numbers,	increased	casualization	and	de-
unionisation	of	port	labour	are	leading	to	worsening	conditions	of	employment.”	
(Hill,	2008:	164-165)		It	 is	worth	noting	here	that	although	there	were	few	female	workers	among	the	operational	staff	of	the	terminals	we	studied,	 it	 is	widely	acknowledged	that	 the	 trend	towards	greater	automation	of	 terminal	
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work	and	consequent	removal	of	at	 least	some	of	the	heavy	physical	strains	associated	with	dock	work	opens	the	way	for	employment	of	an	increased	proportion	of	women	in	the	terminal	labour	force	globally.	This	has	implications	for	the	OHS	management	strategies	adopted	by	companies,	not	least	in	relation	to	those	aimed	at	workers’	welfare.	However	we	saw	little	evidence	of	either	strategies	or	actions	taken	to	address	these	implications	in	any	of	the	terminals.	Rather,	the	implications	of	our	interview	survey	were	that	 in	 those	 terminals	where	women	were	 employed,	 they	 felt	 generally	well-accepted	 by	 their	male	peers	 but	 had	 had	 to	 struggle	 to	 achieve	 basic	 welfare	 provisions.	 As	 the	 example	 below	 shows,	 the	intervention	of	(in	this	case	male)	union	workers’	representatives	could	be	particularly	significant.		
“…when	I	 first	started	there	I	 felt	very,	very	welcomed	and	fitted	 in	…	there’s	challenges	as	well	…	
that’s	just	the	way	it	is	when	there’s	only	16	of	you	in	a	male	dominated	workplace	sometimes	you	
go	 in	 and	 you	 feel	 a	 bit	 like	 you’re	 on	 your	 own	…	But,	 generally,	 people	 are	 pretty	 friendly	 and	
welcoming	…	 [Achieving	appropriate	 facilities]	was	a	 real	 struggle	…they	gave	us	 these	 changing	
rooms	and	the	…	what	are	they	called,	you	know,	menstruating	…	all	that	sort	of	stuff,	was	really,	
really	below	par	like	disgusting	actually	…	I	had	to	really	argue	with	the	company	for	quite	a	while	
to	get	 them	to	upgrade	 it	…	we	had	 to	have	 like	a	 fight	with	 the	 supervisor	and	drag	him	 in	and	
make	him	look	at	it	and	it	was	like	kind	of	humiliating	…	they	ended	up	improving	it	a	bit	and	…	at	
one	point	they	put	in	quite	cheap	plumbing	…	and	it	probably	wasn’t	even	up	to	regulation	and	of	
course	 it	was	a	nightmare	the	women’s	toilets	were	flooding	and	I	kept	going	to	the	management	
and	they	kept	(.)	actually	accusing	the	women	of	being	…	well	I	don’t	really	want	to	use	the	words	
…and	again	it	became	quite	embarrassing	cause	it	became	really	public	instead	of	them	just	dealing	
with	 it	 and	we	 ended	 up	 having	 a	massive	 fight	 about	 it	 and	 actually	 the	 person	who	made	 the	
biggest	 difference	was	one	of	 the	guys	on	 the	OH&S	 committee,	 our	guys,	 our	 elected	guys	…	 if	 it	
hadn’t	 been	 for	 our	OH&S	 guys	 I	wouldn’t	 have,	 you	 know,	 been	 able	 to	 get	 anything	 done	 to	 be	
honest	…	because	I	appealed	to	the	managers,	and	I	appealed	to	the	HR	department	and	they	don’t	
care,	they’re	just	so	cheap,	you	know?”	[Stevedore,	AP1T1]		In	Chapter	4	we	analysed	survey	data	on	work	organisation	and	working	conditions	that	are	determined	by	operational	management	strategies.	To	do	so	we	asked	survey	respondents	questions	concerning	shift	patterns,	 rest	 breaks,	 paid	 holiday	 entitlements,	 working	 hours,	 job	 security,	 work	 intensity,	 and	satisfaction	with	basic	pay	and	both	working	and	welfare	conditions.	The	results	demonstrate	a	high	level	of	work	intensity	 in	all	 the	terminals,	with	workers	 in	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	area	2	experiencing	 long	shifts;	a	third	of	the	respondents	in	Asia	Pacific	area	1	experiencing	irregular	shift	patterns;	as	well	as	a	large	proportion	of	respondents	in	both	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	experiencing	night	work.	Arguably,	they	are	fundamental	to	the	wider	business	and	operational	strategies	that	drive	productivity	in	the	terminals.	However,	 they	 are	 all	work	 experiences	 that	 have	 been	 associated	with	 poor	 health	 outcomes	 such	 as	stress,	fatigue	and	MSDs	in	the	literature.	Significantly,	they	are	all	issues	that	are	largely	ignored	by	the	safety	 management	 arrangements	 in	 place	 in	 the	 terminals.	 The	 lack	 of	 any	 conspicuous	 preventive	strategies	that	take	account	of	these	matters	is	further	reflected	in	our	additional	finding	also	reported	in	Chapter	 4	 that	 those	 who	 reported	 that	 they	 experienced	 high	 levels	 of	 poor	 OHS	 management	arrangements	at	their	place	of	work	were	ten	times	more	likely	to	also	report	experiencing	high	levels	of	poor	 working	 conditions,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 perceived	 the	 arrangements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	management	at	their	workplace	as	failing	to	address	their	concerns	about	their	workplace	health	issues.			The	 survey	 findings	 therefore	 confirmed	 the	 concerns	 expressed	by	workers	 and	 their	 representatives	that	 were	 reported	 in	 the	 previous	 study,	 and	 again	 in	 the	 interviews	 with	 workers	 and	 their	representatives	in	the	present	study.	In	both	cases,	the	prevailing	opinion	of	workers	and	representatives	was	that,	while	safety	arrangements	in	the	terminals	were	conspicuous	and	had	some	impact	on	the	safe	behaviour	of	workers,	they	did	not	prevent	a	range	of	negative	effects	on	their	health,	safety	and	welfare	that	were	the	result	of	the	way	in	which	work	was	organised	to	maximise	the	productivity	of	the	terminal	operations.	Since	they	believed	that	maximising	productivity	was	the	corporate	priority,	a	belief	that	was	reinforced	 by	 their	 everyday	 work	 experiences,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	 workers	 and	 their	representatives	 looked	 somewhat	 askance	 at	 the	 companies’	 efforts	 to	 protect	 their	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	through	behaviour	change	techniques	and	monitoring	their	safe	behaviour.		
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	In	 our	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 we	 went	 on	 to	 create	 a	 combined	 score	 for	 our	 indicators	 of	 work	organisation	and	working	conditions	and	we	considered	associations	between	this	combined	score	and	the	areas	in	which	terminals	were	situated,	the	type	of	 job	held	by	respondents	and	whether	they	were	directly	employed	by	the	terminal	companies	or	employed	by	contractors	in	the	terminals	in	which	they	worked.	We	confirmed	 findings	 that	were	 indicated	 in	 the	previous	 study,	 as	well	 as	by	 the	 interviews	conducted	 with	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 in	 the	 present	 study.	 As	 is	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 4,	multivariate	analyses	of	 these	data	 showed	significant	 independent	associations	between	high	 levels	of	poor	 working	 conditions,	 job	 type,	 area	 of	 employment	 and	 employment	 type.	 Workers	 employed	 by	contractors	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals	in	jobs	combining	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	with	driving	were	by	far	the	most	likely	to	report	high	levels	of	poor	working	conditions.			Jobs	such	as	lashing	and	driving	are	widely	acknowledged	to	be	among	the	most	physically	demanding	in	container	 terminals	 and	 so,	 in	many	ways,	 these	 findings	 are	 not	 surprising.	What	 is	 important	 is	 that	where	these	activities	were	undertaken,	it	was	in	the	main	by	workers	employed	by	contractors,	and	the	working	conditions	 they	experienced	were	amongst	 the	poorest.	Here	again	 these	 findings	corroborate	the	 analysis	 of	 interviews	with	workers	 in	 these	positions	 in	 both	 the	present	 and	previous	 study	 and	suggest	that	the	corporate	strategies	to	outsource	these	activities	to	contractors	has	a	strongly	negative	effect	 on	 their	 experience	 of	 the	 resulting	working	 conditions.	While	 the	 behaviour	 change	 techniques	adopted	by	 terminal	managers	 to	 improve	safety	 in	 these	situations	applied	 to	 the	contract	workers	as	well	 as	 the	 directly	 employed	 workers	 in	 the	 terminals,	 and	 indeed	 both	 managers	 and	 workers	interviewed	 frequently	 cited	 examples	 of	 actions	 taken	 to	 address	 safety	 behaviours	 seen	 among	 the	contract	workers,	these	strategies	did	not	address	their	health	or	their	welfare	with	the	same	degree	of	scrutiny	or	support.	The	perception	of	workers	in	these	terminals	was	that	here	again	corporate	priorities	placed	 operational	 cost	 efficiencies	 and	 productivity	 over	 concern	 for	 the	 health	 or	 welfare	 of	 these	workers.	At	its	extreme,	in	these	terminals	many	of	the	workers	such	as	lashers,	who	were	employed	by	contractors	 and	 who	 experienced	 the	 poorest	 conditions	 of	 safety,	 health	 and	 welfare,	 were	 also	temporary	migrant	workers.	They	came	to	the	terminals	often	in	groups	from	the	same	villages	 located	very	far	away	in	entirely	different	parts	of	the	country.	They	often	spoke	a	different	 language	to	that	of	the	directly	employed	terminal	workers	and	managers.	At	the	same	time	the	education	and	literacy	levels	among	this	group	appeared	 to	be	quite	mixed.	They	 lived	 in	overcrowded	and	poor	housing	conditions	and	were	 dependent	 on	 the	middle-men	who	 organised	 their	 economic	migration	 for	 the	 provision	 of	basic	amenities	and	transport.			As	such,	like	economic	migrants	generally,	they	felt	themselves	to	be	disempowered	and	their	security	of	employment	 to	 be	 extremely	 vulnerable.	 Their	 health	 and	 safety	 concerns	 were	 among	 those	 that	generally	 went	 unrepresented	 at	 work,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 their	 feelings	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 the	precariousness	of	their	employment	prevented	them	from	seeking	representation	on	such	matters.	There	did	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 strategies	 in	 place	 in	 the	 terminals	 to	 address	 these	matters.	 Managers	 were	 of	course	aware	of	the	challenges	of	dealing	with	health	and	safety	issues	in	relation	to	contractors	and	their	workers.	 In	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	 terminals,	 where	 contractor	 employees	 formed	 the	majority	 of	 the	terminal	workforce,	they	indicated	that	there	were	various	strategies	in	place	to	ensure	that	contractors	adhered	 to	 the	 management’s	 OHS	 requirements.	 They	 included	 specifications	 on	 health	 and	 safety	requirements	within	the	contract	itself,	induction	training	on	safety	for	all	contract	workers	on	arrival	at	the	 terminal	 and	 the	 extension	 of	 communication,	 monitoring	 and	 supervision	 of	 compliance	 with	requirements	on	safety	behaviours	to	all	workers,	including	those	of	contractors.	Workers	found	to	be	in	breach	 of	 these	 requirements	 were	 referred	 to	 their	 employers	 for	 further	 training	 or	 discipline	 as	appropriate.	 Managers	 also	 talked	 about	 regular	 meetings	 with	 contractors	 or	 their	 representatives	during	the	course	of	the	contracted	work,	at	which	safety	issues	were	regularly	raised	and	addressed.			We	 were	 unable	 to	 investigate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 these	 arrangements	 systematically.	 However,	interviews	with	workers,	including	those	with	contract	workers,	suggested	that	they	were	only	partially	effective,	 with	many	workers	 complaining	 about	 the	 excessive	 focus	 on	 surveillance	 of	 behaviour	 and	much	less	attention	being	given	to	other	elements	of	compliance.	If	the	combined	findings	of	the	survey	and	interviews	are	taken	into	account,	it	is	clear	that	contractorisation	poses	some	major	challenges	for	
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the	 achievement	 of	 improved	working	 conditions	 for	many	workers	 and	 the	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 the	terminal	 management	 to	 date	 fell	 somewhat	 short	 of	 overcoming	 these	 challenges.	 The	 research	literature	suggests	that	while	a	general	worsening	of	employment	conditions,	 including	those	for	health	and	 safety,	 are	 commonly	 experienced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 contractorisation	 of	 labour	 in	 dock-work	 and	elsewhere,	there	is	also	an	emergent	set	of	strategies	that	help	to	offset	such	deterioration.	For	example,	as	Walters	and	James	(2011)	identified,	buyers	of	these	types	of	services	are	often	in	strong	positions	to	influence	the	conditions	under	which	the	service	is	delivered,	especially	when	its	delivery	takes	place	in	worksites	under	their	control.	They	have	further	shown	(see	James	et	al.,	in	press)	that	such	influence	has	the	potential	to	be	most	effective	in	value	chain	relationships	that	are	relational	rather	than	transactional.	It	was	 these	 types	 of	 relationships	 that	were	most	 typical	 of	 the	 ones	 found	 in	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	terminals,	where	contractor	procurement	tended	to	engage	relatively	small	numbers	of	contractors	on	a	regular	 and	 renewed	 basis,	 establishing	 the	 long-term	 partnership	 style	 relational	 associations	 with	labour	 suppliers	 that	 have	 been	 shown	 elsewhere	 to	 lend	 themselves	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	more	 developed	strategies	 to	 influence	 contractor	 compliance	with	 health	 and	 safety	 requirements.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 for	example	 in	 construction,	 food	 and	 transportation	 (see	 also;	 Walters	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 James	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Sampson	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 and	 it	would	 seem	 that	 terminal	 operators	 still	 have	much	 to	 learn	 from	 these	experiences.			In	short,	this	is	an	area	in	which	corporate	governance	of	health	and	safety	arrangements	could	become	more	 engaged.	Research	 in	 other	 sectors	would	 suggest	 that	 substantial	 improvements	 in	 the	working	conditions	of	contract	workers	lie	within	the	reach	of	such	corporate	influence.	Greater	attention	could	be	applied	to	the	development	of	corporate	standards	concerning	these	matters	without	necessarily	risking	excessive	interference	with	the	freedom	of	business	units	to	manage	their	own	affairs	 in	relation	to	the	financial	and	organisational	aspects	of	their	business	relations	with	contractors.	However,	research	also	shows	that	the	drivers	of	such	engagement	are	not	solely	corporate	ones	but	also	come	from	the	wider	environment	 in	 which	 businesses	 are	 situated.	 This	 is	 an	 observation	 to	 which	we	will	 have	 cause	 to	return	in	the	following	section.			Another	 area	 that	 is	 quite	 strongly	 affected	 by	 contractorisation	 and	 which	 was	 also	 evident	 in	 the	present	and	previous	studies	concerns	the	extent	and	quality	of	worker	participation	in	health	and	safety.	It	is	clear	from	our	findings	in	Chapter	4	that	the	institutional	arrangements	for	worker	consultation	on	health	 and	 safety	 were	 least	 developed	 in	 the	 same	 terminals	 as	 those	 with	 high	 levels	 of	 indirectly	employed	 workers	 (i.e.	 those	 employed	 by	 contractors)	 –	 all	 of	 which	 were	 in	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2.	Interviews	 with	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 in	 both	 studies	 indicated	 that	 these	 arrangements	were	almost	non-existent	among	the	workers	of	contractors	in	the	terminals	in	this	area.	This	is	starkly	illustrated	in	Figures	5.1	and	5.2,	which	represent	a	further	analysis	of	our	survey	data	and	demonstrate	that,	while	 representation	and	 consultation	was	generally	poor	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 the	 region,	 this	was	especially	so	for	workers	employed	by	contractors,	where	over	90	per	cent	had	no	safety	committee	and	almost	 90	 per	 cent	 said	 they	 had	 no	 elected	 health	 and	 safety	 representative,	 despite	 the	 rather	more	positive	portrayal	given	by	managers.		
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Figure	5.1	Ability	to	raise	issues	with	a	health	and	safety	committee	by	employment	type	in	AP2	
(%)	
 
 
Figure	5.2:	Representation	by	an	elected	health	and	safety	representative	by	employment	type	in	
AP2	(%)	
 
 Even	 where	 workers	 were	 members	 of	 autonomous	 trade	 unions,	 they	 were	 not	 recognised	 by	 their	employers	and	had	no	platform	from	which	to	make	representations	about	health	and	safety	matters	that	were	of	concern	to	them.			Consultation	on	health	and	safety,	when	it	occurred	in	these	contexts,	was	generally	in	the	form	of	direct	consultation	between	 individual	workers	and	 their	 supervisors,	managers	or	employers	 (depending	on	the	size	of	the	contracting	organisation)	or	with	supervisors	or	managers	from	the	terminal	company.	In	all	 these	 situations	 the	 quality	 of	 this	 so	 called	 ‘consultation’	 was	 strongly	 affected	 by	 the	 power	imbalance	between	the	parties	and	generally	 the	 feelings	of	vulnerability	and	 insecurity	of	 the	workers	concerned	meant	that	they	did	not	feel	able	to	offer	observations,	raise	issues	or	offer	opinions	on	health	and	safety	matters	they	felt	would	contradict	those	held	by	the	contractor	or	terminal	management.			
“You	see	 I	am	a	 strong	union	 follower.	The	 [GNT	A]	managers	don’t	 like	me	as	a	 result.	Everyone	
knows	me	as	the	difficult	one.	So	they	are	especially	harsh	on	me.	Even	if	I	step	out	of	my	TT	to	check	
tyre	condition	and	pressure	they	supervisor	will	shout	‘Hey	you	go	inside	your	vehicle	at	once’.”	[Truck	Trailer	Driver,	AP2T2]	
	
Union	representatives	said	that	they	had	nothing	to	contribute	in	such	meetings	as	in	their	view	the	
H&S	committee	is	a	matter	of	management	issue	and	nothing	to	do	with	them.	[AP2T1]		
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Direct Indirect 
H&S committee & able to raise H&S committee & not able to raie No H&S committee 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Direct Indirect 
Rep & elected by workers Rep & not eletect by workers No rep 
105		 	
	
Overall,	 the	position	occupied	by	corporate	 strategies	 for	 the	governance	and	management	of	workers’	occupational	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	 in	 relation	 to	 wider	 corporate	 strategies	 for	 managing	 the	business	 and	 operation	 of	 container	 terminals	 limits	 their	 coverage	 to	 a	 rather	 narrow	 aspect	 of	what	might	be	considered	the	‘work	environment’	in	a	more	holistic	sense.	Despite	the	rhetoric	concerning	the	centrality	 of	 a	 commitment	 to	 preventive	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 the	 core	 corporate	 business	 values	 and	practices,	what	has	emerged	in	the	organisations	we	studied	has	been	the	presence	of	an	understanding	of	OHS	which	does	not	conflict	with	the	principles	of	profit	maximisation	adopted	at	the	corporate	level	and	which	 is	 limited	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	 of	 safety	 at	 the	terminals,	and	to	a	particular	form	of	such	governance	in	which	notions	of	developing	‘safety	culture’	and	behaviour	 modification	 predominate.	 This	 largely	 ignores	 a	 range	 of	 occupational	 health	 and	 welfare	issues	that	are	essentially	the	consequence	of	corporate	business	and	operational	strategies	and	practices	aimed	at	increasing	the	productivity	and	profitability	of	the	terminals.	These	issues	are	among	those	that	workers	regard	as	having	an	influence	on	their	health	and	welfare	as	well	as	on	their	safety,	but	they	lie	beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 corporate	 approaches	 that	 are	 largely	 focused	 on	 achieving	 behaviour	 changes	 in	relation	to	safety.			We	 found	 the	 impact	 of	 these	 strategies	 to	 be	moderated	 by	 the	 national	 contexts	 in	which	 they	were	enacted.	We	 discuss	 this	 influence	 on	 the	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	 experience	 and	 the	 arrangements	made	to	support	it	at	the	terminals	we	studied	different	parts	of	the	world	in	the	following	Chapter.			
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6.	Contextual	determinants	of	practices	–	the	role	of	the	state,	regulation	and	labour	relations	 
 Recent	 research	 findings	 have	 pointed	 to	 the	 wider	 contextual	 determinants	 of	 what	 occurs	 within	workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 practices.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 recent	 large	 European	 survey	addressing	workplace	OHS	management	 practices	 in	 all	 EU	member	 states	 conducted	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	European	Union	Occupational	Safety	and	Health	Agency	(EU-OSHA),	 it	was	observed	that	differences	 in	the	degree	of	implementation	and	operation	of	health	and	safety	management	measures	required	by	EU	Directives	 in	workplaces	 in	different	EU	member	states	remained,	even	after	determinants	such	as	size	and	sector	had	been	taken	into	account	(Walters	et	al.,	2013).	Further	work	commissioned	by	EU-OSHA	demonstrated	that	there	were	several	 features	of	the	national	political,	regulatory,	economic	policy	and	labour	 relations	 contexts	 in	 which	 these	 workplaces	 were	 situated	 that	 were	 especially	 significant	 in	influencing	 the	 operation	 of	 process-orientated	 OHS	 regulation	 within	 workplaces	 (Walters	 and	Wadsworth,	 2014).	 This	 finding	 was	 further	 borne	 out	 in	 a	 series	 of	 papers	 analysing	 these	 contexts	within	 several	 different	 EU	 states,	 including	 the	 UK	 (Wadsworth	 and	Walters,	 2014),	 Sweden,	 (Frick,	2014),	Latvia	(Woolfson	and	Vanadzins,	2014),	Spain	(Garcia	and	Benavides,	2014)	and	Cyprus	(Boustras	and	Economides,	2014).	In	all	cases,	the	complex	interplay	of	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	styles	and	structures	within	EU	member	states	was	shown	to	help	to	determine	the	nature	of	the	systems	in	place	in	these	countries	governing	and	supporting	OHS,	which	in	turn	were	prominent	 in	 influencing	the	extent	of	the	uptake	of	supranational	measures	at	the	level	of	the	workplace.			These	findings	have	some	salience	in	relation	to	the	present	study.	The	container	terminals	that	were	its	focus	 were	 situated	 in	 four	 different	 countries.	 Each	 had	 different	 regulatory	 structures	 and	arrangements	 for	 occupational	 health	 and	 safety,	 as	 well	 as	 different	 economic	 histories,	 policies	 and	infrastructures.	 They	 also	 each	 had	 different	 policies,	 histories	 and	 current	 practices	 in	 relation	 to	national	 patterns	 of	 labour	 relations	 generally,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 those	 in	 dock-work	 more	 specifically.	Corporate	 strategies	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 governance	 and	 management	 in	 the	 companies	 were	implemented	within	 these	 different	 national	 contexts	 in	 the	 terminals	we	 studied.	Not	 surprisingly	we	found	 such	 contexts	 to	 be	 significant	 mediators	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	 these	 approaches	 and	 important	determinants	 of	 the	 differences	we	 observed	 in	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 experiences	 of	 the	workers	 thus	affected.			In	this	chapter	we	outline	the	effects	of	these	contexts	on	the	health	and	safety	practices	and	outcomes	in	the	terminals	we	studied	and	we	suggest	a	model	we	think	is	helpful	in	explaining	the	dynamic	between	these	 effects	 and	 those	 of	 corporate	 global	 governance	 of	 OHS	 pursued	 by	 most	 of	 the	 companies	operating	these	terminals.			
6.1 Economic	contexts	As	 pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 both	 the	 economy	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 economic	 policies	 for	 port	development	of	the	countries	in	which	the	container	terminals	were	situated	have	a	significant	contextual	bearing	 on	 arrangements	 for	 their	 operation.	 The	 four	 countries	 in	 which	 the	 terminals	 were	 located	were	 all	 large	 economies.	 Two	 were	 member	 states	 of	 the	 EU,	 but	 with	 quite	 different	 economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	systems,	one	was	an	advanced	market	economy	in	Asia	Pacific	while	the	other	 was	 a	 large	 lower-middle-income	 country	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 region.	 The	 economic	contexts	 in	 which	 the	 terminals	 operated	 in	 all	 four	 countries	 were	 therefore	 quite	 different.	 These	differences,	as	well	as	those	in	National	economic	strategies	for	port	development,	played	a	further	role	in	determining	 terminal	 structure	 and	 operational	 practices.	 This	was	 seen	 both	 in	 the	 arrangements	 for	governance	and	management	of	health	and	safety	and	in	the	degree	of	latitude	available	to	the	terminal	companies	in	implementing	and	operating	corporate	requirements	in	this	respect.		
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	The	corporate	operational	strategies	of	the	GNTs	included	in	the	study	were	global	and	often	relational	not	 only	 to	 local	 and	 regional	 competition	 but	 also	 to	 that	 of	 the	 global	 interests	 of	 the	 companies.	Managers	and	workers	alike	were	highly	aware	of	the	volatility	of	the	market	in	relation	to	the	container	trade	in	which	they	were	involved	and,	the	changeable	business	position	of	the	terminals	in	which	they	worked.	This	resulted	 in	a	substantial	emphasis	on	 issues	of	productivity	and	efficiency	 in	 terms	of	 the	capacity	and	throughput	of	containers	in	the	terminals;	an	awareness	that	pervaded	their	approaches	to	health	and	safety.			We	 pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 1	 that	 there	 have	 been	 broad	 trends	 that	 characterise	 port	 development	during	the	era	of	economic	globalisation,	of	which	the	uptake	of	the	transportation	of	goods	in	containers	has	itself	been	one.	This	has	taken	place	in	tandem	with	others,	including	a	general	movement	from	public	to	 private	 ownership	 of	 ports,	 increased	 mechanisation	 and	 substantial	 downsizing	 of	 port	 labour,	coupled	with	its	outsourcing,	all	aimed	at	facilitating	increased	throughput	and	efficiencies,	to	enable	the	economies	of	their	host	countries	to	better	engage	with	economic	globalisation.			These	 trends	have	also	helped	 facilitate	 the	 increased	 reach	of	 investment	 in	national	port	 facilities	by	companies	with	a	global	corporate	 interest	 in	 the	container	 trade,	not	only	 in	 the	operation	of	national	terminals	but	also	that	of	global	networks	of	terminals	and	their	further	involvement	in	the	business	of	maritime	 and	 land	 transport	 too.	 As	 we	 also	 pointed	 out	 this	 has	 resulted	 in	 economic	 and	 business	dominance	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 global	 operators	 in	 the	 industry,	 four	 of	which	were	 included	 in	 the	present	study.	As	the	literature	reviewed	in	Chapter	1	makes	clear,	national	economic	policies	concerned	with	port	efficiencies,	inward	investment	and	improving	the	capacity	to	export	and	import	goods	have,	in	various	ways,	helped	to	facilitate	this	development.			While	these	broad	trends	are	observed	globally,	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	detail	of	the	way	in	which	 they	have	been	 addressed	 in	 both	national	 economic	policies	 and	 their	 operational	 results.	 This	situation	influences	the	present	position	of	the	terminals	included	in	our	study	and	helps	explain	some	of	the	differences	between	them	that	we	observed	in	terms	of	the	arrangements	for	OHS	management	and	how	workers	perceived	them.	Overwhelmingly,	the	most	significant	of	the	economic	influences	to	which	they	were	subject	was	that	of	the	intensity	of	competition	for	business	that	was	a	driver	of	the	managerial	concern	with	 operational	 efficiencies	 and	which,	 in	 turn,	 caused	workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 to	believe	 they	needed	 to	be	 responsive	 to	demands	 for	 fast	 turnarounds	 in	 the	 loading	and	unloading	of	ships,	that	took	primacy	over	work	related	health	or	safety	issues:			
“For	the	first	time	…	we	will	have	60	sub-contractors	on	site	…	and	that's	the	first	time	we've	gone	
and	done	that	…	and	we're	also	employed	another	60	people	on	the	even	more	flexible	terms	than	
the	 current	 floaters	…	 so	 again	we	are	 looking	at	 greater	 flexibility	 because	 our	 challenge	 in	 the	
light	of	competition	in	[our	country]	…	so	one	of	the	considerations	we	have	to	have	is	bouncing	the	
work	hours	and	all	the	other	criteria,	we	also	have	to	make	ourselves,	so	that	we	can	compete	with	
the	price	with	our	competitors	who	are	ripping	great	big	lumps	out	of	us,	from	a	price	perspective	…	
[terminals	in	our	and	neighbouring	countries]	…	they're	quite	capable	of	taking	major	lines	from	us	
and	leaving	us	with	few	vessels,	you	know,	we	have	to	be	alert	to	all	the	challenges.”	[Operations	manager,	EU2T2]		As	we	saw	in	Chapter	3,	managers	felt	they	kept	the	numbers	of	dock	workers	to	a	minimum	while	ensuring	that	there	were	sufficient	work	to	be	done	safely.	Some	also	acknowledged	that,	on	occasion,	dockworkers	 may	 work	 at	 high	 speed	 because	 of	 a	 perception	 that	 this	 was	 what	 management	wanted,	but	stressed	that	this	would	never	be	condoned	or	encouraged.			The	 possibility	 of	 further	 automation	 was	 another	 consequence	 of	 the	 drivers	 for	 greater	 economic	efficiency.	 Although	 automation	 was	 not	 significantly	 present	 in	 any	 of	 the	 terminals	 in	 our	 study,	managers	were	well	 aware	of	 such	developments	 in	 rival	ports,	 and	workers	and	 their	 representatives	perceived	 it	as	a	potential	 threat	 to	 future	 job	security	and	one	reason	 for	high	work	demands	 in	 their	non-automated	 terminals.	This	was	especially	 the	 case	 in	 the	EU	ports	as	well	 as	 in	Asia	Pacific	 area	1	
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where	the	automation	of	rival	ports	nearby	was	both	advanced	and	well	known.	All	four	European	GNT	case	study	terminals	and	the	one	operated	by	a	national	company	included	in	the	study	were	situated	in	a	region	 in	which	there	was	significant	competition	between	terminals,	 including	between	the	case	study	terminals,	which	gave	rise	to	significant	concern	about	individual	job	security	and	the	future	viability	of	the	terminals	among	the	workers	employed	 in	them.	Similar	scenarios	were	evident	 in	the	terminals	 in	Asia	Pacific	area	1:		
“There's,	 at	 the	 moment	 there's	 a	 bit	 of	 concern	 and	 threat	 if	 you	 like,	 like	 some	 people	 were	
threatened,	 the	 talk	 of	 automation	 coming	 in.	 …	 So	 I	 think	 that's,	 I	 think	 that's	 constantly	 on	
people’s	minds	here.”	[Stores	co-ordinator	and	delegate,	AP1T1]		Differences	 in	 economic	 policy	 contexts	 observed	 in	 the	 national	 situations	 of	 the	 terminals	 included	different	strategies	and	speeds	with	which	the	move	from	public	ownership	to	other	forms	of	ownership	had	taken	place	in	the	countries	concerned.	Among	the	advanced	economies	in	the	study,	these	included	the	 situation	 in	 Europe	 area	 2	 where	 the	 host	 country	 was	 in	 the	 vanguard	 of	 national	 economic	strategies	 to	 liberalise	 its	 economy,	 and	 major	 reforms	 in	 the	 ownership	 and	 operation	 of	 its	 ports,	including	 in	 some	 cases,	 outsourcing	 labour,	 had	 been	 supported	 in	 economic	 policies.	 For	 one	 of	 the	terminals,	 the	privatisation	and	complete	re-organisation	of	 the	port	by	 its	national	operating	company	had	 enabled	 the	 terminal	 to	 outsource	 all	 of	 its	 operational	 labour	 to	 a	 contractor.	 The	 relationship	between	the	operator	and	the	contractor	was	a	stable	one	and	had	been	in	place	for	a	number	of	years,	but	the	practice	of	having	to	re-bid	periodically	for	the	work	was	regarded	by	managers	as	destabilising	and	kept	pressure	on	them	to	ensure	costs	were	minimised.	In	Chapter	4	we	noted	that	while	our	survey	measures	on	health	and	safety	outcomes	suggest	a	better	performance	in	the	terminal	run	by	the	national	operator	 in	comparison	with	 those	run	by	 the	GNTs,	 this	may	have	been	a	consequence	of	 the	younger	age	range	and	more	limited	time	spent	in	dock-work	of	the	employees	concerned.	Measures	on	health	and	safety	management	suggested	that	arrangements	were	perceived	to	be	poorer	by	the	contracted	workers	in	the	terminal	operated	by	the	national	operator	than	in	those	run	by	the	GNTs.	This	could	have	been	a	reflection	 of	 the	 comparative	 remoteness	 of	 the	 contracted	 workers	 from	 these	 terminal	 level	arrangements,	caused	by	limited	communication	between	the	terminal	operator	OHS	management	team	and	the	contracted	workforce.	As	the	OHS	manager	rather	surprisingly	confessed	when	asked	about	shift	patterns:			
Interviewer:	And	what	pattern	of	shifts	do	they	do?	How	many	days	on	and...	
Respondent:	I’m	not	entirely	certain.	[Safety	Manager,	EU2T3]		In	contrast	in	Europe	area	1,	as	detailed	in	Chapter	3,	many	of	the	traditional	institutions	of	dock	labour	had	adapted	successfully	to	the	efficiencies	required	to	compete	successfully	in	the	new	political	economy	and	the	impact	of	change	had	produced	quite	different	port	structures	in	which	the	terminal	companies	we	studied	were	now	embedded.	As	noted	in	Chapter	4,	respondents	to	our	survey	generally	reported	a	better	 experience	 of	work	 environment,	 health	 and	 safety	management	 and	working	 conditions	 in	 the	terminals	in	this	country	than	elsewhere,	and	in	Chapter	3	we	detailed	some	of	the	operational	reasons	why	this	may	have	been	so.			In	Asia	Pacific	area	1,	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	3,	there	were	some	differences	between	the	two	terminals	we	studied	 in	 terms	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	OHS	matters	were	 addressed.	However,	while	 these	 differences	may	have	been	 attributable	 to	 the	 influences	 of	 the	 different	 states	 in	which	 they	were	 located,	 it	was	regulatory	 rather	 than	 economic	 policies	 that	were	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 this	 variation.	 Reforms	 in	 port	ownership	 had	 not	 initially	 led	 to	 the	 privatisation	 of	 either	 of	 the	 ports	 in	which	 the	 terminals	were	located	 but	 to	 their	 corporatisation	 (although	 subsequent	 further	 commercialisation	 of	 the	 ports	 was	helping	to	shift	this	process	towards	privatisation).			As	a	large	lower-middle-income	country,	Asia	Pacific	area	2	has	a	very	different	economic	profile	to	the	others	in	the	study.	It	is	a	large	and	complex	economy	with	a	very	large	population,	a	substantial	part	of	
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which	 continues	 to	 suffer	 considerable	deprivation	across	 the	 full	 range	of	 social,	 economic	and	health	indicators.	 It	 has	 at	 the	 same	 time	 undergone	 a	 relatively	 recent	 phase	 of	 rapid	 industrialisation,	technological	 and	 economic	 growth	 and	 continues	 to	 strive	 to	 deepen	 its	 integration	 in	 the	 global	economy.	 While	 there	 has	 been	 rapid	 economic	 growth,	 it	 has	 been	 uneven	 in	 its	 pace	 and	 location,	resulting	in	huge	differentials	in	wealth	distribution	and	in	the	extent	to	which	infrastructural	and	social	development	has	matched	this	uneven	economic	growth.	These	macro-level	issues	have	had	an	impact	on	the	 operation	 of	 container	 terminals	 in	 many	 ways.	 Public	 ownership	 of	 ports,	 and	 the	 institutional	models	 for	their	governance	and	operation,	were	widely	regarded	as	 inefficient	and	a	constraint	on	the	ability	of	ports	to	compete	effectively,	 limiting	their	flexibility	and	market	responsiveness.	Recent	times	have	 seen	 considerable	 consequent	 privatisation,	 liberalisation	 and	 efforts	 to	 commercialise	 existing	ports,	alongside	the	development	of	new	private	ports,	joint	ventures	and	other	newly	built	port	facilities	situated	away	from	cities	and	congested	transport	infrastructures.	These	policies	have	helped	encourage	investment	 from	 global	 operators	 as	 well	 as	 boosting	 the	 development	 of	 contractorisation	 and	weakening	the	role	of	organised	labour	within	the	workplace.	Considerable	 investment	and	operational	roles	 in	 the	process	of	port	development	have	been	played	by	 the	biggest	GNTs,	 including	 those	 in	 the	present	study.	Although	the	terminals	we	studied	in	this	area	were	all	located	in	older	ports	dating	from	the	era	of	public	ownership	and	the	remnants	of	the	institutional	models	for	their	governance	still	existed,	they	 were	 all	 operated	 by	 GNTs	 with	 the	 freedom	 to	 manage	 their	 operations	 according	 to	 global	corporate	models.			This	said,	there	has	been	much	criticism	of	sclerosis	within	the	economy	and	the	consequent	uneven	pace	of	port	modernisation	in	the	country.	As	we	have	already	mentioned,	major	problems	are	acknowledged	in	relation	to	the	efficient	operation	of	the	transport	infrastructures	of	which	ports	are	a	part.	These	are	to	some	extent	the	result	of	the	continuation	of	intransigent	and	out-dated	port	governance	and	revenue	arrangements.	 They	 are	 also	 a	 consequence	 of	 underinvestment	 in	 transport	 infrastructures	 and	 the	result	of	poor	quality	in	the	established	services	with	which	the	terminals	are	obliged	to	interact.	Within	their	 terminals	 the	 GNT	 operators	 were	 able	 to	 adopt	 corporate	 management	 strategies	 largely	unhindered	 by	 local	 contexts	 but	 the	wider	 national	 economic	 environment	 and	 its	 interface	with	 the	terminal	operations,	was	a	major	challenge	for	the	companies	and	had	an	impact	on	both	the	operation	of	the	 terminals	and	their	arrangements	 for	managing	health	and	safety	within	 them	in	several	 important	ways	mentioned	in	Chapters	3	and	4.	For	example,	the	transport	bottlenecks	referred	to	previously	were	regarded	as	indirectly	responsible	for	serious	accidents	and	incidents	involving	both	terminal	operators	and	 truck	 drivers.	 Lack	 of	 education	 and	 other	 poor	 economic,	 social	 and	 health	 indicators	 in	 the	communities	in	which	many	truck	drivers	and	operational	staff	lived	were	regarded	by	managers	as	being	responsible	for	unsafe	behaviours	within	the	terminal	as	well	as	among	external	truck	drivers	visiting	the	terminals.	The	absence	of	effective	occupational	health	services	and	widespread	support	for	occupational	safety	outside	the	terminals	were	further	contextual	features.			Outreach	work	to	effect	change	in	this	respect	was	attempted	by	some	terminal	managements	as	well	as	being	advocated	in	the	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	agendas	of	the	GNTs	at	corporate	level.	Some	of	 the	 contract	workers	 employed	 in	 the	 terminals,	 and	 especially	 those	 in	 relatively	 low	 skill	manual	tasks	such	as	lashing,	were	economic	migrants	drawn	to	this	work	by	the	prospect	of	higher	wages	than	were	possible	in	the	areas	in	which	they	lived,	which	were	considerable	distances	away.	This	resulted	in	distinct	groupings	of	workers	in	each	of	the	terminals	who	not	only	undertook	different	tasks	and	were	contractor	employees	but	who	often	spoke	a	different	language	from	the	other	workers	and	managers	at	the	 terminal	 –	 with	 consequent	 heightened	 levels	 of	 risk	 in	 relation	 to	 safety	 issues	 requiring	 good	communication.	As	 the	 results	of	 the	 survey	 in	Chapter	4	 indicate,	 it	was	among	 this	group	of	workers	that	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 work-related	 injury,	 ill-health	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 health	 and	 safety	management	arrangements	were	seen.			In	short,	therefore,	although	economic	and	economic	policy	contexts	are	perhaps	difficult	to	measure	in	terms	of	 their	direct	 impact	on	health	and	safety	arrangements	and	outcomes,	 there	 seems	 little	doubt	that	 these	wider	 contexts	 do	 have	 an	 important	 impact.	 They	 are	 among	 the	 influences	 on	 differences	observed	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 these	 arrangements	 and	 their	 outcomes	 in	 terminals	 situated	 in	 different	parts	of	the	world.	As	such	it	is	necessary	to	take	account	of	them	when	trying	to	understand	the	nature	of	
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the	 experience	 of	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	 for	 workers	 in	 these	 different	 terminals,	 as	 well	 as	acknowledging	 their	 implications	 for	 improving	 arrangements	 to	 prevent	 injuries	 and	 ill-health	within	these	wider	contexts.			
6.2 Regulatory	frameworks	and	enforcement	practices		In	as	far	as	they	apply	directly	to	the	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	in	the	workplaces	in	the	study,	regulation	 and	 regulatory	 enforcement	 are	 in	 some	 respects	 more	 tangible	 measures	 of	 national	determinants	of	OHS	practice	than	are	the	economic	policy	contexts	discussed	the	previous	section.	All	of	the	 countries	 included	 in	 the	 study	 had	 such	 measures	 in	 place,	 as	 well	 as	 regulatory	 inspectorates	charged	 with	 ensuring	 duty	 holders’	 compliance	 with	 them.	 However	 there	 was	 variation	 both	 in	 the	nature	of	these	measures	and	in	the	role	of	regulatory	inspection	in	achieving	compliance.	At	the	global	level,	the	container	terminal	operators	talked	of	their	terminal	operations	being	located	either	in	‘heavily	regulated’	or	 ‘lightly	regulated’	countries.	In	our	study	the	former	were	represented	by	the	high	income	advanced	market	economies	of	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	area	1,	while	Asia	Pacific	area	2	represented	the	latter.			Regulatory	measures	on	the	health	and	safety	arrangements	for	container	terminals	were	essentially	of	two	 types.	 In	 all	 the	 advanced	market	 economies	 in	 the	 study	 there	were	 broadly	 similarly	 orientated	provisions	in	place	at	national	level	that	provided	process-based	requirements,	normally	on	employers,	to	manage	health	and	safety	systematically,	with	competent	advice,	having	regard	to	the	nature	of	the	risks	of	the	establishment	and	the	work	undertaken	there	and	to	consult	with	their	workers	on	these	matters.	These	provisions	were	generally	in	keeping	with	international	trends	in	OHS	regulation	in	recent	decades,	in	which	 the	 specification	 standards	 of	 prescriptive	 regulation	 that	 previously	 characterised	most	OHS	statutes	 have	 given	way	 to	more	 ‘goal	 setting’,	 process-based	measures	 addressing	 responsibilities	 for	OHS	management.	In	addition	to	these	broad	based	provisions,	a	second	type	of	regulatory	measure	still	in	 evidence	 were	 those	 more	 specific	 regulations	 that	 applied	 to	 dock-work,	 found	 in	 delegated	legislation,	 such	as	 specific	 regulations	on	aspects	of	dock-work,	 some	of	which	pre-dated	 the	process-based	regulation	and	which	were	more	prescriptive	in	nature.	Generally,	the	latter	had	been	the	subject	of	repeal	and	removal	 in	recent	regulatory	reforms,	as	deregulatory	strategies	 in	keeping	with	neo-liberal	economic	 policy	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 creating	 improved	 conditions	 for	 economic	 growth	 and	competitiveness	 were	more	 widely	 deployed.	 As	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 there	 was	 some	variation	between	countries	in	the	extent	to	which	this	occurred.	Finally	there	were	Codes	of	Practice	and	regulatory	guidance	notes	concerning	some	of	the	operational	activities	 in	the	terminals.	The	latter	had	no	 legal	status,	although	 implementation	was	considered	 to	be	evidence	of	good	practice.	 In	 the	 lower-middle-income	country	in	the	study,	regulatory	provisions	appeared	to	be	more	of	the	prescriptive	type,	with	a	specific	set	of	provisions	for	dock	work	which,	as	we	note	below,	determined	inspection	activities	and	which	inspectors	did	not	feel	empowered	to	go	beyond.			A	 further	 point	 to	 note	 concerning	 regulatory	 influence	 is	 that	 this	 does	 not	 act	 in	 isolation.	 In	 each	country	it	is	one	element	of	the	wider	national	‘health	and	safety	system’,	which	influences	the	nature	of	workplace	practices	and	their	outcomes.	Other	elements	of	the	system	include:	the	support	provided	by	national	 institutions	 for	education,	research,	 training	and	 information	dissemination	 in	relation	to	OHS;	occupational	 health	 and	 safety	 services,	 professional	 practitioners,	 their	 institutions	 and	 the	 like;	 the	courts	 and	 legal	 services	 and	 compensation	 litigation;	 social	 security	 and	 social	 welfare	 systems	addressing	 issues	 of	 compensation,	 rehabilitation	 and	 return	 to	work.	 They	 further	 include	 employers’	organisations	 and	 trade	 unions,	 and	 the	 services	 they	 provide	 for	 their	members	 on	 health	 and	 safety	matters;	as	well	as	those	of	insurance	associations;	public	advice	centres	and	information	services;	and	so	on.	 These	 in	 turn	 are	 embedded	 in	 and	 relate	 to	 the	 wider	 systems	 for	 economic,	 health	 and	 social	welfare,	 including	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 main	 institutional	 actors	 such	 as	 employers’	 organisations,	 trade	bodies,	trade	unions	and	the	state	apparatus	for	policy	making	and	its	delivery	in	relation	to	health	and	safety	at	work.	We	have	represented	these	contexts	in	Figure	6.1,	that	for	simplicity,	positions	workplace	health	and	safety	practice	within	the	terminals	at	the	centre	of	a	constellation	of	influences	in	which	that	of	 corporate	 governance	 and	 management	 influences	 (represented	 by	 the	 arrows	 at	 the	 base	 of	 the	
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diagram)	act	directly	upon	the	terminals	in	the	ways	we	have	described	in	this	report,	but	their	effects	are	mediated	 and	 moderated	 by	 a	 constellation	 of	 national	 influences	 (represented	 by	 the	 overlapping	rectangles	that	surround	the	centrally	placed	square	representing	‘Terminal	level	practice’).	Outcomes	in	relation	to	practice	therefore	vary	by	location	according	to	the	balance	between	these	influences.		
Figure	6.1:	The	influence	of	context	
	And,	 as	we	 have	 argued	 previously,	 it	 is	 the	 differences	 in	 this	 ‘system’,	 including	 those	 in	 relation	 to	regulation	 and	 regulatory	 inspection,	 which	 help	 determine	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 its	 workplace	influence.	 There	 were	 several	 such	 differences	 evident	 in	 the	 present	 study.	 They	 were	most	 obvious	between	 what,	 at	 the	 corporate	 level,	 some	 GNTs	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘lightly’	 and	 ‘heavily’	 regulated	countries.	 In	 essence,	 while	 the	 three	 advanced	market	 economies	 had	 elements	 of	 all	 of	 the	 support	represented	 in	 Figure	 6.1	 present	 in	 their	 national	 systems,	 the	 lower-middle-income	 country	 did	 not.	Moreover,	such	provision	that	it	was	able	to	make	offered	only	limited	help	to	workers	and	was	equally	(if	not	more)	 limited	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 influence	 the	practices	of	 the	 terminal	 company	managements.	 For	example,	 the	role	of	 the	courts,	 compensation,	 social	welfare	provision	and	so	on,	was	underdeveloped	and	 negligible	 in	 either	 the	 support	 offered	 to	 compensate	 injured	workers	 or	 in	 influencing	 company	
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strategies	 for	 their	prevention.	The	extent	and	 influence	of	occupational	health	and	safety	 services	and	the	role	professional	practice	on	OHS	external	to	the	terminals	in	influencing	practices	within	them	was	also	 negligible.	 While	 regulation	 made	 provision	 for	 occupational	 health	 services	 in	 ports	 and	 even	specified	 preventive	 functions,	 there	 was	 little	 evidence	 of	 its	 presence	 or	 use	 beyond	 a	 role	 in	determining	 fitness	 for	 work	 and	 emergency	 treatment.	 Similarly,	 neither	 insurance	 associations	 or	employers’	and	trade	bodies	had	much	influence	on	activities	in	relation	to	health	and	safety	within	the	terminals.	Trade	unions	also	lacked	specific	support	services	or	 information	services	for	their	members	and,	 while	 they	 were	 active	 at	 various	 levels	 in	 attempting	 to	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 terminal	workers,	 as	 we	 will	 discuss	 further	 in	 the	 next	 section	 their	 role	 was	 limited	 by	 their	 weak	 labour	relations	position.	 In	such	circumstances	 the	combination	of	external	pressures	 that	current	socio-legal	scholars	 argue	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 effective	 application	 of	 regulation	was	 a	 very	weak	 influence	indeed	for	the	terminals	situated	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2.			
“The	 union	 leader	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 they	 were	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	 issues.	 Although	 they	 had	
brought	many	 concerns	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	management	 in	 2008	 nothing	 has	 changed	 since.	
Neither	the	contractor	nor	the	terminal	managers	are	willing	to	listen	to	the	plights	of	the	contract	
workers.	No	follow	up	from	the	government	or	the	dock	safety	inspectors	either.”	[AP2T2]		National	arrangements	for	labour	inspection	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	divided	the	country	into	regions.	The	terminals	in	the	study	were	located	in	two	different	regions	and	there	was	specialist	inspection	in	both	of	these	 regions	 for	 OHS	 matters	 under	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 relevant	 legislation,	 by	 which	 inspectors,	interviewed	during	the	study,	felt	their	inspections	were	bound.	That	is,	the	specification	standards	found	in	the	relevant	regulations	concerning	plant	and	equipment	in	use	within	the	terminals	and	safe	working	procedures,	where	they	were	also	specified,	were	a	significant	 focus	for	 inspection,	as	were	the	written	records	concerning	these	things	and	other	documentation	that	regulations	obliged	duty-holders	to	keep.	Inspectors	 believed	 themselves	 less	 able	 to	 address	 matters	 that	 were	 not	 thus	 specified.	 This	 was	particularly	 significant	 because	 they	 further	 indicated	 that	 such	 unspecified	 matters	 included	 the	arrangements	made	by	the	terminal	operators	for	OHS	management.			Under	 regulatory	 prescription	 they	 were	 able	 to	 investigate	 incidents	 that	 had	 caused	 fatalities	 and	injuries.	Inspections	could	extend	to	matters	on	board	ships	if	they	were	likely	to	be	a	risk	to	the	safety	of	dockworkers.	 They	 investigated	 complaints,	 including	 those	 received	 from	 workers.	 They	 said	 both	reactive	and	proactive	visits	were	made	but	did	not	have	a	predetermined	ratio	 for	 these.	Nor	did	they	appear	 to	 undertake	 targeted	 inspections.	 Visits	 to	 the	 terminals	 could	 be	 by	 arrangement	 with	 the	terminal	management	or	they	might	be	unannounced.	They	did	not	make	any	special	provision	to	meet	representatives	 of	 workers,	 although	 in	 one	 region	 the	 interviewee	 indicated	 that	 the	 trade	 unions	sometimes	came	to	the	offices	of	the	labour	inspectorate	to	discuss	issues.	However,	the	impression	was	given	that	such	visits	were	not	entirely	welcomed	by	the	inspector.	Generally	it	was	felt	that	even	without	making	specific	arrangements	to	do	so,	inspectors	would	be	likely	to	meet	workers	as	a	matter	of	course	during	their	visits,	which	they	suggested	were	made	two	or	three	times	a	week	on	average.			They	had	 the	normal	powers	of	 labour	 inspectors	 to	 issue	administrative	notices	 that	 require	remedial	action,	as	well	as	powers	to	stop	or	prohibit	dangerous	work	and,	as	a	Labour	Inspection	Department,	to	prosecute	 serious	violations.	They	kept	 records	of	 all	 these	 actions	 and	 indicated	 that	overall	 statistics	concerning	them	were	published	in	annual	reports.	However,	such	statistics	were	arrogated	in	ways	that	made	it	impossible	to	determine	the	extent	of	actions	taken	in	relation	to	any	of	the	case	study	terminals.			While	the	investigation	of	incidents	leading	to	injuries	and	fatalities	are	clearly	important,	looking	at	the	findings	 in	 Chapter	 4	 it	 appears	 that	 a	 significant	 role	 for	 inspection	 in	 relation	 to	 health	 and	 safety	management	would	be	useful	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals.	Yet	the	inspectors	interviewed	for	the	study	indicated	very	little	engagement	in	these	matters.	They	seemed	unaware	of	the	extent	of	the	health	issues	 such	 as	 stress,	 fatigue,	 MSDs	 and	 gastrointestinal	 issues	 that	 were	 identified	 by	 a	 substantial	proportion	 of	 respondents	 from	 these	 terminals	 or	 that	 the	 contract	workers,	who	were	 a	 substantial	proportion	of	the	terminal	workers,	experienced	a	larger	proportion	of	these	than	did	workers	who	were	
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directly	 employed	 (or	 indeed,	 that	 a	 greater	 proportion	 of	 injuries	 were	 also	 experienced	 by	 contract	workers).	 In	 one	 of	 the	 regions	 the	 inspectors	 said	 they	 believed	 that	 workers	 who	 worked	 for	contractors	at	the	terminals	were	actually	more	experienced	than	those	that	were	directly	employed	and	therefore	more	likely	to	work	safely	as	a	result.			Generally	 the	 inspectors	 suggested	 that	 they	 were	 happy	 with	 the	 terminal	 arrangements	 concerning	health	 and	 safety	management	 and	 supported	 the	 behaviour-orientated	 approach	 these	 arrangements	adopted.	Indeed,	they	seemed	to	regard	the	container	terminals	as	exemplary	in	this	respect.	However,	as	noted	 above,	 they	 did	 not	 inspect	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 systems	 within	 the	 terminals	because,	although	they	were	aware	that	such	systems	existed,	they	believed	them	to	be	outside	the	remit	of	their	inspection	powers.	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	given	the	prescriptive	nature	of	what	they	believed	to	be	these	powers,	there	was	no	sign	of	their	engagement	with	methods	of	inspection	that	would	aid	in	the	 compliance	 behaviour	 of	 contractors	 and	 here	 too	 they	 appeared	 satisfied	 that	 the	 management	systems	adopted	by	the	terminal	management	were	fit	for	purpose	in	this	respect.			Managers	in	the	terminals	reported	a	rather	mixed	experience	of	these	inspections.	For	some,	while	there	was	an	acknowledgement	of	the	existence	of	both	the	docks	inspectors	and	their	inspection	activities,	as	well	as	that	of	obligations	on	the	company	to	co-operate	with	them,	there	was	 little	suggestion	that	the	outcomes	 of	 such	 inspection	 were	 of	 significant	 influence	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 their	 arrangements	 for	health	and	safety	at	 the	 terminals,	not	 least	because	of	a	perception	 that	any	 form	of	enforcement	was	very	rare:		
Interviewer:	 ...has	he	shown	any	power	or	any	authority	lately	to	stop	work,	such	as	this	is	unsafe,	
don’t	do	it?		
Respondent:	Oh	no.	…	They	give	advice	on,	improvement	notice.	…	But	they	don’t	just,	they	not	stop	
…	And	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	years	none	of	 the	 [Asia	Pacific	area	2]	port	has	given	notice	 to	 stop	 the	
work.	[Safety	Manager,	AP2T1]		Others	were	more	challenged	by	the	interventions	of	inspectors,	especially	in	relation	to	their	role	in	the	investigation	 of	 incidents	 that	 had	 caused	 injuries.	 Here	 there	 was	 a	 suggestion	 that	 inspectors	 were	something	 of	 a	 hindrance	 to	 the	 effective	 functioning	 of	 incident	 investigation	 as	 well	 as	 claims	concerning	 inappropriate	activities	on	their	part.	Workers	and	their	representatives	were	 less	mixed	 in	their	views	of	the	role	of	inspection.	In	both	the	present	and	the	previous	study,	they	were	unequivocal	concerning	 both	 the	 limited	 presence	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 inspectors	 in	 influencing	 health	 and	 safety	matters	at	the	terminal.			
Interviewer:	There	seems	to	be	a	very	cooperative	working	relationship	between	the	inspectorate.	
Respondent:	Yes.	…	They	being	an	independent	government	body	they’ve	also	got	their	own	policies	
and	 it’s	 our	 duty	 –	 it’s	 only	 our	 duty	 to	 comply	with	what	 is	 their	 requirement.	 So	we	work	 very	
closely	with	them,	yes,	there	is	no	conflict	or	nothing	like	this.		[Operations	Manager,	AP2T4]		
Interviewer:	when	you	have	a	visit	from	these	inspectors	do	they	do	they	give	you	instructions	about	
how	things	have	to	be	improved?	
Respondent:	no	when	they	will	take	a	visit	to	our	terminal	just	they	will	give	us	information	for	the	
scope	of	the	improvement	after	visit	establishing	what	is	the	scope	for	the	improvement	[Trainer,	AP2T2]		
Interviewer:	have	you	ever	seen	the	dock	safety	inspector	wandering	around	doing	his	inspections?	
Respondent:	I	don’t.	[RTG	Operator,	AP2T1]		A	very	different	portrait	of	external	regulatory	influence	is	apparent	at	the	terminals	in	advanced	market	economies.	 Firstly	 of	 course,	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 wider	 system	 supporting	 health	 and	 safety	 were	 far	
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more	in	evidence	in	these	countries	and	regulation	and	regulatory	inspection	occurred	within	this	wider	context.	 Regulatory	 inspectorates	 had	 the	 conventional	 range	 of	 statutory	 powers,	 similar	 to	 those	described	above	for	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	regulators.	They	undertook	both	reactive	and	proactive	visits	to	the	terminals	and	investigation	of	complaints	and	incidents	that	had	caused	injury.			They	 also	 undertook	 inspection	 campaigns	 focussed	 on	 specific	 risks,	 based	 on	 evidence	 of	 particular	problems.	Historically	there	had	been	specialist	inspectors	or	groups	of	inspectors	for	dock-work,	in	all	of	the	 areas	 in	 the	 study,	 although	 the	 current	 trend	 in	 some	 was	 towards	 more	 generalist	 approaches.	Regulation	was	process-based	and	therefore	embraced	duty-holders’	arrangements	to	manage	the	risks	of	work	in	the	terminals.	Inspectors	were,	in	the	main,	able	to	use	their	powers	in	several	ways	that	were	more	 commensurate	 with	 inspecting	 the	 arrangements	 for	 managing	 health	 and	 safety	 within	 the	container	 terminals	within	 their	 jurisdiction.	Moreover,	 the	role	of	consultation	with	workers	and	their	representatives	was	 prominent	 in	 both	 the	 regulatory	 provision	 and	 in	 the	 arrangements	made	 at	 the	workplace	and	therefore	also	more	likely	to	receive	the	benefit	of	inspectors’	scrutiny.			This	 said,	 we	 found	 considerable	 variation	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 occurred	 in	 practice	 during	inspection	 visits.	 Workers	 in	 both	 the	 previous	 and	 present	 studies	 indicated	 that	 health	 and	 safety	within	their	workplaces	would	benefit	from	a	greater	engagement	with	inspectors.			Differences	 were	 seen	 between	 advanced	 market	 economies	 in	 the	 detailed	 nature	 of	 regulatory	practices,	their	wider	support	and	their	influence.	For	example,	since	the	terminals	in	Europe	areas	1	and	2	operated	within	EU	member	states	they	were	subject	to	European	legislation	and	therefore	were	both	bound	 by	 the	 requirements	 of	 EU	 Directives	 concerning	 health	 and	 safety	 –	 and	 in	 particular	 by	 the	measures	 on	 systematic	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 that	 were	 found	 in	 the	 Framework	 Directive	89/391/EEC	which	 is	 essentially	 the	 regulatory	model	 for	 OHS	management	 for	 the	 EU,	 and	 provides	workers	 in	all	EU	member	states	with	a	common	minimum	level	of	protection	 from	work-related	risks.	Although	 the	precise	way	 in	which	 its	 legislative	provisions	are	 translated	 into	national	 legislation	and	workplace	practice	varies	by	country,	 industry	sector,	organisation	size	and	so	on,	 the	Directive	obliges	all	employers	to	take	appropriate	preventive	measures	to	make	work	safer	and	healthier.	Specifically,	its	key	 elements	 centre	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 risk	 assessment	 within	 a	 participative	 health	 and	 safety	management	 system,	 which	 places	 responsibility	 upon	 employers	 to	 manage	 their	 health	 and	 safety	arrangements	 in	ways	 that	 are	both	 competent	 and	participative.	There	were,	 therefore,	 similarities	 in	the	prevailing	arrangements	for	participation	and	representation	in	European	areas	1	and	2,	as	we	have	seen	 previously,	 such	 as	 requirements	 for	 employers’	 responsibilities	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 plans	 and	policies,	 risk	assessment,	worker	representation	on	health	and	safety	and	so	on,	but	also	differences	 in	the	ways	in	which	these	systems	and	arrangements	were	managed.	Each	had	further,	more	prescriptive,	regulations	specifying	health	and	safety	requirements	specific	to	dock	work.			The	general	character	of	the	national	health	and	safety	systems	in	the	two	countries	were	very	different	and	this	resulted	in	a	variety	of	differences	evident	in	relation	to	regulatory	inspection	at	the	level	of	the	terminals.	 For	 example,	 in	 European	 area	 2	 the	 dock-work	 regulations	 were	 among	 many	 regulatory	standards	that	had	been	deemed	no	longer	necessary	and	regulatory	governance	as	‘high	risk’	no	longer	regarded	 dock-work	 as	 ‘high	 risk’.	 Inspectorate	 numbers	 had	 been	 substantially	 reduced	 by	 public	spending	cuts	and	remaining	inspectors	were	increasingly	required	to	perform	inspection	activities	in	a	more	 ‘business	 friendly’	 manner.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 fewer	 inspectors	 meant	 fewer	 inspections	 were	possible	and	as	a	result	for	several	years	the	regulatory	agency	has	been	exploring	a	range	of	additional	means	 to	 improve	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 practices.	 Essentially	 these	 were	 more	 focused	 on	extending	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 regulatory	 agency	 by	 providing	 leadership	 and	 co-ordination	 on	 good	practice	through	advisory	approaches	and	liaison	with	key	organisational	intermediaries.	In	this	Area	too,	the	 level	 of	 port	 privatisation	 was	 well-advanced	 and	 the	 terminal	 studied	 had	 a	 high	 level	 of	independence	from	other	port	institutions	as	a	result.	There	was	no	evidence	in	our	study	to	suggest	that	any	 of	 this	 contributed	 support	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 practices	 in	 the	 terminals	 studied	 and	 some	 that	indicated	it	had	led	to	feelings	of	poorer	communication	and	a	reduction	of	the	trust	that	workers	felt	for	regulatory	inspectors:		
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“…	to	be	fair	…	if	the	health	and	safety	inspector	is	coming	here,	he	would	normally	let	me	know.	He	
would	write	 to	me,	 if	 he	writes	 anything	 to	 the	 company,	 he	 copies	me	 in.	 So	he	does	give	us	 the	
information	…	But	it’s	going	to	get	worse	because	they’re	being	cut,	and	they’re	starting	to	charge	…	
they	won’t	be	doing	inspections	any	more.	It	will	more	reactive	because	they’re	only	going	to	come	
in	if	there’s	a	serious	accident.	So	I	don’t	think	we’ll	be	seeing	as	much	of	them,	unless	we	call	them	
in	specifically	or	if	there’s	a	serious	accident.”	[Senior	Shop	Steward,	EU2T1]	
	
“Not	very	happy	with	the	[labour	inspectorate]	…	because	I	believe	they	cosy	up	to	management	too	
much	or	 to	 the	company	 too	much.	With	 the	workforce	 the	size	 that	we	have,	when	 the	 inspector	
comes	down	I	would	expect	him	to	make	a	phone	call	and	say,	“We	are	going	to	be	on	the	port.	If	you	
the	union	want	to	come	and	see	us,	please	do”	or,	“Can	we	come	and	see	you	to	have	a	10	minute	
chat?”	…	for	them	not	to	even	have	the	manners	to	come	and	speak	to	us	when	they	visit,	I	think	is	
wrong.	They	visit	our	head	of	safety	on	a	regular	basis.	They	sit	down	have	cups	of	tea,	all	that	kind	
of	stuff.	…	And	so	maybe	that	is	why	they	don’t	come	and	see	me,	because	they	are	too	close	to	our	
management.”		[Senior	Shop	Steward,	EU2T2]		This	 contrasted	 with	 practice	 in	 Europe	 area	 1	 where	 national	 legislation	 transposed	 the	 Framework	Directive	 in	 1996,	 and	 as	 in	 other	 EU	member	 states,	 gave	 its	 provisions	widespread	 effect,	 but	 other	older	 (though	 repeatedly	 revised)	 provisions	 also	 covered	 health	 and	 safety	matters	 in	 dock-work.	 In	addition,	 in	 this	 country,	 regulatory	 provisions	 relating	 to	 employment	 and	 employment	 conditions	 in	dock-work	supported	the	functioning	of	quite	specific	arrangements	within	the	larger	of	the	two	ports	we	studied	 in	 this	area.	Port	policy	and	 legislation	were	devolved	 to	 regions	within	 the	 country	with	 their	own	 parliaments	 and	 legislatures.	 Characteristic	 of	 the	 general	 arrangements	 for	 port	 labour	 was	 the	establishment	 by	 a	 Port	 Labour	 Act	 of	 both	 national	 and	 local	 (in	 relation	 to	 larger	 ports)	 joint	committees,	with	powers	 to	make	port	 labour	regulations.	Collective	 labour	agreements	existed	at	port	level,	concluded	with	the	national	or	local	joint	committees,	they	had	the	force	of	law	within	the	situation	to	which	they	applied	and,	significantly,	only	registered	port	workers	may	perform	dock-work.	In	short,	the	 position	 of	 port	 labour	within	 this	 country	 is	 deeply	 embedded	within	 both	 the	 national	 and	 local	labour	relations	and	regulatory	traditions.	It	has	proved	quite	resilient	in	the	face	of	pressures	for	change	that	have	transformed	such	arrangements	elsewhere	(as	is	the	case,	for	example,	 in	Europe	area	2)	and	resulted	 in	 some	 rather	 different	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	 and	 operation	 of	 OHS,	 even	 in	terminals	 operated	 by	 GNTs.	 Therefore,	 commercialisation	 of	 dock-work	 activities	 had	 taken	 a	 very	different	trajectory	in	this	area	and	as	a	result	port-wide	institutions	remained	of	central	importance	in	the	organisation	of	work,	including	in	the	arrangements	made	for	health	and	safety.			
“It	 follows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 employer	 is	 responsible	 for	 employees.	 The	 dockers	work	 under	
special	 regulations,	 which	 are	 very	 special	 indeed.	 Ultimately,	 they	 [the	 firms-employers]	 are	
responsible	for	the	safety	of	their	dockers.	And	in	{name	of	terminal}	that	is	a	direct	responsibility	of	
each	firm.	The	employer	knows	that	he	is	responsible	and	that	he	must	also	have	his	own	prevention	
service	to	care	for	his	people.”	[EU1T2	inspector]		In	 this	 respect,	 there	 was	 far	 greater	 significance	 attached	 to	 the	 role	 of	 both	 external	 and	 internal	prevention	services	as	well	as	that	of	liaison	between	inspectors,	trade	union	representatives,	those	of	the	prevention	 services,	 employers	 and	 regulatory	 inspectors	 at	 several	 levels	 of	 organisation	 from	 the	terminal	workplaces	through	establishment	level	and	through	to	the	level	of	the	port	overall.	When	it	was	effective,	such	liaison	enabled	information	sharing	between	workers,	their	representatives	and	managers,	giving	feedback	on	OHS	issues,	with	the	input	of	specialist	advice	from	OHS	practitioners	and	inspectors	and	 a	 participative	 approach	 towards	 the	 dissemination	 and	monitoring	 of	 good	 practice.	 This	 clearly	translated	 into	 closer	 contact	 between	workers,	 their	 representatives	 and	 inspectors,	 contact	 that	was	generally	regarded	as	beneficial	in	improving	OHS	practices.	As	one	inspector	put	it:				
116		 	
	
“If	we	do	an	inspection,	we	ask	for	them	but	they	are	not	always	available.	There	is	shift-work	and	...	
Actually,	 it's	much	more	 contact	 to	upon	 their	 request,	 or	at	 the	 level	2	meetings	 (i.e.	 joint	 safety	
meetings	 in	 the	 port).	 Or	 at	 level	 1	 meetings	 also,	 that	 happens.	 I	 have	 told	 them:	 if	 you	 have	
something	you	need	me	to	check,	just	contact	me.	Mostly	it	is	thus	through	them	contacting	me.”		[EU1T2	inspector]		In	Asia	Pacific	 area	1,	 as	outlined	previously,	 the	 two	 terminals	were	 situated	 in	different	 jurisdictions	and	 subject	 to	 different	 laws	 and	 inspection	 authorities	 as	 a	 result.	 While	 there	 were	 some	 minor	differences	between	their	experiences	of	both	regulation	and	inspection,	overall	the	regulatory	influence	was	similar	to	that	in	other	advanced	economies.			Given	that	the	influence	of	regulatory	context	was	a	major	determinant	of	health	and	safety	practices	and	outcomes	 within	 the	 terminals	 it	 was	 of	 concern	 that	 representatives	 of	 the	 regulatory	 inspection	agencies	 and	 the	 inspectors	 themselves,	 who	 were	 interviewed	 in	 all	 of	 the	 countries	 studied	 drew	attention	 to	 limitations	of	 the	role	of	 inspection.	While	 the	nature	of	 the	qualitative	data	 thus	gathered	does	 not	 allow	 for	 systematic	 comparison,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 these	 limitations	 were	 essentially	 of	 two	kinds.	 In	 the	 advanced	 countries,	 while	 there	 were	 still	 strategies	 in	 place	 for	 the	 inspection	 of	 OHS	arrangements	 and	 their	 management	 in	 place	 and	 inspections	 often	 undertaken	 by	 inspectors	 with	experience	and	particular	expertise	in	relation	to	dock-work,	there	were	indications	of	varying	degrees	of	change,	both	with	regard	to	the	use	of	more	general	inspection	and	inspectors,	as	well	as	reduction	in	the	frequency	and	extent	of	inspection.	As	we	have	indicated,	this	was	particularly	evident	in	EU	area	2	but	it	was	also	mentioned	by	regulatory	inspectors	elsewhere.	The	second	kind	of	experience	was	found	in	the	lower-middle-income	country	in	the	study	where,	as	indicated	above,	the	inspectors	themselves	did	not	engage	with	 the	OHS	management	arrangements	 in	place	 in	 the	 terminals	because	 they	 felt	 them	to	be	beyond	the	scope	of	the	prescriptive	regulation	that	they	were	charged	with	enforcing.			Finally,	one	of	the	key	differences	between	approaches	advocated	by	the	terminal	companies	at	corporate	level,	and	which	also	characterises	the	features	of	voluntary	standards	on	OHS	management	generally,	is	the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 adopt	 a	 behaviour	 orientated	 approach	 and,	 relatedly,	 the	 limited	 extent	 to	which	they	provide	for	the	institutional	representation	of	workers’	interests	within	this	approach.	In	this	they	differ	markedly	 from	 the	 regulatory	 requirements	 on	 systematic	 approaches	 to	OHS	management	that	apply	in	the	advanced	market	economies	in	which	most	of	the	terminals	we	studied	were	situated,	as	well	as	from	global	standards	in	the	form	of	ILO	Conventions	and	its	guidance	on	OHS	management.	In	the	report	of	the	previous	study	we	noted	that,	according	to	the	ILO:			
“The	ILO	guidelines	are	quite	clear	that	the	occupational	safety	and	health	management	system	will	
not	 function	 properly	without	 the	 existence	 of	 effective	 social	 dialogue,	whether	 in	 the	 context	 of	
joint	 safety	 and	 health	 committees	 or	 other	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 collective	 bargaining	
arrangements.	Workers	and	 their	 representatives	 should	be	given	 the	opportunity,	 through	direct	
involvement	and	consultation,	to	fully	participate	in	the	management	of	OHS	in	the	organization.”		We	have	shown	in	the	present	study	that	such	dialogue	is	supported	by	specific	regulatory	requirements	and	 the	 wider	 contexts	 in	 which	 the	 ‘health	 and	 safety	 system’	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 advanced	 market	economies	in	the	study.	This	is	a	significant	determinant	of	both	the	character	and	outcomes	of	practices	within	 the	 terminals.	 In	 this,	 the	 role	 of	 labour	 relations	 is	 important	 and	 it	 is	 to	 this	 contextual	determinant	of	OHS	activities	and	outcomes	within	the	terminals	that	we	turn	to	next.			
6.3 Labour	relations	histories	and	their	influences	on	current	practice	In	 the	 previous	 study	 we	 suggested	 that	 one	 of	 the	 key	 differences	 we	 found	 between	 terminals	 in	advanced	market	 economies	 and	 those	 in	 lower	 income	 countries	was	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 arrangements	they	made	 for	 representing	 workers’	 interests	 in	 health	 and	 safety.	We	 discussed	 the	 nature	 of	 these	arrangements,	 the	 contribution	 they	 made	 to	 improving	 health	 and	 safety,	 the	 barriers	 to	 their	development	we	had	identified	and	some	of	the	consequences	for	effective	health	and	safety	management	
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that	 resulted	 from	 this	under-development	or	 absence.	 In	 keeping	with	 the	key	 findings	of	 research	 in	other	sectors,	we	found	that	where	arrangements	to	represent	and	consult	with	workers	were	included	in	the	systems	for	managing	health	and	safety	at	the	terminals	and	genuinely	supported	by	managers,	and	where	 workers	 representatives	 were	 properly	 trained	 and	 given	 sufficient	 facility	 time	 to	 undertake	representational	functions,	the	consensus	among	our	interviewees	was	that	this	contributed	significantly	to	the	effective	operation	of	the	systems	in	place	for	managing	health	and	safety.	They	were	further	able	to	contribute	an	 independent	voice	 for	workers’	concerns,	bringing	a	different	perspective	on	the	work	environment	to	the	attention	of	managers,	and	to	represent	workers’	interests	when	there	was	conflict	on	health	and	safety	matters.	Here	again,	these	findings	were	no	more	than	those	that	would	be	anticipated	from	 reading	 the	 research	 literature	 on	 worker	 representation	 in	 other	 sectors,	 which	 generally	concludes	 that	arrangements	 for	managing	OHS	are	more	effective	when	they	 include	those	 for	worker	representation	 and	 consultation,	 which	 in	 turn	 are	 supported	 by	 regulatory	 provisions,	 management	commitment	and	appropriately	trained	and	informed	participants.			We	have	tried	to	explore	these	effects	further	by	examining	the	extent	of	representation	and	consultation	more	 empirically	 and	 considering	 its	 association	with	measures	 of	 good	management	 practice	 in	OHS.	Among	respondents	working	 in	GNT-run	terminals,	 those	who	reported	they	have	no	health	and	safety	representative	or	not	having	easy	access	to	such	a	representative	had	significantly	higher	levels	of	poor	safety	outcomes,	poor	health	outcomes	and	poor	working	conditions	than	those	who	reported	having	a	health	and	safety	representative17.	Comparing	those	reporting	having	no	health	and	safety	committee	or	not	knowing	if	there	was	a	health	and	safety	committee	with	those	reporting	having	a	health	and	safety	committee	showed	a	similar	pattern,	as	 is	demonstrated	by	the	results	 for	Asia	Pacific	Area	2	shown	in	(Figure	6.2).			
Figure	6.2:	Levels	of	poor	health	and	safety	outcomes	and	working	conditions	by	arrangements	for	
representation	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2	
		These	quantitative	findings	are	entirely	in	keeping	with	the	findings	from	the	interviews	conducted	in	the	previous	study,	and	are	further	corroborated	by	interviews	in	the	present	study.	Both	sets	of	interviews	with	workers	 indicated	 the	 importance	 the	 role	 of	 representation	 and	 consultation	 in	 addressing	 their	concerns	 on	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 their	workplaces.	Moreover,	 as	we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 opportunity	 for	such	representation	and	consultation	to	occur	was	further	affected	by	the	nature	of	the	arrangements	for	employment	 at	 the	 terminals	 studied,	 with	 a	 major	 difference	 between	 the	 experience	 of	 directly	employed	workers	and	those	who	were	employed	by	contractors,	for	whom	access	to	elected	health	and	safety	representatives	or	ability	to	raise	matters	at	joint	health	and	safety	committees	was	minimal.																																																																						
17 2.23 compared with 1.67, F(1, 1395)=76.32, p<0.0001); 4.92 compared with 3.50, F(1, 1315)=148.39, p<0.0001); 6.26 
compared with 4.12, F(1, 1303)=146.90, p<0.0001) respectively. 
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However,	 like	the	effectiveness	of	regulation	and	regulatory	 inspection,	effective	worker	representation	and	 consultation	on	health	and	 safety	 conditions	do	not	occur	 in	 a	 vacuum	and	 the	 supportive	 context	with	which	 their	effectiveness	 is	associated	 is	 the	result	of	a	combination	of	 factors	 that	go	beyond	the	mere	provision	for	consultation	at	the	workplace.	This	was	amply	illustrated	in	the	terminals	we	studied,	where	we	demonstrated	 in	both	 this	and	 the	previous	 study	 that	measures	 for	worker	 consultation	on	health	 and	 safety	matters	were	 best	 developed	 in	 the	 terminals	 in	 those	 countries	 in	which	 organised	labour	continued	to	play	a	significant	role	in	determining	pay	and	conditions	of	work	more	generally,	and	where	they	were	supported	in	so	doing	by	a	regulatory	framework,	collective	bargaining	agreements	and	the	wider	economic	and	labour	relations	contexts	in	which	their	activities	were	embedded.		
	A	 brief	 digression	 into	 the	 history	 of	 port	 labour	 in	 the	 countries	 we	 studied	 confirms	 this.	 Capital	intensified	 cargo	 handling	 activities	 that	 are	 typified	 by	 the	 development	 of	 container	 terminals	 have	come	 about	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 a	 constellation	 of	 other	 reforms	 in	 the	 ownership,	 organisation	 and	operation	 of	 ports	 that	 both	 drive,	 and	 have	 been	 driven	 by,	 the	 features	 of	 economic	 globalisation	 to	which	both	capital	and	states	have	subscribed	during	the	past	several	decades.	Generally,	efficiencies	thus	achieved	 in	oiling	 the	wheels	of	global	 trade	have	been	made	possible	at	 the	expense	of	 the	number	of	workers	employed	in	these	activities,	which	have	steadily	reduced	at	the	same	time	as	the	mechanisation	characteristic	of	containerisation	has	 increased.	But	the	constellations	of	change	that	are	emblematic	of	these	developments	worldwide	have	not	 taken	place	 in	exactly	 the	 same	ways,	 times	or	with	 the	 same	results	in	every	port	in	every	country	in	which	they	have	applied.	The	features	of	context	such	as	the	ones	we	 have	 so	 far	 considered	 in	 this	 Chapter,	 as	well	 as	 others	 such	 as	 the	 relative	 power	 of	 labour,	 the	political	complexion	of	 the	state	at	 the	time	of	change,	questions	of	economic	dependencies,	 the	human	resource	strategies	of	global	companies	and	so	on,	have	influenced	their	outcomes.	The	broad	result	is	a	range	 of	 arrangements	 in	which	 container	 terminals	 have	 different	 degrees	 of	 independence	 from	 the	influence	 of	 the	 ports	 in	 which	 they	 are	 situated	 and	 a	 range	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 relationship	 with	organised	 labour,	 the	 latter	 applying	 even	 when	 the	 terminals	 have	 been	 purposefully	 constructed	 in	entirely	new	and	private	sites	outside	the	influence	of	the	structures	and	procedures	of	established	ports.	This	variation	was	evident	in	the	range	of	terminals	we	studied,	with	different	patterns	of	labour	relations	evident	between	countries	and	even	between	terminals	within	countries.			Among	the	advanced	market	economies	in	which	the	terminals	were	situated,	it	was	clearly	the	case	that	trade	unions	had	been	a	major	historical	presence	in	each	of	the	ports	in	which	the	terminals	we	studied	were	situated.	The	different	directions	that	port	development	has	taken	in	these	countries	help	to	explain	some	 of	 the	 current	 differences	 in	 the	 position	 and	 influence	 of	 trade	 unions	 on	 matters	 of	 labour	relations	within	 the	 terminals,	 including	 those	 on	 health	 and	 safety.	 For	 example,	 in	 Europe	 area	 2,	 a	period	of	bitterly	 fought	 industrial	disputes	resulting	 in	major	defeats	 for	organised	 labour	 that	helped	define	the	future	role	of	trade	unions	in	the	economy	overall,	has	resulted	in	a	disparate	labour	relations	situation	in	the	country’s	ports.	In	some,	such	as	those	operated	by	the	GNTs,	while	workforce	numbers	had	 reduced	 substantially	 and	 with	 them,	 union	 power,	 the	 trade	 unions	 had	 managed	 to	 negotiate	collective	bargaining	agreements	that	helped	determine	the	pay	and	conditions	of	work	for	the	remaining	labour	force.	They	continued	to	be	recognised	by	their	employers	for	the	purpose	of	collective	bargaining	and	were	the	principal	source	of	representation	for	employees,	including	on	matters	of	health	and	safety.	In	 contrast	 in	 the	 terminal	managed	by	 the	national	 operator,	 terminal	 labour	was	 contracted	 out	 and	union	representation	was	relatively	weak.		Very	differently,	 in	Europe	area	1,	 in	one	of	 the	GNT-operated	terminals,	as	described	 in	Chapter	3,	 the	vestiges	 of	 the	 dock	 labour	 scheme	 prior	 to	 containerisation	 were	 still	 in	 evidence.	While	 there	 were	fewer	workers	 currently	 than	previously,	overall	 the	 former	 schemes	had	been	successfully	adapted	 to	the	demands	of	commercialisation.	Organised	labour	retained	a	strong	position	in	the	organisation	of	the	port	overall	as	well	as	in	the	terminal	we	studied.	It	was	helped	by	the	regulatory	framework	governing	the	work	at	the	terminals	and	retained	a	strong	presence	in	all	the	bipartite	and	tripartite	structures	and	processes	for	the	participative	management	of	health	and	safety	that	were	present	 in	both	the	terminal	and	the	wider	port.	In	the	second	terminal	in	this	area,	essentially	the	same	arrangements	had	also	been	maintained,	albeit	on	a	much	smaller	scale	commensurate	with	the	smaller	size	of	both	the	terminal	we	studied	and	the	port	in	which	it	was	situated.	There	were	differences	in	detail	in	the	precise	nature	of	the	
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arrangements	 in	 the	 two	 ports,	 but	 in	 as	 far	 as	 they	 affected	 the	 representation	 and	 consultation	 of	workers	on	health	and	safety	they	resulted	in	the	same	overall	effect	and	trade	union	representation	on	health	and	safety	was	well-integrated	into	all	 the	bipartite	and	tripartite	structures	within	the	port	and	terminal,	enabling	the	statutory	measures	on	worker	representation	on	health	and	safety	to	be	more	or	less	appropriately	implemented.			The	situation	 in	 the	advanced	economy	 in	Asia	Pacific	area	1	contained	elements	of	both	 the	European	experiences	–	the	current	position	in	the	terminals	was	the	result	of	previous	bitterly	contested	and	high	profile	disputes.	Following	these,	the	position	of	the	trade	unions	in	relation	to	the	organisation	of	work	in	 the	 ports	 in	 which	 the	 terminals	 were	 situated,	 as	 well	 as	 within	 the	 terminals	 themselves,	 had	undergone	considerable	changes.	This	said,	as	described	in	Chapter	3,	the	workforce	in	both	the	terminals	had	remained	highly	unionised	and	the	union	had	retained	significant	influence	on	human	resource	issues	concerning	the	employment	and	roles	of	workers.	Because	the	terminals	were	 located	 in	different	state	jurisdictions,	until	recently	the	statutory	measures	applying	to	worker	representation	to	which	they	were	subject	had	been	slightly	different,	which	resulted	in	slightly	different	approaches	being	applied	in	each	terminal.	 However,	 at	 the	 time	 the	 study	 was	 undertaken,	 these	 measures	 had	 been	 harmonised	 and	appropriate	changes	were	in	the	process	of	being	introduced	within	the	terminals.	Relations	between	the	trade	unions	at	the	terminals	and	managers	remained	hostile	and	it	was	in	this	climate	of	labour	relations	that	the	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	had	been	made.	Suspicion	felt	towards	the	behaviour-based	management	 arrangements	 implemented	 at	 the	 terminals	was	 strongly	 evident	 in	 the	 interviews	with	workers	and	their	representatives:			
“[National	1]	were	quite	open	and	they	said,	"here's	a	bloke	from	Dupont	and	he's	going	to	roll	out	a	
new	 safety	 system".	 Relatively	 obvious	 from	 that	 point	 on	what	 the	 score	 is	 -	 rewards,	 reporting,	
giving	people	up	in	reporting,	and	them	sort	of	things.	Right	from	the	very	word	go	-...	 Just	took	a	
position	that	if	there	is	any	rewards,	we	burn	them.	We	will	rip	them	up,	collectively,	and	no	one	will	
report,	except	to	the	delegate,	and	the	delegate	will	put	in	every	report,	and	you	can	effectively	wipe	
out	the	capacity.”	[Union	leader,	AP1]		
“…a	good	 investigation	will	 go	underneath	 these	 things	 to	 see	why	 there	might	be	a	 contributing	
factor	…	 surfaces,	 there’s	 the	 shift	work	 fatigue	…	generally	 I	 think	 that	most	 of	 the	 contributing	
factors	are	identified	I	don’t	think	generally	that	they’re	all	addressed	properly	…	the	ones	that	are	
cheaper	to	address	they	get	done.	The	ones	that	you	can	attribute	blame	and	people	the	ones	that	
are	involved	in	accidents	they’re	the	ones	retrained	formal	re-training	…	frankly	we	got	a	HR	that	
are	very	punitive	and	 it	 seems	 they	want	 to	build	up	warning	 letters	on	people’s	 files	 so	 they	 can	
dismiss	as	many	people	as	possible	so	they	don’t	have	to	pay	redundancy	payments…”	[Safety	facilitator	and	delegate	AP1T1]		
Interviewer:	But	would	an	investigation	get	at	that	[underlying	reasons	for	behaviour]	or	would	it	
stop	at	that	behaviour?	
Respondent:	Look,	I	don’t	have	too	much	faith	in	investigations,	because	I’ve	seen	too	many	things.	I	
think	the	investigator	will	come	up	with	the	reason	and	then	try	and	justify	it,	you	know,	probably	
the	reverse	way	of	something,	the	way	it	should	be,	you	know,	but	I	don’t	think	it’s	as	objective	as	it	
should	be	let’s	say.	[Electrician	and	deputy	delegate	AP1T1]		This	may	reflect	the	distrust	that	workers’	representatives	held	for	managerial	initiatives	more	generally,	which	 was	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 long-standing	 climate	 of	 poor	 labour	 relations	 evident	 within	 the	terminals.	Despite	(or	perhaps	because	of)	this	however,	occupational	health	and	safety	matters	played	a	prominent	role	in	trade	union	activities	and	there	was	significant	involvement	of	union	representatives	at	all	levels	of	joint	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	within	the	terminals.	Arguably,	our	data	show	they	were	 effective	 in	 protecting	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 interests	 of	 workers	 in	 a	 hostile	 labour	 relations	climate.		
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The	situation	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals	was	in	stark	contrast	to	that	outlined	for	the	terminals	in	advanced	 market	 economies.	 In	 all	 the	 terminals	 in	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2,	 the	 trade	 union	 position	 was	considerably	weaker	than	that	in	any	of	the	unionised	terminals	in	Europe	or	Asia	Pacific	area	1.	In	many	of	these	terminals	the	nationally	acknowledged	dockworkers	trade	union	was	not	recognised	and	there	was	 no	 Collective	 Bargain	 Agreement	 in	 place.	 Even	 where	 the	 union	 had	 been	 recognised,	 and	 a	Collective	Bargaining	Agreement	was	in	place,	according	to	the	trade	union	representatives	and	workers	interviewed	 in	 both	 this	 and	 the	 previous	 study,	 this	 was	 no	 guarantee	 that	 its	 measures	 concerning	health	and	safety	matters	were	implemented	in	ways	that	they	found	satisfactory.	Indeed,	in	the	one	case,	identified	in	the	previous	study,	of	a	terminal	in	which	such	an	agreement	was	in	place	at	the	time	of	the	fieldwork,	trade	union	representatives	for	the	terminal	were	able	to	furnish	the	study	with	a	portfolio	of	documented	complaints	concerning	health	and	safety	matters	that	had	not	been	addressed.	At	the	time	of	the	present	study,	this	was	still	the	case,	but	the	Collective	Bargaining	Agreement	had	lapsed	and	a	new	one	 was	 not	 yet	 agreed.	 In	 most	 of	 these	 terminals	 there	 were	 no	 arrangements	 in	 place	 to	 enable	representation	of	workers’	interests	on	health	and	safety	through	elected	representatives	with	time	and	support	 facilities	 to	 perform	 this	 function.	 Even	where	 health	 and	 safety	 committees	 had	 a	 seat	 at	 the	table	for	workers	and/or	their	representatives,	generally	they	were	inconsistent,	which	often	meant	that	if	any	workers	attended	at	all,	they	were	likely	to	be	different	persons	at	each	meeting	because	they	were	given	 no	 facility	 or	 time	 to	 represent	 their	 colleagues.	 Their	 availability	 depended	 on	 down	 times	 and	there	was	 little	 possibility	 to	 use	 regular	 attendance	 at	meetings	 to	 raise	 and	 follow	 through	 concerns	about	health	and	safety.			As	we	saw	previously,	there	was	also	no	recognised	representation	on	health	and	safety	matters	among	the	 contract	workers	 that	made	 up	 the	majority	 of	 the	workers	 in	 these	 terminals.	Where	 individuals	belonged	 to	 trade	unions	and	were	active	 in	 them,	 they	were	aware	of	 their	vulnerability	 to	what	 they	regarded	as	victimisation	by	management.	As	our	data	show,	in	these	scenarios	worker	representation	on	health	and	safety	matters	made	little	impact	on	the	operation	of	arrangements	for	its	management.	At	the	same	 time,	 it	was	 in	 these	workplaces	where	workers	 experienced	 the	 poorest	working	 environments	and	 the	 greatest	 incidence	 of	 self-reported	 harm.	 It	 was	 also	 where	 they	 felt	 least	 supported	 by	 the	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	safety	conditions	at	their	workplace.			What	 is	 important	 is	 that	 the	 wider	 labour	 relations	 situation	 affected	 not	 only	 the	 existence	 of	arrangements	for	worker	representation	and	consultation	on	health	and	safety	in	the	terminals,	but	also	the	quality	of	their	operation.	Moreover	it	was	the	national	contexts	in	which	the	terminals	were	situated	that	were	the	main	determinant	of	both	these	matters.	There	was	no	evidence	in	the	study	that	either	the	corporate	 governance	policies	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 or	 the	management	 strategies	 of	 the	 companies	 to	implement	 and	operate	 them	would	have	 included	 them	 in	 their	provision	 for	health	 and	 safety	 at	 the	terminals	in	the	absence	of	these	contextual	influences.	Indeed,	if	the	experience	of	the	terminals	in	Asia	Pacific	 area	 2	 is	 taken	 into	 account,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 suggestion	 that	 without	 such	 a	 contextual	influence,	there	was	no	place	for	such	arrangements	within	corporate	management	strategies,	and	a	more	unilateral,	top-down	approach	to	the	engagement	of	workers	on	health	and	safety	matters	was	preferred.		
	
6.4	 Taking	account	of	context	Following	 the	 lead	 of	 recent	 work	 highlighting	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 wider	 context	 in	 determining	workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 practice,	 this	 Chapter	 sought	 to	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	economic,	 regulatory	 and	 labour	 relations	 contexts	 on	 the	 approaches	 taken	 by	 terminal	 operating	companies	 to	 managing	 safety,	 health	 and	 welfare	 and	 workers’	 consequent	 experiences	 of	 those	approaches	and	their	outcomes.			Our	findings	make	it	clear	that	elements	of	all	three	of	these	contextual	determinants	have	an	important	impact	not	only	on	the	arrangements	that	terminal	operators	make	to	organise	work	and	manage	health,	safety	 and	 welfare	 –	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 whether	 arrangements,	 are	 in	 place	 at	 all	 –	 but	 also	 their	effectiveness	 and	 value	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 workers.	 In	 short,	 the	 prevailing	 economic,	regulatory	 and	 labour	 relations	 contexts	 associated	 with	 where	 terminals	 are	 situated	 moderate	 the	
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approach	the	organisations	operating	 those	 terminals	 take	 to	OHS	management,	and	so	also	 the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	dock	workers.	Our	analysis	clearly	shows	that	where	these	contexts	provide	only	a	weak	influence	on	the	autonomy	of	company	OHS	practice,	that	is	where	OHS,	in	the	words	of	some	GNTs,	is	 ‘loosely	 regulated’,	 workers	 report	more	 negative	 experiences	 of	 OHS	 than	 where	 these	 factors	 are	more	 strongly	 in	 evidence.	 For	 example,	 where	 outsourcing	 of	 labour	 is	 the	 economic	 ‘norm’,	 where	regulatory	 frameworks	 and	enforcement	practices	 are	not	 strong,	 and	where	 labour	 relations	histories	have	 resulted	 in	 a	 weaker	 voice	 for	 labour,	 workers’	 experiences	 of	 health,	 safety	 and	 welfare	arrangements	are	generally	poorer	than	in	contexts	where	the	development	and	influence	of	such	factors	are	stronger.	And	further,	where	these	combine	with	weaker	national	external	supports	for	OHS	generally	(in	 terms,	 for	 example,	 of	 compensation,	 insurance	 and	 welfare	 systems)	 in	 the	 ‘perfect	 storm’,	 then	workers’	 experiences	 are	 poorest.	 Such	 findings	 are	 in	 accord	 with	 those	 of	 socio-legal	 scholars	 who	argue	that	the	institutional	(including	regulatory)	contexts	within	which	modern	global	business	operates	are	important	determinants	of	both	management	practices	and	worker	welfare	(Short	and	Toffel,	2010).	As	Locke	et	al.	(2013),	and	other	writers	make	clear,	such	contexts	are	critical	in	initiatives	to	influence	the	 extent	 of	 compliance	 with	 labour	 standards	 (see	 also;	 Riisgaard	 and	 Hammer,	 2011;	 Locke	 et	 al.,	2007).		
 We	have	tried	to	capture	the	essence	of	this	influence	of	context	on	experience	by	plotting	a	measure	of	workers’	OHS	experiences	against	a	measure	of	context.	To	do	this,	for	each	case	study	terminal	we	first	summed	our	composite	measures	of	workers’	experiences	of	safety	outcomes,	health	outcomes,	working	conditions	and	OHS	management	arrangements	(derived	in	Chapter	4).	We	then	summed	four	measures	of	context	for	each	terminal.	These	were:	the	percentage	of	the	workforce	that	was	not	represented	by	an	
independent	union;	the	percentage	of	the	workforce	that	was	indirectly	employed;	a	comparative	estimate	of	the	degree	of	devolution	of	port	ownership	along	a	‘continuum’	from	fully	privatised	to	wholly	in	public	ownership,	 with	 the	 former	 scoring	 highest;	 and	 a	 further	 comparative	 estimate	 of	 the	 maturity	 of	national	 OHS	 governance	 systems,	 including	 the	 presence	 of	 prevention	 services,	 again	 along	 a	‘continuum’	 with	 higher	 scores	 indicating	 greater	 immaturity.	 This	 gave	 composite	 ‘performance’	 and	‘context’	scores	for	each	terminal.	Finally,	scores	on	both	these	measures	were	created	for	each	of	the	four	areas	of	 the	study	by	averaging	 their	 respective	 terminal	 scores.	This	 is,	necessarily,	 a	 crude	approach,	with	the	context	measure	providing	a	very	broad	approximation	of	 the	context	 in	which	our	case	study	terminals	were	operating.	Nevertheless,	though	the	results	must	be	approached	with	appropriate	caution,	we	think	the	graphical	description	of	our	findings	that	it	provides	is	helpful	(Figure	6.3).	It	suggests	that	the	poorest	conditions	are	experienced	in	terminals	in	Asia	Pacific	area	2.	Those	in	Asia	Pacific	area	1	and	Europe	 areas	 1	 and	 2	 are	 broadly	 similar.	 The	 important	 message,	 however,	 is	 not	 how	 terminals	compare	 but	 rather	 the	 impact	 of	 context	 –	 suggesting	 that,	 without	 a	 strong	 and	 effectively	 enforced	legislative	 steer	 and	 economic	 and	 labour	 relations	 conditions	 in	which	 the	 balance	 of	 power	between	capital	 and	 labour	 approaches	 equality,	 terminal	 operating	 companies	will	 tend	 to	 favour	 productivity	over	 effective	 safety	 and,	 in	 particular	 health	 and	 welfare,	 management.	 Such	 organisations	 can	 put	effective	 strategies	 in	place,	 but	 they	generally	only	do	 so	under	 certain	 conditions.	 Furthermore,	 even	where	conditions	are	at	their	most	conducive,	there	is	still	significant	scope	for	improvement,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	management	of	workers’	health	and	welfare,	alongside	their	safety,	as	well	as	in	terms	of	the	way	OHS	outcomes	and	performance	are	measured.	
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Figure	6.3:	Context	and	performance	by	terminal	
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7.	Conclusions		
	This	study	of	arrangements	for	the	governance	and	management	of	health,	safety	and	welfare	at	work	in	a	globalised	 industry	has	explored	the	extent	of	 the	protection	of	workers’	health	and	safety	and	support	for	 their	welfare	 in	container	 terminals	operated	by	several	companies	with	global	 terminal	operations	(GNTs)	 as	 well	 as	 two	 others	 with	 national	 terminal	 operating	 interests.	 It	 used	 a	 mixed-methods	approach	to	data	collection	and	analysis	in	which	data	from	respondents	to	a	questionnaire-based	survey	were	 analysed	 alongside	 documentary	 evidence	 and	 detailed	 interviews	 with	 workers,	 their	representatives,	managers	 and	 other	 key	 informants.	 In	 this	 respect	 it	 built	 on	 an	 earlier	 study	which	focused	on	many	of	the	same	terminals	as	those	included	in	the	present	study	(Walters	and	Wadsworth,	2012).	The	key	difference	between	the	two	studies	is	in	nature	and	extent	of	the	evidence	they	obtained	and	analysed.	The	first	study	was	based	on	interviews	with	managers,	workers	and	their	representatives	in	the	terminals	and	on	information	obtained	from	union	officials	globally.	It	concerned	the	perceptions	of	a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 key	 informants	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 container	 terminals	 and	 of	 the	arrangements	made	by	companies	to	manage	this	experience.	The	present	study	included	interviews	with	key	informants	and	sought	evidence	of	occupational	health	and	safety	and	the	arrangements	to	manage	it,	but	it	has	done	so	in	addition	by	drawing	on	the	analysis	of	a	survey	of	nearly	two	thousand	workers	in	container	 terminals	 globally.	 This	 has	 added	 substantial	 quantitative	 power	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	evidence	on	the	experience	of	occupational	health	and	safety	and	the	arrangements	for	its	management.			The	survey	was	administered	 to	workers	 in	each	of	 the	 terminals	 included	 in	 the	 study	and	concerned	their	 experiences	 of	 safety,	 health	 and	 welfare	 outcomes,	 OHS	 management	 arrangements,	 work	organisation	 and	working	 conditions.	Managers	 in	 health	 and	 safety	 critical	 roles	were	 interviewed	 in	these	terminals,	as	were	a	selection	of	workers	and	(where	they	were	present)	their	representatives.	At	corporate	 level,	 documentation	 on	 company	 arrangements	 and	 outcomes	 for	 health	 and	 safety	 was	obtained	 and	 key	 informants	 interviewed	 concerning	 corporate	 governance	 and	 management	 of	 OHS.	Representatives	of	regulatory	inspectorates	in	each	of	the	countries	in	which	the	terminals	studied	were	located,	 along	with	 other	 key	 informants	 such	 as	 trade	 union	 officials,	were	 interviewed	 to	 enable	 the	investigation	to	be	set	within	wider	the	national	and	global	contexts	framed	by	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	systems	and	practices	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	global	corporate	management	strategies	of	terminal	operators	on	the	other.	Analysis	of	the	large	quantity	of	data	collected	was	undertaken	using	appropriate	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods.	The	present	Chapter	 summarises	 the	 findings	of	 this	analysis	and	our	conclusions	concerning	its	implications.			
7.1 The	aims	of	the	study	and	the	questions	addressed	The	study	addressed	five	main	research	questions.	As	stated	in	the	Introduction,	they	were:			
• How	and	to	what	extent	do	the	business	strategies	and	management	policies	of	major	global	and	national	container	terminal	operators	take	account	of	the	occupational	health	and	safety	(OHS)	of	workers	involved	in	the	transfer	of	containers?		
• What	 are	 their	 specific	 strategies	 for	 addressing	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 in	 container	terminals	and	how	effective	are	they?		
• What	are	dockworkers’	OHS	experiences	of	these	strategies?		
• How	 do	 these	 experiences	 compare	 in	 GNT	 terminals	 situated	 in	 different	 countries	 and	 in	terminals	that	are	operated	by	large	national	operators?			
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• What	determines	 the	 features	of	 the	health	and	safety	arrangements	 in	place	 in	 these	different	situations	 and	what	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 for	 good	 practice	 in	 improving	 the	 health	 and	safety	experience	for	workers	in	container	terminals	globally?			In	 summary,	 key	points	 on	 the	health	 and	 safety	 experiences	 of	workers	 globally	 included:	 the	 finding	that	70	per	cent	of	the	respondents	to	the	survey	felt	their	safety	was	at	high	risk,	40	per	cent	felt	these	risks	were	 ineffectively	managed	 and	 one	 third	 reported	 they	 had	 experienced	 some	 kind	 of	 injury	 at	work	 in	 the	previous	year.	Slightly	 fewer	respondents	 felt	 they	were	at	high	risk	of	experiencing	work-related	harm	to	their	health	(60	per	cent),	slightly	more	(48	per	cent)	felt	these	risks	were	ineffectively	managed,	 and	 levels	 of	 respondents	 reporting	 stress,	 mental	 fatigue	 and	 work-related	 illnesses	 were	especially	high	(60	per	cent	65	per	cent	and	41	per	cent	respectively).	Overall	the	survey	findings	show	that	 workers	 experience	 a	 higher	 incidence	 of	 harm	 to	 safety	 and	 health	 than	 recorded	 by	 company	reporting	 procedures,	 that	 many	 of	 the	 more	 commonly	 experienced	 effects	 of	 the	 work	 involved	 in	terminal	operations	on	workers’	health	are	not	addressed	adequately	by	the	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	management	and	that	the	provisions	made	for	workers’	welfare	are	limited	and	do	not	adequately	provide	 for	workers’	 needs.	 These	 findings	were	 corroborated	 by	 data	 from	 interviews	where	worker	participants	expressed	concerns	about	their	safety,	health	and	welfare	and	suggested	that	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	safety	at	their	workplaces	only	partially	addressed	their	concerns.	Comparisons	with	 survey	data	 from	other	 sources	 suggest	 that	 respondents’	 experiences	were	 comparatively	worse	than	 the	 average	 elsewhere.	 There	was	 a	 strong	 association	 between	 these	 negative	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	effects	and	measures	of	poor	work	organisation,	high	work	intensity	and	poor	OHS	management	arrangements.	These	results	were	not	uniform	across	all	jobs,	employment	arrangements	or	geographical	locations	and	the	survey	clearly	identified	a	sub-group	of	respondents	as	being	at	particular	risk.	These	were	found	among	the	indirectly	employed	workers	doing	jobs	combining	quayside	and	driving	work	in	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals.			These	 findings	help	 to	 inform	the	study’s	 conclusions	 in	 relation	 to	 the	research	questions	 it	 set	out	 to	address,	as	briefly	outlined	in	the	following	sections.		
	
7.2 Business	and	management	policies	and	occupational	health	and	safety	
arrangements	in	container	terminals	While	 terminal	 operating	 companies	 have	 strategies	 in	 place	 for	 the	 governance	 and	 management	 of	health,	safety	and	welfare,	workers	and	their	representatives	perceived	these	arrangements	only	partially	addressing	their	experience	of	the	effects	of	their	work	upon	their	health,	safety	and	welfare.	Most	of	the	terminal	operating	companies	had	corporate	strategies	 for	zero	harm	OHS	arrangements	 in	place.	They	were	 especially	 evident	 among	 the	 larger	 GNT	 operators	 and	 they	 were	 disseminated	 across	 all	 their	terminals.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 global	 approaches	 to	 OHS	 governance	 and	 management	 were	accommodated	within	wider	business	and	management	priorities	 that	strongly	emphasised	operational	arrangements	 for	 productivity	 and	 cost	 efficiencies	 in	 the	 highly	 competitive	 business	 of	 terminal	operation.	As	is	clear	from	the	detailed	accounts	given	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	the	arrangements	for	OHS	did	not	fully	engage	with	the	consequences	of	these	wider	strategies	for	the	work	environment	experienced	by	workers.	This	was	especially	so	for	health,	safety	and	welfare	consequences	arising	from	the	structure	and	organisation	of	work	and	employment,	and	was	evident	in	the	experiences	of	the	respondents	to	the	survey	and	in	the	detailed	accounts	given	by	the	workers	and	their	representatives	who	participated	in	interviews.	It	was	seen,	for	example,	in	these	experiences	in	relation	to	staffing	levels,	shift	patterns,	work	intensity,	 rest	 breaks	 and	welfare	 facilities,	 all	 of	which	were	perceived	by	workers	 to	have	 significant	consequences	for	their	health,	safety	and	welfare.	It	was	apparent	that	corporate	safety	strategies	largely	failed	to	address	a	range	of	occupational	health	and	welfare	issues	that	were	essentially	the	consequence	of	corporate	business	and	operational	practices	aimed	at	increasing	the	productivity	and	profitability	of	the	 terminals.	 These	 issues	 were	 among	 those	 that	 workers	 regarded	 as	 having	 an	 influence	 on	 their	health	and	welfare	as	well	as	on	their	safety,	but	they	lay	beyond	the	reach	of	corporate	approaches	that	were	largely	focused	on	achieving	behaviour	change	in	relation	to	safety.			
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This	 focus	 on	 behaviour-based	 safety	 strategies	 effectively	 limited	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 arrangements	derived	 from	 corporate	 zero	 harm	 strategies	 to	 a	 rather	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 what	 might	 be	considered	the	‘work	environment’	in	a	more	holistic	sense.	Despite	the	rhetoric	concerning	the	centrality	of	 a	 commitment	 to	 preventive	 health	 and	 safety	 in	 the	 core	 corporate	 business	 values	 and	 practices,	what	emerged	 in	the	organisations	we	studied	was	the	presence	of	an	understanding	of	OHS	which	did	not	 conflict	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 cost-efficiency,	 profit	 maximisation	 and	 competition	 adopted	 at	 the	corporate	level,	because	it	was	limited	to	a	focus	on	arrangements	for	the	governance	and	management	of	
safety	 at	 the	 terminals,	 and	 to	 a	 particular	 form	 of	 such	 governance	 in	which	 notions	 of	 developing	 a	‘safety	culture’	largely	through	behaviour	modification	strategies	aimed	at	workers	predominated.			
7.3 How	effective	were	the	strategies	for	addressing	health	and	safety	
management	in	container	terminals?		The	 consideration	 of	 the	 company	 data	 concerning	 safety	 outcomes	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 3	 shows	 a	mixed	 picture	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 performance	 but	 a	 generally	 improving	 trend	 is	 discernible.	 As	we	noted	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 this	 is	 a	 finding	 anticipated	 by	 some	 industry	 observers	who	 argue	 that	 the	increased	mechanisation	 in	dock-work,	 represented	by	container	 terminal	activities,	along	with	greater	attention	 to	 health	 and	 safety	 management	 by	 operating	 companies,	 together	 should	 result	 in	 an	improving	 trend	 in	 injuries	 and	 fatalities.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 study’s	 survey	 of	workers’	experiences	indicate	the	existence	of	considerably	higher	levels	of	work-related	harm	than	are	measured	by	company	data,	substantial	dissatisfaction	with	the	nature	and	operation	of	arrangements	for	managing	health	and	safety	and	an	equally	strong	sense	that	health	and	safety	effects	associated	with	the	structure,	organisation	and	pace	of	work	in	the	terminals	were	missed	by	the	systems	in	place	for	monitoring	health	and	safety	performance.			Assessment	of	the	effectiveness	of	corporate	strategies	for	the	governance	and	management	of	health	and	safety	in	the	container	terminals	needs	to	take	some	account	of	the	large	gap	between	these	two	views	of	the	 performance	 of	 these	 strategies	 and	 the	 arrangements	 they	 engendered.	 The	 survey	 data	 strongly	suggest	that	what	 is	measured	by	company	data	 is	only	one	very	narrow	indicator	of	OHS	performance	and	 the	effectiveness	of	 company	strategies.	Even	within	 this	measure	 there	are	 further	questions	 that	need	 to	 be	 asked	 concerning	 reliability	 since,	 as	 we	 point	 out	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 considerable	inconsistencies	in	the	available	data	indicate	a	preponderance	of	reporting	effects	which	warrant	caution	in	their	interpretation.			Seen	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 survey	 of	 workers’	 experiences,	 and	with	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	qualitative	 analysis	 of	 material	 from	 the	 detailed	 interviews	 with	 workers	 and	 their	 representatives	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	the	effectiveness	of	corporate	strategies	and	arrangements	for	safety,	health	and	
welfare	must	be	questioned,	especially	in	relation	to	workers’	experience	of	health	and	welfare.	It	seems	clear	 from	 these	 findings	 that	 the	 company	 arrangements	 documented	 in	 Chapter	 3	 only	 partially	addressed	 this	 experience.	Moreover,	 if	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 survey	 and	 interviews	with	workers	 and	their	 representatives	 are	 considered	 in	 the	 wider	 context	 of	 research	 concerning	 health	 and	 safety	consequences	of	 change	 in	 the	 structure	and	organisation	of	work	 in	other	 sectors,	 they	are	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	of	wider	 literature.	As	we	pointed	out	 in	 the	 Introduction	and	again	 in	Chapter	6,	 the	overwhelming	 evidence	 from	 research	 points	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 pattern	 of	 work	 structure,	organisation	and	pace	witnessed	in	the	container	terminals	is	consistent	with	that	shown	to	contribute	to	increases	in	poor	health	and	safety	outcomes.			In	 the	 Introduction	 we	 indicated	 that	 there	 are	 few	 robust	 studies	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 in	container	terminals.	This	is	mainly	because	the	unreliability	of	the	available	data	and	the	rapid	changes	that	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 ownership,	 structure,	 organisation	 and	 operation	 of	 container	 terminals	make	it	especially	hard	to	undertake	time	series	studies	with	reliable	data	that	enable	assessment	of	the	effects	of	change.	One	exception	 is	 the	work	of	Fabiano	et	al	 (2010)	 in	which	a	detailed	study	of	 injury	data	that	was	unusually	available	from	one	port	during	a	period	of	growth	in	containerisation	showed	a	
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relationship	 between	 increases	 in	 the	 frequency	 of	 incidents	 of	 injuries	 and	 that	 of	 change	 in	 work	organisation	and	workforce	characteristics.		There	 is	 a	 clear	 need	 for	 similar	 further	 detailed	 research	 to	 monitor	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes	 in	container	terminals	more	accurately.	However,	the	findings	of	the	present	study	are	sufficient	to	suggest	that	 arrangements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	management	 should	 take	 a	more	 holistic	 account	 of	workers’	experiences.	 They	 further	 suggest	 that	 companies	might	 find	 it	 helpful	 to	make	 arrangements	 to	 listen	and	respond	more	effectively	to	workers’	voice.	One	of	the	weakest	elements	of	current	arrangements	for	health	and	safety	management	that	was	identified	in	the	present	research	concerns	the	extent	to	which	the	systems	in	place	could	be	said	to	be	truly	participative	and	facilitate	representation	and	consultation	with	workers	concerning	health	and	safety	matters.			Such	arrangements	have	been	shown	by	research	studies	from	many	countries	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	health	and	safety	outcomes	(see	Walters	et	al.	(2012)	for	a	recent	review	of	this	literature).	However,	the	worker	 survey	 in	 the	 present	 study	 confirmed	 the	 poor	 development	 of	 arrangements	 for	 the	representation	 and	 consultation	 of	 workers	 on	 health	 and	 safety.	 Our	 survey	 indicated	 that	 many	respondents	felt	that	OHS	arrangements	failed	to	provide	adequately	for	their	voice	to	be	heard,	with	70	per	cent	of	 respondents	globally	having	no	health	and	safety	 representative	or	difficulty	accessing	one.	Both	 the	 survey	 and	 interviews	with	workers	 and	 their	 representatives	 indicated	 that	 in	 terminals	 in	more	advanced	economies,	where	both	regulatory	requirements	and	trade	union	workplace	organisation	were	 better	 developed,	 consultative	 arrangements	 required	 by	 law	were	 generally	 in	 place,	 but	 these	seldom	went	beyond	 such	 requirements.	 There	was	 also	 a	 strong	 indication	 in	many	of	 the	 interviews	with	representatives	that	they	experienced	various	degrees	of	hostility	to	their	role	from	managers	and	supervisors	 and,	 while	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 they	 received	 strong	 support	 from	 their	 trade	 unions	 to	undertake	 their	 representational	 roles,	 management	 did	 not	 always	 receive	 their	 representations	 on	behalf	of	their	colleagues	constructively.			As	 we	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 here	 the	 implications	 for	 OHS	management	 strategies	 of	 the	 potential	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 female	workers	 in	 operational	 roles	which	 may	 result	 from	 the	 greater	 automation	 of	 container	 terminals.	 In	 our	 research	 we	 saw	 little	evidence	of	strategies	or	action	 to	meet	 the	needs	of	 those	women	currently	working	 in	 the	case	study	terminals,	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 as	 yet	 little	 awareness	 of	 the	 need	 to	 consider	 and	 address	 these	implications.		Overall,	the	study	confirmed	the	findings	of	the	previous	preliminary	research	we	conducted	on	many	of	the	 same	 companies	 and	 terminals	 (see	 Walters	 and	 Wadsworth,	 2012,	 especially	 pp	 85-89)	 which	indicated	 that	 behaviour-based	 safety	 systems	 characterised	 the	 arrangements	 for	 health	 and	 safety	management	 in	 all	 of	 the	 terminals	 we	 studied,	 and	were	 equally	 characteristic	 of	 the	 corporate	 OHS	strategies	 of	 the	 companies	 operating	 them.	 Such	 arrangements	 have	 been	 shown	 in	 many	 previous	studies	 to	 have	 some	 important	 limitations.	 These	 were	 amply	 demonstrated	 in	 our	 previous	investigation	and	corroborated	by	our	findings	in	the	present	study.	Among	them	was	the	fact	that	these	systems	 were	 largely	 antithetical	 to	 making	 adequate	 provision	 for	 worker	 representation	 and	consultation.	 Instead,	 as	 is	 not	 uncommon	 with	 such	 systems,	 they	 favoured	 arrangements	 for	 direct	consultation	with	workers,	 avoiding	 representational	 arrangements	 unless	 obliged	 to	 do	 otherwise	 by	regulatory	 provisions	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 trade	 unions.	 As	 a	 result,	 even	 where	 such	 arrangements	existed	 (as	 they	 did	 in	 most	 of	 the	 terminals	 in	 advanced	 economies),	 their	 success	 was	 generally	proportional	 to	 the	 strength	 of	 organised	 labour	 at	 the	 terminal.	 In	 this	 situation	 in	 the	 terminals	generally,	 the	value	of	participative	systems	to	provide	feedback	information	on	the	nature	of	risks	and	the	monitoring	of	arrangements	to	manage	them	–	widely	acknowledged	in	studies	of	these	arrangements	to	be	an	important	part	of	their	contribution	to	 improved	OHS	performance	–	was	underdeveloped	and	undervalued	in	terms	of	its	contribution	to	the	OHS	management	systems	in	place.			
127		 	
	
7.4 How	do	workers’	experiences	of	OHS	strategies	and	arrangements	compare	
between	terminals	situated	in	different	countries?		Chapter	4	presented	findings	from	the	analysis	of	the	worker	survey	showing	independent	associations	between	poor	safety	and	health	outcomes	and	area	of	employment,	job	type	and	employment	type	after	controlling	 for	 age	 and	 experience	 among	 the	 respondents	 working	 in	 GNT-operated	 terminals.	 High	levels	of	adverse	safety	outcomes	were	more	commonly	experienced	in	terminals	in	the	first	and	second	European	 areas	 and	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2;	 those	 in	 jobs	 other	 than	 maintenance;	 and	 those	 who	 were	indirectly	 employed	 (Chapter	 4,	 Table	 4.3).	 It	 is	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 industry	 that	 workers	 in	 jobs	including	 the	 heavy	 physical	work	 involved	 in	 lashing,	 receiving	 and	delivery	 are	more	 likely	 to	 suffer	physical	harm	 than	 those	employed	 in	other	work	within	 the	 terminals	 and	 this	was	borne	out	by	our	results.	 The	 survey	 results	 also	 show	 that	 these	 workers	 were	 more	 at	 risk	 when	 employed	 by	contractors	 and,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 pointed	 out,	 there	 was	 a	 sub-group	 of	 respondents	 –	 workers	employed	 by	 contractors,	 doing	 jobs	 combining	 quayside	 and	 driving	work	 (a	 combination	 only	 found	within	the	Asia	Pacific	area	2	terminals)	–	whose	OHS	experiences	were	especially	poor.			In	addition	there	were	differences	between	GNT-operated	terminals	in	relation	to	several	of	the	measures	of	 health	 and	 safety	management	 in	 the	 survey,	 again	with	 the	 respondents	 in	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 2	terminals	 reporting	more	negatively	concerning	 their	experience	of	 these	measures	 than	was	generally	the	 case	 elsewhere.	 This	 was	 especially	 true	 for	 measures	 concerning	 whether	 there	 were	 sufficient	staffing	levels	for	safe	work,	as	well	as	on	effective	representation	and	consultation	on	health	and	safety.	Again	respondents	in	jobs	involving	lashing	and	receiving	or	delivering	goods	and	undertaken	by	workers	employed	by	contractors	were	more	likely	to	report	negatively	on	their	experience	of	health	and	safety	management	measures	than	those	in	other	jobs.	The	presence	of	poor	working	conditions	associated	with	a	combination	of	shift	patterns,	arrangements	for	rest	breaks,	long	hours,	job	insecurity,	work	intensity,	and	so	on	(for	 the	 full	combination	see	Chapter	4	Table	4.13),	were	also	 found	to	be	more	prevalent	 in	some	locations,	for	some	job	types	and	for	indirect	employment.			In	short,	the	analysis	of	the	study	overall	indicated	a	generally	poor	experience	of	OHS	outcomes	and	of	the	 effectiveness	 of	 OHS	 management	 arrangements	 to	 address	 these	 experiences.	 There	 was	 also	variation	between	terminals,	jobs	types	and	forms	of	employment,	but	the	most	substantial	differences	in	the	extent	and	quality	of	this	experience	occurred	between	respondents	working	in	terminals	situated	in	higher	 income	 countries	 in	 Europe	 and	 Asia	 Pacific	 area	 1	 and	 those	 in	 terminals	 in	 a	 lower-middle-income	 country	 located	 in	 the	Asia	Pacific	 area	2.	 The	data	 in	Chapter	4	describes	 these	differences	 in	detail.	 They	 were	 found	 in	 most	 of	 the	 indicators	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 outcomes,	 in	 the	 respondents’	experiences	of	representation	and	consultation,	as	well	as	in	their	appreciation	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	arrangements	in	place	to	manage	their	health,	safety	and	wellbeing	and	provide	for	their	welfare.	There	were	further	differences	in	experiences	of	work	organisation	and	work	intensity,	that	contributed	to	their	poor	experiences	of	health	and	safety,	as	well	as	in	the	arrangements	for	their	employment	–	there	was	a	far	greater	proportion	of	workers	who	were	not	employed	by	the	terminal	operator	but	by	contractors	working	within	the	terminals	among	respondents	from	Asia	Pacific	2	area,	who	fared	less	favourably	in	relation	 to	 all	 the	 above	 measures	 than	 did	 directly	 employed	 workers	 in	 the	 same	 terminals.	 It	 is	important	 to	account	 for	 these	different	experiences	of	 the	practice	of	OHS	among	workers	 in	different	jobs	 in	 terminals	 in	 different	 locations	 who	 are	 employed	 under	 different	 arrangements	 and	 doing	different	 types	 of	 jobs	 since,	 as	 Chapter	 3	 indicates,	 there	was	 relatively	 little	 difference	 in	 the	 overall	corporate	approach	to	governance	and	management	in	of	most	of	the	companies	studied.		
	
7.5 Situational	determinants	of	OHS	practices	in	container	terminals		In	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6	we	 argued	 that	 there	were	 three	main	 sets	 of	 influences	 that	 helped	 explain	 the	experiences	 summarised	 so	 far.	 They	 included	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 strategies	 for	 the	 governance	 and	management	of	arrangements	for	the	safety,	health	and	welfare	in	the	terminals	that	are	adopted	by	the	terminal	 companies	 operating	 them;	 the	 position	 of	 these	 approaches	 within	 the	 wider	 corporate	business	and	management	strategies	employed	by	these	companies	to	conduct	the	business	of	container	
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terminal	 operation;	 and	 a	 set	 of	 determinants	 provided	 by	 economic,	 regulatory	 and	 labour	 relations	contexts,	which	varied	in	their	effects	according	to	where	terminals	were	located.	We	have	represented	these	 in	Figure	6.1.	 Starting	with	 the	 company	approaches,	we	have	 shown	 that	 although	 the	GNT	and	national	 container	companies	 implement	a	 set	of	procedures	and	practices	 for	 safety	management	 that	are	widely	 acknowledged	 as	 good	 practice,	 they	 are	 of	 a	 particular	 character.	 Their	 key	 features	 are	 a	prominent	 display	 of	 rhetoric	 concerning	 ‘safety	 leadership’	 at	 the	 corporate	 level,	 which	 promotes	adoption	of	 safety	 governance	 strategies	 that	have	 the	objective	of	 achieving	 ‘zero	harm’	 in	 relation	 to	company	 safety	 performance	 through	 accountability	 for	 the	 delivery	 of	 (largely	 behaviour	 orientated)	safety	management	 procedures	 and	 a	 ‘safety	 culture’	 among	 the	management	 and	workforce	 of	 all	 the	company’s	business	units.	Using	the	results	of	our	analysis	and	situating	them	within	the	wider	research	on	OHS,	we	have	argued	 that	 this	approach	results	 in	 the	adoption	of	a	behaviour-orientated	approach	towards	safety	management,	which	generally	overlooks	work-related	health	and	welfare	 issues,	tends	to	assume	a	common	interest	in	company	values	and	relatedly,	tends	to	provide	only	to	a	limited	extent	for	the	institutional	representation	of	autonomous	workers’	interests.	In	these	respects	the	approach	differs	markedly	 from	the	regulatory	requirements	on	systematic	approaches	 to	OHS	management	applying	 in	the	advanced	market	economies	in	which	most	of	the	terminals	we	studied	were	situated,	and	also	from	global	standards	such	as	those	adopted	in	ILO	Conventions	and	guidance	on	OHS	management.			In	 Chapter	 5	 we	 pointed	 out	 the	 attraction	 of	 these	 ways	 of	 conceptualising	 the	 governance	 of	improvement	 in	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	 for	 corporate	 leaders	 and	 managers.	 Their	 focus	 on	changing	behaviour	does	not	 question	 the	 tenets	 of	managerialist	 thinking,	 or	 assumptions	 concerning	the	 ubiquity	 of	 shared	 company	 values.	 Nor	 does	 it	 require	 critical	 examination	 of	 corporate	 or	managerial	decisions	on	finance,	or	on	the	structure,	organisation	and	operation	of	work	and	the	way	in	which	 business	 is	 conducted	 –	 nor	 does	 it	 accept	 a	 connection	 between	 these	matters	 and	 the	 health,	safety	and	welfare	of	workers.	Yet,	as	we	have	pointed	out	in	previous	chapters,	there	is	now	a	wealth	of	research	 that	 indicates	 that	 these	 structural,	 organisational	 and	business	 features	of	modern	corporate	operation	 do	 have	 negative	 impacts	 upon	 workers’	 health	 and	 safety.	 They	 result	 in	 organisational	structures	and	procedures	that	are	arguably	less	able	to	deliver	the	necessary	controls	to	prevent	every	day	harm	to	workers	caused	by	the	way	work	is	organised,	as	well	as	being	implicated	among	the	causes	of	 more	 high	 profile	 events	 such	 as	 process	 safety	 disasters	 which	 result	 in	 major	 harm	 to	 workers,	hardware,	the	public	and	the	environment.	OHS	governance	and	management	strategies	that	ignore	this	can	therefore	at	best	achieve	only	 limited	results	 in	terms	of	 the	 improvement	of	 the	health,	safety	and	welfare	of	workers	affected	by	the	consequences	of	these	wider	corporate	strategies.			This	said,	the	corporate	safety,	business	and	organisational	strategies	are	not	applied	in	a	vacuum	and,	as	we	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 as	well	 as	 being	 affected	 by	 the	 dictates	 of	 the	 business	 environment	 in	which	container	terminals	operate,	the	corporate	approaches	to	OHS	management	that	are	represented	by	the	broad	arrow	at	the	base	of	Figure	6.1	are	applied	in	terminals	in	countries	characterised	by	their	different	economic,	regulatory	and	labour	relations	contexts.	Our	argument,	which	is	also	supported	by	research	in	other	sectors,	suggests	that	it	is	the	moderating	effects	of	these	contexts	that	help	determine	differences	in	the	nature	and	experience	of	health	and	safety	practice	in	the	operation	of	container	terminals	situated	in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 world.	 By	 plotting	 our	 combined	 composite	 measures	 of	 health	 and	 safety	experiences	 in	 the	 terminals	 against	 a	 contextual	 measure	 made	 up	 of	 scores	 describing	 prevailing	conditions	 in	relation	to	 levels	of	outsourcing	and	unionisation,	degree	of	devolution	of	port	ownership	and	maturity	of	OHS	governance	systems,	we	are	able	to	show	the	relationship	between	them	in	Figure	6.3.	This	effectively	demonstrates	what	perhaps	we	might	anticipate	–	 that	poorest	OHS	conditions	are	experienced	in	terminals	in	poorer	countries,	in	which	the	effects	of	regulatory	infrastructures	are	weak,	as	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 organised	 labour,	 and	 the	 economy	 is	 relatively	 underdeveloped	 but	 politically	supportive	of	both	gaining	investment	and	facilitating	improvements	in	the	logistics	of	the	national	role	in	global	 trade	 through	hosting	 the	 operation	of	 global	 container	 terminal	 interests.	As	 Figure	6.3	 shows,	plotting	the	same	relationships	for	the	terminals	located	in	advanced	economies	situates	them	in	broadly	similar	 positions,	 with	 far	 better	 OHS	 status	 achieved	 for	 workers.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 it	 is	workers	in	terminal	situated	in	the	most	highly	regulated	of	the	economies	we	studied,	which	is	also	the	one	 with	 strongest	 forms	 of	 organised	 labour,	 who	 score	 most	 favourably	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 composite	
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scores	 for	 their	 health	 safety,	welfare	 and	 their	 satisfaction	with	management	 arrangements	 for	 these	things.			As	we	concluded	in	Chapter	6,	the	important	message	here	is	not	how	terminals	compare,	but	rather	the	impact	of	context.	This	suggests	that	without	strong	and	effectively	enforced	regulation	and	economic	and	labour	 relations	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	 capital	 and	 labour	 is	 sufficiently	evenly	distributed	to	allow	workers	an	effective	voice,	terminal	operating	companies	will	tend	to	favour	productivity	 over	 effective	 the	 management	 of	 safety	 and,	 in	 particular,	 health	 and	 welfare..	 We	 have	shown	 that	 these	 operators,	 and	 especially	 those	 working	 at	 a	 global	 level,	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 put	effective	OHS	strategies	in	place,	but	they	generally	only	do	so	when	the	contexts	in	which	their	business	units	are	situated	oblige	them	to.			While	 it	 is	 obviously	 important	 that	 attention	 is	 drawn	 to	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 experience	 of	arrangements	 for	 OHS	 in	 terminals	 in	 countries	 with	 very	 different	 economic	 regulatory	 and	 labour	relations	cultures,	practices	and	standing,	it	is	also	important	not	to	lose	sight	of	the	finding	that	in	none	of	 the	 terminals	 included	 in	 the	present	study	were	 the	arrangements	 in	place	 to	prevent	work-related	deaths,	injuries,	or	ill-health,	or	those	designed	to	address	workers	welfare,	seen	to	be	ideal	in	the	eyes	of	the	 workers	 that,	 after	 all,	 had	 the	 most	 direct	 experience	 of	 them.	 In	 this	 respect,	 there	 are	 some	worrying	trends	evident	in	the	way	in	which	cost	efficiencies	drive	patterns	in	the	organisation	of	work	and	 employment.	 As	 we	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 two	 main	 issues	 are	 of	 most	 concern.	 One	 is	 the	devolution	of	organisational	structures	to	loosely	coordinated	collections	of	business	units	with	varying	degrees	of	autonomy	in	the	conduct	of	their	activities.	The	concerns	here	are	whether	appropriate	levels	of	 control,	 monitoring,	 communication	 and	 feedback	 are	 available	 to	 manage	 the	 delivery	 of	 effective	preventive	strategy	on	health	and	safety	at	the	level	of	the	business	units	under	these	arrangements	and	whether	 appropriate	 advice	 to	 do	 so	 is	 retained	 within	 organisations	 adopting	 these	 structural	approaches.	We	were	unable	to	examine	these	arrangements	sufficiently	closely	 in	the	present	study	to	draw	 firm	 conclusions,	 but	 we	 did	 notice	 substantial	 variation	 between	 different	 companies	 in	 these	respects.				The	 second	 issue	 concerns	 the	 widespread	 practice	 of	 outsourcing	 terminal	 operational	 activities	 to	contractors.	This	was	a	major	trend	in	the	organisation	of	work	in	the	container	terminals	we	studied.	It	is	a	practice	that	has	been	strongly	and	so	far	relatively	successfully	resisted	by	organised	labour	in	some	countries	 but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 at	 a	 corporate	 level	 this	 approach	 is	 likely	 to	 continue	 to	 grow,	 and	 have	increasing	impact,	at	terminal	levels	too.	The	problems	for	health	and	safety	management	that	stem	from	increased	 contractorisation,	 resulting	 in	 multi-employer	 worksites,	 subcontracting,	 poor	 management	communication,	price	and	delivery	constraints	and	so	on	are	now	well-documented	in	many	sectors	and	we	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 literature	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 report.	Many	 of	 these	 problems	were	 seen	 in	 the	experiences	 we	 have	 discussed	 in	 the	 terminals	 we	 studied.	 Less	 ubiquitous,	 however,	 were	 effective	means	 of	 addressing	 them	 –	 although	 there	 were	 examples	 of	 good	 practices	 among	 some	 terminal	managements	 concerning,	 for	 instance,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 measures	 in	 contractor	procurement	 processes	 and	 in	 monitoring	 arrangements	 for	 contract	 compliance.	 Examination	 of	research	findings	concerning	these	practices	elsewhere	suggests	that	the	container	terminal	industry	may	still	have	much	 to	 learn	 from	other	 sectors.	This	applies	not	only	 to	 the	 strategies	of	management,	but	also	to	those	of	organised	labour	and	regulatory	inspectors.	If	practices	of	outsourcing	and	down-sizing	of	the	directly	employed	workforce	are	set	to	continue	–	and	there	is	every	indication	that	in	the	container	terminal	 industry,	 as	 elsewhere,	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 case	 –	 then	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 strategies	 of	regulators	and	trade	unions	need	to	keep	abreast	of	these	developments.	There	was	little	sign	of	this	in	the	 container	 terminals	 we	 studied.	 However	 recent	 research	 literature	 indicates	 that	 such	 strategies	have	 been	 implemented	 in	 other	 sectors	 and	 can	 be	 relatively	 effective	 (see,	 for	 example,	 James	 et	 al.,	2014;	Weil,	 2014;	Wright	 and	 Brown,	 2013).	 There	 are	 therefore	models	 of	 good	 practice	 that	 all	 key	players	in	the	container	terminal	industry	could	explore.		
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7.6 Recommendations		The	 following	 recommendations	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 study.	 They	 address	 issues	 of	policy	 and	 practice	 on	 the	 governance	 and	 operation	 of	 arrangements	 to	 manage	 health,	 safety	 and	welfare	at	work	in	container	terminals.	It	is	hoped	they	contribute	to	improving	the	relevance,	operation	and	outcomes	of	these	arrangements.	They	are	made	having	regard	to	the	tripartite	nature	of	the	interest	in	OHS	 in	 container	 terminals	 globally.	 That	 is,	while	 they	 are	 addressed	 in	 the	main	 to	 corporate	 and	terminal	level	operation,	others	are	aimed	at	national	regulation	and	regulatory	policy	and	at	improving	global	standards	on	OHS	in	container	terminals.	All	also	have	implications	for	the	strategy	and	policies	of	the	trade	unions	that	represent	the	interests	of	workers	at	both	corporate	and	terminal	levels.			When	making	recommendations	it	is	customary	for	researchers	to	indicate	a	need	for	‘further	research’,	since	 it	 is	 also	 normal	 for	 the	 findings	 of	 research	 investigations	 to	 lead	 to	 additional	 questions.	 The	present	study	is	no	exception.	However,	the	recommendations	outlined	below	are	confined	to	those	that	address	policy	and	practice	and	are	of	relevance	to	employers,	governments,	international	organisations	and	trade	unions.	They	include	the	following:			
• Since	the	research	shows	that	there	are	significant	differences	in	health,	safety	and	welfare	practice	and	outcomes	between	terminals	operated	by	the	same	companies	in	different	locations	in	the	world,	
it	is	recommended	that	GNTs	review	the	strategies	they	have	in	place	for	the	corporate	governance	and	management	of	OHS	with	a	view	to	reducing	these	differences	by	learning	from	the	experience	of	what	constitutes	good	practice	and	what	drives	it.	There	may	be	a	role	here	for	the	development	of	a	Code	of	Practice	by	a	global	body	such	as	 the	 ILO,	which	could	act	as	a	 suitable	 standard	 (see	also	later	recommendations).			
• Zero-harm	 strategies	 and	 behaviour-based	 safety	 (BBS)	 arrangements	 dominate	 the	 approaches	taken	to	OHS	at	corporate	level	and	in	the	terminals	studied.	While	there	are	some	benefits	to	such	systems,	they	have	several	acknowledged	weaknesses.	These	are	in	particular	evident	in	relation	to	attention	to	safety	over	health	and	welfare	and	in	relation	to	questions	of	communication	and	trust	between	workers,	their	representatives	and	management.	It	is	recommended	 that	efforts	are	made	to	 ensure	 that	 such	 weaknesses	 are	 addressed	 in	 corporate	 OHS	 systems.	 This	 means	 especially	ensuring	 that	OHS	systems	 in	place	address	occupational	health	and	welfare	as	well	as	safety,	 they	pay	greater	attention	to	the	organisational	causes	of	harm	experienced	by	workers	and	they	further	allow	 for	 improved	 communication	 between	 workers	 and	 managers.	 This	 includes	 improved	arrangements	 for	 consultation	 and	participation	 of	all	workers	 on	OHS	 and	 it	 is	 further	 important	that	such	systems	help	build	trust	between	workers	and	their	managers,	rather	than	distrust.			
• Corporate	 governance	 of	 OHS	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 container	 terminals	 increasingly	 emphasises	 an	approach	to	its	management	in	which	greater	attention	is	paid	to	understanding	the	causes	of	critical	incidents.	This	emphasis	is	valuable	and	it	is	recommended	that	its	further	extension	be	supported.	In	particular,	more	attention	could	be	paid	to	management	strategies	associated	with	the	prevention	of	 low	 frequency/high	 impact	 (LF/HI)	 events.	 Here	 terminals	 could	 improve	 monitoring	arrangements	 for	 these	 incidents	 and	 the	 greater	 development	 of	 trigger	 action	 response	 plans	(TARPs)	in	relation	to	them.	Terminal	operators	might	also	consider	adoption	of	most	suitable	OHS	indicators	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	databases	whose	analysis	may	contribute	to	the	advance	of	knowledge	 in	 the	 development	 of	more	 ergonomic	 solutions	 for	 workers	 in	 ports.	 OHS	 indicators	currently	 used	 by	 container	 terminals	 are	 insufficient	 and	 mainly	 support	 a	 reactive	 rather	 than	proactive	 approach	 to	 incidents.	 Consideration	 could	 be	 given	 to	 more	 proactive	 and	 preventive	orientated	 approaches.	 Although	 some	 operators	 have	 made	 considerable	 progress	 with	 global	communications	 in	 relation	 to	 OHS	 in	 terminal	 operation,	 greater	 use	 of	 IT	 in	 achieving	 data	collection	and	dissemination	in	this	respect	should	be	encouraged	and	good	practices	shared.		
• While	continued	reporting	of	LTIs	is	important,	it	is	recommended	that	KPIs	that	are	used	to	monitor	safety	management	practice	both	at	corporate	and	terminal	level	reflect	the	issues	identified	above.			
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• There	 is	a	strong	body	of	research	evidence	supporting	the	contribution	of	 formal	arrangements	to	represent	workers’	 interests	 to	 improving	 prevention	 outcomes.	 These	 arrangements	 are	 found	 in	many	high	risk	sectors	such	as	mining,	the	petrochemical	industry,	construction	and	so	on,	but	they	are	significantly	underdeveloped	 in	many	of	 the	 terminals	we	studied	and	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	this	 be	 addressed	 in	 both	 corporate	 governance	 of	OHS	 and	 in	 terminal	 level	 arrangements	 in	 the	future.			
• Many	of	 the	 experiences	 of	 harm	 reported	by	workers	 in	 this	 study,	 but	 apparently	 not	 in	 routine	company	data,	concern	health	and	welfare.	It	is	therefore	recommended	that	corporate	and	terminal	strategies	are	reviewed	with	a	view	to	increasing	their	emphasis	on	these	matters	in	the	future.			
• It	 is	 further	 recommended	 that	 investigation	 of	 OHS	 performance	 and	 outcomes	 takes	 greater	account	of	the	views	of	workers	concerning	organisational	causes	of	commonly	experienced	forms	of	work	related	ill-health.		
• The	 organisation	 of	 work	 and	 employment	 in	 the	 terminals	 reflects	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 the	outsourcing	 of	 labour	 through	 arrangements	 with	 contractors.	 There	 are	 well-established	consequences	 for	 OHS	 arrangements	 and	 outcomes	 associated	with	 these	 practices.	Many	were	 in	evidence	 in	 the	 terminals	 studied.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that	 companies	 review	 their	 strategies	 for	addressing	these	consequences	and	take	actions	reflecting	best	practice	on	OHS	in	relation	to	the	use	of	contractors.	These	might	include:			
o Review	of	the	nature	of	supply	chain	relations	between	terminal	operators	and	contractors	in	order	to	identify	better	means	of	incentivising	improved	OHS	performance		
o Further	review	and	revision	of	corporate	guidelines	on	the	extent	to	which	OHS	management	requirements	 for	 contractors	 feature	 in	 arrangements	 for	 procurement	 and	 contract	compliance	
o Greater	engagement	with	monitoring	to	ensure	compliance	from	contractors	
o Investigation	of	incentives	for	contractors	to	improve	OHS	arrangements	and	performance		
o Review	 and	 exploration	 of	 possible	 better	 arrangements	 for	 the	welfare	 of	 the	 contractor	workforce	in	some	terminals	
o Better	 arrangements	 for	 adequate	 representation	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 contractor	workforce		
• In	 terms	 of	 corporate	 and	 terminal	 level	 actions,	 we	 have	 noted	 in	 the	 report	 that	 younger	 male	workers	 dominated	 employment	 in	 the	 container	 terminals	we	 studied.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising,	 but	given	 the	 widely	 anticipated	 changes	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 terminal	 operation	 in	 the	 future,	 it	 is	likely	 that	 the	 participation	 of	 women	 in	 the	 labour	 force	 will	 increase.	 This	 will	 have	 some	implications	for	arrangements	for	health,	safety	and	welfare.	Currently	there	is	little	evidence	of	these	being	 anticipated	 either	 by	 the	 corporate	 strategies	 for	 governance	 and	 management	 of	 OHS	 and	welfare	or	 in	arrangements	 for	 these	matters	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 terminals.	 It	 is	recommended	 that	these	implications	be	explored	at	both	corporate	and	terminal	levels.			
• Both	 national	 regulatory	 contexts	 and	 regulatory	 inspection	 practices	were	 found	 to	 be	 important	determinants	of	terminal	level	OHS	practice.	In	advanced	market	economies	there	was	a	perception	that	 the	 presence	 of	 specialist	 regulatory	 inspection	 had	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 terminal	 level	 OHS	practices.	There	is	understandable	concern	that	reduction	in	such	presence	caused	by	cuts	in	public	spending	and	reorganised	compliance	strategies	(commonly	experienced	in	most	of	these	countries)	will	 result	 in	 negative	 outcomes	 and	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 national	 authorities	 review	 their	strategies	 in	 this	 area,	 and	also	 take	account	of	 likely	 training	needs	 for	 inspectors	 involved	 in	 the	inspection	of	work	in	container	terminals.			
• In	 the	 one	 lower-middle-income	 country	 included	 in	 the	 study,	 both	 the	 regulations	 on	dock	work	and	the	regulatory	inspectorate	stood	at	some	distance	from	engagement	with	the	OHS	management	
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arrangements	 employed	 within	 the	 terminals.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that,	 in	 this	 situation,	 national	authorities	 take	 steps	 to	 close	 this	 gap	 by	 bringing	 regulation	 in	 line	 with	 the	 process-based	regulatory	measures	 for	OHS	 now	widely	 used	 globally,	 and	 by	 providing	 inspectors	with	 training	and	 powers	 to	 engage	with	 OHS	management	 practices	 within	 the	 terminals.	 There	may	 be	 some	scope	 for	 supporting	 this	with	 the	development	of	a	Code	of	Good	Practice	at	global	 level,	perhaps	through	the	agency	of	the	ILO.				 	
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Appendix	
	1.	Table	A.1:	Associations	between	the	variables	of	 interest	and	with	 terminal	operator	 in	 the	 first	Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	2	multivariate	models		2.	Sample	questionnaire		3.	Sample	diary	
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Table	A.1:	Associations	between	the	variables	of	interest	and	with	terminal	operator	in	the	first	
Asia	Pacific	area	and	Europe	area	2	multivariate	models	
MODEL	 AREA	 SECTION	 ASSOCIATION	
SAFETY	
OUTCOMES	WITH	
JOB	TYPES	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.2.3	 Job	type:	3df,	p=0.02	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	
Driving	 3.26	(1.30-8.16)	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 1.35	(0.48-3.82)	Both	driving	and	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	deliver	 2.48	(1.00-6.21)	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
ARRANGEMENTS	
WITH	JOB	TYPE	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.4	
Job	type:	3df,	p=0.006	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	
Driving	 3.50	(1.42-8.64)	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 6.55	(2.25-19.09)	Both	driving	and	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	deliver	 2.60	(1.06-6.41)	Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.009	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 0.50	(0.30-0.84)	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
ARRANGEMENTS	
WITH	JOB	TYPE	
Europe	area	2	 4.4	 Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.02	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 0.41	(0.20-0.84)	
WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
WITH	JOB	TYPE	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.5	 Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.02	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 0.59	(0.38-0.92)	
WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
WITH	JOB	TYPE	
Europe	area	2	 4.5	 Job	type:	3df,	p=0.03	
Maintenance/other	 1.00	
Driving	 1.21	(0.43-3.39)	Lashing	and/or	receiving	and	delivery	 2.74	(0.93-8.10)	Both	driving	and	lashing	and/or	receiving	and	deliver	 1.08	(0.36-3.30)	
WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
WITH	OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.6.1	
Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.05	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 0.58	(0.33-1.01)	OHS	management	arrangements:	1df,	p<0.0001	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 5.18	(3.02-8.89)		
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MODEL	 AREA	 SECTION	 ASSOCIATION	
WORKING	
CONDITIONS	WITH	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
Europe	area	2	 4.6.1	 OHS	management	arrangements:	1df,	p=0.004	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 2.24	(1.29-3.89)	
SAFETY	
OUTCOMES	WITH	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
AND	WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.6.2	
OHS	management	arrangements:	1df,	p=0.04	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 1.97	(1.04-3.71)	Working	conditions:	1df,	p<0.0001	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 4.59	(2.40-8.81)	
SAFETY	
OUTCOMES	WITH	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
AND	WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
Europe	area	2	 4.6.2	 Working	conditions:	1df,	p=0.03	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 1.91	(1.07-3.40)	
HEALTH	
OUTCOMES	WITH	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
AND	WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
Asia	Pacific	area	1	 4.6.2	
OHS	management	arrangements:	1df,	p=0.007	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 2.42	(1.27-4.62)	Working	conditions:	1df,	p<0.0001	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 4.04	(2.13-7.64)	Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.05	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 0.53	(0.29-1.00)	
HEALTH	
OUTCOMES	WITH	
OHS	
MANAGEMENT	
AND	WORKING	
CONDITIONS	
Europe	area	2	 4.6.2	
OHS	management	arrangements:	1df,	p=0.05	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 1.96	(1.01-3.79)	Working	conditions:	1df,	p<0.0001	
Good	 1.00	
Poor	 3.70	(1.92-7.12)	Terminal	operator:	1df,	p=0.05	
National		 1.00	
GNT	 3.33	(1.00-11.11)			
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